Del Simone v Powell & Anor [1994] QCA 556
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1994] QCA 556
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 54 of 1994
Brisbane
[Del Simone v. Powell & Anor.]
BETWEEN: MARGHERITA ANGELA DEL SIMONE
(Plaintiff) Appellant
- and -
IAN ROBERT POWELL
(Defendant)
- and -
FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
(Defendant by Election) Respondent
FITZGERALD P.
DAVIES J.A.
PINCUS J.A.
Judgment delivered 21/12/94
Judgment of the Court
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS TO BE TAXED
CATCHWORDS: NEGLIGENCE - LIABILITY - appellant suffered
personal injuries as result of collision with
respondent's vehicle - appellant commenced U-
turn into path of respondent's oncoming
vehicle - whether respondent failed to act
reasonably in not stopping or slowing down so
as to avoid collision
Counsel: Mr. R. M. Stenson for the appellant
Mr. R. Oliver for the respondent
Solicitors: Dixie Ann Middleton & Associates for the
appellant Baker Johnson & Partners for the respondent
Hearing Date: 21 September 1994
-- 1 of 5 --
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 54 of 1994
Brisbane
Before Fitzgerald P.
Davies J.A.
Pincus J.A.
[Del Simone v. Powell & Anor.]
BETWEEN: MARGHERITA ANGELA DEL SIMONE
(Plaintiff) Appellant
- and -
IAN ROBERT POWELL
(Defendant)
- and -
FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
(Defendant by Election) Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT
Judgment delivered the Twenty-first day of December 1994
This is an appeal by an unsuccessful plaintiff in an
action for personal injuries in the District Court. The
injuries were caused in a motor vehicle collision on Bedford
Road, Mackay on 29 May 1989. Bedford Road ran generally in
a north/south direction at the place where the collision
occurred. The appellant was the driver of a Ford LTD motor
vehicle which, shortly prior to the collision, was parked on
the western side of Bedford Road, facing in a northerly
direction outside No. 163 Bedford Road where she had been.
It was her intention of executing a U-turn in order to
proceed along Bedford Road in the opposite direction to the
-- 2 of 5 --
2
way in which her vehicle had been facing. She had no
relevant recollection of events after entering her car.
The respondent, shortly prior to the accident, was
driving his Ford F100 utility, which was then towing a large
double axle trailer carrying a 26 foot boat, along Bedford
Road in a northerly direction. As it approached the
plaintiff's car the latter commenced its U-turn. The
vehicles collided near the middle of the road but probably
on the eastern side.
Although as the respondent approached the appellant's
car he was coming around a right-hand bend in Bedford Road,
it was common ground that there was clear view of one
vehicle by the driver of the other for more than 100 metres.
The respondent whose evidence the learned trial judge
accepted, said that he was travelling at about 60 kmph until
immediately before the collision. He said that when he was
only a short distance from the plaintiff's car, a distance
which he estimated as that separating the witness box from
the dock in the court, the latter commenced a U-turn in
front of him. He then moved to his right and braked but
could not, he said, avoid the collision.
A Mr Guimelli, who arrived on the accident scene having
heard the collision, gave evidence that he spoke to the
respondent shortly afterwards. He said that the respondent
told him that he saw the appellant's car with its right
trafficator on, that he intended to go around it but that
the car kept on going (apparently across his path) and he
then braked suddenly. The respondent's version was similar
-- 3 of 5 --
3
to this except that he had no recollection of seeing the
right trafficator operating although he recalled seeing
brake lights on before the car moved out. His Honour did
not find it necessary to decide whether the appellant's
trafficator was operating and nor do we. Even if it had
been operating that would not have warned a driver in the
respondent's position that the appellant was about to make a
U-turn. It was more consistent, having regard to his
obvious presence behind her, with an intention to move out
onto the roadway and continue ahead. Had she done that it
is likely that the respondent could have overtaken her and
continued on. The road ahead was clear.
The appellant, by her counsel, conceded that she was
negligent and that her negligence was the main cause of the
collision. But it was submitted that the respondent should
have been able to stop or slow down and avoid the collision.
The crucial question as to any possible negligence of
the respondent is the distance which separated the two
vehicles when it must have been obvious to a reasonable
driver in the respondent's position that the appellant
intended to make the U-turn. If that distance was that
estimated by the respondent by reference to the witness box
and the dock, or anything like it, the respondent could not
reasonably have avoided the collision. At another part of
his evidence the respondent said that the appellant's car
started to turn into his path when he was within 20 to 30
feet of it. It was pointed out by the appellant's counsel
that if either of these estimates was correct the respondent
-- 4 of 5 --
4
would not have had time to brake before the collision yet he
conceded that the skid marks left by his vehicle on the
roadway were in the order of 25 metres long.
It is always dangerous in cases such as this to attempt
too close a mathematical analysis in order to reconcile
estimates of speed and distance with skid marks left on the
roadway particularly where, as here, those marks, or part of
them, could have been made by the vehicle after collision.
The general effect of the respondent's evidence, which as we
have said the learned trial judge accepted, was that the
respondent noticed that the appellant was making a U-turn
when he was only a short distance from her car and that by
then it was too late to avoid the collision. The effect of
his Honour's finding was also that the respondent could not
reasonably have appreciated before he made that observation
that the appellant intended to make a U-turn across his
path. That was a finding which his Honour was entitled to
make once he had accepted the respondent's evidence.
On that finding there is no room for a conclusion that
the respondent was negligent. Accordingly the appeal must
be dismissed with costs to be taxed.
-- 5 of 5 --
Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/1994/556