Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Theo [1993] QSC 205
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TRANSCRIPT
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(Copyright in this transcript is vested in the' Crown. C-opies thereof must not be made or sold
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Wltho~tthe
written authority
of
the Director, State Reporting Bureau.(;
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St.:ue
Reporting
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_-SUPREME
COURT OF
QUEENSLAND
'CIVIL
JURISDICTION
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AUSTRALIA
AND
NEW.ZEALAND
BANKING
GROUP
LIMITED
and--
BRISBANE
..
DATE
28/06/93
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. JUDGMENT
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Plaintiff
;Defendant
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'· 4th Floor, The Law Courts, GeorKeStreet, Brlsba~, Q. 4000 Televhone: (07J 227 4360. FacsimilP-' tn1l ??1
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280693
jlk
(Kiefel J)
HER HONOUR:
The
plaintiff
bank
applies
for
summary
judgment
against
the
defendant
under
a
written
guarantee
and
indemnity
given
by him
and
dated
29
June
1978
with
respect to
a
customer
of the
bank which
is
presently
called
Korab and
Co
Pty
Ltd.
By·
clause
1
of
that
document
the guarantor
may
be
called
upon
at
any
time,
regardless
o{
the customer's
default.
The
guarantor
may
be
liable
under
clause
6.5
for
all
costs
as
between
solicitor
and
client.
Clause
19
contains
a
separate
10
indemnity.
20 n
At
24 May
1993
the
customer
owed some
$749,994.13,
repres~nting
its
liability
on
each
of
an
overdraft
facility
~
!.
..,.
and
a
fully
drawn
advance
account,
together
with
interest
accrued
to
that
date
at
the
respective rates
of
13.25
per cent
30
and
10.75
per cent.
A
letter
of
1
June
1992
(Exhibit
C1
to
Mr
Robertson's
affidavit)
evidences
what
was
the then
agreement between
the
parties
concerning the
overdraft
facility
and
relevantly
that
40
"The
overdraft
facility is
payable
on
demand
and
the
bank
may
cancel or
withdraw
the
facility at
any
time
...
".
The
letter
contains reference to
a
review
date in
August
or
October 1992.
The
fully
drawn advance account
was
in
February
1988
(see
50
Exhibit
E1
to
Mr
Robertson's affidavit) subject to
a
term
that
"The
loan
is
repayable
on demand
but unless
demanded you must
repay
it
by monthly instalmen.ts of
...
11
• Demand was made on
the
comp~ny
and the guarantor
on 25 May 1993 and
neither has
60
2
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-- 2 of 7 --
I~
0
280693
jlk
(Kiefel J)
paid.
To
this
point
so
much
is
uncontested.
I
should
add
that
Mr
T
North,
for the
plaintiff,
predicted
that
the defendant
might
raise
an
issue
as
to the
validity
of
the
demand.
It
appears
that
at
the
time
of
service of
the
notice
the defendant
has deposed
to
the
fact
that
a
bank
officer,
a Mr
Oakes,
said to
him
words
to
the
effect that
the
d6cuments were
just
a
formality
and
that
he
need
not
worry
about
them.
The
defendant did not,
however,
seek
to
argue
that that constituted
some
operative
waiver
affecting
the
validity
of the
demand. The
defendant
sought
to
raise
a
case
concentrating
entirely
on
earlier
conversations
between
0 Mr
Oakes
and, amongst
others,
the
defendant (see paragraphs
39
0
0
to
43,
inclusive,
of
Mr
Thee's
affidavit
sworn
18
June
1993)
which
are said to
give
rise
to
an
estoppel or
waiver
against
the
plaintiff
or,
alternatively,
to
found
relief
baied
upon
misleading
and
deceptive
conduct under
the
Trade
Practices
Act.
It
may
be,
however,
that
the conversation
at
the
time
of
service
may,
as
a
matter of
evidence,
throw
some
light
on
the
earlier
conversation
relied
upon.
The
defendant says in the
affidavit
I
have
referred to that at
a
meeting
on 16 March 1993
the
banking
facilities
referred to
above were
reviewed.
Mr
Oakes
informed
him
that,
"This
is
the
way
the
Bank
wants
things
done
for Korab's banking
facilities.",
and then
said
words
to the
effect that the only
way
the
bank was
prepared to continue with the banking
facilities
and
the financing of the
company was
to continue
an
overdraft facility
with
a
limit of $300,000 and
a
further
account (the number 2
account) in the
name
of the
company was
3
10
20
30
40
50
60
-- 3 of 7 --
r
~-------- -~-------
. 280693 jlk (Kiefel J)
to be established, Th~s account ~as to op~rate in credit
only. Importantly, he said that so long as the o~erdraft
limit did not exceed $300,000 and the second account, in fact;
operated in credit, the bank would maintain the overdraft and
the current f~hancial facilit~es.
At the conclusibn of ~the meeting Mr'Oakes said to Mr Thee that
if members· of his family put'·$100;000 into the company, the
bank would con~ide~ making further loan facilities available
10
to it. As a result, members of his family have loaned moneys 0
20
to the defendant, who in turn Has deposited the sum of $65,000
to the account of the company. The company maintained the
various accounts on the· terms di'scussed.
'However, in April 1993 the bank advised that it would not make
30
the further funding available. Mr Oakes did, however, suggest
to the company and Mr Thee that it act with some speed in
obtaining further e~uity finance elsewhere. A commercial bill
facility, oh the·other hand, matured and the bank apparently
~ncreased the o~~rdraft limit to accommodate it. No demand
0
0
was made for its repayment. 40 0
On 26 May 1993 Mrc Oakes attended upon the company and served_
demands upon it and the defendant. The conversation above
referred to then took place.
Mr Carrigan, for the defendant, submitted that the defendant's
case w~s that the bank· promised on 16 March 1993 that it ~ould
continue with its present level of funding so long as the
company maintain~&'the limits imposed. Implicit in that-
4
50
60
-- 4 of 7 --
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0
0
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280693 jlk (Kiefel J)
representation, which was made directly to Mr Theo, is that
neither the company nor him would be called upon - for
otherwise the promise would be nonsensical. He argued that it
was to be implied, given the usual process of review between
the bank and the company over the years, that that position
10
would maintain until the parties came to another arrangement.
Again, implicit in that argument is that Mr Theo was induced
to believe the situation would maintain. Mr Carrigan argues
that, at the very least, the bank had a duty at the time to
speak if the arrangement it intended was to call upon the
20
company or Mr Theo for payment at any time.
Mr Theo personally has paid moneys in, and I take .it that it
would be said at trial that the company was lulled into a
sense of security and took no other steps to otherwise finance
30
its whole undertaking.
Mr North's answer was that, seen in their true light, the
facilities offered were by their very nature repayable on
demand. By inference, the defendant could not reasonably have
40
understood it to be otherwise. 'rhat is somewhat difficult to
determine on this application.
Whilst the defendant may hav~·cql}siderable .d.lfficultles ..in successfully
defending .flle action, it seems tq _me. at least argu..abla ~that ;.the
conversations of 16 March 1993 may amount to a representation
as to how the bank would conduct the account, at least until
the time of a review. What the statement could have conveyed
is more likely to be properly understood when a full
consideration is had of the long banking history between the
5
50
60
-- 5 of 7 --
280693 jlk (Kiefel J)
parties and, more particularly, of all the conve'rsations
concerning the ~anagem~nt report then undertaken and the
problems, 'if any, then ~pertaining to the viability of the-
business and the potential for its restructure. The question
as 't.o the time within which any such representation would
operafe ·is again better assessed having regard to those
mitters. It·~eems tb me, however, that the statement has the
potential to found an estoppel.
10
Assuming the representation was likely to lead the customer 20 0
and Mr Thee into error, it is only likely to be held
misleading or deceptive if the bank, at the time it was made,
knew it to be untrue or made it recklessly. See Global
Sportsmen Pty Ltd v. Mirrot Newspapers Limited (19ff4) 2 FCR
82. Whether the bank came under a positive duty to speak (as 30
to which see Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v. DIM Chemical
Services Pty Ltd G98~ 12 FCR 477) perhaps requires more, if
0
that is necessary. On this issue also it seems to me that ()
the quality of the representation and the understanding and
intentions of the parties are best tested with regard to all 40
of the background circumstances not presently before me and
which might be the subject of cross-examination. Similarly,
the question of what relief, if any, should in the circumstances
be afforded under the Trade Practices Act can only really be
answered after that inquiry. 50
I propose granting leave to defend. The action may warrant a
speedy trial but I think this is best answered after I have
6 60
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-- 6 of 7 --
280693
jlk
(Kiefel J)
considered
the balance of the
applications
concerning,
amongst
other things, the
validity
of
the
appointment
of
a
receiver.
Those
applications
are to
be
heard
in
the near
future.
I
order
that
the
costs
of the
application
be
reserved
and
I
10
also
order
that
the
parties
have
liberty
to
apply
upon
the
hearing
of the
balance of the
applications presently
adjourned
before the Court.
20
30
0
40
50
60
7
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1993/205