Brisbane Wharves & Wool Dumping Pty Ltd, Conaust Ltd & Anor v Brisbane City Council & Anor [1993] QPEC 56 (1994) QPLR 1
IN THE PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
HELD AT BRISBANE
QUEENSLAND
P & E Appeal No. 9 of 1993
Before Quirk DCJ
[Brisbane Wharves & Anor. v. B.C.C. & Anor]
BE1'WEEN:
BRISBANE WHARVES & WOOL DUMPING PTY. LTD.
) CONAUST LTD. and P&O AUSTRALIA LTD.
Appellants
- and -
) BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Respondent
- and -
BRETTS WHARVES AND STEVEDORING PTY. LTD.
Respondent by Election
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
)
Judgment delivered: 01/07/1993
) Catchwords:
Counsel:
Solicitors:
Hearing Date(s):
C Hughes for the Appellant
J Haydon for the Respondent
D Gore QC with T Kirk for the
Respondent by Election
Flower and
D M Clarke
Mallesons
Respondent
Hart for the Appellant
for the Respondent
Stephen Jaques for
by Election
27-30th April, 4th, 5th May 1993
the
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IN IH.t: PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
HELD AT BRISBANE P & E Appeal No. 9 of 1993
BETWEEN:
BRISBANE WHARVES & WOOL DUMPING PTY. LTD.
CONAUST LTD. and P&O AUSTRALIA LTD.
Appellants
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Res2ondent
BRETTS WHARVES & STEVEDORING CO. PTY. LIMITED
Respondent by Election
C
P & E Appeal No. 13 of 1993 (
BETWEEN:
PETER HAROLD GODSALL
A!)pellant
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Respondent
BRETTS WHARVES & STEVEDORING CO. PTY. LIMITED
Respondent by Election
REA~ONS_f_QR JUDGMENT - QUIRK D.C.J.
Delivered the .9-~.Y of June 1993
These appeals, heard together by consent, are by objectors
against an approval by the respondent of an application to rezone
land on the river at Hamilton from the Waterfront Activities
Zone to Particular Development Zonings which would enable the
land's development for residential and (to a minor extent)
(l
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commercial use. The first appeal (9/1993) is by parties who are
involved in waterfront activities on land which is also on the
Hamilton reach of the river but located some distance to the east
of the subject land. The second appeal is by a resident of
Langside Road at Hamilton.
The land which has a total area of 23,650 square metres has
frontage to Kingsford Smith Drive, Harbour Road and the river.
For many years it has been the site of a complex known as Brett's
Wharves which provided 3 berths for marine cargo handling and
loading at the western end of the Hamilton reach. Along the
river, adjoining the subject land to the east, is land (in
Government ownership) upon which the Hamilton Cold Stores and
Associated Wharves were located and occupied approximately 240
metres of river frontage. This facility is now inactive and the
structures on the land (which are fairly substantial) are
derelict in appearance. Further to the east lies the waterfront
land upon which the appellants' activities are conducted. In
general, land to the east of the subject land and to the south
of Kingsford Smith Drive is zoned and used for industrial,
commercial and other non-residential purposes.
The proposal is to redevelop the subject land into a medium
density residential development with a lirni ted area of commercial
use at the western end where a relatively large area of the site
has been set aside as open space. Three higher buildings (7 to
10 storeys) are located to the rear of the site with a number of
lower buildings (2 storeys) nearer to the river bank. A
continuous line of buildings along the water's edge has been
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avoided with appropriate interruption to building form and a view
of the river from Racecourse Road has been provided.
When the City of Brisbane had its beg innings waterfront
activity {in ·the sense of the handling of marine cargo)
established in the city reaches. With the passage of time, an
increase in the size of ships and in the sophistication (and cost
of establishment) of cargo handling facilities, there has been
a progressive shift in focus of port activity downstream. Port
facilities in the city and Newstead reaches have closed. I was (
informed in evidence that, in recent years, the usage of Brett's
Wharves (which were established in the 1930's) has declined to
the financial detriment of the operator, the respondent by (
election in these proceedings. The redevelopment of the land for
other purposes has been under consideration for a number of
years.
The Port of Brisbane (and the tidal reaches of the river)
is under the control of a statutory authority, the Port of
Brisbane Authority. In 1974 the Authority put forward a (
Strategic Plan, a key element of which was the proposal to locate
the Port to Fisherman Island. A further expression of the (
Authority's strategy in the administration of the Port was
contained in the "Key Port Brisbane" publication which was
approved by the Government in 1993.
This strategy has in mind that:
"Relocation of the Port's facilities at Hamilton should be
completed by the year 2005 with the exception of a cruise
liner terminal which could integrate with other commercial
and residential developments in the area".
The publication points out:
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"there has been a gradual move of the Port down river a~ay
from the City area, largely in recognition of the trend to
larger vessels and the need to provide expensive cargo
handling terminals. Also, relocation of cargo handling
operations away from Hamilton will eventuate as a result of
growing pressure for commercial and residential
redevelopment of the area. In addition, transport
logistics to and from the upriver wharves are becoming more
difficult because of traffic congestion and the trend is
for more industries to locate on the southside of the
river".
Objection to the reception in evidence of these matters was
made by the appe 1 lants. It was argued that the Court was
concerned with the determination of what was essentially a
planning matter and the express strategies of the Port of
Brisbane Authority have never been adopted by the Brisbane City
Council and have not been exhibited for objection and public
comment as would be required in the case of comparable
instruments of the Planning Authority.
Why the Planning Authority should make it its business to
adopt expressions of strategy of another statutory authority is
not entirely clear. It is true that these documents were not
exhibited for public comment as are planning instruments but
there is no requirement that they should be and I do not see how
that detracts from their relevance or weight. If the Court is
to consider (from the point of view of community interest}, the
need to retain land in a particular area for Port purposes,
surely it is relevant (if not essential) that it has regard to
what the authority statutorily entrust~d with the administration
of the Port of Brisbane has to say on the matter.
However I accept the appellant's argument that this
evidence should not be used as a basis for any conclusion that
the appellants' activities on this land will cease at any
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particular time. The evidence indicates a right on the part of
the appellants to occupy the land for approximately another 25
years and does not justify any conjecture as to whether they will
remain active for that long or for any longer time.
The evidence regarding future development of the Port
of Brisbane did lend some support to the approach taken by the
town planning consultants who spoke in favour of the proposal,
Mr. Conway (called by the respondent) and Mr. Brannock (called
by the respondent by election), who saw this area as one which
is "in transition" as a result of the demise of the Hami 1 ton Cold (
Stores and the apparent under utilisation of the area's land and
facilities.
This also appears to be consistent with the attitude of the (
planning authority which, over a number of years, has
contemplated in what appears to have been a positive way,
redevelopment of this area of the City. The preparation of a
"Hamilton Wharves reveloprnent Plan" \.'-:is cor-,r:-.enced and although
such a plan has not achieved the status of a formal planning
document, this toget'ber with favourable responses to requests for 0
consideration in principle to redevelopment of the area and the
decision to approve this application make it clear that the ('
planning authority sees the future development of this part of
the Hamilton reach being for other than waterfront activity and
the introduction of residential development into the area as a
probability.
The proposed development was seen by both Mr. Conway and Mr.
Brannock as a very desirable form of redevelopment of the subject
land which, because of its convenient location and waterfront
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position, offers an attractive opportunity for residential use.
The importance of the river to the community as open space and
the added fact that·this land is at a point where visitors to
Brisbane arriving from the airport obtain their first view of the
river and the city area beyond, called for very careful attention
in the design and layout of the proposal.
Mr. Conway accepted that the proposal had successfully met
this challenge and I adopt his description of it;
"The design places emphasis upon a parklike setting for the
residential towers and a 'green edge' to the river.
Pedestrian access to the water's edge has been incorporated
along the full length of the site in the form of a public
promenade. In addition a large area at the western end of
the site has been set aside as open space. This will allow
for a view of the river from Racecourse Road and a
convenient corridor for pedestrians from Racecourse Road to
the river's edge".
He concluded that the proposal would "make a significant
contribution to the City of Brisbane by returning the river~s
edge to public usage".
The matter which appears to me to be important to the
determination of the appeal is whether or not
the proposal would probably lead to the appellants being
inhibited in the lawful use of its land in accordance with its
zoning. There was some talk of a "reverse impact" situation
existing here in as much as it is not said that the proposal will
give rise to disturbance to other landholders. Whether or not
that is so, it seems to me that a better way of approaching the
matter is to accept that proper town planning requires that a
town planning scheme should give rise to expectations as to the
way in which particular land may be used so that commitments in
regard to tenure, building, plant, equipment and other
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"infrastructure" can be made with confidence. This obviously
sensible notion lies behind many of the objectives of the Town
Plan to which the Court's attention was drawn in the course of
the hearing.
In town planning arguments raised against the proposal, attention
was drawn to a number of provisions of the Town Plan which, it
was contended,called for the protection of existing development
from the establishment of adjacent new development and an
ensuring that industrial and commercial areas are secure against (
development on adjacent land. A formally adopted policy (7.19)
refers to the undesirability of the establishment of new
residential areas immediately adjacent to existing or committed(
non-residential uses. A debate as to whether the word "adjacent"
should be understood as being equivalent to "adjoining"
developed.
Ref ere nee was made to the "structure plan" which, quite
understandably, calls for the "consolidation of industrial
areas". However it is difficult to see how the redevelopment ofo
this land, which is on the western extremity of the Hamilton
waterfront/industrial area would give rise to fragmentation orO
would otherwise work against a proper consolidation of industrial
areas.
The appropriate separation of residential and industrial
uses is, by no means, a novel concept in town planning and one
does not need to rely on a narrow reading of the Town Plan to
find support for it. To decide whether there would be
appropriate separation of the proposal and the appellant's
activities in this case docs not call for an exercise in
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semantics, but requires a careful examination of the proposal and
the consequences of its introduction into the area. Expert
evidence in relation to these matters was given and must be
looked at.
The activities in which the appellants are involved give
rise to the creation of quite a deal of noise which cannot be
easily avoided.
cargo and the
The operation of machinery, the handling of
movement of vehicles are essential to these
activities. An examination of the appellants' operations and an
assessment of their likely impact (in relation to noise) upon the
proposed development was made by two consulting engineers expert
in that field. Mr. Winders was called by the respondents by
election and Mr. Manser gave evidence for the appellants. Each
adopted a different approach to their assessment and, perhaps not
surprisingly, reached differing conclusions.
Mr. Winders used an environmental noise model to anticipate
peak noise levels at the proposed development while Mr. Manser
based his conclusions upon measurements of particular activities
on the appellants' site which he then projected to what was
believed would be the nearest receptor location on the subject
land.
Some of the readings taken by Mr. Manser's assistant and the
imposition of tonal penalties in respect of those readings were
questioned with apparent justification. It was suggested, also
with some evident validity, that Mr. Manser's approach in
projecting his readings to what were essentially minimum
separation distances, produced results which were not really
representative or helpful in gaining a balanced impression of the
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impact of activities taking place on the appellants' land (which
stretched a considerable distance to the east} and the proposed
development (which is to be distributed over a considerable area
of land to the \,test). The extremities of each site are separated
by a distance of approximately 2 kilometres.
Mr. Winders explained that his method of relying on the
environmental noise model led to a better appreciation of likely
11 barrier and ground" effects, matters which do not appear to be
adequately considered by Mr. Manser' s approach. Such effects
would be likely to result from the presence of the cold store
buildings on the land separating the subject land and the
appellants' land which, on the evidence given, will probably not Q
be redeveloped for some considerable time.
Mr. Winders also doubted the appropriateness, in an
assessment of this kind, of a comparison of intrusive noise to
background noise levels and pointed out that such an approach did
not appear to be part of the relevant standard. He preferred a
method which, he explained, is generally employed when noise
sources from transport related activities are being examined.
Perhaps most significantly, it seems to me that Mr. Winders' C
conclusions in favour of the proposal are supported by the
1:elevance of a number of matters which are specified by the
provisions of the Noise Abatement Act (s.6(2)) as matters to
which regard must be had in forming an opinion as to whether a
noise is excessive noise. Among these matters the following
appears:
"The nature of the lawful uses permitted for premises in
the neighbourhood of the premises from which the noise is
emitted and the dates of establishment of particular lawful
uses;
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The number of complaints received concerning the alleged
excessive noise;
Other noises ordinarily present in the neighbourhood of the
premises from which the noise is emitted;
If the complaint on which the person required to form the
opinion impacting has been made by an owner of an occupier
of premises who has become such owner or occupier at a date
subsequent to the date when the noise complained of first
came to be admitted, the action taken in relation to such
prerotses to limit the effect of noise emitted from other
premises in the neighbourhood."
It was submitted by the legal representatives of the
respondent by election, that these paragraphs of the relevant
legislation make relevant to the examination of any complaint in
respect of noise;
11 1. The fact that the P & o Wharves were established
first.
2. The absence to date of any noise complaint relating to
the P & o Wharves.
3. Traffic noise on Kingsford Smith Drive and elsewhere.
4. Action taken in the design of the Brett's development
to limit the effect of the earlier established P & o
Wharves."
On a consideration of the evidence given in relation to this
aspect of the appeal, I pref er the view of Mr. Winders and accept
that:
"Provided the appellants' activities do not become no1s1er
than at present, it is unlikely that a complaint from a
future resident of Brett's Wharves development would result
in the appellants' activities being constrained by the
appropriate authority to solely satisfy a Brett's Wharves
residents' complaint."
A consideration of likely disturbance to residents of the
proposed development by floodlighting of the appellants'
activities was made by Mr. Manser and by Mr. van Oosten (on
behalf of the respondent by election). As the evidence on this
topic unfolded, the debate appeared to narrow itself to a dispute
about the impact of the luminous intensity created at the
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appellants' premises during what were referred to as "curfew
hours" (11 p.m. - 6 a.m.).
Each of the expert witnesses were prepared to consider the
matter by reference to a set of draft standards for "The
obtrusive effects of outdoor lighting" which is expected to be
issued for public review in the near future, but which is yet to
gain statutory force.
Leaving aside some criticisms by Mr. van Oosten of Mr.
Manser's approach in carrying out the necessary calculations, the €
former was prepared to concede that, in terms of luminous
intensity, the present lighting arrangements on the appellants'
premises would exceed the limit set by the draft standards to an C
extent which, on first impression, y;ould seem substantial.
However, in so doing, he made two points which appear to be of
importance.
In relative terms, the luminous intensity created,on the
appellants' wharves is not remarkably high when compared to
levels commonly encountered in everyday life (street lighting on
major roads 'was given as an example) . In Mr. van Oosten, s
opinion, the existing lighting arrangements, even if unaltered,
would by no means be certain to provoke complaint from the
subject land.
Secondly, Mr. van Costen was of opinion that a rearrangement
of the light sources (which would be neither complex nor costly)
on the appellants' land could achieve results which would be
acceptable for all concerned. Mr. Manser initially appeared to
have some doubts about this and expressed concern as to whether
the light could be rearranged and still provide sufficient
Q
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lighting at various elevations to enable all necessary aspects
of loading operations to be carried out but, in cross-examination
on the matter, he could not rule out the possibility of this
being achieved.
After a consideration of this evidence, I am prepared to
accept the opinion of Mr. van Costen that light from the
appellants' wharves would not present such serious and
unavoidable problems for the proposed development as would lead
to unreasonable pressures being placed upon the appellants in
their operations.
Certain cargoes handled from time to time at the appellants'
wharves can give rise to dust creation and offensive odours
particularly if wind conditions are adverse. However dust
monitoring which is presently conducted at premises close to the
subject land suggests that air quality levels are within
acceptable limits for residential amenity.
While the area is not presently a residential one, many
people nevertheless resort to it for business and other purposes.
The creation of unhealthy or otherwise unacceptable levels of
odour or dust would hardly be regarded as desirable whether this
development proceeds or not. Mr. Winders appeared to be of the
view that dusty or odorous cargoes should be handled at the most
easterly berths and this would avoid any serious difficulties.
Any suggestion that this was impractical was not advanced. On
the evidence given in the appeal I am satisfied that the creation
of dust or odour during the appellants' operations is not a
matter which calls for the proposal's rejection.
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The respondent by election made the point in evidence and
in submissions that its own operations had not, over a long
period, provoked serious reaction from residents living at
Hamilton within distances comparable to those which would
separate the proposal from the appellants' wharves. I have no
difficulty in accepting this evidence but I feel cautious in
relying upon it to draw any conclusion as to the likelihood of
any disturbance to the proposed development. Circumstances would
be different and the relevant differences have not, in my view
been adequately explored. I prefer to rely on the Town planning
and Engineering opinion that has been given as to the adequacy
of the distance that would separate the appellants' activities C
and the proposal.
I am satisfied on the evidence that there would be
sufficient separation and, having regard to the evident attitude
of those in control of the adjoining "Cold Stores" land,
(notwithstanding its zoning) the probabilities are that it will
continue to be provided.
In summary, on the evidence given, I am satisfied that;
1.In view of demonstrated changes in the pattern of land (
usage for waterfront activity, a redevelopment of this land for
other than waterfront activity is not contrary to the public
interest.
2.The form of development here proposed is a suitable form
of development for the subject land and it would be in the public
interest that a rezoning to permit it proceed.
3. The appellants' interests in remaining free to conduct its
activities on its land in accordance with the land's zoning are
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entitled to protection but there would be sufficient separation
between the proposed development and the appellant's activities
to preclude justified pressures upon the appellants' freedom to
conduct those activities.
4.The proposal does not offend the objectives of the Town
Plan which seek to safeguard the interests of those legitimately
engaged in industrial and waterfront activity.
On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that the onus
of showing that the proposal should be approved has been
discharged and the appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QPEC/1993/056