Doo v Murphy [1992] QSC 450

iK·· I I i. 1 I I i I ' 1 I ·, I TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS. (Copyright in this transcript is vested in the· Crown. Copies thereof must not be made or sold without the \Yritten authority of the Director, State Reporting Bureau.) SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND· CIVIL JURISDICTION WILLIAMS J No 995 of 1992 RONALD ANTHONY DOO and TAMMY JUNE MURPHY BRISBANE .. DATE 22/12/92 JUDGMENT REV!S.:::D. COPI:=:S ISSUED State R0po~ting Bt.:ft:; 2 u Data o? S/. l; .Cf 3 . ·.· Plaintiff/Applicant Defendant/Respondent · ·.Floor, The Law Courts, George Street, Brisbane, Q. 4000 Telephone: (07) 227 4360. Facsimile: (07) 227 5532 -- 1 of 4 -- ~--- ---~---- 221292 '. r- . ._ HIS HONOUR: In this matter the plaintiff in a personal injuries action pending in the District Court seeks an order that it be transferred to the Supreme Court pursuant to section 83 of the there is a "reasonable likelihood" in the opinion of his counsel 10 that the damages recovered will exceed $200,000. The defendant, who has refused to consent to any enlargement in the jurisdiction of the District Court, opposes the making of be tried in the Supreme and not the District Court. It is said that the damages might exceed $200,000 because of the component in the total award for economic loss. The case is a30 somewhat unusual one. The most significant injury received by the plaintiff was a laceration to the bony prominence above his left eye which has healed leaving scar tissue. It is that injury which it is claimed has occasioned the plaintiff economic loss of the order of $225,000. 40 At the time he sustained the injury the plaintiff was, if evidence is accepted, a successful professional boxer with some years of earning capacity in that field ahead of him. The assertion is that as a result of the laceration above the eye he 50 can no longer earn income as a professional fighter, and as he has no other significant earning capacity he will suffer considerable economic loss. ( 60 1 . ~ -~ 2 JUDGMENT ,, I. ! -- 2 of 4 -- 221292 A deal of material from persons associated with professional boxing has been incorporated into the affidavits supporting the application. It is not possible to make any detailed assessment of that_material during this chamber hearing. All I can really say is that if it was all accepted, then the plaintiff would have some chance of proving economic loss in excess of $200,000. Defendant 1 s counsel points to the details of earnings set out in the Statement of Loss and Damage and submits that in the light of that it is unlikely that the plaintiff would recover such a 10 20 large award as would necessitate the transfer to this Court. Ultimately, the defendant may well be right but it is impo~sible for me now to conclude decisively that the amount mooted could not be recovered given the circumstances of this case. Pursuant to section 83, the order can be made if I conclude on the balance of probability that there is 11 reasonable ground for supposing 11 that the award of damages could exceed $200, 000. That phrase was considered by Master Lee, as he then was, in 30 Re Lovell, OS 587/83, judgment delivered 5 August 1983, see 40 paragraph 7537 of Ryan, Weld and Lee. I generally agree with the approach adopted therein. But here, if all the evidence from those in the boxing industry were accepted, damages in excess of $200,000 could possibly be 50 recovered. I am persuaded, though not without some hesitation, that there are reasonable grounds for supposing the plaintiff might recover more than $200,000, and therefore the action should be transferred. 50 3 JUDGMENT •\'---. \ -- 3 of 4 -- /---- 221292 The plaintiff was and is happy to have a trial in the District Court if the defendant consented to an increase in jurisdiction. It seems to me that the matter is clearly one which could be properly tried in the District Court. The assessment of quani-nm would not involve any unusual considerations and there is nothing 10 about the action which calls for determination by a Supreme Court Judge. I made observations to that effect in the course of argument but the defendant maintained her position. I was minded in those circumstances to order that the defendant pay costs on the Supreme Court scale regardless of the amount of quantum recovered by the plaintiff. 20 However, I have decided that I should not do so as matters may emerge at trial which are not noi.r known to me and would make such an order unjust. However, in those circumstances the defendant should pay the· taxed costs of this application. My remarks can be drawn to the attention of the trial Judge on the issue of costs generally .. I will therefore order that District Court action No 680 of 1992 30 be transferred to the Supreme Court, and I will order that the 40 defendant pay the costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed. 50 HIS HONOUR: Mr O'Sullivan, your submission as to the costs of this application is noted. However, I took that consideration generally into account and for the reasons that I have given, my order will stand. GO 4 JUDGMENT l.· . I II -- 4 of 4 --