Coral Sea Properties Pty Ltd & Batagamma 41 Pty Ltd v Macfadyen [1993] QSC 69
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SUPREME
COURT OF
..
QUEENSLAND
CIVIL
JURISDICTION
THOMAS
J
No 1
of
1993
CORAL
SEA PROPERTIES PTY
LTD
First Plaintiff
and
BATAGAMMA
41
PTY LTD
Second
Plaintiff
and
JAMES
MACFADYEN
Defendant
CAIRNS
..
DATE
26/02/93
..
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
1
4th Floor, The Law Courts, George Street, Brisbane, Q. 4000 Telephone: (07) 227 4360. Facsimile: (07) 227 5532
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260293
HIS
HONOUR:
This
is
a
motion
for
judgment
under Order
57
Rule
2.
Final
judgment
in the action
is
sought.
The
relief
that
is
requested
is
a
mandatory
injunction
requiring the
defendant
to pull
down
and
remove
the
partially
completed
house
which he
is
constructing
upon
the allotment
which he
purchased
some
time
ago from
the
plaintiffs.
The
plaintiffs
are
real
property
developers
who
have
developed
an
estate situated
west
of
Tolga
in
the
Atherton Tableland.
It
is
a
rural residential
subdivision
known
as
the
Rangeview
Park
Estate.
The
allotments
purchased
by
the
defendant
in
December
1990
consist
of
approximately
1.2
hectares.
Apparently
when
completed
there will
be
101
lots.
54
of these are described
as
being
developed
and
51
of
them have been
sold including the
one which
was
sold to the
defendant.
The
defendant
started to build
a
modest
steel-framed
house
in
about October
1991.
He
has proceeded
quite
slowly
since
that
time doing
a
little
at
a
time as
and
when money
has
become
available to
him.
The
reason
for his
slow
progress has been
the
result
of financial troubles
due
to the collapse of his
business.
The
plaintiffs
rely
upon
a
covenant contained in
a
deed dated
14
December 1990
in
which
the purchaser of the allotment
undertook
certain things in relation to
any
building
that
JUDGMENT
2
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60
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260293
might be
erected
upon
the
land.
The
clause
that
is
relied
upon
is:
11
(d)
That
the
purchaser
will
expeditiously
complete
the
erection
of
any
said
dwelling
house
or
shed
to
be
erected
on
the said
lot
once
the erection thereof
shall
be
commenced."
Apparently,
a
variety
of dwellings
have been
erected
en
the
estate,
some
of
them
are
heroes
of
quality
whilst others are
quite
modest
homes
comparable,
I
think,
to
the
style that
the
defendants
house
will
be
when
it
is
completed.
Its
current
state
of
development
is
to
be
seen
from
a
number
of
photographs.
The
most
recent
of
these
shows
that
the
..
structural
members
are
complete,
the roof
has been
fixed, the
front
cladding
has been
fixed
to
the front
wall,
and
the
verandah
is
virtually
complete.
However,
cladding
has
not yet
been
fixed
to
the side walls or the
rear
wall.
The
verandah
10
20
floor
is
in place
but
the floor for the
enclosed
part
of the
JO
house has
not yet
been
laid
although
joists
and
bearers are
fixed.
The
stairways
have
not yet
been
erected.
A
certain
amount
of scaffolding
is
still
fixed
which
might be
thought
by
some
to
be
somewhat
unsightly.
However,
the aspect
as
a
whole
is
hardly
off-putting.
The
defendant has kept
the
40
site
clean:
he has had
it
slashed
from
time
to
time and
overall
it
presents
a
relatively tidy
appearance. There
is
no
evidence as
to the probable cost of
completion but
it
might be
described as close to substantially
completed.
50
The
defendant says
that
he hopes and
expects to
be
able to
complete
it
within another three
months
although counsel for
the
plaintiff
points out
that similar expectations have been
mentioned over an extended period. In short,
it
has been in
60
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260293
the
process of
erection
now
for
a
period of
about
16
months.
On
the material
before
me
it
would
seen
that
the
defendant
is
in
breach of
the
covenant
that
has
been
quoted
above.
However,
the
remedy
which
the
plaintiff
seeks
is,
to
say
the
least,
surprising
and
may
be
the
result
of
frustration
or
overreaction
to
perceived
injury.
In
my
vi'=:w
it
.is
impossible
to
see
why
damages
for
any
bre~h
of
this
covenant
would
not
be
an
adequate
remedy.
Mr
Priestly
for the
plaintiff
submitted
that
in
their
nature
such
damages
would
be
difficult
to
prove
or
quantify.
That
may
well
be
true
and
its
truth
may
lie
in the
fact that
they
may
not
be
significant
damages
at
all.
That,
however,
is
an
exercise for another
day.
It
depends
upon
the extent to
which
the
Court
regards
the
incomplete
structure
as
an
eyesore or
as
something
that
would
deter
other
persons
from
purchasing other
lots
on
the
estate.
These
comments
are
relevant
to
one
of the
matters
regarded as
relevant to
deciding
whether
a
mandatory
injunction
should
be
granted
as
set
out
in
Morris
v.
Redland
Bricks Limited
(1970) A.C. pp
665
-
666.
It
seems
to
me
that
if
there are
any damages
shown on
the material before
me
they
are
not
likely to
be
particularly significant.
I
note
that the
covenant
requiring expeditious completion of
dwellings
once
commenced
does not
go on
to confer
a
right to
pull
down
such
structures.
In other
words,
the parties
did
not see
fit
to confer
upon
the
plaintiff
an
express right
such
as he
now
seeks to obtain in the discretion of the Court.
One
of the criteria expressed in Morris v. Redland Bricks is
JUDGMENT
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260293
that
a
mandatory
injunction will
not
be
granted unless the
plaintiff
shows
a
very
strong
probabili~y
that
grave
damage
will
accrue
to
him
in the future.
In
my
opinion,
the
plaintiff
has
not
indicated
such
a
matter
in
this
case.
All
the indications are,
in
my
view,
to
the contrary.
10
The
other
main
criterion
involves the cost to the
defendant of
doing
works
that
would
follow
from
the granting of the
injunction.
In
my
view,
it
would
be
unfortunate,
wasteful
and
destructive
of
an
existing asset
if
the
existing
fairly
substantially
coppleted
structure
were
required
to
be
torn
down.
This
would
not
be
a
factor that
would
assist
me
in
exercising
any
discretion
in
favour
of the
plaintiff.
20
The
defendant,
I
apprehend,
is
as anxious
to
complete
the
house as
the
plaintiff is.
He
has been
stopped
from
doing
so
30
merely
by
impecuniosity.
It
would
be
surprising
if,
in
times
of
an economic
recession,
judges
exercised
their
discretion
so
as
to
make
orders against
people
who
were
short of
money
to
pull
down
substantially built
houses
which
they
wish
to
complete
but are delayed because they
do
not
have enough
money.
Whatever views
others
might have
I am
certainly
not
constrained to exercise
such
a
power
unless the legal right to
require the
house
to
be
pulled
down
is clearly
shown.
In
the
present matter
I
consider
that all
the factors that
might
justify the granting·of
such
an
injunction are
contra-indicated.
I
shall therefore dismiss the motion.
The
question of costs arises.
JUDGMENT
5
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260293
HIS
HONOUR: I
think
that
the
plaintiffs
probably
let
themselves
become
unduly
frustrated.
The
writ
was
issued
on
7
January
1993.
It
seems
to
me
that
in
seeking
a
mandatory
injunction,
and
a
mandatory
injunction
only,
the
plaintiffs
insisted
upon
the
wrong
remedy.
The
defendants
have
been
brought
to
Court
by
the
plaintiffs
and
the
defendants
have
succeeded.
The
usual
rule
as
to costs
should apply.
I
shall,
therefore,
dismiss the
motion
and
the action
with
costs
to
be
taxed.
JUDGMENT
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1993/069