Bidner v The Valuer-General [1992] QLC 339 (1992) 14 QLCR 88

LAND COURT, BRISBANE. 8 May 1992 Re: Appeal against valuation of the Valuer-General Shire of Mareeba V91-989, V91-990. James J Bidner V The Valuer-General DliGISl0N QN P01NT OF JURISE>ICTION These cases raise the preliminary question whether the Land Court has jurisdiction to proceed and determine appeals against two valuations by the Valuer- General of an area of land in the Parish of Cairns. The question is to be answered by reference to section 21 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944. The facts To appreciate how the question arises it is necessary to consider the facts. Briefly stated the chronology of events (as appears from records on the Land Court's files) is as follows: 10 July 1991: The Valuer-General issued a notice to the Estate of Charles G Binder stating that: (a) the objection against Valuation No 4669 at Mareeba had been allowed and the value reduced to $105,000, effective from 4 September 1990; and (b) unless the recipient appealed to the Land Court within 60 days after the date of issue of that notice the Valuer-General's decision would be deemed to stand. [1992] QLC 339 -- 1 of 10 -- 10 July 1991: 26 August 1991: 6 September 1991: 2 The Valuer-General issued a notice to the Estate of Charles G Binder stating that: (a) the objection against Valuation No 4669 at Mareeba had been allowed and the value reduced to $120,000, effective from 30 June 1991; and (b) unless the recipient appealed to the Land Court within 60 days after the date of issue of that notice the Valuer-General's decision would be deemed to stand. The Land Court received by post a Notice of Appeal dated 23 August 1991 from James J Bidner appealing against both of the Valuer-General's valuations and noting "present title (Transmission by Death) in the name of James Joseph BIDNER". The Registrar of the Land Court wrote to Mr JJ Bidner advising him that the Notice of Appeal appeared to be defective. The Form of Requisition attached to the letter particularised non-compliance with section 21 (3) as follows: "The grounds of appeal must be stated". Both the letter and the Form of Requisition referred to section 21 (3) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944. (a) The letter explained that section 21 (3) sets out the requirements for lodging a valid notice of appeal. The letter enclosed an extract from the relevant sections of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 and stated that subsections (3) and (3B) refer to this Requisition. -- 2 of 10 -- ' ' 11 September 1991 : 16 September 1991: 14 January 1992: 3 The letter stated that the defect may be remedied by replying to the Requisition and returning the form to the Registrar "within 21 days of the date of the Requisition", and that the reply "within the prescribed period of 21 days" would be awaited. (b) The Requisition stated that the form duly completed or advice to the like effect should be returned to reach the Registrar "within 21 days of date of issue" and that failure to return the requisition "within the prescribed period may result in your Notice of Appeal ... being declared invalid". The Deputy Registrar of the Land Court signed a notice of the case coming on before the Land Court at Mareeba on 2 October 1991. The notice was sent to Mr Bidner. Mrs T Stevenson wrote to the Registrar of the Land Court advising that Mr Bidner was away until at least 5 October 1991 and so would not be able to attend the sittings of the Court at Mareeba on 2 October 1991. The letter was received by the Land Court by post on 19 September 1991. Mr Bidner wrote to the Registrar of the Land Court apologising for "not having written to you earlier", explaining that he had been seriously ill since October 1991, and enclosing grounds of appeal. The letter was received by the Land Court by post on 16 January 1992. -- 3 of 10 -- 20 January 1992: 4 The Acting Registrar wrote to Mr Bidner acknowledging receipt of Mr Bidner's letter and noting that it was received "outside the prescribed period of 21 days as specified in the requisition". Mr Bidner was advised that the matter would be set down for the first available sittings of the Land Court at Mareeba when the question whether the Court has jurisdiction to proceed and determine the appeal would be raised as a preliminary point. Following further correspondence the matter was listed for hearing by the Land Court in Brisbane on 6 May 1992. The Valuation of Land Act 1944 Section 21 (1) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 provides that, "subject to this section", an owner who has duly objected to the Valuer-General against a valuation made by the Valuer-General may, if dissatisfied with the decision of the Valuer- General upon objection, appeal to the Land Court. Such an appeal must be instituted within 60 days after the date of issue to the owner by the Valuer-General of notice of his decision upon the objection. In these cases there is an issue whether the Land Court has jurisdiction to proceed and determine the present appeals as contained in the Notice of Appeal. The relevant extracts from section 21 for the purpose of determining whether the Court has jurisdiction are as follows: '(3) An appeal under this section shall be instituted by filing in the Land Court registry a notice of appeal. Such notice shall state the grounds of appeal and the appeal shall be limited to the grounds so stated, and the burden of proving any and eve,y such ground shall be upon the owner. -- 4 of 10 -- . , 5 Such notice shall also state the amount which In the opinion of the appellant should be the valuation of the subject land. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the Valuer-General not later than 7 days after the notice Is flied In the Land Court registry. (3B)(a) Where It appears to the registrar of the Land Court that a notice of appeal filed in the registry does not comply in all respects with the requirements of subsection (3) or is otherwise defective in a material particular, he shall issue or cause to be issued to the appellant a requisition specifying the non-compliance or defect and requiring him to comply In all respects with the requirements of subsection (3) or remedy the defect, as the case may be, by filing in the registry within 21 days of the date of the requisition an answer to It so that the requirements of subsection (3) are satisfied or the defect is remedied, as the case may be. (c) If the appellant does not fully comply with the requirements of the requisition to the satisfaction of the registrar within the prescribed time, the Land Court shall not proceed to hear and determine the appeal unless it is satisfied that the notice of appeal as first filed complied In all respect with the requirements of subsection (3) and was not defective in any material particular or that, where in its opinion a requisition was properly issued, the requirements of the requisition have been complied with to the extent that, taking such compliance into consideration in conjunction with the notice of appeal as first filed, the requirements of subsection (3) have been complied with and there Is no defect in any material particular.• The issue resolved In each of the present cases, an appeal was instituted within 60 days of the date of issue of each notice from the Valuer-General (10 July 1991). The only issue in this case is whether the Notice of Appeal complied with the requirement of section 21 (3) that a notice "shall state the grounds of appeal". The Notice of Appeal stated: "The grounds of my appeal are precisely those quoted in my objection to the valuations of the Valuer-General with the exception that I remove from the grounds of appeal my allegation that no Local Authority services are provided to the land. I know now that a rubbish removal service is available." -- 5 of 10 -- 6 The Notice of Appeal appeared to the Registrar not to comply in all respects with section 21 (3) and, in the requisition dated 6 September 1991, he particularised the non-compliance as: "The grounds of appeal must be stated". An answer to the requisition was not filed in the Land 'Court registry within the 21 day period referred to in that requisition. It is apparent from the correspondence on the Land Court files and from Mr Bidner's statements to the Court that Mr Bidner was absent from Brisbane for a period including and extending beyond the date of the Registrar's requisition and the prescribed time within which compliance with the requisition was required. He returned to Brisbane about 5 October 1991. His letter of 14 January 1992 states that, following a period of serious illness in October 1991, he visited the Registrar's office and was advised that "the Land Court was separate from the Valuer-General's Department and thus the Land Court was not necessarily aware of my grounds for objection and consequently it was necessary for me to advise the Land Court in writing of my grounds of appeal". Those grounds were enclosed with the letter and were also dated 14 January 1992, more than 4 months after the date of the requisition from the Registrar. Mr Bidner does not make any submission based on his lack of actual knowledge of the Registrar's requisition at the relevant time. Rather, he contends that the Notice of Appeal complies with the requirements of section 21 (3). Accordingly, the Registrar was in error in taking the view that the Notice of Appeal does not comply with section 21 (3), and no question arises under section 21 (3B). The Valuer-General disagrees, submitting that the Notice of Appeal does not comply with the statutory requirements and hence the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeals on their merits. -- 6 of 10 -- '• - • > 7 As has been noted in previous cases, the Land Court is a Court of statutory creation and its jurisdiction is bestowed by statute. It has no inherent jurisdiction. Because it is a Court of limited jurisdiction, it must necessarily only assume jurisdiction when and in the manner authorised by the Legislature. (See Gold Coast Milk Pty Ltd and South Coast Co-operative Dairy Association Limited v The Valuer- General (1983) 9 QLCR 13, at 17.) The practical consequence for the appellant is that the Court only has jurisdiction to hear the appeals if section 21 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 confers that jurisdiction. The requirements of section 21 are mandatory and constitute conditions precedent to the jurisdiction of the Court. (See, for example, CM Conroy v The Valuer-General (1986) 11 QLCR 25, at 27 and cases cited in it.) Before the Land Court can proceed and determine the present appeals, it must be satisfied that the Notice of Appeal complies with the requirements of section 21 (3) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944. The matter can be approached under section 21 (3) or section 21 (3B)(c). As quoted earlier, section 21 (3) requires that a notice of appeal "shall state the grounds of appeal". The Notice of Appeal in these cases described the grounds of appeal by reference to a document which had been lodged with the Valuer- General. It was not possible to ascertain from the Notice of Appeal alone what were the grounds of appeal. Mr Bidner said that he felt sure that the Registrar, if he did not have a copy of the notice of objection to the Valuer-General, could have obtained a copy. Mr Paterson for the Valuer-General contended that there is no statutory basis for the Valuer-General notifying the Registrar of a notice of objection. Any administrative arrangements that may be in place from time to time for such notice to be given does not relieve the appellant of the duty to state grounds of appeal. The Notice of Appeal in these cases, he submits, is not clear enough to discharge the burden on the appellant. -- 7 of 10 -- 8 In my view, because the grounds of appeal as stated cannot be understood in their own terms, the appellant has not complied with section 21 (3). The fact that the grounds can be ascertained by reference to another document, albeit one which was not annexed to the Notice of Appeal and which ,the Valuer-General was not formally obliged to provide to the Registrar, does not overcome that lack of compliance. I note that, in these cases, the Valuer-General would not be prejudiced if this Court were to hold that the Notice of Appeal satisfies the requirements of section 21 (3). The Valuer-General would have clear notice of each of the grounds as they conform, subject to the one specified modification, with the grounds of objection made to him. The lack of prejudice to the respondent in these cases cannot, however, be the basis of ignoring a failure to comply with statutory requirements. Section 21 (3B)(c) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 does not assist the appellant. Under that subsection, the following questions must be answered. (a) Has the appellant not fully complied with the requirements of the requisition to the satisfaction of the registrar within the prescribed time? (b) If the answer to (a) is yes, can the Land Court be satisfied that either: (1) the notice of appeal as first filed complied in all respects with the requirements of section 21 (3) and was not defective in any material particular; or (2) the requisition was properly issued and the requirements of the requisition have been complied with to the extent that, taking such compliance into consideration in conjunction with the notice of appeal as -- 8 of 10 -- . , 9 first filed, the requirements of section 21 (3) have been complied with and there is no defect in any material particular? Section 21 (3B)(c) clearly contemplates the situation ~here an appellant has replied to a requisition from the Registrar but has not complied with all of the Registrar's requirements within the prescribed time. The present appeals are not such cases. The appellant did not reply within the prescribed time. Can it be said that the appellant did not "fully comply" with the Registrar's requirements when he did not comply at all? In other words, can the appellant seek relief under section 21 (3B)(c) even though he did not reply to the Registrar until more than 4 months after the Registrar's requisition? The answer is no. As the former President of the Land Court, Mr Smith, wrote in CM Conroy v The Valuer-General: "In my opinion the word "fully" implies that there has been some (or part) compliance ·with the requisition within the prescribed time. It would extend the provisions of paragraph (c) too far to hold that they apply to cases where there has been [1Q compliance at all within the prescribed time. It seems to me on a careful reading of the aforequoted part of paragraph (c) as a whole that the only compliance which the paragraph authorises to be considered in conjunction with the Notice of Appeal for the purposes of deciding compliance with the requirements of subsection (3) is compliance which occurred within the prescribed time.• {(1986} 11 QLCR 25, at 28) As the answer to the threshold question to be answered under section 21 (3B)(c) is no, then there is no need to answer the other questions. In any case, as I have already held, the Notice of Appeal as first filed did not comply in all respects with the requirements of section 21 (3) so that part of section 21 (3B)(c) would not assist the appellant. No reliance was placed on the final part of section 21 (3B)(c) and no submission was made concerning it. I express no view about it. -- 9 of 10 -- 10 Although the decision in this case may appear to result from a somewhat rigid application of the statutory provisions, that seems to be the only proper course to adopt. As the former President of the Land Court observed in at least two cases, subsections (3A)-(3F) of section 21 are not "a charter fo~ a liberal or wholesale assumption of jurisdiction" and do not grant "unfettered power on the Court to assume jurisdiction by correcting all defects or omissions in the appeal process. The prerequisites and hurdles are still there ... in mandatory terms requiring that appellants duly observe them". Their form and scope can be contrasted with the wide discretionary powers given to the Land Appeal Court by section 44(11) of the Land Act 1962. Even though, where possible, Courts usually interpret questions of jurisdiction in a liberal rather than a narrow fashion, the specific provisions applicable in cases such as these militate against such an approach. (Gold Coast Milk Pty Ltd and South Coast Co-operative Dairy Association Limited v The Valuer- General (1983) 9 QLCR 13, at 19; CM Conroy v The Valuer-General (1986) 11 QLCR 25, at 28.) The Land Court has no jurisdiction to proceed to hear the appeals on their merits. Both appeals are to be struck out for want of jurisdiction. GJ Neate Member of the Land Court -- 10 of 10 --