Beaumont, Re; Re Dean [1993] QSC 27
IN
THE SUPREME
COURT
OF
QUEENSLAND
O.S.
No.
45
of
1993
IN
THE
MATTER
of the
Succession
Act
1981
as
amended
-
and
-
IN
THE
MATTER
of the
Will
of
BURTON
WILLIAM
BEAUMONT
late
of
134
Bramston
Street,
Tarragindi,
Brisbane
in
the
State
of
Queensland,
Retired,
Deceased
-
and
-
IN
THE
MATTER
of
an
Application
by
BEVERLEY
MARION
DEAN
under
Part
4
of
the
said
Act
REASONS
FOR
JUDGMENT
- WHITE
J.
Delivered
on
the
17th
day
of
February,
1993
Counsel:
Applicant/respondent
-
solicitor
Respondent/applicant
-
solicitor
Solicitors:
Graham
Davies
&
Associates,
town
agents for
O'Dwyer
&
Bradley
for the applicant/respondent
McCarthy
&
Holzberger
for the respondent/applicant
Hearing Date: 17th February,
1993
7
-- 1 of 24 --
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
No. 1033 of 1989
Brisbane
Before Justice White
[Richards v. Richardson & Ors]
BETWEEN:
KRISTINE ROSEANN RICHARDS
Plaintiff
AND:
KEVIN HARRY RICHARDSON
First Defendant
AND:
BUNGE PROPERTIES PTY. LTD. Second Defendant
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD OF QUEENSLAND
Defendant by Election
AND:
SUNCORP INSURANCE AND FINANCE
Third Party
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - WHITE J.
Judgment delivered 03/03/1993
CATCHWORDS:
Counsel:
Solicitors:
Lord Campbell' s action - employee foreman killed
when crushed by forklift - unsafe place of work -
unsafe system of work - system of informal signals
with truck driver deceased employee with
authority and skills.
Mr. P. Feely for plaintiff
Mr. R. Douglas for first defendant and defendant by
election
C.A. Sciacca and Associates for plaintiff
McCrea Jones for first defendant and defendant by
election
Hearing Dates: 18th and 19th February, 1993
-- 2 of 24 --
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
No. 1033 of 1989
BETWEEN:
KRISTINE ROSEANN RICHARDS Plaintiff
AND:
KEVIN HARRY RICHARDSON First Defendant
AND:
BUNGE PROPERTIES PTY. LTD. Second Defendant
AND:
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD OF QUEENSLAND
Defendant by Election
AND: SUNCORP INSURANCE AND FINANCE
Third Party
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - WHITE J.
Judgment delivered 03/03/1993.
The plaintiff is the widow of Garry Ronald Richards ("the
deceased") who died in the afternoon of the 4th September, 1987
when he was crushed by a forklift in the course of his employment
with the second defendant at its premises at Eagle Farm. The
employer was commonly known as Union Steel and was referred to
throughout the trial by that name and it will be convenient to
continue to do so. The plaintiff brings her action on her own
behalf and on behalf of her son Jacob Marcus Richards born on 18th
-- 3 of 24 --
2
December, 1985 pursuant to s.15A of the Common Law Practice Act
1867-1981.
The first defendant was the driver of a prime mover to which
a trailer was attached and from which the deceased was unloading
nine metre length aluminium pipes at the relevant time. The
Workers' Compensation Board has elected to be joined as defendant
and in turn has joined the licensed insurer of the first defendant.
Quantum has been settled between the plaintiff and defendants
in the sum of $214,000. The defendant by election and the third
party have settled the question of contribution as between
themselves. What remains in issue for decision is the liability of
the defendants for the death of the deceased and any question of
contributory negligence.
The deceased held a certificate to operate a forklift at the
time of his death and had done so since 22nd March, 1982. He had
been employed as a forklift operator at Union Steel for about 18
.months and had been a foreman for possibly six to nine months prior
to his death. He was appointed foreman by the site manager at
Union Steel, Mr. Alan Neish, himself a qualified forklift operator,
who described the deceased as a competent foreman and a competent
forklift operator. A fellow employee and forklift driver, Mr.
Frank Lenz, described the deceased as a very good forklift
operator.
Union Steel was engaged in the distribution of steel in the
south-east Queensland area. Its premises at Eagle Farm occupied
about five acres. Trucks would load and unload material at that
-- 4 of 24 --
3
site. It
appears that
most
of the unloading occurred undercover
but
some
took place outside
and
that is
where
the events occurred
giving
rise to the death of
Mr.
Richards. That area
is
shown
in
the photograph Exhibit
1A
taken
shortly after
the deceased
was
killed.
It
depicts
two
large
warehouses
separated
by
a
cement
apron
or
roadway.
The
distance
between
the
warehouses
was
not
given
in
evidence but
it
appears
to
be
a
wide
area able to
accommodate some
four
to five semi-trailers in parallel.
The
truck
on
the
left
of the
photograph
was moved
closer to the
warehouse
on
the
left
after
the accident
to
allow
Mr.
Lenz
to
come
through
at
an
angle
on
a
large
forklift
to
enable the smaller
forklift
to
be
lifted
off
the
deceased.
Mr.
Lenz
estimated
that
truck
originally
to
have been
within four
or five
feet
of the
back
of the
fallen
forklift.
The
smaller
forklift
is
shown
in
Exhibit
1A
as
lying
on
its
side
with
the
underneath
facing the
camera on
a
slight
angle
from
the
semi-trailer
driven
by
the
first
defendant.
The
load
of
aluminium
pipes
can
be
seen
lying
almost
parallel
to
the
semi-
trailer
between
the overturned
forklift
and
the
semi-trailer.
Between
the
first
defendant's
semi-trailer
and
the
warehouse
on
the
right
of the
photograph
can be
seen
a
quantity of
stacked
goods and
materials possibly piping,
resting
on
pieces of
timber
which
protrude out onto
the
apron.
The
first
defendant,
a
self-employed
truck
driver,
had
attended
at
the
premises
of
Union
Steel
approximately
three
times
per
week
for several
years
prior to
the accident.
He
knew
the
deceased
and had spoken
to
him
in the
course
of attending
at
Union
-- 5 of 24 --
4
Steel's premises.
He
had regularly seen the deceased operate the
forklift
and regarded
him
as
a
proficient driver.
The
deceased on
previous
visits
would
direct the
first
defendant
where
to drive his
truck
and
direct
him
as to
what
to
do and
who was
to load his
truck.
The
first
defendant
would
talk to the deceased
if
he had
any problems concerning the loading of
any equipment
or
steel.
On
4th
September,
1987
the
first
defendant
arrived
at
Union
Steel's
premises
already
loaded with the
aluminium
pipes.
He
was
to
load
plate steel at
Union
Steel
and
the pipes
had
to
be
taken
off his
trailer
so
that
the
steel
plate
could
be
put
on
the floor
and
the
pipes reloaded.
The
trailer
was 12
metres long
and
the pipes
were
positioned
on
the
passenger
side
and
closer to
the
rear
of the
trailer.
The
first
defendant discussed
this
with the
deceased
but
can
now
no
longer
recall
the
details
of the conversation.
The
first
defendant
after that
conversation returned to the cabin
of
his
semi-trailer
and
observed
the load being
removed by
the
deceased
by
looking
into
a
side mirror located
on
the
passenger
side
door
of the
prime
mover~
That
mirror
gave
the
first
defendant
vision
down
the
edge
of the
trailer
and
approximately
three to
four
feet
out
from
the side
of the
trailer.
On
the
bottom
of
that
mirror
was
superimposed
another
mirror described
by him
as
a
"spotter"
mirror
which gave
a
wider
angle
of vision
with
some
distortion in
that
the
image
was
slightly larger.
It
allowed
the
first
defendant
to
see
the
ground
close
to the front
of the
semi-
trailer
and
further
out
from
the
trailer
than
was
possible
with
the
standard
mirror.
-- 6 of 24 --
5
The first defendant watched the aluminium pipe being lifted
off the trailer in the passenger mirror continuously until he saw
that the load was a distance of about 12 to 18 inches clear from
the trailer and that there was no part of the load projecting over
the edge of the trailer. The first defendant then changed his eye
contact to the spotter mirror to watch the deceased who was sitting
in the driving position on the forklift. Very shortly after, the
deceased raised his left arm and waved. The first defendant was
unable to recall precisely the deceased's arm movement. In the
witness box he held up his own left arm with the palm of his hand
facing out in a fairly relaxed fashion. He did however say that
whatever its detail it was a signal with which he was quite
familiar from working with the deceased on numerous previous
occasions. He said that if the deceased were positioning the first
defendant's truck which was being backed up such a wave would be an
indication to stop. On the other hand, if the truck were
stationary such a wave would be an indication to move. The first
defendant's semi-trailer on this occasion was stationary and when
the first defendant saw the signal he checked the load to see if it
was still clear, put the semi-trailer into a low gear and moved
forward very slowly. He looked into his driver's side rear vision
mirror noting the timbers supporting the pipes stacked on the
ground on the right hand side of his vehicle close to the trailer
wheels to which I have referred. He did not look in the passenger
side mirror again. The semi-trailer went forward 10 to 12 feet
approximately and the first defendant applied the brakes because
-- 7 of 24 --
6
vehicle was waving "frantically". He then got out of the prime-
mover's cabin.
There were two witnesses to much of what occurred although
neither were watching at the crucial moment. They were Mr. Frank
Lenz, foreman and forklift driver with Union Steel and Mr. Paul
Renz, a truck driver waiting to take up a load.
Mr. Lenz had worked for the second defendant for some six to
nine months prior to the accident as a forklift driver on the same
shift as the deceased. He observed the deceased's conversation
with the first defendant, saw the deceased get on to the forklift
and drive in to take the load of pipes off the first defendant's
semi-trailer. Mr. Lenz himself checked to make sure that the forks
were under both timber lines which were around the pipes so that
the load would not slip off and saw that the load was evenly
balanced. Mr. Lenz described it as "a good lift". He saw the
deceased lift up the load and back the forklift out (in cross-
examination he said that he did not see the forklift reverse back,
transcript p.18 1.33). The semi-trailer was stationary. Mr. Lenz
turned and walked away from the forklift but turned back when he
heard someone yelling. He saw the forklift tipping over and
observed that the back tailgate of the trailer had come into
contact with the load on the forklift. The semi-trailer was moving
forward slowly.
semi-trailer had
By the time he had finished turning around the
stopped. He noted that the forklift was
positioned further back from the side of the first defendant's
vehicle and that it was falling at an angle so that the rear of the
-- 8 of 24 --
7
forklift
was
closer to the
trailer
than the front, in other
words,
that the
forklift
was
not "square on"
to the
trailer.
This
was
confirmed by Mr. Lenz when
he
saw
the
forklift
lying
on
the
ground.
He
also
observed
that the load
was
still
held
up
high
on
the tines
of the
forklift
and
that
the
semi-trailer
had
moved
forward
in
a
straight line.
Mr. Lenz
called to the driver of the truck
parallel
to the
first
defendant's semi-trailer
(and
seen
on
the
left
of the
photograph
Exhibit
1A)
to
move
and
got
a
bigger
forklift
which
was
about
40
metres
away.
That
truck
had
to
be
moved
because
Mr.
Lenz
could not bring the
forklift
in
straight
to
lift
the
small
forklift
off
the deceased. This
was
because
the
small
forklift
was
at
an
angle
to
the
first
defendant's vehicle
and
Mr.
Lenz
could only
effect
a
lift
if
straight
on
to the
small
forklift.
This can
best
be
seen
by
reference to
photograph
Exhibit
1D. Mr.
Lenz
used
the
forklift
to elevate
the
overhead
protection area of the
small
forklift
in
order
to extract
the
deceased.
Mr.
Lenz
agreed
that
the
ends
of the
tines
of the
forklift
closest to
the
tray of the
first
defendant's
trailer
were
well
clear
of the
tray
after
the
fall.
The
other
witness,
Mr.
Renz,
was
seated
in his
truck
facing
towards
the
first
defendant's vehicle waiting
to
load.
His
truck
can
be
seen
above
the
small
forklift
in
the
left
centre of
photograph
Exhibit
1 A.
Mr. Renz
had been
to
Union
Steel's
premises
a
few
times
previously
and had
met
the
deceased.
He
observed
the
deceased
pick
up
the pipes
on
the
forklift,
elevate the
load
above
the
deck
of the
trailer
and
reverse
away
from
the
trailer.
-- 9 of 24 --
8
Although Mr. Renz could not see clearance light between the
load and the trailer because of the angle of his line of sight
(photograph Exhibit 2 demonstrates this; Mr. Renz's truck's left
passenger door is on the front right of the photograph), he was
comfortable that there was clearance. At the coroner's inquest Mr.
Renz gave evidence that he saw the deceased wave after he had
reversed the forklift away from the trailer. He was less confident
of the detail of this when giving evidence on this occasion but
said that he was reasonably sure that the deceased raised his left
hand and waved. He said that in his 15 years experience as a truck
driver such a wave in the circumstances prevailing would be a
signal to the truck driver to move on. Mr. Lenz said that he
looked away for a second or two and when he looked back the truck
was moving forwards. He then saw the forklift start to tip and
fall. He thought that the truck moved six to twelve feet before it
stopped.
Evidence was adduced from a number of witnesses as to safe
practices when using a forklift. The most relevant seems to be the
need to drop a load as soon as possible because forklifts are
unstable with a load in an elevated position. There was a general
consensus that it would be unsafe to turn a forklift to the right
or left when carrying a load in the vicinity of a moving platform
until well clear. Reversing away at right angles to the moving
platform was the agreed method of clearing the platform.
Whether the loading area used on this occasion was confined in
the sense that it created a hazardous work environment was in
-- 10 of 24 --
9
issue.
Mr. Lenz thought that
it
was
just
a
normal working day
neither
busy nor quiet.
There was,
I
find,
on
the balance of the
evidence, an average
amount
of industrial noise. There would seem
to
have been
three trucks in the general area
on
the
apron where
the loading
was
taking place
-
the
first
defendant's,
Mr.
Renz's
waiting to load
and
the
third
truck
which
was moved
to
allow the
large
forklift
in.
It
was
accepted
that
the deceased as
foreman
could
and
did readily direct
the truck drivers
who
came
onto
Union
Steel's
premises
to
move
their
vehicles to appropriate loading
points.
There
was
no
evidence
to
show
that
there
was
want
of
room
on
the
site
generally.
The
driver of the
third
truck
was
able to
move
his
truck quickly
when
directed to
do
so
by Mr.
Lenz
so as
to
clear
the area.
The
steel laid
out
on
the
ground on
the
driver's
side of the
first
defendant's
semi-trailer
near the
warehouse
appears
to
have narrowed
the area.
The
evidence
was
that
there
was
insufficient
room
for the
deceased
to turn his
forklift
with
its
9
metre
wide
load
between
the
first
defendant's
semi-trailer
and
the
third
truck whilst the
first
defendant's
semi-trailer
remained
stationary.
It
is
not,
however,
clear that
it
was
necessary
for
the
deceased
to
turn the
forklift
or
if
that
was
his intention.
Mr.
Lenz
said
that
as
far
as
he
could
recall
the
aluminium
piping
taken
from
the
first
defendant's
trailer
was
going
to
be
put
on
the
opposite
side of the
first
defendant's vehicle
and
that
was
why
his
semi-trailer
was
being
moved
forward.
On
this
view
there
was
no
occasion
for the
deceased
to
do
other
than
go
straight
back,
for
which
Mr.
Lenz
says
that
there
was
sufficient
clearance,
and
then
-- 11 of 24 --
10
to
go forward
when
the
first
defendant's semi-trailer
had
moved
forward out of the
way.
The
case for the
plaintiff against the second defendant, the
employer,
in
submissions was:-
1.
that
no
truck should have been
required to
move
in the
loading process;
2.
that
it
was
negligent not to
have
in place
a
formal
signalling
system between
a
forklift
driver
and
the
driver of
a
truck required to
move
during the loading
process;
3.
that
the
rear
metal
gate
on
the
trailer
of the vehicle
being loaded ought
to
have been
required
to
be
removed
during the loading process;
4.
that
the
workplace
was
permitted
to
be
cramped
and/or
cluttered
and
did not allow
for safe
manoeuvring
by
the
forklift
driver.
The
case
against
the
first
defendant,
the
driver, in
submissions
was:-
1.
that
he
did not
keep
a
proper lookout
that
the
deceased
and
the
load
remained
clear
of his truck
when
he
commenced
moving;
2.
that
he
negligently misinterpreted the deceased's
signal
which
was
"stop"
and
not
"go";
3.
that
he
ought
to
have
removed
the
rear
metal
gate of
his
trailer
before the
unloading process
commenced.
-- 12 of 24 --
11
The appropriate legal principles to be applied were not in
dispute by counsel. They were stated by Gibbs C.J. in MacLean's
Roylen Cruises Pty. Ltd. v. McEwan (1984) 58 A.L.J.R. 423 at
p.425:-
"The duty of the appellant, as the employer of the
respondent, was to take reasonable care to avoid exposing
his employee to unnecessary risk of injury. In a case
such as the present, for the respondent to succeed 'it
must appear, by direct evidence or by reasonable
inference from the evidence, that the defendant
unreasonably failed to take measures or adopt means,
reasonably open to him in all the circumstances, which
would have protected the plaintiff from the dangers of
his task without unduly impeding its accomplishment' :
Vozza v. Tooth & Co. Ltd. (1964) 112 C.L.R. 316 at 319."
There is an obligation on an employer to instruct his employee in
the performance of his work where instructions might reasonably be
thought to be required to secure him from danger of injury,
O'Connor v. Commissioner for Government Transport (1954) 100 C.L.R.
225.
It was not seriously pressed by Mr. Feely for the plaintiff
that the second defendant ought to have prohibited all trucks
coming onto the site to be moved during the loading or unloading
operation. The danger inherent in having two moving bodies in
juxtaposition is recognised, (see in particular the evidence of Mr.
King at transcript p.55) but, in effect, to require drivers to
leave their trucks to be loaded and to return to the cabin only
when the forklift had left the relevant area entirely would not
appear to be called for and would certainly impede the dispatch of
business.
-- 13 of 24 --
12
There was and neither is there any formalised system of
signals between drivers of trucks and forklift operators on the
Union Steel site nor indeed, it would appear, anywhere else in
south east Queensland. Evidence was given of Australian Standards
signals for use between dogmen and crane drivers. The forklift
drivers are familiar with them for use when operating cranes. As
Mr. King, an engineer called by the plaintiff, noted, the crane
driver is usually unable to see the load and is directed by the
dogman as to positioning to effect the lift. In the truck/forklift
situation the forklift operator only is in control and involved in
moving the load. If the driver of the truck is to move he must
know when it is safe to move. Whilst the truck driver must check
from the cabin of his truck - usually with the rear vision mirror -
that there is no impediment to his vehicle's movement, he is
dependent upon the forklift driver communicating with him that it
is safe from the forklift driver's point of view for the truck to
move. What is necessary, as was recognised by Mr. King, is that
there is agreement as to the signals between the forklift driver
and the truck driver. The first defendant had a long association
with the deceased loading and unloading his vehicle with the use of
a forklift. He had a conversation with the deceased on the day of
the accident about the unloading, saw that the load was clear and
saw a signal which, consistent with prior experience, he understood
to mean "go", saw the load was still clear and then moved. Mr.
Renz also saw the signal. He had worked with the deceased before.
The signal was read by him as a signal to move. I cannot conclude
-- 14 of 24 --
13
that the failure to
have
a
formalised system of signals in
operation
on
the
site
was
causative of the
damage
suffered.
The
system
in place, at least
on
this
occasion,
was
satisfactory for
the task in
hand.
It
may
well have been
different
were
the truck
driver
and
forklift
operator
unused
to
working
together.
I
turn to the next
ground
of negligence,
namely,
that
the
second
defendant ought
to
have
required the
rear
metal
gate to
be
removed.
The
evidence
is
clear that
the
aluminium
pipes
came
into
contact with the
metal gate
at
the
end
of the truck. Paint
from
it
was
found on
the
end
of the pipes.
There
was no
suggestion
that
the
paint
got
on
to the pipes
prior to entering
Union
Steel's
premises.
Mr. Renz saw
the pipes
in
contact
with
the
metal
gate.
Mr.
Renz
said
that
such
equipment
is
often
used
in
conjunction with
a
tarpaulin or
if
side gates are
to
be used
on
the
trailer.
In
his
experience the gate
is fitted
into
holes
in
the
trailer
and
is
tied
down
with ropes although
there
were
no
ropes
tying
this
gate
down.
Mr.
Renz
mentioned
that
the gates are quite
heavy and sometimes
get
silted
in
with
dirt
and
are
difficult
to
remove.
The
first
defendant
said
that
it
did not occur
to
him
to
remove
the gate
before the
deceased
starting
unloading.
It
would
appear
to
be
a
complicated
task to
remove
the gate
to
facilitate
loading
and
I
am
not
persuaded
that
any
benefit
gained
on any
particular
occasion
would
not
be
outweighed
by
the disadvantages as
a
general policy.
Finally
it
was
submitted
that
it
was
negligent
of
the
second
defendant
to
permit loading/unloading
to
take place
in
a
confined
area.
As
mentioned above,
I
have
concluded
that
more
likely
than
-- 15 of 24 --
14
not on the available evidence the deceased planned to place the
pipes on the right side of the first defendant's semi-trailer and
that there was no need for him to turn the forklift at all. Even
if this were not so and the deceased thought it necessary to turn
the forklift to take the load elsewhere or further to the right or
to the left the deceased ought to have waited until the first
defendant's truck was quite clear or to have directed the driver of
the third truck positioned behind him to move out of the way. The
deceased was the foreman. He decided how to unload the first
defendant's semi-trailer, with what equipment, and where it was to
take place. He directed the first defendant where to go. He had
the necessary skills to drive a forklift and was seen as competent.
Mr. Neish, the site manager, said that the deceased's skills were
assessed when he commenced employment and he exercised them and in
due course he was made a foreman. No unsafe practices involving
the deceased were identified. He had the experience and authority
to control the work environment with which he was concerned. As
Crockett J. observed in A.W.A. v. Keogh [1985] 3 M.V.R. (Vict) 245
at p.250, a case with features similar to this,
"The employer was entitled to treat the matter as one for
the man doing the job."
Accordingly I do not find any of the grounds of negligence
argued against the second defendant made out.
The plaintiff also pleads negligence against the first
defendant driver. Mr. Richardson was directed by the deceased to
position his semi-trailer for unloading. The obstruction on the
right of his vehicle was known to the deceased. If that
-- 16 of 24 --
15
obstruction
had not been there the
first
defendant might have
looked again finally before
moving
off.
He
did look again
after
the deceased's
wave and
satisfied
himself
that the load
was
clear
and caused
his vehicle to
move
forward.
It
should
also
be
remembered
that
the
first
defendant needed
to
keep
the
way
ahead
under
observation
and
that
he
was
familiar
with the deceased's
method
of
working. There
was no
evidence
to
suggest
that there
was
anything unusual about
this
day.
In
all
the circumstances
I
do
not
find
that
the
first
defendant
negligently failed to
keep
a
proper
lookout.
The
plaintiff
submitted
that
the
first
defendant
negligently
misinterpreted the signal
given
by
the deceased.
There
is
little
more
that
needs
to
be added
about
the signal to
what
I
have
set
out
above.
It
was
not the case
that
only
the
first
defendant
gave
evidence
of seeing
it.
Mr. Renz
did,
was
familiar
with
the
deceased's
work
and
interpreted
it
in
the
same
way
as
the
first
defendant.
I
can
discern
nothing
negligent
in
the
·first
defendant's
response
to
the deceased's
signal.
As
to
the
final
submission
that
the
first
defendant
ought
to
have
removed
the
metal
gate
from
the truck
-
it
was
not
a
practice
and
it
was
for
the
deceased
to
direct that this
be done
if
he
thought
it
necessary.
He
had
the
necessary
skills
in
relation
to
unloading
and had
the
authority to
direct
it. It
was
not
negligent
in
the
first
defendant
to
fail
to
remove
it.
What
happened
on
that
afternoon
was
a
tragic
occurrence.
It
is,
of course,
idle
to
speculate
as
to
what
actually
happened
in
-- 17 of 24 --
16
the brief
moment when Mr. Renz and Mr. Lenz were not looking.
Mr.
King
referred to the rear-wheel steering
mechanism
of
a
forklift
which can cause
it
to turn very quickly.
An
accidental touch
to
the
wheel
or
a
miscalculation as to
how
fast
the semi-trailer
would
move
on seem
not unlikely explanations.
The
fact
remains
that
the
load
was
clear of the truck but
had
not
been dropped immediately
on
clearing
it,
and,
that for
whatever reason, the
deceased turned the
forklift slightly
so
that
the
end
of the pipes
came
into
contact
the with
tailgate
on
the
semi-trailer.
The
deceased
must be
regarded
on
the
evidence as having been
the author of the
event
giving
rise
to his
death.
If
I am
incorrect in
all
or
any
of these findings, the issue
of
quantum
has
been
agreed
between
the
parties.
I
have
perused
counsels' advices
on
apportionment
between
the
plaintiff
and
her
son
and
regard
that
apportionment as proper
whereby
the
infant
son
born
on
18th
December, 1985 was
to
receive
$57,000 and
the
widow
$157,000.
There
will
be judgment
for
the
first
defendant
and
the
defendant
by
election against the
plaintiff.
I
will
hear counsel as
to costs.
-- 18 of 24 --
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
O.S.
No. 45
of
1993
IN
THE MATTER
of the Succession Act
1981
as
amended
-
and
-
IN
THE MATTER
of the
Will
of
BURTON
WILLIAM
BEAUMONT
late
of
134
Bramston
Street,
Tarragindi,
Brisbane
in
the State of
Queensland,
Retired,
Deceased
-
and
-
IN
THE MATTER
of
an
Application
by
BEVERLEY
MARION DEAN
under
Part
4
of the
said
Act
REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
-
WHITE
J.
Delivered
on
the
17th
day
of
February,
1993
Today
is
the
first
return date for directions in
an
application
by
Beverley
Dean
for provision out of the
estate
of
her
late
father,
Burton William
Beaumont
who
died
on
15
April
1992
pursuant
to Part
IV
of the
Succession
Act 1981.
The
executor, the
applicant's
brother,
has
filed
a summons
also returnable
today seeking
an
order
that
the
applicant
provide
security for the
estate's
costs of the
proceedings.
By
cl.
3
of
his will
dated
24
January
1992
the
testator
provided:-
"3.
I GIVE
the
whole
of
my
estate
to
my
Trustee
UPON
TRUST:
(a)
As
to
a
one-fifth
share
thereof to
my
daughter
BEVERLEY
MARION
DEAN
PROVIDED
THAT
at
the date
of
my
death
EITHER
her
spouse
LESLIE
DEAN
has predeceased
me
OR
that
my
said
daughter
is
no
longer
legally
married
to
or
living
with
the
said
LESLIE
DEAN.
In
the
event
that
the
said
LESLIE
DEAN
has
not
predeceased
me
and
that
my
said
daughter
BEVERLEY
MARION
DEAN
shall
still
be
married
to
the
said
LESLIE
DEAN
THEN
the
aforesaid
one-fifth
share of
my
estate shall
be
held
by
my
-- 19 of 24 --
Executor UPON TRUST to be divided equally amongst
those of the children of my said daughter BEVERLEY
MARION DEAN who survive me upon their attaining the
age of twenty-one years.
(b) As to the rest and residue of my estate to be divided
equally amongst those of my children BURTON JAMES
BEAUMONT, BARBARA ANNE BEAUMONT, KAY LYNETTE BEAUMONT
and GAY SUSANNE BEAUMONT who survive me."
The applicant is the third of the testator's five children.
The estate when realised will be no more than $300,000. The
applicant is aged 36 years, is married to one Leslie Dean and has
four children aged between 14 years and 2 years. Her husband is
presently unemployed. She does not reveal when he last was in
gainful employment but says that neither of them have any trade
or professional qualifications which could assist in gaining
employment. As is apparent from the terms of the will, the issue
is the applicant's husband. At one time, such a clause in a will
might well have been subject to close scrutiny as being in part
against the institution of marriage. Such considerations no
longer in my view should concern the court.
The applicant deposes to strained relationships between her
husband and the testator from the time of the engagement to
marry. The applicant conveys the impression that it was solely
due to her father being a Scotsman and the future son-in-law
being an Englishman that caused this state of affairs. The
applicant married in 1977 and whilst she apparently continued to
have a satisfactory enough relationship with the testator,
contact between her husband and the testator was sought to be
avoided. There was a violent argument in 1984 between the
testator and her husband and property belonging to the testator
and his wife was damaged and gave rise to an order in the
-- 20 of 24 --
3
Magistrates Court
that
he keep the peace and be of
good behaviour
for
12 months.
The
applicant continued to see the testator
but avoided
speaking of her
husband
to
him.
In her opinion the
testator's
attitude
was
not warranted.
She
continued to
see her father
until his
death.
The
executor deposes
that Leslie
Dean
-
"
...
has
in the past
wasted
substantial
sums
of
money
in
gambling and
the
consumption
of alcohol.
I
have no
reason
to
suppose
that
he
has changed
his
ways.
In
particular
I am
able to
say
that:
a.
Since
I
have
known
Leslie
Dean, and
at least in
the
last
ten
(10)
years,
he
has been
drinking alcohol
on
the majority of occasions
when
I
have
seen
him.
b.
On
4th
April,
1984
he
damaged windows,
gardens
and
a
door
at
my
parents residence
and
verbally
abused
and
threatened
my
parents,
myself
and
my
family.
He
was
completely
drunk
on
this
occasion.
His
actions
on
that
date centred
on an argument
over
a
loan
which
was
made
by
my
sister
Barbara
to
him
and
his
wife.
I
do
not
know
the
amount
of
that
loan, but
I
am
informed
by
Barbara
and
verily
believe
that this
loan
still
has
not
been
repaid.
c.
On
my
visits
in
the
past to
the
home
of Leslie
Dean
I
have
frequently
seen
racing
form
guides.
I
recall
my
sister
Beverley
commenting
to
me
some
years
ago on
the
trouble
caused
at
home
by
Leslie's
gambling
on
horses."
The
executor
goes
on
to
suggest
that
Leslie
Dean
has
involved himself
inappropriately in
the matter of the
will in
as
much
as
the
applicant
lodged
a
caveat
against
the
grant of
probate
and
Leslie
Dean
had an
active
role
in
maintaining
that
caveat.
It
was,
in
due
course,
removed by
consent
and
the
applicant
was
ordered
to
pay
the
costs
by
order of
Callinane
J.
on
26
November
1992.
I
should
note
that
the
executor's
summons
and
affidavit
was
faxed
to
the
applicant's
solicitors late
in
the afternoon
of
4
-- 21 of 24 --
4
February 1993. There has been sufficient time for the applicant
to make some response to the allegations about her husband in the
affidavit. Indeed, an affidavit was received this morning from
the applicant's solicitors dealing with the applicant's capacity
to pay the costs ordered by Cullinane J.
The applicant and her husband rent a Housing Commission
home, have few assets and live on social security of about $400
per week. If any costs order is made against her she will have
great difficulty in satisfying it.
It is submitted for the executor that an order is unlikely
to be made either because the testator has made proper provision
for the applicant or because s. 41(2)(c) of the Succession Act
permits the court to refuse to make an order because an
applicant's circumstances are such as to make such refusal
reasonable.
There is no suggestion that the applicant seeks more than
one-fifth of the estate out right. The executor does not seek
to deny the one-fifth share being held on trust for her children.
The real issue, it seems to me, is whether the testator when he
made the disposition set out in cl. 3(a) of his will was acting
as a wise and just father to use the well-known phrase in Bosch
v. Perpetual Trustee Coy. Ltd. [1938] A.C. 463 at p. 478. To
relieve a person of certain expenses of life by, for example,
providing a house or for a child's education may be regarded as
making proper provision in the circumstances of the case. The
testator has turned his mind to this matter quite apparently.
He has not rested content with the provisions of the Trust Act
but has spelled out in cl. 4(e) and (f) that the trustee might
-- 22 of 24 --
5
make
an advance
to
an
infant beneficiary or applied the fund
for
an
infant's benefit.
This might include the provision of
a home
for the family or the
payment
of education expenses and
a
maintenance allowance
to
the applicant for the children.
It
has however been submitted
on
behalf of the applicant
that
on
a
more
detailed investigation of the facts that
the
testator will
be
shown
to
have been unreasonably prejudiced
against the
applicant's
husband.
I am
concerned
however
that
the
applicant
has
made
no
attempt
to
answer
the allegations of
improvidence
and
influence levelled against
her
husband
by
the
executor
and,
if
it
remains unanswered
I
would by no means
be
persuaded
that
the
testator
had
not
made
appropriate
arrangements
from which
the applicant
would
obtain
benefit.
If
there
is
thought
to
be any
family animosity
resting in
the executor then
the Public Trustee
could
be
appointed
trustee
of the
children's
trusts
in
lieu
of the present executor. That,
of
course,
will
incur
charges
possibly not incurred
if
the present
executor
remained
as
trustee.
In the
end
I
have
concluded
that
an
order for security for
costs
ought
not
to
be
made
against the applicant
because
of
the
range
of orders
which
in practice
might be
made
in
an
application
under
the
Succession
Act.
Even
if
the
applicant
is
unsuccessful
the court
may
well
be
persuaded
that
no
order for costs
is
the
appropriate order,
see
the
kinds
of orders often
made
set
out
in
Davern
Wright,
Testators
Family Maintenance
in
Australia
and
New
Zealand,
3rd
ed.,
at
pp.
173
et
seq.
Accordingly
the
summons
for
security
for costs
is
dismissed.
-- 23 of 24 --
6
Directions are made as per draft including the remitter of
the action to the District Court. I will hear submissions as to
the costs of the application for security for costs.
-- 24 of 24 --
Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1993/027