Drochmann v Queensland Railways [1994] QSC 41
(
I\
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SUPREME
COURT OF
QUEENSLAND
CIVIL
JURISDICTION
DEMACK
J
No
34
of
1993
COLIN MELVIN
DROCHMANN
and
QUEENSLAND RAILWAYS
ROCKHAMPTON
..
DATE
04/02/94
JUDGMENT
1
RE.VtSED
COPIES
ISSUED
\
St~te
Reporting Bureau
-1
1 G!/1
:/t.f-
Date 1
Plaintiff
Defendant
4th Fluor, 1'/l£• Law Courts, Gcorgc Street, /Jrisbunc·. Q. 4000 Telephone: (07) 227 4360. Fucsimill': (07) 227 5532
-- 1 of 8 --
04029.4
(Demack
J)
HIS
HONOUR:
Mr
Drochmann
was
born
on
15
March
1948.
He
commenced
working
for the
defendant
on
28
January 1964.
At
that
stage
he
was
obviously
15
years of
age.
He
sustained
injuries
in
the
course of
his
employment on
two
specific
occasions.
The
first
of
these
was
on
13
August 1990
when
he
twisted
his
left
knee
and
suffered
lower back
pain
when
10
jumping
from
a
motor
vehicle.
Later
on 14
May
1991
he
suffered
a
severe episode
of
lower back
pain
whilst
pushing
a
25
tonne
test
wagon
along with
other
workmen.
20
On
23
April
1993 he
issued
a
writ
claiming
damages
against the
C:
defendant. Clearly
enough,
the
damages
that arise
from
those
specific injuries
are
well within the
normal
period of
limitation.
The
issue
in
this
application
is
whether
the
period of
limitation
can be so
extended as
to
embrace
the
30
effect
of
injuries
sustained
through
poor
work
practices
over
a
lengthy period of time.
Mr
Drochmann
had been aware
of
backache
prior to
1991
and
had,
c/
indeed,
sustained
injuries
in the course of
his
employment
40
earlier
than 1990.
However,
in respect of the pain
and
loss
of mobility
that
followed
from
the incident
on l/
13
August 1990 and
the incident
on 14
May
1991,
Mr
Drochmann
says
he
believed
that
these
were
a
result
of the
specific
trauma
that
he had
then experienced. This understanding
is
50
confirmed,
if
that
be
the right
word,
in the
affidavit of
a
general practitioner
Dr
Ganter
(Document
54).
60
JUDGMENT
2
-- 2 of 8 --
040294
(Demack
J)
In paragraph
15
Dr
Canter
says:
"On
the
numerous
occasions
that
Mr
Drochmann
has
consulted
me
in respect
of
injuries
to
both
knees
and
his
back,
I
do
not
believe
that
I
have
ever
told
him
that
aggravation of the degenerative
changes
therein
were
factors contributing
to his
injuries.
When
he
complained
of
a
specific
incident
causing
his
injuries,
the
injuries
appeared
to
be
consistent
with
the
stated
cause.
I
do
not
recall
ever
telling
Mr
Drochmann
what
may
have
caused
the
degenerative
changes
in-his
spine
and
knees.
I
did not
discuss
with
him
that
there
may
have been
a
relationship
between
the degenerative
changes
in his
joints
and
the
type
of the
work
that
he
performed."
Mr
Drochmann
worked
as
a
scale
maker
and
in his
affidavit,
Document
4, he
describes
the
work
in
paragraph
12
in
this
way:
"Most
of
my
1,1ork
as
a
scale
maker
over twenty-seven
years with the
Defendant involved
squatting,
kneeling,
working
in confined spaces
and
twisting
my
body
around
beams,
levers
and
the
like.
It
was
usual
for
me
to
spend
a
number
of
hours
working
in
cramped
conditions.
I
received
no
instruction
or
advice
to
take
regular
breaks
to relieve
my
posture.
Often,
sometimes days
at
a
time,
I
would be
required to
lift
weights
on
to
weigh
bridges.
The work
involved the
men
forming
a
human
chain
and
passing along
fifty-six
pound
weights
from
our
right-hand side to
our
left-hand side.
We
could
stand in the
one
position twisting
our bodies to pick
up
a
weight
and
passing
it
as
far
as
possible to the
other side of
our bodies
and
placing
it
down
for
days
on
end. This
would be done
to
test
weigh
bridges.
It
was
a
regular part
of our
work
to
lift
and
carry
weights.
We
would
usually carry the weights
two
at
a
time,
i.e.
we
would
carry
one hundred and
twelve pounds.
It
was
generally recognised
amongst
the
workers
that
it
was
better
to carry
two
weights,
i.e.
one on
each
side rather
than
one
as
you would become
lop sided
and
get sore
more
quickly carrying
one.
11
This
work
is
obviously
work
of the heaviest
and most arduous
nature that
involved not only the regular
lifting
of
heavy
weights, but the regular
working
in very cramped
conditions.
Mr Drochmann
says that
he was
advised for the
first
time on
JUDGMENT
3
10
20
30
40
50
60
-- 3 of 8 --
040294
(Demack
J)
9
December 1992
by
a
medical
practitioner,
Dr
Johnson Nurse,
that
his
back
disability
was
due
to
wear and
tear
over
along
time.
He
consulted
a
solicitor
in
March 1993
and
eventually
saw
his present
solicitor
on
8
April
1993.
He
was
then
advised
that
the
work
practices
to
which he
had been
subjected
may
involve
a
breach of duty.
The
contention
here then
is
that
up
until
that
time
he
was
not
aware
of
evidence
of
alternative
systems
of
work
which
could
have
greatly
reduced
the
likelihood
of
his sustaining injury.
It
was
contended
by
Mr
McMeekin
that
the
availability
of
an
alternate
system
of
work
which would have
reduced
greatly
the
risk
to the
applicant
could
be
a
material factor
of
decisive character
as
that
concept
is
defined
in
the
Act.
Mr
McMeekin
relied
on
a
decision
I
have
given
earlier
in
Sichter
v. Gregory
N
Conrad and
Sharon
N
Conrad
62
of
1991,
judgment
given
on
8 May
1992.
In
that
case
I
examined
the
decision of the
High
Court
in
Do
Carmo
v. Ford Excavations
10
20
c!
30
Pty Ltd (1984)
154
CLR
234.
I
came
to the conclusion
that
the
(/
majority of the
members
of the
High
Court
in that
case
supported the
view
for
which
Mr
McMeekin
contended.
So,
here
it
is
asserted
on
the
basis of the
plaintiff's
evidence
that
up
until
he
knew
of the
availability
of
this alternate
system
of
work, he
was
not
aware
of
a
decisive factor of
a
material
kind
which
was
relevant to his
claim for
damages
arising out
of
work
practices
over
a
period of
27
years.
The
evidence
that suggests to the contrary
comes from
Ms
Peters.
Ms
Peters is
a
rehabilitation counsellor
employed
by
the Workers' Compensation Board. In her affidavit she says
JUDGMENT
4
---------
40
50
60
(
-- 4 of 8 --
(
040294
(Demack
J)
in
paragraph
4:
"On 4
October
1991 I
had
a
further
interview
with
Colin during
which
he
stated that
he
had
been
advised
to
seek
alternative
work
by
both
the
doctor
and
the
physiotherapist.
During
this
interview
I
discussed
with Colin
the
fact that
he would
not
be
able
to
return
to
work
of
a
similar
nature to
that
he
had
previously
been
performing as
a
scale
maker.
I
explained
to
him
that
his
inability
to
return
to
his
previous
work
was
partly
caused
by
the
long
days
he had
previously
undertaken
as
a
scale
maker
which
included
several
hours
driving
in
travelling
to the
work
site
and working
for
extended hours while
crawling
in,
out
and
under
things.
I
discussed
with
Colin
the
effect
work
of
that
nature
would have on
his
back
and
left
knee.
Colin
stated
to
me
that
he
preferred
not
to
think
about such
matters
and
that
he
would
wait
until
he
spoke
to
Dr
MacFarlane."
When
Ms
Peters
was
cross-examined
it
became
clear that
she
was
discussing the
work
that
Mr
Drochmann
had
been doing
and would
be
expected
to
do
as
a
scale
maker
essentially
from
the
perspective of
his
ability
to return
to
that
work.
She
was
not suggesting
a
medical
opinion
that
his present condition
was
a
consequence
of the
work
that
he had done
over
27
years.
What
she
was
doing
was
saying
that in
view
of his present
condition,
he would
not
be
able to return to that
kind
of
work.
That, of course,
is
a
different
issue
from
the
one
that
the
plaintiff
seeks to
establish
here
and
it
does
not
seem
to
me
that
Ms
Peters'
evidence
in
any
way
casts
doubt
on
Mr
Drochmann's
assertion that
in respect of his
degenerate
condition
he
first
became aware
that that
was
a
consequence
of
wear and
tear
over
a
long period of
work
in
November 1992 and
that
he became aware
that alternate
work
practices,
which
might have reduced the
risk to
him
significantly,
were
available
first
in April
1993.
In those circumstances,
I am
satisfied that
he has
JUDGMENT
5
10
20
30
40
50
60
-- 5 of 8 --
040294
(Demack
J)
demonstrated
that
a
material factor
of
a
decisive
kind
did not
become
within
his
knowledge
until
that
date.
In
respect
of the reasonableness of
his
conduct
up
till
that
time,
it
is
clear that
he
has sought medical
attention
when
that attention
has been
required.
It
seems
clear
from
those
10
doctors
who
dealt
with
him
and
who
swore
to
affidavits
as
to
what
was
said, that
they
have
not suggested
to
him
that his
presenting
problems
were
other
than those
that
were
a
consequence
of the
specific
incidents
that
took
him
to the
doctors.
In
other
words,
he
only
became
aware
of the
impact
of
wear and
tear
through
heavy
work
when
Dr
Johnson
Nurse
discussed
this
with
him
in
November
1992.
Until
he
was
aware
of
that
medical
fact
there
was no
basis for
him
to
begin
to
seek
legal
advice
and
thereafter
he
moved
with reasonable
30
speed
from
one
solicitor
to
another
until
he
received
his
present advice.
In the circumstances,
I
am
satisfied that
he
has
taken
all
C' /
reasonable
steps to
inform
himself
and
that in
the
40
circumstances the
time should
be
extended.
Are you
satisfied
with order in
terms
of the
summons,
Mr
Carroll?
50
MR
CARROLL: I
have
a
draft
order,
Your Honour.
HIS
HONOUR:
Order
in terms of the draft, initialled
by
me
and placed with the papers.
60
JUDGMENT
6
-- 6 of 8 --
(
\
040294
(Demack
J)
HIS
HONOUR:
This
matter
has
been
before
me
on
two
previous
occasions.
On
the
return
date
of the
summons,
22
November
1993,
the
application
was
adjourned
by
consent
until
13
November
1993
and
costs
were
reserved.
The
reason
for the
adjournment
was
that
the defendant
needed
more
time
to
consider
the
material.
The
plaintiff
had,
indeed,
filed
a
substantial
amount
of material in the
application.
This
was
filed
on
12
November
1993.
It
would
seem
to
me
to
have been
foreseeable
that
such
an
adjournment
would
be
sought
and
in
those circumstances
I
am
not
satisfied
that at this
point
any
order
should
be
made
in respect
of those
costs.
The
practice
with these
applications
as
a
general
rule
is
that
the
plaintiff,
though
successful,
does
not get
an
order for
costs
because
an
indulgence
has been
granted.
When
the matter
came
on on
13
December 1993
it
was
adjourned
until
31
January
1994.
The
matter
came
on
in
some
confusion.
The
defendant sought
to
call
Dr
Baker and
Dr
Ganter
to deal
with
a
number
of issues
which were
subsequently
dealt
with
in
aifidavits
sworn
by them. The
plaintiff
had
very
late
notification
of
this
and had
no
idea
what
was
intended to
be
led
from
those doctors,
no
affidavit
was
produced and, indeed,
it
is
not
clear
on what
basis
they could have sworn an
affidavit at that stage in the proceedings.
It
seems
to
me
that
the reason for that
adjournment
was
substantially
brought
about
by
the approach
that
the defendant sought to take.
In those circumstances,
it
seems
to
me
to
be proper that the
JUDGMENT
7
10
20
30
40
50
60
-- 7 of 8 --
040294
(Demack
J)
defendant should
pay
the
costs
that
the
plaintiff
has
thrown
away
by
that
adjournment.
The
plaintiff
had
served
its
material
following
filing
in
November
and
it
would
have been
simple
enough
for the
defendant
to
indicate
that
it
was
not
satisfied
with having
10
the
medical
reports
annexed
to
a
solicitor's
affidavit,
but
wanted
direct
evidence
from
the
doctors.
For
the defendant
to
attempt
to
produce
that
evidence
itself,
rather
than
have
it
come
through
the
plaintiff,
seems
to
me
to
have
introduced
a
20
little
confusion.
c
The
orders
will
be:
in respect
of
th~
application, order
in
terms
of the
draft
with
no
order for
costs.
I
order
that
there
be no
order for costs in respect
of the
adjournment
on
30
22
November
1993.
In
respect of the
adjournment
on
13
December
1993,
I
order
that
the defendant
pay
the
plaintiff's
costs
thrown
away
by
that
adjournment.
(_/
40
l/
50
60
JUDGMENT
8
-- 8 of 8 --
Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1994/041