I AM THE LAW
Browse › Case law › Queensland

Becin & Ors v GEC Australia Ltd & Ors [1993] QSC 152

Case law · Queensland · 1993
~' l ,_ - ( (_) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND BETWEEN: MIRIAM BECIN No. 2123 of 1988 WILLIAM PARNELL KOCH No. 4672 of 1987 ANTHONY MAHONEY No. 3249 of 1988 MARTIN MURPHY No. 4669 of 1987 SLAV SPASOVKI No. 1193 of 1989 JOHN SMITH No. 2799 of 1988 ROBERT JORGEN ANDERSON No. 4106 of 1988 GLEN WILLIAM MciLROY No. 4673 of 1987 KEITH DAVID WYATT No. 4667 of 1987 WASYL SAPOROSHETZ No. 4665 of 1987PHILLIP ROSS McDONALD No. 194 of 1988 ROBERT JAMES THORPE No. 4666 of 1987 RAYMOND PETER DAVIDSON No. 4671 of 1987 MICHAEL SPRING No. 2843 of 1988 HARRIET BETTY KETLAND No. 4668 of 1987 SIMON PETER MASTIN No. 4670 of 1987 COLIN FRANCIS WILLIS No. 2217 of 1989 Plaintiffs AND: GEC AUSTRALIA LIMITED -First Defendant AND: HITACHI LIMITED Second Defendant AND: IAN DUDLEY LOW Third Defendant AND: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY SERVICES PTY. LTD. Fourth Defendant REASONS FOR JUDGMENT -THOMAS J. Judgment delivered 04/06/93 CATCHWORDS: .Costs - recoverability of costs in relation to compromised actions - effect of offers to settle on costs R.S.C. 0.26 r.9(1) not to cover settlements - recoverability of costs in relation to plaintiff's joinder of further defendants - recoverability of reserved costs of plaintiff's summonses once ultimately successful in litigation directions to Taxing Master matters heard together to be sep~rately taxed - reasonableness of engagement of senior counsel Counsel: S. Williams Q.C. for plaintiffs R. Bain Q.C. for defendants Solicitors: Quinlan Miller & Treston for plaintiffs Clayton Utz for defendants Hearing Date: 27th May, 1993 -- 1 of 21 -- n () ( ) ~/ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND BETWEEN: MIRIAM BECIN No. 2123 of 1988 WILLIAM PARNELL KOCH No. 4672 of 1987 ANTHONY MAHONEY No. 3249 of 1988 MARTIN MURPHY No. 4669 of 1987 SLAV SPASOVKI No. 1193 of 1989 JOHN SMITH No. 2799 of 1988 ROBERT JORGEN ANDERSON No. 4106 of 1988 GLEN WILLIAM MciLROY No. 4673 of 1987 KEITH DAVID WYATT No. 4667 of 1987 WASYL SAPOROSHETZ No. 4665 of 1987 PHILLIP ROSS McDONALD No. 194 of 1988 ROBERT JAMES THORPE No. 4666 of 1987 RAYMOND PETER DAVIDSON No. 4671 of 1987 MICHAEL SPRING No. 2843 of 1988 HARRIET BETTY KETLAND No. 4668 of 1987 SIMON PETER MASTIN No. 4670 of 1987 COLIN FRANCIS WILLIS No. 2217 of 1989 Plaintiffs AND: GEC AUSTRALIA LIMITED First Defendant AND: HITACHI LIMITED Second Defendant AND: IAN DUDLEY LOW Third Defendant AND: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY SERVICES PTY. LTD. Fourth Defendant REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THOMAS J. Delivered the 4th day of June, 1993 Applications have been made on behalf of the plaintiffs in all the aboie 17 matters for orders for costs. These matters, and some others which are not the subject of the present applications, were case managed by Williams J. from June, 1992, in consequence of which there was a commendable co-ordination of ,; -- 2 of 21 -- 2 resources, a reduction of issues, and ultimately a single trial before me of those matters which had not, up to that point, settled. In the result, ten actions commenced before me on 17th March, 1993 with the benefit of arrangements that would allow all evidence given in the one proceeding to be available for·use in all cases, subject only to the question of relevancy. Ultimately I shall address the specific orders that need to be made in each m~tter. But first it is necessary to discuss a number of issues which are common to all or some of the C applications 1 and to set out the background information necessary for that discussion. Five of the . ten actions which came on for hearing on 17th March, 1993 were settled in the course of the trial, on terms not disclosed to me. The remaining five matters (Becin, Koch, Mahoney, Murphy and Spasovki) have proceeded to publication of reasons for judgment. Reasons were handed down in those 0 matters. on 13th May, 1993, . but formal judgment has been deferred () pending receipt of the present submissions on costs. With respect to all matters which have been settled, I have been in~ormed that the settlement was upon terms that a certain sum of money be paid to the plaintiff 11 plus costs including reserved costs if any be reserved for the determination of the trial Judge. 11 It was agreed that the Judge who tried the unresolved matters would also determine the outstanding questions of·costs in respect of those matters which were compromised. One of the issues argued before me concerns the recoverability of costs_incurred by reason of the plaintiffs' joinder on 30th June, 1989 of the third and fourth defendants. 0 -- 3 of 21 -- () 3 Another concerns whether the plaintiffs should be granted costs which were reserved on certain applications for particulars and cross-applications for the delivery of a defence, which were in the end adjourned with costs reserved. It is necessary background that at material times G.E.C. had engaged the fourth defendant and used the services of the third defendant to advise it in relation to the relevant processes and appropriate safety measures. Broadly speaking it may be said that the plaintiff joined them as defendants in· order to avoid the possibility that the operative negligence might be found to lie with those parties, and that the first two defendants might plead that the engagement of the fourth defendant was a sufficient discharge of its duty of care. I~ the event, in or before June 1992 there was a compromise between the first, second, third and fourth defendants on terms not disclosed to the plaintiffs, but which led in due course (by July 1992) to clear (_) intimations during the case management procedure that the first and second defendants (in real terms the Workers' Compensation ( . '·_/ Board) would have the carriage of the action on behalf of the defendants. Substantial admissions were then made by way of amended defence on behalf of the first and second defendants which made further proceedings against the third and fourth defendants unnecessary. For all practical purposes the third and fourth defendants may be regarded as having disappeared from the action, or at least from any relevant role in it, from at·least as early as September 1992. The following chronology contains the basic facts upon which the arguments in rela~ion to the above issues have been -- 4 of 21 -- 4 presented. (To facilitate reference to the particular issues, the entries directly relevant to the_ joinder of the third and fourth defendants are italicised). 10.04.89 Hitachi (which had not yet delivered a defence) · delivered requests for further and better particulars. of the statement of claim .. 16.06.89 Some particulars were provided but there was a refusal of the balance. Hitachi was invited to apply within seven days if it claimed entitlement to further particulars, and ('; \..._j in any event there was insistence upon the delivery of Hitachi's defence. 23. 06 .. 89 Hi tachi filed 17 summonses seeking particulars. CJ They. were returnable five weeks later (28th July, 1989). 26.06. 89 The plaintiffs solicitors objected to the deferred return date. of Hitachi's summonses, requesting that the application be made "forthwith" and threatened a summons for delivery of.a defence. The response of Hitachi's solicitors was ('; that 28th July was the only date convenient to Hitachi's counsel . .. 26. 06.89 The state of t;he pleadings between the plaintiff and G.E.C. was that the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence L/, wez:e.· denied. However documents discovered by G. E. C. disclosed that the company had engaged Dr. Low as an occupational hygienist at the factory and as a medical practitioner to whom the employees were ;referred. The plaintiffs solicitor contacted the defendants solicitor expressing concern that G.E.C. might subsequently rely on this engagement as satisfying its duty. 27. 06.89 The sol_icitors for G.E.C. pointed out that they had not raised such an all_egation and that it was not possible -- 5 of 21 -- 5 to make the "wide sweeping admissions" requested on behalf of the plaintiffs. (The only admission requested was that G.E.C. was vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Low). The solicitors for G.E.C. observed that they could "see no point in Dr. Low being joined as a defendant". They further commented that "at this stage it is not our intention to run an argument that as a· result of engaging Dr. Low our client took all reasonable steps to protect its employees ... " (my underlining) () 27.06. 89 Summonses were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs Davidson and Smith for the delivery of a defence. The summonses were returnable on 30th June, 1989. 30. 06.89 Those applications were adjourned. On the same date orders were made joining the third and fourth defendants as defendants in the action. 26. 07.89 Hi tachi' s solicitor asked the plaintiffs solicitor not to proceed with the applications (which were returnable in (. two days' time) . He said there was no point in obtaining the particulars and asked for 14 days for delivery of Hitachi ':s defence. The solicitors agreed to adjourn the applications and that costs should be reserved. 31. 07.89 G. E. C.'s solicitor asked the plaintiffs solicitors for any assistance they could give regarding the liability of Dr. Low. 02.08.89 Notice of change of solicitors whereunder G.E.C. 's solicitors acted for both G.E.C. and Hitachi .. Conversation between plaintiffs' solicitors and defendants solicitors in which the latter stated that they were still investigating the liability of the third and fourth defendants. -- 6 of 21 -- 6 11.08. 89 The th.i:r:d a~d fourth defendants delivered their defence in which liability was denied. 18.08.89 Hitachi's defence was delivered .. 02. 09. 90 The. third and fourth defendants gave notice as claiming contribution or indemnity against the first and second defendants. 10.03.92 The first and second defendants delivered notices claiming contribution and indemnity and statements of claim against the third and fourth defendants. c Soon after this, the defendants settled their differences t and the case management procedure ensued. The Reserved Costs 0 Hitachi had no right to delay delivery of its defence until after the receipt of particulars. The plaintiffs, Smith and Davidson, were entitled to bring their summonses seeking delivery of Hitachi's defence, because time had expired. In the event it became unnecessary to proceed with those summonses because Q Hitachi. undertook to deliver its defence within a further 14 ·days.. It seems perf~ctly appropriate that the plaintiffs ought to have their reserved costs of those summonses now that C the· plaintiffs have been ultimately successful in the litigation. In relation t.o Hi tachi' s applications for particulars, these were simply not proceeded with. There is nothing in the circumstances to ~ndicate, for example, th~t this became unnecessary.because the pl~intiffs belatedly complied with the original request .. To the contrary ~ t would seem that for reasons known to Hitachi it dec~ded not to press the application which it·had initiated. In these circumstances _I have no doubt that -- 7 of 21 -- ·7 the plaintiffs' reserved costs of · and· incidental to those applications ought to be included in the costs of the ultimately· successful plaintiffs. Costs of and incidental to joinder of third and fourth defendants The first and second defendants submit that the costs of and incidental to the proceedings against the third and fourth defendants should not be included in the costs which the first and second defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs. They suggest that the plaintiffs and the third and fourth defendants should each bear their own costs in relation to those (~) proceedings. Each counsel before me has posed as the relevant question whether their joinder was a reasonable step in this particular litigation. The submission for the defendants is that the joinder was neither a necessary nor a reasonable step arising out of the actions against the first and second defendants. (J I have studied the sequence . of events and have paid particular attention to the letters of 26th June, 1989 ari'd 27th June, 1989. The defendants submission is that the second defendant's duty of care was non:-delegable (Kondis v. State Transport Authority (1984) 154 C.L.R. 672). However r·do not think that the discussion in that case puts the proposition beyond "continuing debate" (cf. Mason J. p.678-679, 684-685), although one could say with some confidence th~t G.E.C. would be unlikely to have been able to escape on this basis (see ·p.689; cf. Jones v. Tivoli Collieries (1966) Qd.R.140), and Deane J. would in any event hold the employer vicariously liable (p.694). The same does not follow in relation to the action against -- 8 of 21 -- 8 Hitachi. Furthermore, ,as . a practical matter it might be impossible to prove the negligence of the independent contractor (for whose negligence the employer would arguably be liable) unless that contractor were a party to the action. I do not suggest for a moment that G.E.C. 's. solicitors encouraged the plaintiffs solicitors to bring in the extra defendants. Indeed there ·was> some attempt at discouragement. However, the defend~nt's solicitor was not instructed to give the assurance that would make the joinder unnecessary, and was riot prepared to admit the legal consequence which his counsel now suggests to be clearly established by authority (i.e. vicarious liability for Dr. Low'·s acts) .. The period under. the statute of limitations was about to expire.' At that time there ·was little more than a bare denial of negligence in the defence of G.E.C .. The plaintiffs' advisers 0 0 must have been in a far less assured position than might now be thought with the . benefit . of hindsight, after successful 0 litigation against the first two defendants. At that stage I should think the claims could be regarded as fairly hazardous litigation, and the solicitors for the plaintiffs could not afford·to leave any stone unturned.· In the circumstances I think that the joinder was a reasonable precaution .. It may be regarded as something done out of an abundance of caution, but the solicitors could not afford to leave any possible gap or avenue of escape in litigation of this kind. It may also be noted that after the joinder, the first and second defendants saw fit to deliver notices of contribution and indemnity against the additional parties~ After the defendants settled their -- 9 of 21 -- C) () 9 differences, the plaintiffs took no further steps against the third and fourth defendants. I accept the submission of counsel for the plaintiffs that the joinder was reasonable in the circumstances. There is no reason to regard the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants as other than ordinary costs in the action. It is not appropriate to deprive the plaintiffs of these costs by special order, or to refuse to give them the benefit of any costs of this kind which have been specifically reserved. Directions to Taxing Master The defendants submitted that there should be a direction that the actions be taxed as one large matter. I originally assumed this submission to relate only to counsel's fee .on brief and work done thereafter, having regard to the fact that from the end of Quly 1992 all matters were co-ordinated and in due course () all matters were able to be set down at the one time for the one hearing. However the submission is wider than this. It seeks a direction that all 17 actions be taxed as one matter. I do not regard this as feasible or reasonable. It is true that there was some co-ordination from the outset and that the one firm of solicitors has acted for all. However the actions were and remain separate actions asserting separate rights. This is not to say that the Taxing Master should not take into account the economies of effort and scale which have been able . to be achieved. It seems to me that the same result ought to occur.upon taxation as one large matter (with appropriate a~lowance for the -- 10 of 21 -- 10 work done on behalf of. each of 17 individual plaintiffs) as it would if· there were 17 taxations (each taking properly into account the fact that the work was done in the course of one co-ordinated exercise). Mr. Williams Q.C. for the plaintiffs submitted that a single taxation 11 would have the practical effect of diminishing significantly amount that would be allowed to the plaintiffs for care and consideration and would also confine the plaintiffs to recovering one fee on brief 11 • I do not think that these consequences would necessarily follow. c=J The case for viewing the work as a single co-ordinated. exercise is considerably.stronger after 27th July, 1992. From that time on, all the actions were in one stream, including the 1 7 cases . the subject of today' s applications. The following circumstances will no doubt be noted·by the Taxing Master. Ten of the actions were still alive at the first day of trial. The trial was expected to run for 20 days, but concluded in 13 days. 0 By that time five actions had settled and five proceeded to Q judgment. The total of the damages and interest in the five matters that proceeded to. judgment is about $1,000,000. Apart from evidence concerning conditions in the paint shop, all the expert · evidence concerning the . site . and work methods was applicable to all actions. The case on liability resembled a single case, with adaptations according to whether the plaintiff was·a paint shop worker or a Bay 6 worker, and adaptations on the part of each plaintiff to bring himself or herself within the relevant environment. Similarly, the medical evidence came from a limited number of doctors, and the discussion of the relevant condition was applicable to all claimants, but a separate case 0 -- 11 of 21 -- 11 had to be prepar~d in relation to each .. There was to a large extent a common stream of medical advice and opinion, although a separate case was advanced in relation to ·the particular symptoms and life of each individual plaintiff. In my view it is essential that each case.be separately taxed. I consider it unnecessary to direct whether the fee on brief be allowed as a single brief or as separate briefs, but note that if a single fee on brief is allowed, it will still be ( ~\/) necessary to apportion it between the respective plaintiffs. I also note that if separate fees on brief are allowed as such, their total ought not to exceed that which would be appropriate for a single brief with respect to all matters. One cannot escape the reality that there was one counsel (with a junior) appearing.~n the one court in the one l~rge forensic exercise. It is hardly necessary for me to say that the engagement of senior counsel was justified in such a matter, and that neither ( I counsel nor the solicitors ought to be unduly disadvant.ag,ed~ from ~j ( the fact that through intelligent co-ordination and a good sense of relevancy they were able to run the litigation in a relatively economical fashion. In the absence of a direction for combined taxation there. will be a separate bill with respect to each plaintiff. Having regard to the above discussion I do not consider it necessary to give any specific directions to the Taxing Master other than that the engagement of senior counsel was justified; and, . in case there is any doubt about it, that the costs of the appearances in the course of the .case management procedures ought to be regarded as costs of each party in the cause; and of course, -- 12 of 21 -- 12 consistently with the earlier discussion, that the plaintiffs' costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a ~art of the plaintiffs' costs in the cause. The effect of offers to settle In three instances it was submitted that a special order ought to be made against the defendants for solicitor and client costs by reason of the making of offers to settle. The applications were made in Davidson, Mastin and Mahoney. They are based upon R.S.C. 0.26 r.9(1). It provides "where the plaintiff makes an offer to settle which is not accepted by the defendant and the plaintiff obtains a judgment no less favourable than the offer to settle the court shall order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs fixed on·a solicitor and client basis 1 unless the defendant shows that another order for costs is proper in the circumstances." Mr. Williams Q.C. submitted that the spirit of the rule ought to cover settlements as well. However, the letter of the rule does not, and quite plainly this rule does not authorise me to make 0 0 an orde·r for the payment of solicitor and client costs in cases 0 where no judgment has been obtained. I do not think it would be a correct exercise of my general discretionary·power on costs to make such an order when the· rule is not satisfied, unless there 0 was some special ·circumstance such as impropriety on the part of the defendant or wanton conduct leading to wasted costs (Fountain v. International Produce (1988) 81 A.L.R. 397, 400). There are no such allegations here. However in Mr-.· · Mahoney' s action where a · judgment was obtained which was substantially more favourable to Mr. Mahoney than the· offer· which ·the defendants refused, there. is every -- 13 of 21 -- 13 reason why I should give him the benefit of the discretion conferred by 0.26 r.9(1). Orders I shall now formulate orders in all matters. The first five are the matters in which judgments will be pronounced. The remaining twelve matters will consist of orders for costs in matters which have been settled. 1 . Miriam Becin No. 2123 of 1988 Judgment for the plaintiff for $471,532.44 with costs to be taxed including all reserved costs. Direct the Taxing Master - (a) the cpsts of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (~) (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 2. William Parnell Koch No. 4672 of 1987 Judgment for the plaintiff for $126,548.61 against the first and second defendants with costs including all reserved costs to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master - (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) The costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; -- 14 of 21 -- 14 (c) the engagement of senior counsel . was reasonable in the circumstances. 3. Anthony Mahoney No. 3249 of 1988 Judgment for the plaintiff against the first and second defendants for $146,998.30 with costs including all reserved costs, ·to be taxed-on a solicitor and client basis. Direct Taxing Master - (a) ·the costs of and incidental to .the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of cl the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management 0 procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 4. Martin Murphy No. 4669 of 1987 Judgment for the plaintiff against the first and second defendants-for $134,968.96 with costs including all reserved 0 costs to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as cost~ in the cause; ( c') the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 5. Slav Spasovki No. 1193 of 1989 -- 15 of 21 -- 1 5 Judgment for the plaintiff against the first and second defendants for $46, 440. 30 with costs including all reserved costs to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master - {a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of. the action; {b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management () procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 6. John Smith No. 2799 of 1988 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, includirig all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (~) (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in .the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in. the circumstances. 7. Robert Jorgen Anderson No. 4106 of 1988 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master -- 16 of 21 -- 16 (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are·a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) ·the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 8. Glen William Mcilroy No. 4673 of 187 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs cost~ of and iricidental to the a6tion, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master - (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; 0 0 (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; 0 (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 9 . Keith David Wyatt No. 4667 of 1987 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs'' of and· incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master - (a) the costs of·and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are·a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; -- 17 of 21 -- () () 1 7 (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 10. Wasyl Saporoshetz No. 4665 of 1987 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) · the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. (_) 11. Phillip Ross McDonald No. 194 of 1988 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in- the circumstances. -- 18 of 21 -- 18 12. Robert James Thorpe No. 4666 of 1987 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the ·course of case management Q pr6cedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of· senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 13. Raymond Peter Davidson No. 4671 of 1987 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. 0 Direct Taxing Master - 0 (a) the costs of·and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; G (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 14. Michael Spring No. 2843 of 1988 Order the first,~nd second defendants-to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, . including all reserved costs, to be taxed. -- 19 of 21 -- 19 Direct Taxing Master - (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. ( 15. Harriet Betty Ketland No. 4668 of 1987 (_) Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's.costs of the action; (_) (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case mana,<;ement procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 16. Simon Peter Mastin No. 4670 of 1987 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (a) the costs of and incidental to th~ joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; -- 20 of 21 -- 20 (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 17. Colin Francis Willis No. 2217 of 1989 Order the first and second defendants to pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to the action, including all reserved costs, to be taxed. Direct Taxing Master (a) the costs of and incidental to the joinder of the third and fourth defendants are a part of the plaintiff's costs of the action; 0 (b) the costs of appearances in the course of case management procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause; (c) the engagement of senior counsel was reasonable in the circumstances. 0 -- 21 of 21 --