Commissioner of Water Resources, Re [1990] QSC 221 [1991] 1 Qd R 549

I, 10 20 30 40 50 60 // IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CIVIL JURISDICTION ,/ /''\ ·' \·~ \ 1' / / {p O.S. No.·/·;f{ 0£1986 2:>C C/O/;;;_;;J_/ ,•·/ / / - /' ,/---~--=•---.......- BEFORE MR. JUSTICE BYRNE A REVISED cor1.Es .,ss ED i ·I Court F{eporting Bure u IBRISBANE, 6 JULY 1990 Onto: lt I 7 Ao i (Copyright in this transcript is vested -rn_-~--···-·-----1-1,.oJ the Crown. Copies thereof must not be made or sold without the written authority of the Chief Court Reporter,Court Reporting Bureau.) IN THE MATTER OF The Arbitration Act 1973 -and- IN THE MATTER OF a contract between the Commissioner of Water Resources as Principal and Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd as contractor -and- IN THE MATTER OF an application to set aside writs of subpoena duces tecum JUDGMENT HIS HONOUR: I regret the delay in delivering my decision in this appeal. As will soon be seen, I have _thought it necessary to consider a substantial volume of cases and other materials to which I was not referred either at the hearing or in the subsequent written submissions. I vacate my order made on 28 February 1990 suspending until further order the operation of the subpoenas. The appeal is dismissed. The appellants have, as they requested, leave to make the amendments to the summons and to the notice of appeal mentioned in the appendix to my reasons, which I now publish. • ....r,_Qvt. Printer, Qld. 1 20 30 40 50 60 -- 1 of 20 -- r 10 20 30 40 so 60 I order that the appellants pay the respondent's taxed costs of the appeal limited to those incurred to and including 28 February 1990. !"; : ..· '""•wt. Printer, Qld. ~ ~..,; 2 10 20 30 40 50 60 -- 2 of 20 -- \ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND o.s. No. 379 of 1986 Before Mr. Justice Byrne IN THE MATTER of the Arbitration Act 1973 - and - IN THE MATTER of a Contract between the Commissioner of Water Resources as Principal and Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd as Contractor - and - IN THE MATTER of an Application to set aside Writs of Subpoena duces tecum JUDGMENT - BYRNE J. Delivered the 6th day of July, 1990 CATCHWORDS: Practice - subpoena duces tecum - whether subpoena issued under s. 18 of the Arbitration Act 1973 (Qld) can compel production to an arbitrator of documents of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitutional law - whether State Act can bind the Commonwealth Counsel: Solicitors: Mr H.G. Fryberg Q.C. with him Mr P.E. Hack for appellants Mr W. Sofronoff Q.C. with him Mr P.L. O'Shea forrespondent Australian Government Solicitor for appellants Morris, Fletcher and Cross for respondent Hearing date: 28th February, 1990 -- 3 of 20 -- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND O.S. No. 379 of 1986 IN THE MATTER of the Arbitration Act 1973 - and - IN THE MATTER of a Contract between the Commissioner of Water Resources as Principal and Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd as Contractor - and - IN THE MATTER of an Application to set aside Writs of Subpoena duces tecum JUDGMENT - BYRNE J. Delivered the 6th day of July, 1990 Mr G.L. Miller, Mr M.S. Keating and Mr N.J. Tanzer are Secretaries of departments of the executive government of the Commonwealth. They appeal against the refusal of Senior Master Horton Q.C. to set aside writs of subpoena duces tecum issued at the behest of Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd ("Leighton"). Leighton is the claimant in an arbitration in Queensland. Its claim arises out of a contract for the construction of the Burdekin Falls dam. Leighton was the contractor. The State Commissioner of Water Resources was the principal and is the other party to the arbitration. The Commonwealth provided financial assistance for the dam's construction. The State assumed responsibility for supervising construction and meeting the cost of development of the -- 4 of 20 -- 2 irrigation area. To facilitate the project's co-ordination, a Committee was established with members drawn from both State and Commonwealth departments. The appellants are the Secretaries of the Commonwealth departments. The subpoenas require production to the arbitrator of documents held in their departments. Leighton invoked the Freedom of Information Act 1982 to obtain access to records of the Commonwealth germane to the arbitration. The departments responded by identifying several documents for which exemption was claimed. These lists have been used by Leighton to describe in the impugned subpoenas the documents to be produced. Each subpoena is directed to "the Secretary" of a department. No point is taken about the misdescription. The case was conducted -as if each subpoena had been directed to the Commonwealth of Australia, by its proper officer: cf. Rochfort v. Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 C.L.R. 134, 146. The subpoenas issued pursuant to s. 18(4) of the Queensland Arbitration Act 1973, which stipulates: "Any party to a reference under an agreement to arbitrate may sue out of the Court in aid of the reference a writ of subpoena ad testificandum or a writ of subpoena duces tecum and no order of the Court for the issue of such a writ shall be necessary, but no person shall be compelled under any such writ to produce any document which he could not be compelled to produce on the trial of an action." The section is central to this appeal. The bases on which the subpoenas are sought to be set aside are that s. 18(4) (i) does not purport to affect the Commonwealth; or else (ii) to the extent the statute attempts to do so, it is beyond the legislative competence of the Queensland Parliament. The -- 5 of 20 -- 3 Commonwealth ( as the appellants may, with some inaccuracy, conveniently be referred to) does not advance some public interest immunity or other claim to privilege. So this appeal does not involve any competition between important public interests: for example, that arbitrations be decided according to the true facts and the preservation of government secrets: cf. Sankey v. Whitlam (1978) 142 C.L.R. 1. Presumably the Commonwealth resists production because compliance may be inconvenient. The case is also, Mr Fryberg Q.C. said, the first time the Commonwealth has contended that a subpoena duces tecum issued out of a State Court cannot compel the production of its documents. The initial question is whether s. 18 of the Arbitration Act authorises a subpoena duces tecum directed to the Commonwealth. Only if Leighton succeeds on this point is it necessary to consider whether the Queensland Parliament lacks the constitutional power to compel production. The principles applied in deciding whether legislation should be construed to bind the Crown in right of an enacting legislature have been recently reconsidered by the High Court: Bropho v. State of Western Australia 20th June, 1990 F. C. 90/027. However, Bropho was not concerned with legislation which specifically states a presumption against construing a statute as intended to bind the Crown. Queensland has such a prescription. Section 13 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954-1989 provides: "Future acts when binding on the Crown. No Act hereafter passed shall be binding on the Crown or derogate from any prerogative right of the Crown -- 6 of 20 -- 4 unless express words are included therein for that purpose." This choice of language may perhaps have been endeavouring to exclude the doctrine that the Crown could be bound by statute if it so appeared by necessary implication: Murray v. Cold Road Pty Ltd [1969] Q.W.N. 15, at p. 31. But the section does not enunciate such a restrictive rule. Section 13 does not mean that the Crown cannot be bound where it appears to be a necessary implication that the Crown is to be bound. In Kaye v. Attorney-General (Tas) (1956) 94 C.L.R. 193 Williams J. said (at pp. 204-5): "In Tasmania the Acts Interpretation Act ... provides that no Act shall be binding on the Crown or derogate from any prerogative right of the Crown unless express words are included therein for that purpose. The words of an Act could, no doubt, be sufficiently expressed to derogate from such a right although they did not in terms refer to the prerogative if their operation necessarily or naturally had that effect. 'It is quite clear that whatever the language used necessarily or even naturally implies is expressed thereby' per Willes J. in Chorlton v. Lings". The same approach to s. 13 was applied by Wilson J., Gibbs and Mason JJ. agreeing, in Brisbane City Council v. Group Projects Pty Ltd (1979) 145 C.L.R. 143, 167. This appeal concerns the potential impact on the Commonwealth of s. 18 of the Arbitration Act. s. 13 does not specifically governments. address its intended operation to other It is, however, unlikely that the Crown in its other capacities was intended to be treated less favourably than the State Crown. It should be taken, in my opinion, that the Queensland Parliament intended the presumptions. 13 expresse~ to have effect not only in relation to the State government and -- 7 of 20 -- 5 its instrumentalities but also with respect to the Commonwealth where a State statute might impinge upon it: cf. Bradken Consolidated Limited v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd (1979) 145 C.L.R. 107; Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v. Commissioner of Stamps (S.A.) (1979) 145 C.L.R. 330, 355-6. Accordingly, s. 18 cannot authorise a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of the Commonwealth's documents unless an intention to achieve that result is clearly to be discerned in the Act. Bys. 6 of the Arbitration Act, "This Act shall apply to any arbitration to which the Crown is a party." This explicit reference to the Crown's being bound in arbitrations to which it is a party does not necessarily imply that the legislation is not intended to affect t:t1e Crown in respect of arbitrations to which it is not a party. Whether s. 18 binds the Crown in any capacity requires attention to other considerations: principally, the subject matter and terms of the statute. The Arbitration Act gives effect to an important public interest in consensual arbitrations. Plainly, its intent is to facilitate the private resolution of disputes which would otherwise require curial determination. provisions towards that desirable object. The Act contains The conduct of arbitrations is not of course assimilated to the procedure of a court. Yet the Act's evident intent is to assist references to arbitrations; and for that purpose the Act accords to the parties most of the means available in litigation for -- 8 of 20 -- 6 ascertaining the truth. Bys. 18(11), a court may make orders in aid of arbitration: for discovery (documents and interrogatories), evidence on affidavit, interim preservation and the like. Recourse to the writs of subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum serves the same purpose. Because of their value in promoting the just disposition of cases, it is no surprise that the legislature has provided for their extension to consensual arbitrations. The role of the subpoenas in the administration of justice is crucial. The power to secure the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce documents is "a power which has long.been recognised as an essential adjunct to adjudication": Commonwealth of Australia v. The Hospital Contribution Fund of Australia (1982) 150 C.L.R. 49, 82 per Brennan J. The importance of the process to the proper resolution of curial conflicts is widely acknowledged. In Wilson v. United States (1911) 221 U.S. 361 Hughes J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said (at pp. 372-3): "As was said by Lord Ellenborough in Amey v. Long ... 'The right to resort to means competent to compel the production of written, as well as oral, testimony seems essential to the very existence and constitutionof a court of common law, which receives and acts upon both descriptions of evidence, and could not possiblyproceed with a due effect without them' ... In Summers v. Moseley ... the function of the writ was carefullyconsidered Bayley B. said: 'The origin of the subpoena duces tecum does not distinctly appear. It has been said on the part of the defendant that it was not introduced or known in practice till the reign ofCharles II and it may be that in its present form thesubpoena duces tecum was not known or made use of until that period; but no doubt can be entertained that there must have been some process similar to thesubpoena duces tecum to compel the production ofdocuments, not only before than time, but even before the statute of the 5th of Elizabeth. Prior to that statute there must have been a power in the Crown (for -- 9 of 20 -- 7 it would have been utterly impossible to carry on the administration of justice without such power) to require the attendance in courts of justice of persons capable of giving evidence, and the production of documents material to the cause, though in the possession of a stranger.'" See also United States v. Bryan (1950) 339 U.S. 323, 331; Alister v. The Queen (1984) 154 C.L.R. 404, 451. As Wigmore saw it, the subpoena achieved society's right to testimony. "The demand comes", he wrote, "not from any one person or set of persons, but from the community as a whole - from justice as an institution and from law and order as indispensable elements of civilised life": On Evidence (McNaughton revision, 1961) Vol. 8 para. 2192. (ibid): Wigmore, a little melodramatically, suggests "The whole life of the community, the regularity and continuity of its relations, depends upon the coming of the witness. Whether the achievements of the past shall be preserved, the energy of the present kept alive and the ambitions of the future be realised depends upon whether the daily business of regulating rights and redressing wrongs shall continue without a moment's abatement, or shall suffer a fatal cessation. The business of the particular cause is petty and personal, but the results that hang upon it are universal. All society, potentially, is involved in each individual case. The vital process of justice must continue unceasingly. A single cessation typifies the prostration of society. A series would involve its dissolution. The pettiness and personality of the individual trial disappear when we reflect that our duty to bear testimony runs not to the parties in that present cause, but to the community at large and forever." The subpoena ad testificandum was the first of these two forms of compulsory process. Its origins appear to lie in Chancery in the 14th Century: Wigmore para. 2190; Tomlins s_ Law-Dictionary 4th ed. (1835) vol. II defining "subpoena"; Ward v. Interag Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd.R. 552, 558; Wood "Challenging -- 10 of 20 -- 8 Subpoenas Duces Te cum: Is there a Third View? 11 ( 1 9 8 4) 1 0 Syd.L.Rev. 379, 380-1. Its extension to the common law courts was enhanced if not achieved by the Statute of Elizabeth, 1562-63, 5 Eliz. 1, c9. The importance of the public interest served by the attendance of witnesses and the production of their documents encouraged the common law Courts to grant the writs in aid of other proceedings. By 1845 it had been established that the Court of King's Bench would lend its aid to inferior tribunals by recourse to subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum: Currie v. Chief Constable of Surrey [1982] 1 All.E.R. 89. But the courts at Westminster did not issue subpoenas to compel attendance at an arbitration: Wansell v. Southwood (1829) 4 Man. & Ry. 359; Chitty's Collection of Statutes of Practical Utility 4th ed. (1880) vol. 1 p. 162; Mysore West Gold Mining Company (1889) 42 Ch.D. 535. The reluctance of the judges was not based on a perception that arbitrations did not require process to compel attendance of witnesses and production of documents. Almost certainly, it stemmed from antipathetical attitudes bred of ancient concerns about the loss of judicial work to private dispute resolution. The need for the writs or some similar process was demonstrable; and so legislatlon secured for arbitrations the advantages conferred by the writs. The first step came in 1833 when, in Baron Parke's Act 3 & 4 Will. 4 c42, s40, the United Kingdom parliament permitted Courts to issue writs of subpoena ancillary to private arbitrations. The significance of the writs is attested to by thei'r reach. Apart from the Sovereign, in whose name the command to -- 11 of 20 -- 9 attend under penalty (subpoena) issues, no one is immune. A Prince of Wales was summonsed (Gordon-Cuming v. Wilson Notable British Trials (3d) 75), and Prime Ministers too: R. v. Baines [1909] 1 K.B. 258; Mulroney and Coates (1986) 27 D.L.R. (4th) 118. Persons in public service are not thereby exempted from the general obligation to give evidence in a court of law. In Smallwood v. Sparling [1982] 2 S.C.R. 686 Wilson J., speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada, (at p. 695) adopted Wigmore (para. 2370): "Let it be understood, then, that there is no exemption for officials as such or for the executive as such from the universal testimonial duty to give evidence in judicial investigations. The exemptions that exist are defined by other principles." See also Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (1988) 49 D.L.R. (4th) 57; United States v. Nixon (1974) 418 U.S. 683, 709; Sankey v. Whitlam at p. 32; cf pp. 9-10. Section 18(4) recognises that the subpoenas are essential to the prospect that arbitrations will be conducted by reference to the truth . Instead of devising new forms of process to compel attendance and to produce documents before arbitrators, the legislature chose the traditional writs. Their selection seems a distinct indication that the reach of the writs when deployed in aid of arbitrations was to be co-extensive with their effect in litigation: in other words, that no one within Queensland ( or otherwise amenable to the process) should be immune from compliance. There is no sufficient reason to doubt that the Parliament intended that the documents held by the State and Commonwealth governments, and those of their -- 12 of 20 -- 10 emanations entitled to the shield of the Crown, were to be affected. In Bropho, Mason C.J., Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. said (at p. 11 of their reasons): "The historical considerations which gave rise to a presumption that the legislature would not have intended that a statute bind the Crown are largelyinapplicable to conditions in this country where the activities of the executive government reach into almost all aspects of commercial, industrial and developmental endeavour and where it is a common place for governmental commercial, industrial and developmental instrumentalities and their servants and agents ... to compete and have commercial dealings on the same basis as private enterprise." This notion supports the view that the Act was indeed intended to permit subpoenas duces tecum to issue to require production of the Commonwealth's documents. Moreover, it is not easy to identify opposing considerations of substance. A predominant public interest in arbitrators acting on true facts has been mentioned. What stands against it? Section 18(4) does not jeopardise the Commonwealth's entitlement to claim privilege from production in reliance on some established exemption such as legal professional privilege or public interest immunity. Even if the documents must be produced to the arbitrator, the parties might not see them. The arbitrator may refuse inspection or else permit it only on terms adequate to protect confidences the documents contain or any other sufficient interest: cf. National Employers' Mutual General Association Ltd v. Waind [1978] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 372; Cross on Evidence 3rd Aust. ed. (1986) para. 13.10. And the Queensland Parliament could hardly have contemplated that the Commonwealth might -- 13 of 20 -- 1 1 prefer that no weightier reasons than that answering a subpoena would be irksome or involve a little cost should prevail over the concern that arbitrations be decided according to the actual facts. In the United States, selective legislation inhibiting access to government files has been in place for many years: Boske v. Comingore (1899) 177 U.S. 459; Boron Oil Company v. Bownie (1989) 873 F. 2d. 67, 69. The national parliament in this country has taken similar measures. Before 1973, when the Arbitration Act was passed, there were Commonwealth statutes restricting access to records. An example is s. 17(3) of the Social Services Act 194 7 ( considered in Smith v. Swinfield [1981] F.L.C. 91-084). There is no present suggestion of federal legislation hinting that the Commonwealth Parliament is anxious that the documents r~ferred to in the subpoenas should be withheld al though their disclosure in the privacy of an arbitration may advance an important community interest. In my opinion, the public welfare and other considerations mentioned lead to the conclusion that s. 18 necessarily implies that a subpoena duces tecum may require production to an arbitrator of the Commonwealth's documents. The next question is whether s. 18(4) is, to that extent, beyond power. The potential for State laws to bind the Commonwealth remains controversial: see Meagher and Gummow "Sir Owen Dixon's Heresy" ( 1980) 54 A. L. J. 25; Zines The High Court and the Constitution 2nd ed. (1987) p. 312 ff.; Lumb and Ryan The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated 4th ed. (1986) para. 682; Howard Australian Federal Constitutional Law -- 14 of 20 -- 12 3rd ed. ( 1985) p. 198 ff.; and Sawer "State Statutes and the Commonwealth" (1960) 1 U. of Tas. L.Rev. 580. I shall content myself with a brief statement of my reasons for deciding that s. 18(4) is effective to bind the Commonwealth. In the Engineers' case (Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129) Knox C.J. Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ. declined to accept that the Constitution implied a prohibition on either the Commonwealth's legislating to affect the States or upon the States' legislating to affect the Commonwealth. At p. 155 their Honours said: "The doctrine of 'implied prohibition' finds no place where the ordinary principles of construction are applied so as to discover in the actual terms of the instrument their expressed or necessarily impliedmeaning. The principle we apply to the Commonwealthwe apply also to the States, leaving their respective Acts of legislation full operation within their respective areas and subject matters, but, in case of conflict, giving to valid Commonwealth legislation the supremacy expressly declared by the constitution, measuring that supremacy according to the very words of sec. 109." Five years later, the High Court held that a State may legislate in a way incidentally affecting the Commonwealth in the exercise of governmental power. The question in Pirrie v. McFarlane (1925) 36 C.L.R. 170 was whether a State Motor Traffic Act applied to a Commonwealth soldier acting in that capacity. The argument that, if the State Act applied, it would impinge upon the carrying out by the Commonwealth of its powers in relation to defence was rejected. Knox C.J. held (seep. 181) that, in view of the Engineers' 'case, the defendant could not; succeed unless he established that the Victorian legislation was -- 15 of 20 -- 13 inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth and invalid by reason of s. 109 of the Constitution. Higgins J. was of the same opinion: seep. 212ff. See also Starke J. at pp. 227-8. In Bradken Consolidated Mason and Jacobs JJ. said (at p. 136): "There is one country under the rule of a body of law even though the sources from which the law emanates are different in different cases; ... the law bindseveryone whom it is intended to bind no matter from which legislative source it springs by virtue of the constitution, provided that it is a law which it was in the legislative competence of that source to enact and which remains a valid law under the constitution. That was the effect of the decision in the Engineers' case ... and that decision has never been overturned even though a limitation has been placed on its· application to particular situations as a result of development which culminated in the decision in Commonwealth v. Cigamatic Ptv Ltd (In Liquidation) ... (1962) 108 C.L.R. 372." There are observations in other cases to the effect that a State has no power over the Commonwealth: fOr example, by Fullagar J. in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bogle ( 1953) 89 C.L.R. 229, 259-60. But such a broad proposition is inconsistent with the essential reasoning in Pirrie v. McFarlane. Cigamatic, on which the appellants placed particular reliance, does decide that a State Parliament cannot legislate to affect the prerogative rights of the Commonwealth: per Menzies J. at p. 389. The prerogatives are powers retained by the Commonwealth which regulate "legal rights and duties between the Commonwealth and its people": see Dixon C.J. at p. 377. However, s. 18(4) of the Arbitration Act does not purport to derogate from the rights of the Commonwealth with respect to its people; and it does not specially affect any governmentat functions of the Commonwealth or its prerogatives. There is no -- 16 of 20 -- 14 prerogative to withhold evidence. Absent statutory intervention, there may be a prerogative immunity from discovery: Hogg Liability of the Crown 2nd ed. (1989) p. 30. Assuming its existence, the immunity is restricted to pre-trial discovery. It does not extend to protect against producing documents pursuant to subpoena: Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation. A subpoena duces tecum is not in the nature of an order for discovery. The Arbitration Act is a law of general application within this State. Although it may "incidentally affect Commonwealth administrative action" (cf. F.C.T. v. Official Liquidator of E.O. Farley Limited (1940) 63 C.L.R. 278, 308), it does not particularly act on or discriminate against the Commonwealth: Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth of Australia ( 1947) 74 C.L.R. 31, 61, 78. It is not in conflict with any law of the Commonwealth. It is not of a class within the exclusive competence of the Commonwealth (see Ss. 52, 114 of the Constitution). Nor, as I have indicated, does the Act otherwise exceed the constraints on legislative power imposed by the Constitution on the States. In such circumstances, as Lee J. said in Trade Practices Commission v. Manfal Pty Ltd (1990) 92 A.L.R. 416, 423 of other State legislation held to bind the Commonwealth, "there would be no reason such legislation should not be regarded as being within the independent legislative competence of a State"; cf. First Investors Corporation Ltd (No. ll ( 1 9 8 7 ) 4 6 D . L . R. ( 4 th) 6 8 7 , 6 9 3- 4 . In my opinion, s. 1 8 ( 4) , to the extent it affects th·e Commonwealth, is not beyond State power. -- 17 of 20 -- 15 My earlier order suspending the operation of each subpoena until further order is vacated. The appeal is dismissed. The appellants have, as they requested, leave to make the amendments to the Summons and to the Notice of Appeal mentioned in the appendix. -- 18 of 20 -- Appendix 1. The summons filed on 15th February 1990 be amended in the following respects: (a) by inserting the words "Geoffrey Lee Miller, The Secretary", between the figure "1." and the words "The Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy"; (b) by inserting the words "Michael Stockton Keating, The Secretary" between the figure "2." and the words "The Commonwealth Department of Finance"; (c) by inserting the words "Noel John Tanzer, The Secretary" between the figure "3." and the words "The Commonwealth Department of Administrative Services"; ( d) by deleting the following words "The Department of Primary Industries and Energy, The Department of Finance and The Department of Administrative Services and inserting in lieu thereof the words "Geoffrey Lee Miller, The Secretary of The Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy; Michael Stockton Keating, The Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Finance and Noel John Tanzer, The Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Administrative Services". 2. The Notice of Appeal filed on 21st February 1990 be amended in the following respects: (a) by deleting the words "the Department of Finance, the Department of Primary Industries and Energy and the Department of Administrative Services" and inserting in lieu thereof the words "Geoffrey Lee Miller, The Secretary of The Commonwealth Department of Primary -- 19 of 20 -- 2 Industries and Energy; Michael Stockton Keating, The Secretary of The Commonwealth Department of Finance; Noel John Tanzer, The Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Administrative Services and the Commonwealth of Australia". -- 20 of 20 --