Douglas & Douglas v Brisbane City Council [1992] QPEC 43
)i
IN THE PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT
HELD AT BRISBANE
QUEENSLAND P. & E. Appeal No. 169 of 1991
BETWEEN:
CARMEL MICHELE DOUGLAS and WILLIAM LEONARD DOUGLAS
as trustees for the W.L. & C.M. DOUGLAS FAMILY TRUST
and WILLIAM LEONARD DOUGLAS
Appellants
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - O'SULLIVAN, D.C.J.
Delivered the 17th day of July, 1992
..._
The Appellants appeal against the deemed refusal of the
Brisbane City Council of a claim for compensation for injurious
affection relating to land situated at 26 and 30 Ellis Street,
Kangaroo Point described as Lots 22 and 23 on RP 11328 and Lot
1 on RP SL 1 0695 Parish of South Brisbane ( "the land"). The nett
area of the land following a 4.25 metre road widening along the
Ellis Street frontage is 2047 square metres.
The land was at all material times in the Residential "B"
Zone under the Respondent's Town Plan.
Under the Respondent's 1978 Town Plan (" the 1978 Plan") the
land was "Undeclared" on the Respondent's Undeclared RDA Maps for
the area. According to the Council's unpublished maps, the
permissible density for this designation in this area was TS.
The Undeclared RDA Map for the land has notations 7 and 9 on it.
Attachment A to Mr. Hanisch' s report is a Schedule entitled "For
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the purposes of advising the public the notations on the map
series indicate recommended maximum development. potential and
special considerations based on precedents with prior approvals
and on detailed investigations". It includes: "Reasons for being
left unallocated - not for public release", and lists thirteen
reasons by numbers. Numbers 7 and 9 are "access problems" and
"areas considered suitable for higher density development"
respectively.
In his report Mr. Hanisch opined that the Undeclared RDA
Maps had no legal status and simply served as an indication of
density which Council may accept in the event of an application
for consent. He said that in practice the contents of these maps
were readily available to the public, although he conceded that
the public could not obtain copies of the maps. He opined that
in practice these Maps assumed the ~ame status as the Declared
RDA Maps. Mr. Zahnlei ter disagreed as to the public availability
of the contents of the Undeclared RDA Maps. It was clear that
the Appellants were given information contained on the Maps.
The land is included in the "Medium-High Density
Residential" designation on the Respondent's City Frame Structure
Plan.
Under the 1978 Plan an Apartment Building on the land was
a purpose "for which development may be carried out only with the
consent of the Council."
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3
The Statement of Intent of the Residential "B" Zone in the
1978 Plan included the following:
"The Residential "B" Zone is intended to constitute
the part of the City's residential area in which
apartment buildings may be permitted. It is
distinguished from the Residential "A" Zone in which
such buildings are not permitted .....
Consistent with the philosophy referred to above, it
is intended that apartment buildings, attached housing
and semi-detached housing should be permissible only
with the consent of the Council ...
In exercising its discretion .. the Council will take
into account all relevant issues, including the
effects of the building on sun-penetration and
shadows, air circulation, views and aspect for
existing and future residents of the area, topography,
the character and residential amenity of the locality
and the nature and capacity of the road system and
public utilities in the area and the susceptibility of
the area to flooding ... "
By the publication of the Town Plan in the Government
Gazette on 13 June 1987 ( "the 1987 Plan") the Residential
Development Area ("ROA") for the land became R3. The Statement
of Intent for the Residential "B" Zone is as follows:
"Land included in the "Residential B" Zone is intended
to provide for a variety of residential uses ranging
from a relatively low intensity to a quite high
intensity. This zone includes the only land in the
residential zones where apartment buildings are
allowed.
The "Residential B" Zone is divided into a number of
Residential Development Areas from RDA 2 to RDA 7. Each
RDA determines the intensity of development allowed in that
part of the "Residential B" Zone. To ensure that an
adequate level of amenity is achieved, permissible building
type, site cover and site area is prescribed for each RDA."
The statement of Intent for ROA R3 is as follows:
"In Residential Development Area R3 any duplex house
or attached house complying with the requirements of
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ROA R2 or ROA R3 will be allowed without requiring the
c~nsent of Council. Such development will require a
si. te of not less than 800 square metres with a
frontage of 20 metres or more. The height of the
buildings will be limited to no more than two storeys.
This will minimize any overshadowing of adjacent
housing".
Clause 7. 6 in the 1987 Town Plan deals with "Special
Requirements of Residential Buildings". Clause 7. 6. 1 is as
follows:
"The provisions of paragraphs 7.6.2 to 7.6.12 of this
clause are development standards applicable to
development for the purpose of a duplex house,
attached house or apartment building generally or in
the circumstances indicated in the particular
development standard, as the case may be"
"Development standards" are defined in Clause 30.3 of the 1987
Plan, as "provisions of the Plan".
Clause 7.6.5 is headed "Where the site is in a Residential
Development Area R3". In summary, sub-clauses (a) to (h) cover
the following matters: area of the site, length of frontage, site
cover, storeys, gross floor area, number of dwelling units, and
distance from side and rear boundaries of the site.
Under the 1987 Plan an apartment building is prohibited
whereas it was permissible under the 1978 Plan. The result of
the 1987 Plan was to restrict the use of the land to attached
housing.
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History:
By letter dated 26 June, 1985 an Application was made to the
Respondent for consideration in principle for the development of
the land for the purpose of an apartment building, to T6 density.
By letter dated 2 August, 1985 the Council responded by
saying that it would oppose the application "as it would require
a change in the RDA from R4 to Undeclared or a higher ROA and
such amendment was considered to be unwarranted."
The Appellant's Architects replied by letter dated 5 August
1985. They stated that the RDA was Undeclared and the Council's
Policy Supplementary Maps had a designation RDA RS, and asked the
Council for RDA R6.
By letter dated September 9, 1985, the Council advised that
it would oppose a proposal to a higher density than T5 after road
widening and development to TS or less on the site area after
road widening would have reasonable prospects of approval,
subject to certain matters which were listed in the letter.
In September 1986 a new Town Plan was put on public
exhibition. On 5 September 1986 the Appellants lodged an Object-
ion to the RDA Designation of R3. By letter dated 1 December,
1986 a letter from Brisbane City Council indicated that the
Objection had not been upheld, and stated:
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"Tha~ the Residential Development Type R3 be maintained,
J?rovided an accept_able development can be formulated taking
into account the limitations of the site consideration can
be given to a higher Residential Develdpment Area at that
time".
City of Brisbane Town Planning Act (1964):
Section 13:
Claims for compensation are dealt with under section 13 of
the City of Brisbane Town Planning Act 1964 (as amended)("the
Queensland Act"). Sub-section (1)(a) is as follows:
"(1) Subject to this Act any person-
(a) who has an estate or interest in land in the City
of Brisbane and such estate or interest is injuriously
affected-
( i )
(ii)
by the coming into operation of any
provision contained in the Plan; or
by any prohibition or restriction imposed by
under the Plan ... " or
Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the claim is made
pursuant to sub-section 13 (1) (a) (ii) only, not sub-section 13
(1) (a) (i).He further submitted that it follows that only sub-
section 14 (1) (d) is applicable and that the claim is outside
sub-section 14 (1) (c). because an apartment building is
prohibited.
Section 14:
section 14 of the Queensland Act provides that compensation
is not payable in certain cases, including the following relevant
provisions:
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"(1)(c) h w ere an estate or interest in land is
aff~cted by any provision of the Plan or an ordinance
of_ t~e Council which prescribes the space about
buildings or other structures or limits the size of
allotments or the number of buildings or other
structures to be erected or prescribes the height,
floor space, design, external appearance or character
of buildings or other structures .....
( d) where an estate or interest in land is
affected by any provision of the Plan which prohibits
or restricts the use of land or the erection or use of
a building or other structure thereon for a particular
purpose, unless the applicant establishes that he had
a legal right immediately before the provision in
question of the Plan came into force to use the land
or erect or use a building or other structure thereon
for the particular purpose which is prohibited or
restricted as aforesaid ... "
(2) For the purpose of construing paragraph (d) of
subsection (1) it shall not be held that an applicant
had not a legal right such as is referred to in that
paragraph by reason only of the fact that his right
depended upon an exercise of discretion by Brisbane
City Council or its delegate in his favour (whether or
not he has in fact sought such an exercise) if the
applicant shows that it is reasonable to expect that
such exercise of discretion would have been in his
favour had he sought such exercise immediately before
the provision in question of the Plan came into force.
Subject to the preceding paragraph, the
proving that compensation is not payable in
by virtue of the provisions of subsection (1)
upon the Council."
onus of
any case
shall be
Counsel for the Applicants submitted, and I accept, that one
of the appropriate principles of construction of sub-section 14
( 1 ) ( c) is to be found in Re Ellis v Ruislip Northwood Urban
District Court (1920) 1 KB 343 at 375, as follows:
" .. it must be borne in mind that we are here
considering an Act which expressly and in terms
recognizes the right to compensation in respect of
property injuriously affected by the schem~ and that,
in examining these parts of the Act which create
exceptions, the canon of construction applicable is
that they must not be deemed to take away or
extinguish the right unless it appear by express words
or by plain implication that it was the intention of
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8
the ~egislature so to do: Western Counties Railway Co.
v. Windsor & Annapolis Railway Co (1882) 7 App Cas
178, 188" •
Sub-section 14 (1) (c):
In the context of the statutory interpretation of sub-
section 14 (1) (c), Senior Counsel for the Respondent referred
to section 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act (1954), which is
as follows:
11
(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act,
the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose
of the Act is to be preferred to any other
interpretation.
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the purpose
is expressly stated in the Act."
He submitted that" the evident purpose of section 14 (1)
( c) is to enable the Council, without fear or risk of being
deterred by individual ( or multiple) compensation claims, to
introduce provisions which control building development, by
reference to such characteristics as plot ratio, height, gross
floor area, design and purpose and which are considered by it to
be desirable in the public interest."
Senior Counsel for the Respondent referred to, and relied
on, the judgment of the Land and Valuation Court of New South
Wales in Baker v. Cumberland County Council (1956) 1 L.G.R.A.
321. In Baker, since the relevant provisions of the scheme had
come into operation they had been an effective bar to subdivision
of the subject land and to separate sale of any of the blocks
into which it could be sub-divided, or of the two blocks into
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9
which it had been subdivided. The blocks in the subdivision
would not have been of sufficient size to constitute the
curtilage required by the definition and would therefore, in a
practical sense, be unsaleable, since they could not lawfully be
used as building blocks.
At pages 328-9, Sugerman J. said:
"The general purpose of the Part (XIIA of the Local
Government Act) is town and country planning with a
view to securing ends conceived of as desirable in the
interests of the public generally or of particular
neighbourhoods. The means by which this planning is
to be brought about include regulations, controls,
prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed upon the
use of land by individuals, and the legislation makes
incidental provision ancillary to, or consequential
upon, the attainment of the desired ends. Measures of
this character are likely to carry with them the
consequence that there will be some who will suffer
loss or damage to their individual interests by
reason, for example, of restrictions upon the use or
enjoyment of their lands imposed in the general or
neighbourhood interest, and that there may be others
who reap unearned benefits, it may also be suggested
that, to some extent, such loss or damage suffered by
individuals may be offset by their participation in
the benefits conferred upon the public generally, or
upon the neighbourhood, through the imposition upon
others of restrictions of a similar character. 11
He further said, at pages 330-331:
"Section 432AC ( 2) ( c) speaks of, inter alia, any
provision of the prescribed scheme which 'prescribes'
certain matters, those here relevant being 'the space
about buildings' , the 'use of buildings' and the
'character of buildings'. In the sense in which the
word 'prescribe' is here used, more particularly when
it is considered in conjunction with s. 342G as the
source of authority for every provision of a
prescribed scheme, it refers to, or includes, in.my
opinion, prescriptions of the purposes for which
buildings may or may not be used, or of the character
of the buildings which may be erected or of those
which may not. . ........... A prescription of the
'character' of buildings is, then, one which
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prescribes the nature, or sort, of buildings, in
respects other than those of 'height', etc. which are
specifically enumerated."
Sugerman J. concluded ( at page 334) that the relevant
provision, in so far as it dealt with the erection of buildings
in "Green Belt Area" Zones and prescribed the purposes for which
they may have been erected with consent, with a residuary
prescription that they may not have been erected of any other
purpose was, "in substance and on the face of it, a provision
which prescribed the 'character' of buildings."
In assessing the applicability of Baker, it is necessary to
compare the relevant New South Wales and Queensland legislative
provisions.
Under the N.S.W. Act there is no equivalent in section 342
AC (1)(a) to section 13(1)(a)(ii) in the Queensland Act which
refers to "prohibition".
A comparison of sub-section 14(1)(c) of the Queensland Act
and sub-section 342AC(2)(c) of the NSW Act reveals the following
differences: Sub-section 342AC (2) (c) has the word "use" between
"floor space" and "design", and also includes "bulk". The
Queensland provision includes "size of allotments" which the NSW
provision does not. I consider that the first of these differ-
ences is of some importance.
In Williams v Claremont Town Council (1975) LGRA 155 the
supreme court of western Australia referred to Baker (supra).
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11
Williams concerned an amendment to a scheme whereby an area,
including the plaintiff's land, was rezoned to single resfdential
zone SR3 (group houses). The effect of this was to limit use to
duplex houses, dwellings, patio houses and terrace houses, each
subject to certain development conditions as defined. As a
result of the amendment, flats were prohibited. Sub-section 12
(2) of the Town Planning and Development Act (1928-1973) (WA)
provided:
"Land or property shall not be deemed to be
injuriously affected by reason of the making of any
provisions inserted in a town planning scheme which,
with a view to securing the amenity, health, or
convenience of the area included in the scheme, or any
part thereof, prescribe .... the purpose, dimensions, or
general character of buildings ... "
Wickham J. said, at page 156:
"For myself I think it is plain that the scheme and
its amendment, so far as it relates to the plaintiff's
land, prescribes in relation to it the general
character of buildings and that, in that respect, his
land is by the force of this section deemed not to be
injuriously affected by reason of the making of that
provision. This was the interpretation placed upon s.
342AC (2)(c) of the Local Government Act, 1919 (NSW)
by Sugerman J. in the case of Baker v Cumberland
County Council .... If this decision is correct, and I
have no reason to think that it is not, it disposes of
the plaintiff's case at the threshold."
counsel for the Applicants urged me, in construing sub-
section 14 ( 1 } ( c), to adopt the approach followed In Re Ellis
(supra) at page 375, and thus to look carefully at the
legislative provisions in the Queensland Act. He submitted, and
I accept, that this is particularly important because of the
following passages:
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12
Baker at page 332:
"In order . that a provision of a prescribed scheme
should satisfy one of the descriptions contained ins.
342 Act _(2_) (<?) it must, in my opinion, appear from
the provision itself that it fulfils that description,
for example, that it is a provision which "prescribes
the space about buildings. " It is not sufficient
that is to ~ay, that it is a provision which bring~
about, or is capable of bringing about, the same
result by other means".
Jones v Gosford Shire Council (1975) 33 L.G.R.A. 368,
at 371:
"It is sufficient to say that for a provision to come
within this paragraph it must be one which, by its
terms, imposes one or more of the restrictions
mentioned in the paragraph. It is not sufficient that
the provision brings about, or is capable of bringing
about, the same result by other means."
Jones concerned an amendment to the Shire of Gosford
Planning Scheme Ordinance whereby reserved land was designated
as reserved for the purpose of open space - parks and recreation.
The restrictions imposed on the reserved land by the Ordinance
were, in effect, to prohibit the erection or alteration of a
building or the carrying out or alteration of a work of a
permanent character or the making or alteration of a permanent
excavation except one required for or incidental to the purpose
for which the land is reserved. This restriction was subject to
a power on the part of the Council to consent to such things
being done if it appeared to it that the purpose for which the
land was reserved cannot be carried into effect within a
reasonable time after the commencement of the scheme. Use of the
reserved land for any purpose other than its existing use was
prohibited without the consent of the Council.
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13
The Court found (at page 371):
"In the present case the restrictions relating to reserved
land to which I have referred cannot be described as
limiting the number of buildings to be erected or
prescribing the character of buildings. All that can be
said is that the restrictions are such that, as a
consequence of their application to the land, the number of
buildings on the land may be limited and the character of
any buildings on the land may be prescribed as a
consequence of a decision of the Council. Accordingly, the
restrictions do not come within para. (c)."
I consider, (applying Baker, Jones and Williams), that the
provisions of the 1987 Town Plan relevant to the land are not
provisions which by their terms include the prescriptions
nominated in sub-section 14 (1) (c) of the Queensland Act.
I consider that there is a significant difference in the
statutory provisions in that sub-section 14(1)(c) does not refer
to "prohibits" while sub-section 14(1)(d) does. I agree with
Counsel for the Appellants that a prohibition is not a
prescription. There are no prescriptions for an apartment
building on the subject land.
I find that sub-section 14(1 )(c) of the Queensland Act does
not deny compensation to the Appellants.
Sub-section 14 (1) (d):
rt now becomes necessary to decide whether sub-section 14
(1) (d) denies compensation to the Appellants.
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14
Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the "prohibition"
part of sub-section 14 (1) (d) is relevant. The prohibition {of
an apartment building) is in the Table of Development. That
Table does not deal with the matters listed in sub-section 14 (1)
(c) and recourse should not be had to other provisions of the
1987 Plan.
Senior Counsel for the Respondent submitted that in dealing
with a claim for injurious affection, the Court needs to go
beyond the prohibition, and look further into the Plan to
ascertain if there are restrictions in order to assess whether
there has been a diminution in value. He submitted that the
matters dealt with in Clause 7.6.5 of the 1987 Plan are relevant.
He submitted that the words "any provision of the Plan which
prohibits or restricts the use of land" should not be limited to
the Table of Development, and recourse should be had to the whole
of the Plan. He cited Walton Properties Pty. Ltd. v Brisbane
City Council 14 LGRA 379 at 381, which in turn cited Bingham v
Cumberland County Council (1954) 20 LGR (NSW) 1, at pp. 5 and 12
as calling for a wide import to be given to "provision contained
in the prescribed scheme".
I consider that Clauses 7.3.2 and 7.6.5, and the ROA Map for
the area, are "provisions contained in the Plan" (sub-sections
13 (1) (a) (i) and 14 (1) (d) of the Queensland Act).
The Table of Development, to which I have already referred,
refers to RDA R3. In order to determine whether the land is in
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15
ROA R3, recourse must be had to other provisions of the 1987
Plan, specifically the ROA Maps. RDA scheme maps are defined as
"S h M II •
c eme aps in Clause 30.3 of the 1987 Plan.
I consider that the Appellants' claim falls within the first
P art of sub-section 14 (1) (d) 1 " • • f th , name y, any provision o e
Plan which prohibits or restricts the use of land or the erection
or use of a building or other structure thereon for a particular
purpose ... ". Thus it becomes necessary to decide whether the
Appellants have discharged the onus cast on them by sub-section
14 (2).
Mr. Zahnlei ter, Town Planning Consultant engaged by the
Appellants, and Mr. Hanisch, a Town Planner in the employ of the
Respondent, gave evidence concerning the likely exercise of the
discretion to permit an apartment building to T6 density.
Mr. Zahnlei ter undertook a detailed investigation of an
application under the 1978 Plan for an apartment building, based
on the T6 Drawings prepared by the Appellants' Architects. He
concluded that "a properly made application proposing a carefully
designed T6 type building could be approved on the land because
the effects of that development would have little or no effect
on adjoining land", and that such an application "would stand a
reasonable chance of success". He considered that relevant
factors included development trends in the locality, road
network, public transport network, presence of major attractors
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and existing land uses. He noted that the lot size of the land
is within the 1500 square metres specified for T6 density.
Mr. Zahnleiter considered it appropriate to give more weight
to the published Statement of Intent for the zone rather than the
Respondent's unpublished internal ROA policy which was subject
to change. I accept this evidence.
Mr. Hanisch did not assess the Architects' T6 Drawings. In
reaching his opinion on the TS/T6 issue, he referred to a number
of matters, including the refusal of the consideration in
principle (to which I have already referred) the unofficial RDA
Maps (which he said were used as if they were Declared RDA Maps)
and policy, the small number of T6 approvals given by the
Respondent, the small size of the land and the Respondent's
letter of 1 December 1986 (to which I have already referred).
Taking into account all the matters referred to by Messrs.
Zahnleiter and Hanisch, I am satisfied that it is reasonable to
expect that the Council would have exercised its discretion (to
permit an apartment building to T6 density) in their favour had
they sought such exercise immediately before the RDA designation
provisions of the Plan came into force. The Applicants have
accordingly discharged their onus.
I therefore find that Sub-section 14 ( 1) (d) does not preclude
compensation being payable to the Appellants.
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17
Valuations:
Evidence concerning the unaffected ("before") and affected
("after") values of the land was given by Mr. Rowland, a Valuer
in the employ of the Respondent, and Mr. Walsh, a Valuer engaged
by the Appellants. Both are experienced Valuers who gave their
evidence in a professional way.
They used different bases for the unaffected values. Mr.
Rowland preferred a rate ( $175) per square metre for a T6
development, while Mr. Walsh preferred a rate ($17,500) per unit.
This led to a considerable variation in figures, namely, $362,000
(Rowland) and $650,000 (Walsh). Mr. Beedell, an Architect and
Developer who gave evidence on behalf of the Appellants, also
supported a per unit rate.
Mr. Rowland acknowledged the relevance of what occurs in the
market place, and the number of units actually achieved on land
used for comparative sales purposes. However, he considered that
a rate per unit method is only a "rule of thumb" rate used by
developers for a preliminary site investigation. It can be used
as a check method for valuation purposes. He considered that the
method had validity for land under the 1987 Plan but not the 1978
Plan.
Mr. Rowland considered that his approach was reinforced by
the report of Mr. Matovic, an Architect and Developer who
prepared a report for the Respondent, which Mr. Rowland
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18
considered pointed to the inferiority of the site and development
constraints.
I consider Mr. Walsh allowed too much for the influence of
Expo 88 in his assessment.
While there may be validity in the methods used by both
Valuers, I agree with Mr. Rowland that there is no real basis for
comparison between any proposed units for the subject land and
the unit sales in the Schedules prepared by both Valuers. Any
valuation on a per unit basis suffers because it does not address
the number of bedrooms, quality of finish, physical constraints
of the site, orientation and location of the unit within a
particular building, views, amenities available such as tennis
courts etc. , proximity to the CBD and other factors.
Consequently, I prefer a valuation on a per square metre basis.
I accept the evidence of Mr. Rowland that a valuation based on
a per unit basis is too broad in the context of the different
variables for units being compared. A per metre valuation also
incorporates any effect of the influence of Expo 1988 as any
increase in value would be reflected in sales 3 and 4 of Schedule
"A" in Mr. Rowland's report.
I assess the "before" value of the land at $362,000.
There was little difference between the figures of Mr.
Rowland ($190,000) and Mr. Walsh ($195,000) for the affected
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value of the land.
$195,000.
19
I assess the "after" value of the land at
The difference between the unaffected value ($362,000) and
the affected value ($195,000) is therefore $167,000.
I find that the estate or interest of the Appellants in the
land has been injuriously affected.
I assess the amount of compensation at $167,000.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QPEC/1992/043