Ferrero & Anor v The Valuer-General [1992] QLC 216

f-"ff'-, ;;,·•: f" F, ,.. : !.~ .., r, • • Re: Appeal against a determination of the Valuer-General, Shire of Hinchinbrook. (AV91-166). E.L. & M.M. Ferrero v. The Valuer-General (Hearing at Ingham) DECISION LAND COURT, BRISBANE. 31st March, 1992. The basic ground of this appeal is that land described as Lot 1 on R.P. 706937 Parish of Cordelia, containing 4.246 hectares, fronting Four Mile Road, Victoria Estate, about 9 km east of Ingham, is being used for primary production purposes and should be valued under the provisions of Section ll(l)(vii) of the Valuation of Land Act of 1944 (as amended). The Valuer-General determined the unimproved value of the land as at 31st March, 1990, in the sum of $20,500. Evidence was led through Mr D.T. Treston, registered valuer, in support of the valuation. Mr Treston saw the highest and best use of the land as a rural homesite and provided sales evidence to support the level of value applied, with consideration given to various disabilities, including flooding and lack of access over a tramline (used for the hauling of sugar cane) running parallel to the road carriageway. Mr A. Antcliff acted as agent for the appellant in the conduct of the hearing. It is contended that in terms of Section ll(l)(vii) of the Act, the unimproved value of the land is $6,400 based on a grazing level of value. Mr E. Ferrero was called to give [1992] QLC 216 -- 1 of 3 -- 2 evidence in support of a written submission providing details as to the nature and use of the land. Stock numbers vary, but at the time of the hearing there were 18 head of cattle grazing the land, being 9 breeders in calf, 7 heifers and 2 male calves. Artificial insemination is utilised in the breeding program and the land used to its maximum grazing potential. A small number of fruit trees are also established. The property is unsuitable, partly because of the nature of the land and its flooding disability, for the growing of sugar cane. The appellants grow sugar cane on other land in the locality which is leased under a family arrangement. The submission is that the grazing use of the land is an adjunct to the business of primary production in which the appellants engage. Mr Ferrero's evidence indicates that the income from the grazing arm of the activities would not exceed $2,500 per annum, exclusive of the value of milk and meat used privately. There are no separate records kept for the grazing operation, the income and expenditure included with the overall primary production business record. When necessary, machinery and fuel requirements come from the cane-farming operation. A number of photographs were tendered and evidence given as to the physical disabilities of the land, the drainage and filling which has been carried out. However, the case for the appellants did not seriously challenge the valuation of the land as a rural homesite, the valuation contended for $6,400, was based on values applied to other properties used for grazing purposes. Mr Treston had given consideration to the grazing use of the land and had no disagreement with the suggestion that it was being utilised to its maximum grazing potential. It was his opinion that the scale of the grazing operation on the land was however insufficient in its own right to be regarded as a business and it was not a - -- 2 of 3 -- 3 natural adjunct to the dominant cane-farming business of the appellants. He agreed that if the subject property was being used in conjunction with other land in the locality for a recognised grazing business then it might, depending on the circumstances, qualify for the protection provided for in the Act. He also agreed that if the land was to be valued on the basis of use for the business of primary production (grazing) its valuation would be $6,400 as claimed. For the provision of Section ll(l)(vii) of the Act to apply it must be found that the land is exclusively used for "the business of primary production". On the evidence before me it would seem that the appellants are in the business of primary production through their sugar cane farming activities on other lands in the locality. Giving consideration to the matters discussed and reviewed by the Land Appeal Court in K. Crawford v. The Valuer-General in an as yet umeported judgment delivered on 27th August, 1990, I have no doubt that the activities carried out by the appellants on the subject land do not in themselves constitute a business. The land or the activities carried on there are not seen as a · necessary or integral part of the business of sugar cane farming, the primary activity of the appellants, but incidental thereto. Consequently I am unable to agree that the land should be seen to qualify for the protection sought under Section ll(l)(vii) of the Act. To find otherwise would, in my opinion, be qualifying the appellants rather than their use of the land. For these reasons, the appeal fails and the determination of the Valuer- General is affirmed. (R.E. Wenck) Member of the Land Court. -- 3 of 3 --