Federated Clerks' Union of Australia (Central and Southern Queensland Branch) Union of Employees v The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland [1993] QIRC 319 (1993) 144 QGIG 181

176 QUEENSL.i\ND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE I IOSeptember, 1993 IOSepte mb er, 19931 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUS T RIAL GAZETTE 177 ## # # #### ## ### ######## ############# ##### # ############ QUEENS LAND INDUSTRIAL REL.A.T IO NS COMMISSION Industrial Relalions Act 1990 s. 13 .19 - appl i ca ti on for change of name Federated Clerks ' U nion of Aust ra lia {Ce ntr al and Sou thern Queensland Bra n ch) Union of Employees AND T he Austrai ian Workers' Un ion of Employees, Queensland (No . U/2 of 1993) CHIEF INDUSTRiAL COMMISSIONER HA LL 27 August 1993 Sec retary's A ut hority to Lodge Aμpl ication - Nature an d Ex te nt or Com mission's Discretion to Reject Change in Name -· Similarity of Na me - Confusion as to Identity and/or Cover age - Om ission of "Industrial". D ECISI ON Th e Application ·1he Aμp licant, 1he rederated Clerks' Un i on uf ,\ustralia (Cen tral an d Southern Q ueensland Branch) Un ,on of f mμ loy ees is an ind us tria l organi za1ion of employees un cJer the /ndumial Relations Ac( 1990. Rule 60 of the Appl i <:a n t's rules is c as t i n thP ioll ow ing terms:- "60 . Aiterat,ons and Amendments Th ese rules may be amended or deleted, or additions made 1hereto, by a mee ti ng oi Branch Counci l, or by a postal vote of Branch Councillors, provi ded seven ( 7) days· notice of mot io n in wr iti ng, of the specific amendment, deletion or addition, has b een given 10 the Branch Secretary. ·1he Bra nch Secreta ,v, upon receipt of su ,h Not ice of Mot ion shall ,hereupon forward to all 8 r,1nch Councillors a copy of such proposed chang es. Upo n the exp ir ation o( the s,•ven ( 7) day~ notice oi mo1ion the Secretary sh ai I cause a vote on su ch amendmen ts to be taken by Branch Coundl in session, or by postal vote, to determine such proposed change~: Provided Br~n ch Cou nc i I ai the i i rst meeting ai tcr the tnenn,a! Branch el ec1ions may make such ch.inges wi thout seven ( 7) d.ays ' notice h av ing been given.". By a letter and attachments d,1ted 4 May ·1 993 the Branch Secret,,ry for wa rded a copy of the following notice of motion to each or th e fl r an,h Counc ill or 5: -··· -- 1 of 3 -- 178 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE [10 September, 1993 "That the rules of the Federated Clerks Union of Australia (Central and Southern Queensland Branch) Union of Employees be replaced by the rules of the Australian tV,unicipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union Central and Southern Queensland Clerical and Administrat_ive Branch, Union of employees as per the attached schedule.". It has not been suggested in argument that the notice of motion had not previously been received by the Secretary within the meaning of Rule 60. The Secretary subsequently, and at least seven days after the date of receipt of the notice or motion (whatever that date might have been) by the Councillors, caused a ballot to be taken of those Branch Councillors. Eleven Councillors cast a vote in favour of the resolution. Seven Councillors did not return the ballot paper. No Councillor voted against the resolution. There is no rule which suggests that anything other than the simple majority otherwise (Rule 31) required for the passage of a resolution by the Branch Council applies to amendments to the rules. It seems plain that the resolution was carried. By a circular letter dated 19 March 1993 and addressed to '·1\il Branch Councillors" the Branch Secretary so declared The Branch Secretary subsequently lodged two Applications with the lndustnal Registrar. One Application was for a complete change of rules. That Application was made necessary by s. 13 20(4) and (6) [now s. 211(4) and (6)] which requires all alterations of rules to be registered by the Industrial Registrar and denies effect in law to alterations which are not so registered. The second Application was an Application to change the name of the organization. That Appiication was necessary - (a) because the Applicant's name is contained in rule (1 J of its registered rules, lb) because rule (1) of the rules contained in the schedule attached to the notice of motion is in the terms "The name oi the Union shall be 'Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union, Central and Southern Queensland Clerical and Administrative Branch, Union of Employees'", and (c) because by s. 13 19(3) [now s. 21213)] a change in the name of an industrial organisation does not take E'ftect unless the Industrial Commission consents to the change. It is the Application for consr'nt to a change of name (No. U 12 of l 9'JJ) with which I am presently concerned. It was faintly argued by Mr Timo who appeared ior The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland (in circumstances which I shall shortly describe) that s. 13.19(4) and (5) [now s. 212(4) and (5)] required that a change of name, as such, be expressly approved by the organization. In my opinion the section does no such thing. It remits to the rules of the organization the function of determ1,~ing what must be done to change the name and detcrrrnning the persons within the orgar.117atiori by \vhor:1 it n1ust be dorie. 1here is noth:ng 1n the Anpl1cant's registered rules to require that a resolution for a change of name must be formulated in any particular way, nor anything to require that such a resolution be not joined with another resolution or included within the scope of a resolution impacting on matters other than the name. Indeed, the matter of change oi name is not dealt with at all. The matter of alteration of the rules is dealt with. The name is found in one of the rules. It is by means oi that mechanism that any change in the name must be accomplished. Mr 1 imo argued also that the Branch Secretarv had no authority to make Appl;cation ior a change of name. • By rule lO(c) of the Applicant's rules - "Trie Branch Secretary shal I. Ix) Be responsilile tor the preparation of all necessarv material required ior applications to Industrial Tribunals, Jnd shall when required present tr1e cases on behalf of the Union to such Tribunals. (xiv) Be the Ofticer to sue and prosecute or bP sued and prosecuted on behalf of the Union." 1 he ru:cs arc Pxpressed In the ianguage of la.ymen 1 not in the language of lav,,rverc;. Rule l 0(c)(xiv) is intendPd to pithily express an authority sufficient to cover a variety of situations. I do not consider that it should be read as governing the institution of civil proceedings and prosecutions in what (without disrespect) may be described as the "ordinary Courts", and no more. It should in my view be read as nominating the Branch Secretary as the officer to initiate and defend proceedings on behalf of the Applicant in all courts and tribunals, local or foreign, in which it is necessary for the Applicant to take or defend proceedings; compare the approach taken by the Sellers L.J. in "The Merak, T.B, and S. Batchelor & Co. Ltd (Owners of Cargo on the Merak) v Owners of SS Merak [1965] 1 All ER 230 at 234. For example, it would in my view permit the Secretary to make application on the Applicant's behalf under s. 88(7) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 for authorisation to engage in conduct which would otherwise breach s. 45D. Equally the rule seems to me to authorise the Branch Secretary to institute proceedings in this Commission. Further, I can see no reason why "present" at rule lO(c)(x) should be read as if the words "the argument in" appeared immediately thereafter. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines "present" as, inter alia, "to deliver a document to the proper quarter for acceptance". In Hammond v Haii;h Castle and Co, Ltd. l1973] 2 All ER 289 a complaint of unta1r dismissal was held to be presented within time under the Employment Protection (Consolidation Act) 7978 where it was delivered (within time) to the Tribunal office (by post) on a Saturday but was not registered until the following Monday. The decision was approved by Waller L.J in Swainston v Hetton Victory Club Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 1179 at 1184. Similarly in Alston v Alston [1946] P 203 at 204-5 Willmer J said "I must decide that a petition is presented when it is filed with the court". It seems to me that the rule must be construed as authorising the Branch Secretary to lodge an Application with the Industrial Registrar. I do not, of course, suggest that either rule 10(c)(x) or rule 10(c)(iv) authorises the Branch Secretary to institute and prosecute all such actions as to the Secretary may seem appropriate, without regard to decisions taken by deliberative bodies within the organization pursuant to the rules. But here the decision to replace the rule containing the name with a rule containing a different name, had been taken by the Branch Council in the exercise of its authority under the rules. Replacement can be achieved only by consent of the Commission under s. 13.19 [now s. 212]. The resolution of the Branch Council must be taken to authorise the seeking of such consent. There is not, I should add anything in the resolution or in the proposed new rules to suggest that the Councillors were doing other than approve the change in name even if al I other changes were to be rejected by the certifying Barrister. In truth, the change in name appears to be unrelated to the other proposed changes. The Objection fhe application was duly notified pursuant to s. 3.12 of the Industrial Relations Regulation 1990. Only one person, The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland - itself an industrial organization of employees under the Industrial Relations Act 1990 - lodged an obiection It was in the following terms (formal parts omitted):- "Statement of Crounds, Particulars, Facts and issues 1. By way ot notice forwarded to this Union dated May 27, 1993, the Federated Clerks' Union of Australia (Central and South Qld Branch has made application to change its name to 1he Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union, Central and Southern Queensland Clerical and Administrative Branch, Union of Employees. 2. The impact of the changes in the registered named has significant potential effects on the Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland in that the proposed change of name of the applicant will create confusion and uncertainty amongst members and employees covered by this Union as to which organization has the right to cover particular work and to enrol membership. 3. Furthermore, the proposed new name does not reflect the Eligibility Rules and Registered List of Callings currently registered with the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. The application ii granted may also serve as a vehicle by the applicant Union to extend its membership coverage beyond the scope of its present industry rule. 10 September, 1993] QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 179 4. In addition, the proposed new name does not accurately describe the applicant's current industry coverage as the proposed new name is predicated on the recent federal amalgamation between the ASU and the FCU. 5. The application, if granted would create industrial confusion, uncertainty and unrest, and mitigate against the efficient management of Industrial Relations" The Objector was subsequently granted save to amend the Objection to add an additional paragraph 6. In substance that paragraph raised the matters with which I have dealt above at the subheading "The Application". I do not reproduce paragraph 6. The Applicant, by its solicitor (Mr Reidy), contends that with the exception of the ground at paragraph 2 of the Objection (which is said to be bad for other reasons), the Notice of Objection does not raise grounds of objection which the Commission may entertain. It aids understanding of the contention to set forth the terms of s. 13. 19(3) to (5) [now s. 212(3) to (5)1. "(3) A change in the name of an industrial organization, or an alteration of the eligibility rules of an industrial organization, does not take etfect unless the Industrial Commission consents to the change or alteration. (4) The Industrial Commission may consent to a change in the name of an industrial organization or an alteration of the eligibility rules in whole or part, but is not to consent unless the Commission is satisfied that the change or alteration has been made under the rules of the industrial organization. (5) The Industrial Commission is not to consent to a change in the name of an industrial organization unless the Commission is satisfied that the proposed new name of the industrial organization - (a) is not the same as the name of another industrial organization; and (b) is not so similar to the name of another industrial organization as to be likely to cause confusion." The contention is that "may" at subsection (4) does not vest a true discretion. It is argued that once the Commission is satisfied that the change in the name has been made under the rules oi the organization and is satisfied as to the matters at subsection (5)(a) and (b), the Commission must consent to the change in name. Ifs. 212(3) had stood alone I should have been inclined to accept the argument. In Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (1989) 166 CLR 338 at 347 Wilson, Deane and Gaudron JJ observed:- "A legislative direction to decide does not, as a matter of ordinary statutory construction, import a discretion to give effect to that which, having regard to the scope and purposes of the legislation, is in the opinion of the decision-maker desirable. A discretion of that nature will be implied only it the context (including the subject-matter to be decided) so necessitates as, e.g. where the context provides no positive indication of the considerations by reference to which a decision is made:-" Here there is an indication that comp! iance with the rules and the matters at rules (5)(a) and (b) are the considerations by reference to which a decision is to be made. Section 13.19(4) [now s. 212(4)] does not stand alone. The general powers of the Commission and the principles governing their exercise which appear at Part 8 of the Act will apply to the discharge of a specific function unless excluded by express words or some consideration of subject matter or context. Section 8.2(1 )(b) [now s.68(1 )(b)] provides:- "Subject to this Act, in any industrial cause the Industrial Court or Industrial Commission - (a) (bJ may dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or determining the cause, if it appears to the Court or Commission that the cause 1s trivial or that, in the public interest, further proceedings by the Court or Commission are not necessary or desirable: (c) I have some difficulty in envisaging an application under s. 13.19(4) [now s. 212(4)] which might be craracterised as trivial. i have no difficulty at all in envisaging an application for a change in name or an alteration of eligibility rules which might, if granted, do grave damage to the public interest. It is, if I may say so without impertinence, eminently sensible for the Legislature to arm the Commission with power to reiect such an application. The inclusive definition of "industrial cause" at s. 2. l /1) [now s. 5(1)] does not justify the exclusion from the phrase of an application which would otherwise fall within it, compare Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd. v FCT (1976) 10 ALR 441 at 455 per Mcinerney J. Further, by s. 8.4(2) [now s. 70(2)]. I am directed to have regard, amongst other things, to the interests of the persons immediately concerned of the community as a whole. The counterpart provision of the Federal Act (s. 90) has been held to apply to the federal provision which is the equivalent of s. 13.19(4) [now s. 212(4)], viz s. 204(2), see Re Independent Teachers' Federation (Print No. H9829). I do not consider that the Queensland Act should be differently construed. In the premises I consider that it is open to me to consider matters other than those at s. l 3.19(5)(a) and (bi [now s. 212(5)(a) and (b)J and compliance with the rules. The Objector's Case It was submitted that the proposed name is misleading and, in the alternative, confusing in that it is likely - (a) to lead employers and employees into error and, in the_ alternative is unclear as to the callings in respect or which the applicant is registered. (b) to lead employers and employees to believe that the applicant is a branch of the Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union and, in the alternative, to be unclear as to the applicants' relationship with that federally registered organization. In the premises, so it was argued, consent should be withheld on the ground that I could not be satisfied as to the matter at s. l 3.19(5)(a) [now s. 212(5)(a)] and, in the alterriative, on the ground that 1t would be contrary to the public interest to give consent. The Construction of s, 13,19(5)(a) and (b) [now s. 212(5)(a) and (b)J Bv s. 13.19(5)(a) [now s. 212(5)(a)] the Industrial Commission is not· to consent to a change in the name of an industrial organization unless the Commission is satisfied that the proposed new name of the industriai organization:- (a) is not the same as the name of another industrial organization; and (b) is not so similar to the name of another industrial organization as to be likely to cause confusion "Industrial Organization" is defined by s. 2 1 (I) [now s. 5(1 )] to mean (not include) "an association of employers or employees registered under this Act, or the continuity of whose registration as an industrial union under any Act is preserved by this Act.". As a matter of first impression what is covered is the grant and consent to a change in name which would cause the applicant's name to be same as that of another association of employees registered (in the extended sense) under the Industrial Relations Act 7990, or cause the applicant's name to be so similar to the name of another association of employees registered (in the extended sense) under the Industrial Relations Act 7990 as to cause confusion as to the identity of the applicant. Such a construction leaves the whole of the subsection with work to do. A name may be sufficiently similar to that of another industrial organization as to cause people to wonder if they are the same or to be confused, without being the same as that other name or in anyway misleading as to the identity of the first mentioned organization, see the discussion at Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property, firsted, paragraphs 40.24 to 40.27. In Electrical Trades Union of Australia v Australian Society of Engineers (Print J1340) at 4 Moore DP (as he then was) summarised and discussed the authorities upon the comparable federal provision as follows:- "The proposed name of the amalgamated organization 1s "Australian Electrical, Electronics & Engineering Union". It is not the same as the name of the PRE!. ls it so similar to the name of the PREI as to be likely to cause contusion/ The -- 2 of 3 -- 180 QUEENSLAND GOVEM~fENT INDU STRIAL GAZET TE j 10 September, 1993 ri,st question that th en an ses is whether the names should be compared as a who le or only el emen ts of them. This qu est ion, m turn, mav b e related to the question oi what is the nature of the cont'usion referred to in s. 240(1}(c). in Re Commonwealth Publ ic Service Clerical Association il 956) 86 CAR 566 the Court expr essed the view, in a slighti)' d ,iferen t context, that the name as a who le shou ld be loo i-- ed at wh ile in Re Supervising Tec hnicians Associa ti on (19i 1J 140 CAR 112 1 the Reg istrar appears to have been pr epa r ed to consider elemen ts in a prop osed name. It may be th at if the coni us i on reierred to i n s. 240\ 1)(c) rela tes only to co nfusion about the identity oi the two organizat ions (b el ieving one is the other) then the name as a who le :1eed only be looked at. Ii, howeve r, the co nfusion reie rred to in s. 240(1)(c) re fers to matters such as confusion amongst employees and emp loyers as to the class of employees the organi zation see ki ng to change its name ca n represent then it would seem logi ca l to look at elements in the name wh ich m ay, 1h emse l ves, create su ch coni us ion. I am inclined to think that the sec1 ion should be constr ue d in the first oi the ways I have just di scusse d though it ma y be un necessa ri lv narrow co ns truc ti on. There was n0 su bm issions· oi any length on th is issu e and it is not ne cessa ry for me to fini!lly decide it as, on e it her approach, I am simil ar to the name 01 th e PREI as to ca u se co ntusion ". In m y view, i n the con tex t of the presen t Q u eens land Act wh ich, ;-,s described above, permi ts cons ideration oi a change in name on public i nterest grounds and thereby deals in a di fferent w ay with confusion as to maners other than identity. the De puty Pres ident's "incl ination " is plainly correct. There i s, of cou rse, no suggest ion in this case that the prop osed name is the sa me as or simi lar to the name of an y associat io n oi empl oyee s r eg istered (in the extended sense) under the Industrial Relations Ac t 1990. The ma tter of P11bli c Interest (aJ lt is im portant to remember that the A pp lication re!ates to a name, no t to a b ook. On ly in exceptional circumstanc es w i ll an industnal organ i zat i on succeed in pi th il y expressing it 's covera ge 1n i t' s name. In ordinary circumstances it wi l l be n f'cessa ry to reier to the el igibili ty rule wh ich like all other rules is o pe n to i nsp1~c Iion (see s. 13 . 103 [r.ow s 318]1, and to the list oi ca llings (wh ich as a pub li c document is op P.n to inspection ). in order to est ab li sh tho se whom the orgonizaI ion is en tit l ed to (an d mu st ) enrol and represent. Given the presence of the wor ds "Clerical and Administrative Branch'' , I am unabie to ac cept that the chan$e in name wou ld (if al lowed) be so mi slead i ng or ,o con tus ing as to be injurious to the pub lic intcrc:,t. I accept th at the App licant's coverage oi "admi ni strato rs" has been an i ssue in nther cases . However, no appli ca tion having been made io r an alt eration to the applican t's el igibi lity rule, an;, attempt to rciy upon the prop ose d name i n constru ing the eligibility rule wo uld in ev itably fa il. The success 01 th ,s Appli cation wi li do no more than preserve the st atus qvo. (bl r hough th ere is no evidence be iore me as to th e characteri;tics oi the class oi person s like ly to ha v P. an in terpst in distinguish ing betw een the Appl ican t ancJ th e Aus 1r al 1an Mu nici pa l, Adm inistrative, Cl erical and Services Un ion, I am prepared to accept thdt the risk oi con fusion w i ll be greater ii th e chan ge in name is al lo w ed . I have li ttle doub t that the App li ca nt's relationsh ip w i th th e iederaily registered organiz at i on known as Au st r al ian Mun icipa l, Adm inistrati ve, Clerical an d Servi ce, Umon, is confused. That iedcral body was the result of an amalgamation in wh ich the Fed erated Clerks' Un ion of 1,us tralia was the host organi sa tion. There is some au1 horitv for the vi ew that the Ap plican t was a Branch oi the Fe de rated Clerks Un ion of A u,t rali a, see Callaghan v Federated Cler ks ' Union of Australia ( 1987) 22 IR 346 (Grav ).) In Re Federated Clerk s' Uni on of Austra lia, N orth Q ueen sl and Branch, Union of Emplo yee s ( 1989) 130 QC IG 29 di 30 Moyn i han P. so held in relation IO another orga nization v1z, th e Federated Cl erks ' Union of AustrJl i a North Q ueens !and Branch, Uni on oi Emp loyees, r eg i stered under the then Q ueensl and Ac t. rhat organization appea rs to h,we b een in a somewha t similar factu al situation to that of the App lican t. I hastened to add that th e O b1ec tor was not a party in ei1her c,he. I acknowl ed ge .1lso that some doubt i s ca,t upon the principl es upon w h ic h th ey are bas0e .l b, the deci s;on 1n Fri z ze ro v Ri ce (1 992) 45 IR 20 4 (Fu ll Court o/ Fede r al Court) and the necision in M c)annet v White l1993) 46 IR 183. Th e rea lity remai ns that the re is a credi ble a rg ument f0r the proposi ti on that the A ppl i ca nt is the Australian M unici pal, .A,dministralive, Clerical an d Se rvi ces Union and that pursuant to s 25 3(U) oi the Industrial Relations Act 19 88 {Cth) the Appl icant 's ceni iicate of registration now has the effec t w hich i t wou ld have i f th at name appeared therein. Further, the Commission h as only recently, on 10 February 1993. gran ted the App li ca nt a certriicate under s. 6 oi the lncfustri al Relarions (Protection irom i nvalidit ies) Act ·1991 on the b asi s that there ha s been (or mi ght have b een ) an intermingling of the memb ers , officers affairs and assets of the App licant an d the Central and Southern Queensland Branch oi the federated Cl erks ' Unio n oi Aumaiia, see 142 QG IG 336. One may only f eel sympathy ior the draftsperson. The name proposed is attacked ior su gge st ing a relationship wh ich may we ll ex i~ t. Th e Appl ic an t's current name mighr equally w e ll be attacked for fa iling to su ggest that relationship. H av ing regard to the use oi the traditional Quee ns !an d descriptive iormu!a, vi z, "u nion of employees", it see ms to me that what the Coun cillo rs have done is ma in ta in the (admitted ly confu si ng) stat us quo. I am no t prepared to hold that, in the pr ese nt con iused state oi the law, main tenance oi the staw s quo, pending reso lution of the question oi pri n cip le in the Mc)annet v White app ea l or by l eg islative ir.terventi on, is co ntrary to the public interest. There is th e ad ditiona l consi dera tion th at co nf us io n oi the ty pe now under consideration has long been recogni sed to be a co nsequence of state and feder al "bodies" (ii so they be J adopting the same or simi lar names. Su ch co nfus ion has been cha racteri sed as uns at isfactory an d ob jectionable. It has not hitherto b een treated as a ground ior rejecting a name. In Re A.S.C. and J. of Australia (195 2) 74 CAR 88. at 105 the then Court of Conciliation and Arbitrati on (s itt ing as a Full Court) sai d :- " There are numerous instances in wh ich bodi es r eg istered under the Commonwealth Act bear nam es vi rtua ll y identi cal w ith those of bodi es r eg i ster ed under the l eg islat ion of the various St ates. In these instances there are, as in the c ase oi the Bu ilding Wo rk ers Industria l Un ion and the Sta te organizati on in Queensland wh ich w e panicu larl y considere d, an identity clo se, or ab sol ute, be tween the mem be rs oi the State organization and the members ol the Commonwealth organi 1.at ion who reside in :he State , though it may be that in all of such cases t her~! is no hostility be tw een the Commonwealth body and the State body. Neverthei ess, the fact !hat there are instances oi this kind indicates tha t it has no t, in the p.ist, b<ien rega rded as a ground for the rejec ti on of Commo nwealth r egi st r at ion t ha t then" i~ simi ia ri ty between the narne of a Com ino nweai th organi za 1i on an d Ihat oi a State organizat ion. We be lieve that no au thori ty ex ists on the (luestion whether or not there existence of a State registered body with a name the same as, ore closely rese mbling, th at oi one see ki ng r eg i st r at ion under the Commonweal th Act is of i tse lf a sufficient ground upon w hich the di scre ti on under the Commonwealth iaw. W e ass ume, for the purpose of th is judgmen t, that Sll ch mi gh t b e the po~ ition, though we d es i re to l eave tha t question open as, in all the ci rcum st anc es of thi s c ase we are oi the opinion that the registration of this organi zation should not be refused on the ground under consideratio n. In the exercise of our discretion of thi s matter we have ba lanced a ll the circu mstances in deci ding wh ether the mdtters pertaining to the r eg istration oi the respondent Society under the name wh ich i t hc1s chosen sh ou ld outw<ii gh the ,;r,5a tis factory. or objectionable, fe,llu res relating to the name". I am unw illi ng at thi s l ate stage in the development oi th e industna! re la tio ns system to apply to this App li cation a f) ercepti on of the pub li c interest wh ich se ems no t to have been appli ed adversely to a,1 dppl ican1 in the "name" cases hi therto d eci ded. Union of Employees or Industrial Org,w ization of Employees Of al I oi th e i ssues In thi s case, the i ssue w hich I ha ve found most perplexing is th at which ari ses under s. 13.9 [now s. 202 ). f he sec tion provides as foll ow s:- ., 13. 9 Reg,ste recl name ol indusuial orga nization. Q D .s.69.( 1) The regi ste red name of an i ndustri ai organization registered after the commencement of this Act 1.1) if 11 is an in du str ia l organizati on 01 employer,, mu st include the words ''i ndustrial or gan i zat ion of employer~" or "industrial union oi ernployer s"; (b) ii i t is an i nduw i al or gan ization of employee s, rnus t include the word s "i ndustrial organi7.a tion oi emp loyees" or "industri al union oi empl oyees". 10 September, I 993) QUEENSLAND GOVERNM EN T INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE (2} O n appli ca tion thereiore by or on b eha lf oi a union of employers or emp lo yees registered at the commencement of thi s Ac t, the Industrial Reg i stra r may so alter the registered name oi the union that the name con tains reference to the w or ds "industrial organizati on" in lieu of reference to th e wo rd • union ' . (3) The regi ster ed name of every md ustrial o rga nization of employers or emp loye es must con ta in re feren ce to the loc al ity in wh ich the maj ority oi its mem be rs r es ide or engage in the ir busin es s or cal ling". Having regard to the referen ce to "a unio n of employers or employees register ed at th e commencement oi th is Act" at subs. (2), the phr ase "r eg i stered ai te r the commencement oi the ,\et" at subs . (1 ) should I think be read as qu alifyi ng " industrial organization" rather than "name". It fol lows that th ere is a la cuna in the Act in that nothing is sa id as to the rule to be appli ed where a union registered at the co mmencement oi the Act makes application for a chanie in nam e. On the vi ew wh ich I h ave adopted, i.e. tha t the Commi ss i on must reject changes wh ich are contrarv to the public interest and has a di sc retion exerci sab le by reference to the iactors at s. 8.4(2) [n ow s. 70 (2)], I arn, I think, bound to give great weight to any indi cat ion that it is the p olicy of the Act that associations registered under the Act sh o uld henceforth i nclude the words "in dustri al orga ni za ti on [Union] oi empl oyer s" or "industrial organization [ Un ion) of employees" (as the case ma y be). Here, however, there is no such indication. There is no requireme nt that an organi zati on regis ter ed at the commencement of th e Act mu st change it s name to incorporate those wo rd s. There is no indica tion tha t such an organ i za ti on mu st forfeit the right to use th e more tr ad itional "union oi employees" or "union of employer s" u po n m ak ing application io r a chan ge in name. Ne ither is there any reason to believe that the mem be rs and the p ersons w ith who m such an orga ni za ti on ha bitua lly com es into con tact wo uld be assisted in their unders tan ding of the n a\Ure of the organization by the omission of lamiliar wo r ds indicating r eg istr at ion under th e Sta te Ac t an d the substitution of uniam il iar words wh ich make that same po int. There is every reason IO believe th at the de l ay invo lv ed in a rei ection w o uld be frust ra ting and perhaps adverse to th e in terests of the "persons i mmediately concerned ". O n ba lan ce I have deci ded I() conseni lo the change in the name. D .R. HA LL ., Chiei Industrial Commission er Appearances:- Mr S. Rei dy of Re idy and Tonk in and w i th him Ms B. Ca ll agha n for the appli can t. Mr N. Ti mo for the Obj ec to r. Operative Da te: 16 August 1993 Oecis1on - App l ication ior Change oi Name Relca~cd: 2 7 Aug us t 1993 18 1 -- 3 of 3 --