Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Jones & Ors [1992] QSC 118
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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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REVISED COPI.ES iSSUED
~
Court
n~pcrting
Bureau •
SUPREME
COURT OF
QUEENSLAND· Date,-:)/ I
~
I 2.._
CHAMBERS
( WHITE, M
aster
'i
\
No
3941
of
1987
AUSTRALIA
AND
NEW
ZEALAND
BANKING
GROUP
LIMITED
and
MARGARET ANNE
JONES
and
MORRIS
EVAN
JONES
and
LEWIS DAVID JONES
BRISBANE
. .
DATE
18/ 3/92
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff
First
Defendant
Second
Defendant
Third Defendant
1
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JUDGMENT
MASTER:
This
is
an
application
by
the
plaintiff
bank
to
amend
its
reply
and answer
to
the defendants'
defence
and
counterclaim.
The
action
is
set
down
for
trial
for
six
days
commencing
Monday
next
on 23
March
1992.
The
plaintiff
sues
the defendants as guarantors of the
obligations of
a
company,
sungleam
'pty Ltd,
which
was
the
vehicle for
borrowings
by
the
first
defendant
from
the
bank
for
certain
development
projects
over
a
period
from
November
1980
to
May
19a4.
As
at
the date
of
issue
of
the
writ
in
1987,
the
i
amount
sued
for
was
$281,207.17 with
interest
accruing
at
$112.14
per
day.
The
defendants
delivered
an
amended
defence
and
counterclaim
on
9
March
1989.
In
it
the defendants
allege
that at
all
material
times
one Kenneth George Rushworth
was
an
area
manager
of the
plaintiff
bank,
and
that in that
period the
first
defendant,
either
personally or
through
a company
controlled
by
her,
became
involved
in
the purchase
and
development
of
real estate
on
the
recommendation and
advice
10
30
-40
40
of
Rushworth.
The
vehicle
company was
unable
to service
the
loans
and
the
plaintiff
realised
various
mortgages
held
by
I
it
over
real
property
owned
by
the defendants
or
interests
associated with
them.
so
50
The
losses suffered
by
the defendants are pleaded
to
be due
to the negligence of the
plaintiff inter alia
because
Rushworth was
not competent
to give advice about
real
estate.
The
defendants seek to set off these losses against
the amounts claimed by the plaintiff.
They
also allege
a
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JUDGMENT
l
isale
at
under
value of various
properties.
That
is
not
presently relevant.
The
second
and
third
defendants plead
that
the
first
10
defendant induced
them
to
give guarantees
because
of
the
advice
of
Rushworth.
The
plaintiff
requested
further
and
better particulars
of
certain
of
the
paragraphs
in
the
amended
pleadings.
Relevantly, the
plaintiff
requested
in
paragraph
l(d)
(v)
that
the defendants,
20 "
...
state
the date or dates
upon
which
[or
substance
and
effect
of]
the
advice
of the
plaintiff
by Rushworth
was
given
...
"
Paragraphs
2
(a),.
3
(a) and
4
(a)
simply ask
for
particulars
of
.
1
.
advice given
by
Rush
worth.
In
my
opinion, the
form
of the
request for
particulars
is
of
no
consequence
and
could
not
30
amount
to
any
kind
of
"admission"
of
agency
as
was
suggested. Paragraph
l(a) of the
particulars indicates
that
the
defendants
and Rushworth were
associated other
than
simply as bank
official
and
clients
of the
bank,
for
it
is
r
stated that:
\.
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40
"The company,
Larissa
Pty Ltd,
also
became
involved
in
the
purchase
and development
of
real
estate.
That
is
a
company
in
which
the defendants
held
one
share
each
and which
was.controlled
by
the
said
Kenneth George Rushworth."
The
particulars of
advice given
on one
occasion
were
that
Rushworth
advised the
amount
of
profit in the
development
50
"which
the
first
defendant
would have
to share with
Rushworth
for his advice
and
expertise
...
"
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JUDGMENT
The
plaintiff
had
delivered
a
reply
and answer
to
the
original
defence
and
counterclaim
which
was a
general
denial
of the matters
pleaded,
yet
neither
delivered
nor
gave any
indication
that
it
intended
to deliver
an
amended
reply
and
answer
in
response
to
the
amended
defence
and
counterclaim
of
8
March
1989,
not
even
after
receipt
of the
particulars
which
revealed the
extended
relationship
with
Rushworth.
The
plaintiff
now
seeks
to
amend
its
reply
and
answer.
The
application
was
raised
on
13 March 1992
and
adjourned
to
17
March
to
enable
an
amendment
to
be
formulated.
In the
proposed
amended
pleading the
plaintiff
admits
that
Rushworth
was
its
area
manager
at
the relevant
time,
but
denies
that
if
he gave
any
advice of the
kind
particularised
then
he
·
did
·
so
on t
behalf of the
plaintiff.
Without
more
there
could
be
no
objection, but the pleading
goes
on
to
assert positively that
if
Rushworth gave
the advice,
it
·was
as
a
friend or
personal advisor
to
the
defendants
and
as
a
person about
to enter into
and
having
entered
into
a
commercial
relationship
with
the defendants.
A
limitation
defence
is
pleaded with
respect to the
November 1980
advice,
the action
having been
commenced
in
1987
and
the counter
claim
raised
in
1988.
10
30
40
"o
The ·
plaintiff.
now: allegesL:.-tha"(:· -,any ---ioss
--:
arising out
so
of
any
of the transactions pleaded·and.particularised
were
due
to other intervening causes, for
example,
over-runs
on
the cost of construction; increased interest rates
and
adverse market conditions. Other-proposed amendments do
not
60
in essence ·raise
new
issues.
·
It
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JUDGMENT
plaintiff
must
have
leave
to
make
the
amendm~nt
sought
if
those
issues to
which
I
have
referred
are
to
be
raised
..
at
the
trial.
The
original
reply
and answer does
not,
in
my
view,
do
anything
more
than put
Rushworth's
agency
in issue.
10
It
does
npt
support the
positive
case
now
raised
and would,
from
a
pleading
point
of
view,
offend
0
22
r
14.
The
principles to
be
applied
on
~n
application to
amend
are
not
in
dispute
and
are conveniently
enunciated
in
the old
case
20
of
Cropper
v.
Smith
(1884)
26 Ch.D.
700
per
Bowen
LJ
at
pp
C1
110, 111.
c
( I
30
"The
object of courts
is
to
decide the
rights
of the
parties
and
not to
punish
them
for
mistakes they
make
in
the
conduct
of
their
cases
...
I know
of
no
kind of
error
or mistake
which,
if
notfr,audulent
or
intended to overreach, the
court
ought
not
to correct,
if
it
can
be
done
without
injustice to
the other party.
As
soon
as
it
appears
that
the
way
in
which
a
party
has
framed
his case
will
not lead to
a
decision of the
real
matter
in
controversy,
it
is
as
much a
matter of
right
t:>n
his part
to
have
it
corrected,
if
it
canbe done
without
injustice,
as anything
else in the
case
iE
a
matter
of
right."
40
That
passage
was
cJ.ted with approval
by
the
High
Court
in
Clough
v. Frog (1974)
4
ALR
615
at
617.
Mr H
Fraser for the
defendants submits
that
leave to
amend
ought
to
be
refused
because otherwise the defendants
will
10
20
30
40
so
suffer prejudice not
..
compensable by an
order for costs.
The
so
prejudice
is
said to
be
two-fold.
Had
the proposed
amended
reply
and answer been delivered promptly
in
1989
the
defendants could have sued Rushworth personally.-
However,
it
seems
to
:rne
that by then itwould appear that only the
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JUDGMENT
!Heads
property
in
February
1984
and
following
could
have
I
bee.n
the
subject
of
suit
against
Rushworth
in
1989.
Mr
O'Connor
swears
that
he
took
the
view
that
because
-
1.
the
particulars
did not
seek
particulars
of
Rushworth's
agency,·
2.
the
plaintiff
did not discover
documents
going
to
the
ambit
of
Rushworth's
employment, and 3.
no amended
pleading
put
in
issue
Rushworth's
authority
it
was
unnecessary
to join
Rushworth
as
a
defendant
by
counterclaim.
Had
the
proposed
amendment
been
made
at
the
appropriate
time
the
first
defendant,
he
deposes,
would have
!given
instructions to join
Rushworth
as
defendant.
I
I
find
it
extraordinary
that
the
defendants
and
their
legal
advisors thought
that
the
authority
of
Rushworth
to
bind the
plaintiff
was
not
to
be
in issue
save
for
formal
proof
at
the
trial.
The
general denial, unfortunate as
that
pleading
practice often
is, is
permitted
by
the
Queensland Rules
'although
rarely
elsewhere.
The
nature of the advice, the
ambit
of the relationship particularised,
must have
clear~y
highlighted the
marginal
nature of
Rushworth's
authority
from
the
plaintiff
to act
as
he
did.
The
defendants
must have
been conscious of the limitation difficulties
frcim·the'time of
delivery of the original
defence and
counterclaim.
One
10
20
30
40
so
transaction
seems· on
its
face
to
lie
outside of the six
-year
so
period
on
the defendantsf.pleadirig.
An
inquiry to the
solicitors
for the
plaintiff prior to
making a
decision in
1989
not·to join
Rushworth
in
view of the state of the
pleadings might have been a
course taken
on·
behalf of the
6o· defendant althou
h
of course there is
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JUDGMENT
have
done
so
in
terms
of pleading.
I
cannot conclude
that
the
failure
to
amend
at
an
earlier
time,
namely
in
1989,
is
the
reason
why
the
defendants
did
10
not
join
Rushworth.
The
failure
to
discover
documents
going
to
Rushworth'
s
employment
is
another···:
ground
upon
which
Mr
Fraser
founds
his
submission
that
it
would
be
unjust to
the
defendants
to
permit the
amendments.
20
The
failure
to
discover
is
a.
serious-delict
by
the
(
\,
plaintiff.
Even
if
Rushworth'
s
employment
with the
bank
is
( \
30
not
in issue
on the.
proposed
am~ndment
up
until
now
it
has been.
But I-weuld
not
regard
the
failure to
discover
as an.indication
to the
defendants
that
it.was
not
a
matter
in issue.
The
other
' '
matter of prejudice
is
the
supposed
destru~tion
of
documents
1
by
the
bank
relating
to
some
of these
impugned
transactions
which
took
place
more
than seven
years
ago.
It
is
unfortunate
that
the
bank
has
not put
in
an
affidavit
f
dealing with
this
issue
as
was
suggested_when
it
was
raised
\.
40
last
Friday.
· From
the
Bar
table
Mr J
Douglas
QC
for the
bank
indicated
that transactions
and
statements
have been
destroyed but
that files
are
still
intact:
Passage of time
prejudice
is
50
also raised
by
Mr
Fraser, but the issues. and evidence are
60
clearly raised in
.the
particulars
given by
the defendants,
-
and I would suppose
that detailed statements must have been
taken from them
in that regard, and I do
not·see·this.as
an
objection to leave being
~iven;
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As
noted
above
there
is
no
dispute
on
the
principles
and
each
case
must
ultimately
be
decided
on
its
own
facts,
and
it
seems
to
me
that
any
prejudice suffered
by
the
~efendants
by
allowing
the
amendment
either
can.be. cured
by
:costs
or
is
not,.
as
a
consequence
of the
conduct
of the
plaintiff.
I
should
add
that
no
explanation
has
been
offered
by
the
plaintiff
for the
delay
in
seeking
to deliver
an
amended
reply
and answer.
I
can
only say
that
its
conduct
of
this
litigation
has been
careless
and
productive of considerable
monetary
loss.
It
fs
clear
then
that
the
trial
which
is
set
for
hearing
on
Monday
next
cannot proceed.
It
is
nowestimated
that
the
trial
will
take nine
days and
it
was
certified
for six
days.
There
will
be need
for
further
discovery
and,
as
I
apprehend
it,
for
some
interrogatories
from
the defendants.
Subject
to
any
submissions
that
might be
made,
these
would
be
the
formal
orders
that
I
propose:
that
the
plaintiff
have
leave to deliver
an
amended
reply
and answer
in
the
form
tendered;
that
the
plaintiff
pay
the defendants' costs
thrown
away
as
a
consequence
of the
amendments
to
be
taxed;
vacate the
trial
dates; the
plaintiff
to
pay
the defendants'
costs
thrown
away
as
a
consequence
of the
adjournment
of the
trial.-·
I
propose
to
give
some
directions
ord~rs
as
to
50
further discovery
and
delivery of intetrogat?ries.
MASTER: I
think,
having considered the submissions,
I am
not disposed
to
change
the order which I
originally
made, j
that the plaintiff
should bear the costs thrown away
as
a
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1992/118