Council of the City of Gold Coast v Reeves & Ors [1993] QSC 93
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State Reportin ·Bureau
TRANSCRIPT OF
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SUPREME
COURT OF
QUEENSLAND
CIVIL
JURISDICTION
MACKENZIE J
No
2051
of
1989
COUNCIL
OF THE
CITY
OF
GOLD
COAST
and
PETER REEVES,
KENNETH
PARISH SCOTT,
ANTHONY
DEREK
SWIFT
MANGNALL,
WILLIAM
THOMAS
NOEL
REEVE, JOHN RICHARD
EDWARD
KENT
trading
as
11
GIBB AUSTRALIA"
and
CARDNO
& DAVIES AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
and
C E
HEATH
UNDERWRITING & INSURANCE
(AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
(sued
in
its
own
right
and
as
representatives of certain
Lloyds'
Underwriters),
ASSICURAZIONI GENERAL
DI TRIESTE E VENIZID (UK)
and
EAGLE STAR
INSURANCE
COMPANY
LIMITED
and
GIBB AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
and
1
Plaintiff
First
Defendants
Second Defendant
First
Third
Party
Second Third
Party
4th Floor. ThP. Law Courts. Georve Street. Brisbane. 0. 4000 Telenhon.J?..' f07l 227
4:~1in. Fac~imilP! {()7) ??7
;:;.<;~?
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GIBE AUSTRALIA
PTY
LTD
BRISBANE
..
DATE
05 I
04/93
..
JUDGMENT
Third
D'efendant
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HIS HONOUR: These are mirror image applications for
declarations concerning the scope of professional indemnity of
a professional indemnity insurance policy. The matter
involves having that issue, which arises as between the second
defendant and the first third party, determined before trial.
Notwithstanding that the trial date is set for 17 May and
several weeks have been set aside for it, all parties express
reasons, including the saving of time at the trial, in favour
of having the point heard now rather than at trial.
Notwithstanding my misgivings over the risk associated with
the possibility of an appeal against this decision delaying
the trial, the parties indicated that they were desirous of
keeping the trial date and, if an appeal were advised, would
approach the Court of Appeal for an expedited hearing which
they felt was feasible because of the narrow point of
construction involved. The brevity of the reasons that follow
reflects the objective of maximising the time available for
the appeal process should any party be advised to appeal.
The point in issue is whether the first third party, which I
shall call "Heath", is liable to indemnify the second
defendant, which I shall call "Cardno Davies", under a
professional indemnity insurance policy entered into on or
about 30 June 1987. It seems to be common ground that Cardno
Davies and the first defendant, which I shall call "Gibb",
were joint venturers under the name of Damcorp in a project
involving works on the Hinze Dam, and that the negligence
alleged by the plaintiff, Gold Coast City Council, which I
shall call "The council" arose from activities of Gibb and not
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J)
Cardno
Davies.
Mr
Gore
soughb
leave
to
appear
on
beha~f
of the council
on
this
hearing
on
the
basis
that
his
client
had
a
sufficient
interest
in
the
outcome,
principally
by
reason
of the
10
difference in
sums
available
to
meet damages,
if
awarded,
if
one
or other
views
of Heath's
liability
prevailed
and
the
effect
of
this
on
the
plaintiff's
consideration of possible
settlements
if
there
was
a
shortfall.
20
I
took
the
v~ew,
notwithstanding
an
objection
from
Mr
Sofronoff,
that
Mr
Gore's
client
had
sufficient interest
to
justify
leave
being
granted
and
such
leave
was
given.
The
proposal
for
the insurance
cover contained
three questions
30
whichare
conveniently
referred to hereafter
as "Question 19".
They
were,
"Does
the proposer
require
coverage
for:
(a)
Their
whole
liability
in
joint
venture?
(b)
Liability
in respect of
work
physically
performed
by
them? ~
(c)
Liability
of
joint
venture?"
There were boxes provided so
that
a
"Yes"
or
"No"
answer
could
be
indicated
and Cardno Davies
indicated
"Yes"
to
each
of
those questions.
Cardno Davies accepted,
by
the execution of
the proposal,
that:
"The
proposed
form
shall
be
the basis of the contract
and
shall
be deemed
a
part of the
policy/certificate
as
if
annexed
thereto
and deemed a
part thereof."
The
certificate
of insurance declared that
Heath
was bound
in
accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the
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certificate and in accordance with the insurance clauses
attached to it. The preamble in the document so described
recited that the insured, ''Named in the proposal being the
basis of this insurance'' had made a written proposal
containing particulars and statements which it was agreed were
the basis of the contract and were to be considered as
incorporated therein.
I should mention that there was nothing between the time of
the proposal and the time of finalising the policy that
suggested that the request for joint venture coverage had been
refused or, for that matter, even discussed, although Mr
Sofronoff submitted that what was offered by Heath did not, on
its face, refer to joint venture cover. One can see that if
what was sought to be covered in the proposal was varied by
the insurer, but that the policy incorporated the proposal
into the agreement, there would be a question about the extent
to which the remainder of the proposal was incorporated into
the policy. However, that is not this case.
It is in that context that the critical issue in the
application is to be viewed. By Clause 1(a) of the insuring
clauses the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured for
breach of professional duty by reason of any negligent act,
error or omission, whenever and wherever committed, on the
part of the insured or its employees.
Mr Sofronoff, for Heath, submitted that the construction of
Clause 1 (a) is that it does not extend to liabilities for
which Cardno Davies is contractually liable by reason of
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J)
its
participation
in
the
joint
venture
agreement.
It
extended
only
to
breach
of
professional
duty
by
Cardno
Davies
itself.
He
relied
on
a
line
of
authorities
to
the
effect that,
where
there
is
inconsistency
between
the proposal
form and
the
policy, the
terms
of the policy
prevail.
The
authorities
to
which he
referred
are
conveniently
set
out
in
paragraph
6
of
his outline
and
I
will
not read
them
into
the record.
Mr
Gotterson,
for
Cardno
Davies,
submitted
that
the proposal
had,
by
express
words, been
incorporated
into
the
policy.
He
submitted,
in
effect,
there
was
no
express exclusion of
joint
venture
liability
and
that
there
was,
at
worst,
an
ambiguity
in
Clause
1
(a)
which
should
be
resolved
in
favour
of
his
client
by
resorting
to
the
terms
of the proposal.
He
co:r:1eentrated
on the
phrase,
"On
the
part
of",
submitting
that
it
was-not
a
term
of
art
and
that,
therefore,
it
was
.&ppropriate,
by
reference to
Clause
1(a)
and
question
19
in
the proposal,
to
construe
it
as extending
to acts
on
the
part
of the
joint
venturer for
whose
negligent acts, errors or
omissions
the
insurer
was
liable.
Alternatively,
he
submitted
that
words
to
like effect
should
be imported
into
Clause
1
(a)
to effect
the true intent
of the
parties.
He
relied
on
a
line
of cases,
which
are
set
out in
paragraph
5
of his outline, for
the proposition that
where
the proposal
and
the
certificate
of
insurance both incorporate the proposal
into the contract,
they should be
read
and
construed together to arrive at
the
true contract.
Mr
Gore
supported the proposition that the policy extended to
cover Cardno Davies.
He
submitted that the three separate
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questions
in
question
19
could only
be
sensibly
read
as being
directed
to
coverage
for
joint
venture
liabilities.
He
submitted
that
the
words
of
Clause
1
(a)
were,
in
any
event,
without the help of the proposal,
wide enough
to
cover
Cardno
Davies.
He
submitted
that
even
if
Cardno
Davies'
liability
was
in contract
and
founded
on
acts
or
omissions
of
Gibb,
the
policy defined the
type
of
claim
and
not the type
of
legal
liability.
In substance the
claim
was
for
breach
of
professional
duty
on
the
part
of
Cardno
Davies
by
reason of
any
negligent
act,
error
or
omission.
He
submitted,
on
the
basis
of the
authorities
in
paragraph
9
of his outline, that
a
narrow
or
pedantic
approach
should not
be
taken
to the
construction
of
professional
indemnity
clauses.
It
is
not necessary
to
refer
to other
refinements of
his
argument
in
view
of the conclusion
that
I
reach.
In
my
view,
the case
falls
within the category of cases
where
the true
meaning
of the
contract
can be
determined
by
reading
the proposal
and
the
words
of the insuring clauses together.
When
that is
done any
ambiguity
or lack of
clarity
within the
meaning
of Clause
1
(a) disappears in
favour of
interpretation
that
the policy extends
to
cover
any
liability that
Cardno
Davies
may
be found
to
have
incurred as
joint venturer.
It
is
not
a
case
where
the
conflict
between
the
words
of the
proposal
and
the
words
of the policy are of such
a
nature that
the principle relied
on by
Mr
Sofronoff applies.
I
will therefore formally determine that the issue of
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construction
should
be
determined
separately
from
the question
of
election,
which
is
another
issue
on
the pleadings.
The
orders
that
I
make
are the
following:
that
the
Heath
summons
is
dismissed.
On
the
Cardno
Davies
summons
I
make
a
declaration in
terms
of
paragraph
1 .
I
order
that
the
respondent
pay
the
applicant's
costs to
be
taxed
on
the council
summons.
I
grant leave
to
Mr
Gore
to
appear.
I
order
that
the
costs of the
application
be
the
council's
costs in the
cause
against
Heath.
HIS
HONOUR:
That
is
my
intention, that
having
been
given
leave to
appear,
he
should
have
the costs of the application.
The
view
I
take
is
it
was
not unreasonable
for the council
to
appear
on
the matter with
a
view
to protecting
its
interests
in
the matter
and, having given leave,
I
think
that that
order
is
appropriate.
HIS
HONOUR:
Yes,
I
propose
to
allow the order to stand.
If
there
is
any
question of appeal
and you
wish
to
appeal
against
that
as well,
I
will give
you
leave.
MR
BRANDIS: I
ask for leave.
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HIS
HONOUR:
I
will
give
you
leave
to
appeal
against costs,
if
you
wish,
in
that
respect.
MR
BRANDIS:
Thank
you,
Your
Honour.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1993/093