Beanland v The Valuer-General [1990] QLC 225

Re: Appeals against determinations of Valuer-General - City of Caloundra. V89-311/12. R.M. and A.J. Beanland V. The Valuer-General DECISION LAND COURT, BRISBANE 2nd February, 1990 These appeals are against determinations of the Valuer-General of the unimproved value of certain lands owned by the appellants in the area of the City of Caloundra. The valuations were made for the purposes of the general revaluation of the Area as at 31st March, 1988. The appeals are brought on grounds that the valuations are contrary to law in that they were not amalgamated in terms of s. 14 (b) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 ( as amended). The quantum of the separate valuations is not in dispute. The appellants' estimate of the unimproved value of the parcels if included in one valuation is $65,000. The Valuer-General's estimate is $61,000. Mr A.R. Thomason lodged the appeals as agent for the appellants and he appeared on their behalf. He did not call evidence. Mr G.P. Crowley, registered valuer in the employ of the Valuer-General, was called on his behalf. His evidence dealt with matters which exercised his mind in deciding not to include the parcels in the one valuation and he was cross-examined by Mr Thomason. The relevant section (s. 14) sets out the circumstances in which parcels of land owned by the same person are to be included in the one valuation unless the [1990] QLC 225 -- 1 of 4 -- 2 Valuer-General otherwise directs. An application of the section to the valuation of the subject parcels was considered by the Land Appeal Court in respect of the general revaluation of the Area as at 31st March, 1984 - R.M. and A.J, Beanland v. The Valuer- General (1986-87) 11 Q.L.C.R. p. 131. In writing that judgment, the Land Appeal Court set out the provisions of s. 14 prior to the Valuation of Land Act Amendment Act of 1984 and as amended by that Act - there being a submission by Mr Thomason that the intention of the Legislature in passing the amendment was that all parcels which satisfied the criteria contained in paragraph (b) of the section were to be included in the one valuation unless there existed a unique situation such as where the relevant lands are in separate divisions of a shire and are subject to a different rating structure. He repeated the submission and argued that the intention of the Legislature was to place the owners of scattered parcels of land (those whose lands may fall for consideration under paragraph (b) of the section) on the same footing as owners of adjoining parcels (those whose lands may fall for consideration under paragraph (a) of the section). He placed considerable emphasis on the final sentence of the second reading speech on this subject - "The amendment will remove that disadvantage" - in supporting the submission. The Land Appeal Court considered the provisions of the Act before and after the amendment and it also perused the second reading speech. The Court had no difficulty in interpreting the section nor can I read anything into the section other than what it says; that is, that owners whose lands may fall for consideration under either paragraph (a) or (b) are on an equal footing and that their lands shall be included in the one valuation unless the Valuer-General otherwise directs. Mr Thomason seems to be of the view that where paragraph (a) is concerned the inclusion of the land in the one valuation is so automatic that the discretion vested in the Valuer-General is surplus and that by analogy paragraph (b) should be given similar practical effect. And so he argues -- 2 of 4 -- 3 that distance between parcels which was one matter considered by the Valuer-General in exercising his discretion not to include the subject parcels in the one valuation is irrelevant. Whilst this may be the limit of his practical experience with the Act, the section does not so provide nor did it so provide in respect of paragraph (a) prior to the 1984 Amendment. The argument he advances makes an assumption which is not apparent in the section. Were matters as simple as he would have me believe the Legislature could have covered the matter quite clearly and directly and removed the discretion vested in the Valuer-General in both instances but it has not. I accordingly find that his primary submission has no foundation. The evidence of Mr Crowley is that there has been no change in circumstances since the judgment of the Land Appeal Court. He said that the parcels have continued to be used for pineapple growing; that one parcel is situated on the edge of the town of Glasshouse and that the other is on the western side of Old Gympie Road about 5.5 kilometres away; that both parcels are reasonable sized properties capable of being operated independently of each other; that one set of machinery is used for working both parcels; that there was no facility or feature on one property which makes the other one dependent upon it; that the properties are separated by a number of rural homesites and farms; that there was no policy defining a maximum number of kilometres beyond which parcels would not be included in the one valuation and generally that there were no real circumstances to say that he should put the blocks together. The principles which I have to apply in the circumstances have been laid down by the Land Appeal Court. At p. 135, the Land Appeal Court said - " It follows that it is not enough for an appellant to convince us that if we were in the position of the Valuer- General we would have taken a different course. It must be shown that the Valuer-General has not had regard to all the material and relevant facts of the case or has otherwise been capricious or unreasonable. " -- 3 of 4 -- 4 Evidence was not given by or on behalf of the appellants and the cross examination of Mr Crowley has not elicited anything which would lead me to a conclusion that the Valuer-General has acted unreasonably in the circumstances of the subject case. Further, I find that the decisions to which Mr Thomason referred are of no assistance. In the case of R.A. and G.F, Dawes v. The Valuer-General 13.3.1987 V86-1104, the matter turned on the question whether the lands were .used for the purposes of a single business of primary production. In R.S, and G.M. Tumbridge v. The Valuer-General 13.3.1987 V86-1110, an appeal against the decision of the Valuer General not to amalgamate parcels used for dairying purposes (one parcel being the home dairy farm and the other a dry paddock about 8 kilometres away) was dismissed on grounds that the appellants had not convinced the Court that the Valuer-General had not "had regard to all the material and relevant facts of the case or has otherwise been capricious and unreasonable". The phraseology used by the former learned President at the foot of page 2 of the decision is common phraseology in the circumstances and cannot be given the meaning attributed to it by Mr Thomason nor can the fact that the parcels were included in the one valuation for the purposes of the current revaluation of the Area be a deciding factor in the application of the relevant principles to the circumstances of the subject case. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed and the determinations of the Valuer-General affirmed. Member of the Land Court DM White -- 4 of 4 --