Becin & Ors v GEC Australia Ltd & Ors [1993] QSC 152
~'
l
,_
-
(
(_)
IN
THE SUPREME
COURT
OF
QUEENSLAND
BETWEEN:
MIRIAM BECIN
No.
2123
of
1988
WILLIAM PARNELL
KOCH
No.
4672
of
1987
ANTHONY
MAHONEY
No.
3249
of
1988
MARTIN
MURPHY
No.
4669
of
1987
SLAV
SPASOVKI
No.
1193
of
1989
JOHN
SMITH
No.
2799
of
1988
ROBERT
JORGEN
ANDERSON
No.
4106
of
1988
GLEN
WILLIAM MciLROY
No.
4673
of
1987
KEITH DAVID
WYATT
No. 4667
of
1987
WASYL
SAPOROSHETZ
No.
4665
of
1987PHILLIP
ROSS
McDONALD
No.
194
of
1988
ROBERT
JAMES THORPE
No.
4666
of
1987
RAYMOND
PETER
DAVIDSON
No.
4671
of
1987
MICHAEL
SPRING
No.
2843
of
1988
HARRIET BETTY
KETLAND
No.
4668
of
1987
SIMON
PETER MASTIN
No.
4670
of
1987
COLIN FRANCIS WILLIS
No. 2217
of
1989
Plaintiffs
AND: GEC
AUSTRALIA LIMITED
-First
Defendant
AND:
HITACHI LIMITED
Second Defendant
AND:
IAN
DUDLEY
LOW
Third
Defendant
AND:
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH
AND
SAFETY SERVICES PTY. LTD.
Fourth
Defendant
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
-THOMAS
J.
Judgment
delivered
04/06/93
CATCHWORDS:
.Costs
-
recoverability of costs in relation
to
compromised
actions
-
effect of offers
to
settle
on
costs
R.S.C. 0.26
r.9(1)
not to
cover
settlements
-
recoverability of costs in relation
to
plaintiff's
joinder of further
defendants
-
recoverability of reserved costs of
plaintiff's
summonses
once
ultimately successful in
litigation
directions to
Taxing Master
matters heard together to
be
sep~rately
taxed
-
reasonableness of
engagement
of senior
counsel
Counsel: S. Williams
Q.C.
for plaintiffs
R.
Bain
Q.C.
for defendants
Solicitors:
Quinlan Miller
&
Treston for plaintiffs
Clayton Utz
for defendants
Hearing Date: 27th
May, 1993
-- 1 of 21 --
n
()
( )
~/
IN
THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
BETWEEN:
MIRIAM BECIN
No.
2123
of
1988
WILLIAM
PARNELL
KOCH
No.
4672
of
1987
ANTHONY
MAHONEY
No.
3249
of
1988
MARTIN
MURPHY
No.
4669
of
1987
SLAV
SPASOVKI
No.
1193
of
1989
JOHN SMITH
No.
2799
of
1988
ROBERT
JORGEN
ANDERSON
No.
4106
of
1988
GLEN
WILLIAM MciLROY
No.
4673
of
1987
KEITH
DAVID
WYATT
No.
4667
of
1987
WASYL
SAPOROSHETZ
No. 4665
of
1987
PHILLIP
ROSS
McDONALD
No.
194
of
1988
ROBERT JAMES THORPE
No.
4666
of
1987
RAYMOND
PETER DAVIDSON
No.
4671
of
1987
MICHAEL SPRING
No.
2843
of
1988
HARRIET BETTY
KETLAND
No.
4668
of
1987
SIMON PETER MASTIN
No. 4670
of
1987
COLIN FRANCIS WILLIS
No. 2217
of
1989
Plaintiffs
AND: GEC
AUSTRALIA LIMITED
First
Defendant
AND:
HITACHI LIMITED
Second Defendant
AND:
IAN
DUDLEY
LOW
Third
Defendant
AND:
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
AND
SAFETY SERVICES PTY. LTD.
Fourth
Defendant
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
-
THOMAS
J.
Delivered the 4th
day
of June,
1993
Applications have been
made on
behalf of the
plaintiffs in
all
the aboie
17
matters for orders for costs.
These
matters,
and
some
others
which
are not the subject of the present
applications,
were case
managed by Williams
J.
from June, 1992,
in consequence of which there
was a commendable
co-ordination of
,;
-- 2 of 21 --
2
resources,
a
reduction
of issues,
and
ultimately
a
single
trial
before
me
of
those
matters
which
had
not,
up
to
that
point,
settled.
In the
result,
ten actions
commenced
before
me
on
17th
March, 1993
with
the
benefit
of
arrangements
that
would
allow
all
evidence given
in
the
one
proceeding
to
be
available
for·use
in all
cases,
subject
only
to
the question of relevancy.
Ultimately
I
shall
address
the
specific
orders
that
need
to
be
made
in
each
m~tter.
But
first
it
is
necessary
to
discuss
a
number
of issues
which
are
common
to
all
or
some
of the
C
applications
1
and
to
set
out the
background
information necessary
for
that
discussion.
Five
of
the
.
ten
actions
which
came
on
for
hearing
on
17th
March, 1993
were
settled
in
the course
of the
trial,
on
terms
not disclosed to
me. The
remaining
five
matters
(Becin,
Koch, Mahoney,
Murphy
and
Spasovki)
have
proceeded
to publication
of
reasons
for
judgment. Reasons were handed
down
in
those
0
matters.
on
13th
May,
1993,
.
but
formal judgment
has been
deferred
()
pending
receipt
of the present
submissions
on
costs.
With
respect to
all
matters
which have been
settled,
I
have
been
in~ormed
that
the settlement
was
upon
terms
that
a
certain
sum
of
money
be
paid
to the
plaintiff
11
plus costs including
reserved costs
if
any
be
reserved for the determination of the
trial
Judge.
11
It
was
agreed
that the
Judge
who
tried
the
unresolved matters
would
also
determine the outstanding questions
of·costs in respect of those matters
which were compromised.
One
of the issues
argued before
me
concerns the
recoverability of costs_incurred
by
reason of the
plaintiffs'
joinder
on 30th June, 1989
of the third
and fourth defendants.
0
-- 3 of 21 --
()
3
Another
concerns
whether
the
plaintiffs
should
be
granted
costs
which were
reserved
on
certain
applications for
particulars
and
cross-applications for
the
delivery of
a
defence,
which were
in
the
end
adjourned with
costs
reserved.
It
is
necessary
background
that
at
material
times
G.E.C. had
engaged
the
fourth
defendant
and
used
the
services
of the
third
defendant
to
advise
it
in
relation
to
the
relevant
processes
and
appropriate
safety
measures. Broadly
speaking
it
may
be
said
that
the
plaintiff
joined
them
as defendants
in·
order
to
avoid
the
possibility that
the
operative
negligence
might be
found
to
lie
with those
parties,
and
that
the
first
two
defendants
might
plead
that
the
engagement
of the fourth
defendant
was
a
sufficient
discharge of
its
duty
of care.
I~
the event,
in or
before
June
1992
there
was
a
compromise
between
the
first,
second,
third
and
fourth
defendants
on
terms
not disclosed to
the
plaintiffs,
but
which
led in
due
course
(by
July
1992)
to
clear
(_)
intimations during the case
management
procedure
that
the
first
and
second
defendants
(in
real
terms
the
Workers' Compensation
( .
'·_/
Board) would
have
the carriage of the action
on
behalf of the
defendants.
Substantial
admissions
were
then
made by
way
of
amended
defence
on
behalf of the
first
and second
defendants
which
made
further
proceedings
against the
third
and
fourth
defendants unnecessary. For
all
practical
purposes the
third
and
fourth defendants
may
be
regarded as having disappeared
from
the
action, or
at least
from any
relevant role in
it,
from
at·least
as early as September 1992.
The
following chronology contains the basic facts
upon which
the arguments in
rela~ion
to the above
issues have been
-- 4 of 21 --
4
presented.
(To
facilitate
reference
to
the
particular
issues,
the
entries directly
relevant to
the_
joinder of
the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
italicised).
10.04.89
Hitachi
(which had
not yet delivered
a
defence)
·
delivered requests for further
and
better
particulars.
of the
statement
of
claim
..
16.06.89
Some
particulars
were
provided but
there
was
a
refusal of
the balance. Hitachi
was
invited
to
apply
within
seven days
if
it
claimed
entitlement to further particulars,
and
(';
\..._j
in
any
event
there
was
insistence
upon
the
delivery
of
Hitachi's
defence.
23.
06
..
89
Hi
tachi
filed
17
summonses
seeking
particulars.
CJ
They.
were
returnable five
weeks
later
(28th
July,
1989).
26.06.
89
The
plaintiffs solicitors
objected to
the
deferred
return date. of
Hitachi's
summonses,
requesting
that
the
application
be
made
"forthwith"
and
threatened
a summons
for
delivery
of.a
defence.
The
response
of
Hitachi's solicitors
was
(';
that
28th
July
was
the
only
date
convenient
to Hitachi's
counsel
.
..
26.
06.89
The
state
of
t;he
pleadings
between
the
plaintiff
and G.E.C.
was
that
the
plaintiffs'
allegations
of
negligence
L/,
wez:e.·
denied.
However documents
discovered by
G. E. C.
disclosed
that
the
company
had engaged
Dr.
Low
as
an
occupational
hygienist
at
the
factory
and as
a
medical
practitioner
to
whom
the
employees were
;referred.
The
plaintiffs solicitor
contacted the
defendants
solicitor
expressing concern
that
G.E.C.
might
subsequently
rely
on
this
engagement as
satisfying
its
duty.
27. 06.89
The
sol_icitors for
G.E.C. pointed out that they
had
not raised
such an
all_egation and
that
it
was
not possible
-- 5 of 21 --
5
to make the "wide sweeping admissions" requested on behalf of the
plaintiffs. (The only admission requested was that G.E.C. was
vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Low). The solicitors
for G.E.C. observed that they could "see no point in Dr. Low
being joined as a defendant". They further commented that "at
this stage it is not our intention to run an argument that as a·
result of engaging Dr. Low our client took all reasonable steps
to protect its employees ... " (my underlining)
() 27.06. 89 Summonses were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs
Davidson and Smith for the delivery of a defence. The summonses
were returnable on 30th June, 1989.
30. 06.89 Those applications were adjourned. On the same
date orders were made joining the third and fourth defendants as
defendants in the action.
26. 07.89 Hi tachi' s solicitor asked the plaintiffs solicitor
not to proceed with the applications (which were returnable in
(. two days' time) . He said there was no point in obtaining the
particulars and asked for 14 days for delivery of Hitachi ':s
defence. The solicitors agreed to adjourn the applications and
that costs should be reserved.
31. 07.89 G. E. C.'s solicitor asked the plaintiffs solicitors
for any assistance they could give regarding the liability of Dr.
Low.
02.08.89 Notice of change of solicitors whereunder G.E.C. 's
solicitors acted for both G.E.C. and Hitachi ..
Conversation between plaintiffs' solicitors and defendants
solicitors in which the latter stated that they were still
investigating the liability of the third and fourth defendants.
-- 6 of 21 --
6
11.08.
89
The th.i:r:d
a~d
fourth
defendants
delivered
their
defence
in
which
liability
was
denied.
18.08.89
Hitachi's
defence
was
delivered
..
02. 09. 90
The.
third
and
fourth
defendants
gave
notice
as
claiming
contribution
or
indemnity
against
the
first
and
second
defendants.
10.03.92
The
first
and second
defendants
delivered
notices
claiming
contribution
and
indemnity
and
statements
of
claim
against
the
third
and
fourth
defendants.
c
Soon
after this,
the
defendants
settled their
differences
t
and
the case
management
procedure ensued.
The
Reserved
Costs
0
Hitachi
had
no
right to
delay
delivery of
its
defence
until
after
the
receipt
of
particulars.
The
plaintiffs,
Smith and
Davidson, were
entitled to
bring
their
summonses
seeking
delivery
of
Hitachi's
defence, because time had
expired. In the event
it
became
unnecessary
to
proceed with those
summonses
because
Q
Hitachi. undertook
to deliver
its
defence within
a
further
14
·days..
It
seems
perf~ctly
appropriate
that
the
plaintiffs
ought
to
have
their
reserved costs of those
summonses
now
that
C
the·
plaintiffs
have been
ultimately successful in
the
litigation.
In
relation
t.o
Hi
tachi'
s
applications for particulars, these
were simply
not
proceeded with. There
is
nothing
in the
circumstances
to
~ndicate,
for
example,
th~t
this
became
unnecessary.because the
pl~intiffs
belatedly
complied
with the
original request ..
To
the contrary
~
t
would seem
that for reasons
known
to Hitachi
it
dec~ded
not to press the application
which
it·had initiated. In these circumstances
_I
have no doubt
that
-- 7 of 21 --
·7
the
plaintiffs'
reserved costs of
·
and·
incidental to
those
applications
ought
to
be
included
in
the
costs of
the ultimately·
successful
plaintiffs.
Costs
of
and
incidental to
joinder of
third
and
fourth
defendants
The
first
and
second
defendants submit
that
the costs of
and
incidental to
the
proceedings
against the
third
and
fourth
defendants should
not
be
included
in the
costs
which
the
first
and
second
defendants
are
ordered
to
pay
the
plaintiffs.
They
suggest
that
the
plaintiffs
and
the
third
and
fourth
defendants
should
each
bear
their
own
costs
in
relation
to
those
(~)
proceedings.
Each
counsel
before
me
has posed
as
the relevant
question
whether
their
joinder
was
a
reasonable
step in
this particular
litigation.
The
submission
for the defendants
is
that
the
joinder
was
neither
a
necessary
nor
a
reasonable
step arising
out
of the actions against
the
first
and
second
defendants.
(J
I
have
studied the
sequence
.
of events
and have
paid
particular attention to
the
letters
of
26th June,
1989
ari'd
27th June,
1989.
The
defendants submission
is
that
the
second
defendant's
duty
of care
was
non:-delegable
(Kondis
v.
State
Transport Authority
(1984)
154
C.L.R.
672).
However
r·do not
think that the discussion in that
case puts the proposition
beyond
"continuing debate" (cf.
Mason
J.
p.678-679, 684-685),
although
one
could say with
some
confidence
th~t
G.E.C. would be
unlikely to
have been able to escape on
this basis (see ·p.689;
cf.
Jones v. Tivoli Collieries
(1966) Qd.R.140), and Deane
J.
would
in
any event hold the employer
vicariously liable (p.694).
The same does not follow in relation to the action against
-- 8 of 21 --
8
Hitachi.
Furthermore,
,as
. a
practical
matter
it
might
be
impossible
to
prove
the
negligence
of
the
independent
contractor
(for
whose
negligence
the
employer
would
arguably
be
liable)
unless
that
contractor
were
a
party to the action.
I
do
not
suggest
for
a moment
that
G.E.C.
's.
solicitors
encouraged
the
plaintiffs solicitors
to
bring
in
the
extra
defendants.
Indeed
there
·was>
some
attempt
at
discouragement.
However,
the
defend~nt's
solicitor
was
not
instructed to
give the assurance
that
would
make
the
joinder
unnecessary,
and
was
riot
prepared
to
admit
the
legal
consequence
which
his
counsel
now
suggests
to
be
clearly
established
by
authority
(i.e.
vicarious
liability
for
Dr.
Low'·s
acts)
..
The
period
under.
the
statute
of
limitations
was
about
to
expire.'
At
that
time
there
·was
little
more
than
a
bare
denial
of negligence
in
the defence of
G.E.C
..
The
plaintiffs'
advisers
0
0
must have
been
in
a
far less
assured
position
than
might
now
be
thought with the
.
benefit
.
of hindsight,
after
successful
0
litigation
against the
first
two
defendants.
At
that
stage
I
should
think the claims could
be
regarded as
fairly
hazardous
litigation,
and
the
solicitors
for the
plaintiffs
could not
afford·to
leave
any
stone unturned.· In the circumstances
I
think
that
the joinder
was a
reasonable precaution
..
It
may
be
regarded
as something done
out of
an abundance
of caution, but the
solicitors
could not afford to leave
any
possible
gap
or
avenue
of escape in
litigation
of this
kind.
It
may
also
be noted
that
after
the joinder, the
first
and second defendants
saw
fit
to
deliver notices of contribution
and indemnity against the
additional
parties~
After the defendants settled their
-- 9 of 21 --
C)
()
9
differences,
the
plaintiffs
took
no
further
steps against
the
third
and
fourth
defendants.
I
accept
the
submission
of
counsel
for the
plaintiffs
that
the joinder
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
There
is
no
reason
to
regard the
costs of
and
incidental to
the
joinder of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
as
other
than
ordinary
costs in
the
action.
It
is
not appropriate to
deprive
the
plaintiffs
of these
costs
by
special
order, or to refuse to
give
them
the
benefit
of
any
costs of
this
kind
which have been
specifically
reserved.
Directions
to
Taxing Master
The
defendants submitted
that there
should
be
a
direction
that
the
actions
be
taxed as
one
large matter.
I
originally
assumed
this
submission
to
relate
only
to counsel's
fee
.on
brief
and
work
done
thereafter,
having
regard
to the fact that
from
the
end
of
Quly 1992
all
matters
were
co-ordinated
and
in
due
course
()
all
matters
were
able to
be
set
down
at
the
one time
for the
one
hearing.
However
the
submission
is
wider than
this.
It
seeks
a
direction that
all
17
actions
be
taxed as
one
matter.
I
do
not
regard
this
as
feasible or
reasonable.
It
is
true that
there
was
some
co-ordination
from
the outset
and
that
the
one
firm
of
solicitors
has
acted for
all.
However
the actions
were and
remain
separate actions asserting separate rights.
This
is
not
to
say
that
the
Taxing Master should not take into
account the
economies
of
effort
and
scale
which have been
able
.
to
be
achieved.
It
seems
to
me
that the
same
result
ought to occur.upon
taxation as one large matter (with appropriate
a~lowance
for the
-- 10 of 21 --
10
work
done
on
behalf
of. each
of
17
individual
plaintiffs)
as
it
would
if·
there
were
17
taxations
(each
taking properly
into
account
the
fact that
the
work
was
done
in
the
course
of
one
co-ordinated
exercise).
Mr.
Williams
Q.C.
for
the
plaintiffs
submitted
that
a
single taxation
11
would
have
the
practical effect
of
diminishing
significantly
amount
that
would
be
allowed
to
the
plaintiffs
for care
and
consideration
and
would
also
confine the
plaintiffs
to
recovering
one
fee
on
brief
11
• I
do
not
think
that
these
consequences
would
necessarily
follow.
c=J
The
case
for
viewing
the
work
as
a
single
co-ordinated.
exercise
is
considerably.stronger
after
27th
July,
1992.
From
that
time on,
all
the actions
were
in
one
stream,
including the
1 7
cases
.
the subject
of
today'
s
applications.
The
following
circumstances
will
no
doubt
be
noted·by
the
Taxing
Master.
Ten
of the actions
were
still
alive
at
the
first
day
of
trial.
The
trial
was
expected
to
run
for
20
days,
but
concluded
in
13
days.
0
By
that
time
five actions
had
settled
and
five
proceeded
to
Q
judgment.
The
total
of the
damages
and
interest
in the five
matters
that
proceeded to.
judgment
is
about $1,000,000. Apart
from
evidence concerning conditions
in the paint
shop,
all
the
expert
·
evidence concerning the
.
site
.
and work methods
was
applicable to
all
actions.
The
case
on
liability
resembled
a
single case, with adaptations according
to
whether the
plaintiff
was·a
paint
shop worker
or
a Bay 6
worker, and
adaptations
on
the
part of each
plaintiff
to bring himself or herself within the
relevant environment. Similarly, the medical evidence
came from
a
limited
number
of doctors,
and
the discussion of the relevant
condition
was
applicable to all
claimants, but
a
separate case
0
-- 11 of 21 --
11
had
to
be
prepar~d
in
relation
to
each
..
There
was
to
a
large
extent
a common
stream
of
medical
advice
and
opinion, although
a
separate
case
was
advanced
in
relation
to ·the
particular
symptoms
and
life
of
each
individual
plaintiff.
In
my
view
it
is
essential that
each
case.be
separately
taxed.
I
consider
it
unnecessary
to
direct
whether
the
fee
on
brief
be
allowed
as
a
single
brief
or
as
separate
briefs,
but
note
that
if
a
single
fee
on
brief
is
allowed,
it
will
still
be
(
~\/)
necessary
to
apportion
it
between
the respective
plaintiffs.
I
also
note
that
if
separate
fees
on
brief
are
allowed
as
such,
their total
ought
not
to
exceed
that
which would
be
appropriate
for
a
single
brief
with
respect to
all
matters.
One
cannot
escape
the
reality
that
there
was
one
counsel (with
a
junior)
appearing.~n
the
one
court in the
one
l~rge
forensic exercise.
It
is
hardly necessary
for
me
to
say
that
the
engagement
of
senior
counsel
was
justified
in
such
a
matter,
and
that neither
( I
counsel nor
the
solicitors
ought
to
be unduly
disadvant.ag,ed~
from
~j
(
the
fact that
through
intelligent
co-ordination
and
a
good
sense
of
relevancy they
were
able to
run
the
litigation
in
a
relatively
economical
fashion.
In the
absence
of
a
direction for
combined
taxation there.
will
be
a
separate
bill
with respect to
each
plaintiff.
Having
regard to the
above
discussion
I
do
not consider
it
necessary to
give
any
specific directions to the
Taxing Master
other than
that
the
engagement
of senior counsel
was
justified;
and,
.
in
case
there is
any doubt about
it,
that the costs of the appearances
in the course of the .case
management
procedures ought to
be
regarded as costs of each party in the cause; and of course,
-- 12 of 21 --
12
consistently
with
the
earlier
discussion,
that
the
plaintiffs'
costs
of
and
incidental to
the
joinder of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
~art
of the
plaintiffs'
costs in
the
cause.
The
effect
of
offers to
settle
In
three instances
it
was
submitted
that
a
special
order
ought
to
be
made
against the
defendants
for
solicitor
and
client
costs
by
reason
of the
making
of
offers
to
settle.
The
applications
were
made
in
Davidson,
Mastin
and
Mahoney. They
are
based
upon
R.S.C.
0.26
r.9(1).
It
provides
"where
the
plaintiff
makes
an
offer
to
settle
which
is
not accepted
by
the
defendant
and
the
plaintiff
obtains
a
judgment
no
less
favourable than
the
offer
to
settle
the
court
shall
order the
defendant
to
pay
the
plaintiff's
costs
fixed on·a
solicitor
and
client
basis
1
unless the
defendant
shows
that
another order
for costs
is
proper
in
the circumstances."
Mr.
Williams
Q.C.
submitted
that
the
spirit
of the
rule
ought
to
cover
settlements
as
well.
However,
the
letter
of the
rule
does
not,
and
quite plainly
this
rule
does
not authorise
me
to
make
0
0
an orde·r
for
the
payment
of
solicitor
and
client
costs in cases
0
where no judgment
has been
obtained.
I
do
not think
it
would be
a
correct exercise of
my
general discretionary·power
on
costs to
make
such
an
order
when
the·
rule
is
not
satisfied,
unless there
0
was some
special
·circumstance such as impropriety
on
the
part
of
the defendant
or
wanton
conduct leading
to
wasted
costs
(Fountain
v.
International
Produce (1988)
81
A.L.R. 397, 400).
There
are
no
such
allegations here.
However
in
Mr-.· · Mahoney' s
action
where
a ·
judgment
was
obtained
which was
substantially
more
favourable to
Mr. Mahoney
than the· offer·
which ·the defendants refused, there.
is
every
-- 13 of 21 --
13
reason
why I
should give
him
the
benefit
of
the
discretion
conferred
by
0.26
r.9(1).
Orders
I
shall
now
formulate
orders
in
all
matters.
The
first
five
are the matters
in
which judgments
will
be pronounced.
The
remaining twelve
matters
will consist
of orders for costs in
matters
which
have been
settled.
1 .
Miriam
Becin
No.
2123
of
1988
Judgment
for the
plaintiff
for
$471,532.44 with
costs to
be
taxed
including
all
reserved
costs.
Direct the
Taxing Master
-
(a)
the
cpsts of
and
incidental to
the joinder of the
third
and
fourth defendants are
a
part of
the
plaintiff's
costs
of
the
action;
(b)
the costs of
appearances
in
the course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the cause;
(~)
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
2. William
Parnell
Koch No.
4672
of
1987
Judgment
for the
plaintiff
for
$126,548.61
against the
first
and
second
defendants with costs including
all
reserved costs to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing Master
-
(a)
the costs of
and
incidental to the joinder of the
third
and
fourth defendants are
a
part of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
(b) The
costs of appearances in the course of case
management
procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause;
-- 14 of 21 --
14
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
.
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
3.
Anthony
Mahoney
No.
3249
of
1988
Judgment
for
the
plaintiff
against
the
first
and
second
defendants
for
$146,998.30
with
costs
including
all
reserved
costs, ·to
be
taxed-on
a
solicitor
and
client
basis.
Direct
Taxing Master
-
(a)
·the
costs
of
and
incidental to
.the
joinder
of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
cl
the
action;
(b)
the
costs
of
appearances
in
the course of
case
management
0
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the
cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in the
circumstances.
4.
Martin
Murphy No.
4669
of
1987
Judgment
for the
plaintiff
against the
first
and
second
defendants-for
$134,968.96 with
costs
including
all
reserved
0
costs to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing Master
(a)
the
costs of
and
incidental to the joinder of the
third
and
fourth defendants are
a
part of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
(b)
the costs of
appearances
in the course of case
management
procedures should be regarded as
cost~
in the cause;
( c')
the
engagement
of senior counsel
was
reasonable
in the
circumstances.
5. Slav Spasovki
No. 1193
of
1989
-- 15 of 21 --
1 5
Judgment
for
the
plaintiff
against the
first
and
second
defendants
for
$46, 440.
30
with
costs
including
all
reserved
costs
to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing
Master
-
{a)
the
costs
of
and
incidental to
the
joinder of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs
of.
the
action;
{b)
the
costs
of
appearances
in
the
course
of
case
management
()
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the
cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
6. John
Smith
No.
2799
of
1988
Order
the
first
and second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs
of
and
incidental to
the action,
includirig
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing
Master
(~)
(a)
the
costs of
and
incidental to the joinder of the
third
and
fourth defendants are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
(b) the
costs of
appearances
in the course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
.the cause;
(c) the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable in. the
circumstances.
7. Robert Jorgen
Anderson
No.
4106
of
1988
Order
the
first
and second defendants to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs of
and
incidental to the action, including
all
reserved
costs, to
be taxed.
Direct Taxing Master
-- 16 of 21 --
16
(a)
the
costs
of
and
incidental to
the
joinder of
the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are·a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
(b)
the costs of
appearances
in
the
course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs
in
the
cause;
(c)
·the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in the
circumstances.
8.
Glen
William
Mcilroy
No.
4673
of
187
Order
the
first
and
second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
cost~
of
and
iricidental
to
the a6tion, including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing Master
-
(a)
the costs of
and
incidental to
the joinder of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
0
0
(b)
the
costs of
appearances
in
the course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in the
cause;
0
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in the
circumstances.
9 .
Keith
David Wyatt
No. 4667
of
1987
Order
the
first
and second defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs'' of
and·
incidental to the action, including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing Master
-
(a) the costs of·and incidental to the joinder of the third
and
fourth defendants
are·a part of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
-- 17 of 21 --
()
()
1 7
(b)
the
costs
of
appearances
in
the
course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the
cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
10.
Wasyl
Saporoshetz
No.
4665
of
1987
Order
the
first
and
second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs of
and
incidental to
the action,
including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing
Master
(a)
the
costs of
and
incidental to
the joinder of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
(b)
·
the costs of
appearances
in
the
course
of case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the
cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
(_) 11.
Phillip
Ross
McDonald
No.
194
of
1988
Order
the
first
and
second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs of
and
incidental to the action, including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing Master
(a)
the costs of
and
incidental to the joinder of the
third
and
fourth defendants are
a
part of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
(b)
the costs of appearances
in the course of case
management
procedures should be regarded as costs in the cause;
(c) the engagement
of senior counsel
was
reasonable
in-
the
circumstances.
-- 18 of 21 --
18
12. Robert
James
Thorpe
No.
4666
of
1987
Order
the
first
and
second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs
of
and
incidental to
the
action,
including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing
Master
(a)
the costs
of
and
incidental to
the joinder of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the
action;
(b)
the
costs
of
appearances
in
the
·course
of
case
management
Q
pr6cedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of·
senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
13.
Raymond
Peter
Davidson
No. 4671
of
1987
Order
the
first
and
second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs of
and
incidental to
the
action,
including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
0
Direct
Taxing Master
- 0
(a)
the costs
of·and
incidental to the joinder of the
third
and
fourth defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
G
(b)
the costs of appearances
in the course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in the cause;
(c) the
engagement
of senior counsel
was
reasonable
in the
circumstances.
14. Michael Spring
No. 2843
of
1988
Order the
first,~nd
second defendants-to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs of
and
incidental to the action,
.
including
all
reserved
costs, to be taxed.
-- 19 of 21 --
19
Direct
Taxing
Master
-
(a)
the
costs of
and
incidental to
the
joinder of
the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the
action;
(b)
the
costs of
appearances
in
the course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the
cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
(
15.
Harriet
Betty
Ketland
No.
4668
of
1987
(_)
Order
the
first
and second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs
of
and
incidental to
the
action,
including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing Master
(a)
the
costs of
and
incidental to
the joinder of the
third
and
fourth defendants are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's.costs
of
the
action;
(_) (b)
the
costs of
appearances
in the course of
case
mana,<;ement
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
16.
Simon
Peter
Mastin
No. 4670
of
1987
Order
the
first
and second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs of
and
incidental to
the
action, including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing Master
(a) the costs of
and
incidental to
th~
joinder of the third
and
fourth defendants are
a
part of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
-- 20 of 21 --
20
(b)
the costs
of
appearances
in
the
course
of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the
cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
17.
Colin
Francis
Willis
No.
2217
of
1989
Order
the
first
and
second
defendants
to
pay
the
plaintiffs
costs
of
and
incidental to
the
action,
including
all
reserved
costs, to
be
taxed.
Direct
Taxing
Master
(a)
the
costs
of
and
incidental to
the joinder of the
third
and
fourth
defendants
are
a
part
of the
plaintiff's
costs of
the action;
0
(b)
the
costs of
appearances
in the
course of
case
management
procedures should
be
regarded as
costs in
the
cause;
(c)
the
engagement
of senior
counsel
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
0
-- 21 of 21 --
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