Corney v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 305

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Corney v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 305 PARTIES: Corney, Steven (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent) CASE NO: WC/2022/201 PROCEEDING: Objections to notices of non-party production DELIVERED ON: 9 December 2024 (Townsville) DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: Appellant's written submissions filed on 6 December 2024 Respondent's written submissions filed on 6 December 2024 Written submissions of the State of Queensland (Townsville Hospital and Health Service) filed on 6 December 2024 MEMBER: Merrell DP ORDERS: The orders contained in paragraph [116] of these reasons for decision CATCHWORDS: WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – Appellant employed by the State of Queensland as an Enrolled Nurse at the Townsville University Hospital which is part of the Townsville Hospital and Health Service – Appellant applied for workers' compensation pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 in respect of a psychiatric injury – application rejected by WorkCover Queensland – on review, the Respondent confirmed the decision of WorkCover Queensland – appeal by Appellant to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission against the review decision of the -- 1 of 24 -- 2 Respondent – in November 2024, the Appellant took out two notices of non-party production directed to the Chief Executive Officer of the Townville University Hospital for various documents including the medical records of a patient – Townsville Hospital and Health Service filed notices of objection to the two notices of non-party production – Appellant applied for decisions about the objections to the two notices of non-party production to lift the stays on them brought about by the service on him of the objections – the two November 2024 notices of non-party production requested by the Appellant were an abuse of the procedures of the Commission because they were requested as a means of avoiding stays of two earlier notices of non-party production requested by the Appellant in October 2024 which sought the same documents – the two November 2024 notices of non-party production set aside PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY – INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS – TO PREVENT ABUSE OF PROCESS – OTHER CASES AND MATTERS – express or incidental powers of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission to exercise power to prevent an abuse of its procedures – abuse of process where Appellant's request for notices of non-party production was to avoid the operation of r 64F of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 in respect of the same categories of documents sought by earlier notices of non-party production requested by the Appellant – notices of non-party production set aside PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE OR TERRITORY COURTS – PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EVIDENCE – SUBPOENAS AND NOTICES TO PRODUCE AT HEARING – SETTING ASIDE AND OTHER RELIEF – grounds to set aside notices of non-party production having regard to the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in McEwan v Rains – whether notices of non-party production requested by the Appellant should be set aside on such grounds – notices of non-party production requested by the Appellant are -- 2 of 24 -- 3 broadly expressed or otherwise lack apparent relevance – notices of non-party production would also have been set aside on these alternative bases LEGISLATION: Criminal Code Act 1899, s 358 Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011, s 145 Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 429, s 447, s 448, s 451 and s 553. Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 64B, r 63E, r 64F, r 64G and r 97 Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32, s 548A and s 553 CASES: Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2021] QIRC 059 Department of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council [2021] NSWCA 145 DJL v The Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; (2000) 201 CLR 226 Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612 McEwan v Rains [2023] QCA 135; (2023) 15 QR 251 Re: Applications to vary the Building, Engineering and Maintenance Services Employees (Queensland Government) Award - State 2016 [2024] QIRC 064 APPEARANCES: The Appellant in person. Ms L. Willson of Counsel directly instructed by Ms C-L. Godfrey of the Respondent. Ms E. Hall, Principal Lawyer, State of Queensland (Townsville Hospital and Health Service) -- 3 of 24 -- 4 Reasons for Decision Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript Introduction [1] Mr Steven Corney was employed by the State of Queensland as an Enrolled Nurse in the Townsville Community Care Unit ('TCCU') within the Mental Health Service Group, ('MHSG'). The MHSG is operated by the Townsville Hospital and Health Service ('the Health Service'). The MHSG is part of the Townsville University Hospital ('the Hospital'). [2] On 20 June 2022, Mr Corney made an application, pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ('the WCR Act'), for workers' compensation in respect of a psychiatric injury. [3] By decision dated 11 August 2022, WorkCover Queensland rejected Mr Corney's application for workers' compensation. [4] On 2 September 2022, Mr Corney applied for a review of the decision by WorkCover Queensland to the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator'). By review decision dated 21 November 2022, the Regulator confirmed the earlier decision of WorkCover Queensland to reject Mr Corney's application for workers' compensation ('the review decision'). [5] By notice of appeal filed on 14 December 2022, Mr Corney, pursuant to ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act, appeals to this Commission against the review decision. As I understand Mr Corney's notice of appeal to this Commission (by reference to the review decision attached to the notice of appeal), it seems to be the case that the date of Mr Corney's alleged injury was 16 June 2022, being the date his General Practitioner, Dr Benedict Ponti of the Townsville Family Medical Centre ('Dr Ponti') assessed Mr Corney as suffering from an adjustment disorder. [6] After one adjournment of the hearing of Mr Corney's appeal which was originally listed for June this year (the circumstances of which I will describe later in these reasons), by notice of listing dated 21 June 2024, Mr Corney's appeal was re-listed for hearing to commence today and to proceed for five days until Friday of this week. [7] By virtue of s 553 of the WCR Act, the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 ('the Rules') apply to appeals made to this Commission pursuant to ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. Part 2, div 2, sub-div 7A of the Rules deals with notices of non-party production. [8] On 26 November 2024, Mr Corney, pursuant to r 64B of the Rules, requested two notices of non-party production for specified documents which, for all practical purposes, were directed to the Health Service. The two notices of non-party production were issued on 27 November 2024. [9] By objections filed on 4 and 5 December 2024 pursuant to r 64E of the Rules, the Health Service objected to the production of the specified documents. -- 4 of 24 -- 5 [10] By email sent on 5 December 2024 to the Industrial Registry, Mr Corney, pursuant to r 64G of the Rules, applied for a decision about the Health Service's objections ('Mr Corney's application'). [11] By Directions Order dated 5 December 2024: • I ordered the parties and the Health Service to exchange and file written submissions in respect of Mr Corney's application so that today I could deliver a decision about his application before the commencement of Mr Corney's appeal; and • I ordered the parties and the Health Service to address, in their submissions, the issue of whether or not the notices of non-party production issued on 27 November 2024 were an abuse of the process of the Commission given earlier notices of non-party production issued on 14 October 2024 and the objections made to those notices by the Health Service filed on 22 October 2024. [12] This is my decision about Mr Corney's application. Background The parties' claims in respect of Mr Corney's substantive appeal [13] Both parties have filed statements of facts and contentions. [14] By way of a broad overview, Mr Corney contends he has suffered a psychiatric injury which arose out of, or in the course of, his employment and that his employment was a significant contributing factor to his injury. This is contended to be the case because: • he was falsely accused by his employer of a serious ethical breach, namely, that while employed as an Enrolled Nurse in the TCCU, he accessed '…the electronic medical records of two consumers … between 24 and 26 July 2021 without apparent legitimate reason to do so' ('the allegation');1 • he was not afforded procedural fairness and natural justice by his employer's investigation about the allegation and, in respect of which, his employer did not comply with all relevant legislation, policies and procedures;2 and • he is facing disciplinary action about the allegation, which is false and is biased,3 because of legitimate complaints he had made about '…breaches of the Mental Health Act';4 and • the disciplinary action could lead to his dismissal.5 1 Mr Corney's statement of facts and contentions filed on 24 August 2023 ('Mr Corney's contentions'), page 1, second paragraph. 2 Mr Corney's contentions, page 3, fourth paragraph. 3 Mr Corney's contentions, page 3, fourth paragraph. 4 Mr Corney's contentions, page 1, third paragraph. 5 Mr Corney's contentions, page 3, fourth paragraph. -- 5 of 24 -- 6 [15] As best as I understand his contentions, Mr Corney contends that he did not breach any confidentiality of patients' medical records and that he had lawful justification to access the relevant patients' medical records.6 [16] Again, by way of a broad overview, the Regulator contends that: • Mr Corney was not falsely accused of a serious ethical breach and he was afforded natural justice throughout all processes; • any potential disciplinary action faced by Mr Corney is a result of reasonable management action conducted in a reasonable way; • Mr Corney has not sustained a personal injury of a psychological nature; or, in the alternative, • any personal psychological injury Mr Corney has suffered either: - has not arisen out of, or in the course of his employment, and his employment was not a significant contributing factor to such an injury; or, in the alternative, - arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with his employment; or, in the alternative, - arose out of, or in the course of, his expectation of reasonable management action taken against him.7 The adjourned hearing of Mr Corney's substantive appeal [17] By notice of listing dated 22 January 2024, Mr Corney's appeal was listed for hearing over five days, in Townsville, commencing on 17 June 2024. Following a telephone mention of Mr Corney's appeal on 12 June 2024, by email from Mr Corney to the Industrial Registry sent on 13 June 2024, he applied for an adjournment of the hearing of his appeal commencing on 17 June 2024. [18] Following a further telephone mention held later on 13 June 2024, I granted Mr Corney's application and I adjourned the hearing of his appeal to later in 2024. Mr Corney's October 2024 notices of non-party production and the objections by the Health Service [19] As referred to earlier, by notice of listing dated 21 June 2024, Mr Corney's appeal was listed for hearing to commence today in Townsville. [20] On 11 October 2024, Mr Corney requested two notices of non-party production. These were both issued on 14 October 2024. I will refer to those notices collectively as 'the 6 Mr Corney's contentions, page 2, paragraphs numbered 1 and 2. 7 The statement of facts and contentions of the Workers' Compensation Regulator filed on 11 June 2024, paras. 47-49. -- 6 of 24 -- 7 October NNPPs' or to them individually as 'the first October NNPP' or the 'second October NNPP'. [21] The first October NNPP requested four categories of documents and was directed to Mr Kieran Keyes, the Chief Executive Officer of the Health Service, as the nominated party ('Mr Keyes'). No affected party was listed. The date range in respect of which the documents were sought was 1 July 2021 to '…2024.' The four categories of documents sought were (errors in the original): 1… All complaint letters/emails submitted by Steven Corney about patients mental health paperwork being unlawful to detain the patient at PDSU 2… All documents and communication in the form of emails, file notes, investigation reports and any other forms of documentation relating to the Alleged breach of confidentiality by Steven Corney and the subsequent investigations, management action and Disciplinary process by Queensland Health. 3… Evidence of any investigation, or notifications by Townsville University Hospital relating to patients Human rights being breached and being unlawfully detained as complained about by Steven Corney. 4…. All documents and communications between Queensland Health and WorkCover or the Workers Compensation Regulator relating to this matter. [22] In respect of this notice, Mr Corney gave the following explanation as to why the documents sought were directly relevant to his appeal, namely (errors in the original): All documents and communication in the form of emails, file notes, investigation reports and any other forms of documentation relating to the Alleged breach of confidentiality by Steven Corney and the subsequent investigations, management action and Disciplinary process by Queensland Health. Evidence of any investigation, or notifications by Townsville University Hospital relating to patients Human rights being breached and being unlawfully detained as complained about by Steven Corney. All documents and communications between Queensland Health and WorkCover or the Workers Compensation Regulator relating to this matter. These documents will show that Queensland Healths actions were not reasonable Management Action and that the WorkCover claim should be accepted. These Documents are also subject to the Right to Information Act 2009 [23] The second October NNPP requested two categories of documents in respect of a named patient of the Hospital. Again, it was directed to Mr Keyes and no affected party was listed. [24] Pursuant to r 97(3) of the Rules, I determine that it is not in the public interest that the name of the patient be published in these reasons. This is because publication of the name of that patient, who I now understand to be deceased, is not material to any issue I have to determine in respect of making any decision pursuant to r 64G of the Rules. Further, I determine that such modification will not affect the essence of these reasons. [25] The date range in respect of which the documents were sought was 1 July 2021 to '…2024.' The two categories of documents sought were: -- 7 of 24 -- 8 1… Handover entries in the shared handover sheet for TCCU for patient: [patient's name deleted] 2… Medication record showing Nursing signatures for patient: [patient's name deleted] [26] In respect of this notice, Mr Corney gave the following explanation as to why the documents sought were directly relevant to his appeal, namely: The below documents for [patient's name deleted] while he was a patient of the Adult Acute Mental Health Unit but housed at Townsville Community Care Unit (TCCU) Handover entries in the shared handover sheet for TCCU for patient [patient's name deleted] Medication records showing Nursing signatures for patient: [patient's name deleted] These documents will show that TCCU nurses were receiving confidential patient information from the PDSU Nurses and that TCCU were caring for PDSU patients and having to view confidential patient information to provide that care. [patient's name deleted] is now deceased so his consent cannot be obtained. [27] On 22 October 2024 the Health Service, pursuant to r 64E of the Rules, filed objections in respect of the October NNPPs. I will refer to these objections collectively as 'the Health Service's October objections' or to them individually as 'the first October objection' and 'the second October objection'. [28] By the first October objection to the first October NNPP, the Health Service objected to the first and third categories of documents sought by Mr Corney. The Health Service gave the following grounds of objection (errors in the original): The non-party, Townsville Hospital and Health Service objects to the Applicants sealed notice served on 15 October 2024, seeking the following schedule of documents: 1 . on 1/07/2021 to 2024 - All complaint letters/emails submitted by Steven Corney about patient mental health paperwork being unlawful to detail the patient at PDSU; 3. on 1/07/2021 to 2024 - Evidence of any investigation or notifications by Townsville University Hospital relating to patientst human rights being breached unlawfully detained as complained about by Steven Corney The non-party objects to the production of the above stated documents for the following reasons pursuant to section 64E(4)(e) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 on the basis that : - there is a lack of relevance of this request to the workcover claim of Mr Corney's appeal of a workcover decision. It is unclear how the disclosure of this information will advance the claim before the Commission. - there is a lack of particularity of any specified dates, of when the Applicant has made this request, and in relation to what patient. - should particulars be advanced as to a named patient(s), the confidential nature of the documents should not be displaced in these circumstances. A copy of the sealed Form 29, is annexed to this application to demonstrate service took effect on 15 October 2024. [29] By the second October objection to the second October NNPP, the Health Service objected to both categories of documents sought by Mr Corney. The Health Service gave the following grounds of objection (errors in the original): -- 8 of 24 -- 9 The non-party, Townsville Hospital and Health Service objects to the Applicants sealed notice served on 15 October 2024 seeking the following schedule of documents: 1. on 1/7/2021 to 2024 - to produce the handover entries in the shared handoversheet for TCCU for patient: [patient's name deleted]. 2. on 1/7/2021 to 2024 - to produce medication records showing Nursing signatures for patient: [patient's name deleted]. The non-party objects to the production of the above stated documents for the following reasons pursuant to section 64E(4)(e) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 that - there is a lack of relevance to the proceedings, that is the workcover claim of Mr Corney's appeal of a workcover decision. It is unclear how the disclosure of confidential patient information will advance this claim before the Commission. the confidential nature of the documents requested as it relates to a deceased patient, namely [patient's name deleted]. Patients whom receive treatment at public hospitals expect that their records will remain confidential and that confidentiality should not be displaced in these circumstances. A copy of the sealed Form 29, is annexed to this application to demonstrate service took effect on 15 October 2024. [30] Pursuant to r 64F of the Rules, service of an objection operates as a stay of the notice of non-party production. [31] From the submissions filed by Mr Corney, there is no dispute that the October objections, made pursuant to r 64E of the Rules, were served on him. [32] In respect of the October NNPPs, to the extent they were the subject of the Health Service's October objections, Mr Corney did not, pursuant to r 64G(1) of the Rules, within seven days after service of the Health Service's October objections on him, apply to the Commission for a decision about those objections. [33] As a consequence, the stays of the October NNPPs, to the extent they were the subject of the Health Service's October objections, remain operative. Mr Corney's November 2024 notices of non-party production and the Health Service's December objections [34] On 26 November 2024, Mr Corney requested two notices of non-party production. These were both issued on 27 November 2024. I will refer to these notices collectively as 'the November NNPPs' or to them individually as 'the first November NNPP' or 'the second November NNPP'. The November NNPPs were directed to Mr Keyes. The second November NNPP was also directed to three other individuals, as affected parties, who are employed (I assume) by the State of Queensland in the Health Service. [35] The first November NNPP requested four categories of documents in exactly the same terms as the first October NNPP. In respect of the first November NNPP, Mr Corney gave the following explanation as to why the documents sought were directly relevant to his appeal, namely (errors in the original): All documents and communication in the form of emails, file notes. investigation reports and any other forms of documentation relating to the Alleged breach of confidentiality by Steven Corney and the subsequent investigations, management action and Disciplinary process by Queensland Health. -- 9 of 24 -- 10 Evidence of any investigation, or notifications by Townsville University Hospital relating to patients Human rights being breached and being unlawfully detained as complained about by Steven Corney. There are mandatory notification required to be made when there are serious breaches of the Mental Health Act are made. The Chief Psychiatrist has to be notified of the event. The Patient is required to be notified that their Human Right may have been breached. PDSU Patients were unlawfully detained at TCCU this is a breach of the QLD Criminal Code Act 1899 section 358. Mandatory notification have to be made to the Crime and Corruption Commission of possible criminal act. It is also mandatory to notify the Health Ombudsman also when a potential criminal event has happen by Queensland Health Staff. If the TUH has not made these required notification it shows a possible conspiracy to cover up potential criminal activity by certain staff members. All documents and communications between Queensland Health and WorkCover or the Workers Compensation Regulator relating to this matter. These documents may show that staff are providing false information to the Workers Compensation Regulator which is a breach of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. These documents will show that Queensland Healths actions were not reasonable Management Action and that the WorkCover claim should be accepted. These Documents are also subject to the Right to Information Act 2009 [36] This explanation is different from the one Mr Corney gave in respect of the first October NNPP. [37] The second November NNPP requested two categories of documents in relation to the same named patient, and in exactly the same terms, as in the second October NNPP. In respect of the second November NNPP, Mr Corney gave the following explanation as to why the documents sought were directly relevant to his appeal, namely (errors in the original): The below documents for [patient's name deleted] while he was a patient of the Adult Acute Mental Health Unit but housed at Townsville Community Care Unit (TCCU) Handover entries in the shared handover sheet for TCCU for patient: [patient's name deleted]. These documents will show that the PSDU nurses were actively sharing confidential patient information with the Nurses of the TCCU as we were part of the team involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients. As per Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 section 145 Disclosure of confidential information for care or treatment of person. This will refute the claims by Mr Baird, Ms Mallett and Mr Eaton that I breach confidentiality and that their management actions were unreasonable. Medication records showing Nursing signatures for patient: [patient's name deleted] The Medication record of [patient's name deleted] will prove that TCCU nurses were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients. Certain medications are required by Law to be double checked by a second nurse before being administered. Some of the medication [patient's name deleted] was on was required to be double checked proving TCCU nurses were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients. I believe it is the Public interest to clear my name and reputation about the false claims by the Townsville University Hospital staff that I breached patients confidentiality by looking at patients documents to report unlawful detention of PDSU and the obvious retaliation by the TUH for making the complains to discredit me and my reputation in what I believe is an attempt to cover up a possible Criminal Code Act 1899 breach of section 358. [patient's name deleted] is now deceased so his consent cannot be obtained. [38] This explanation is also different from the one Mr Corney gave in respect of the second October NNPP. -- 10 of 24 -- 11 [39] On 4 and 5 December 2024, the Health Service filed objections to the first November NNPP and to the second November NNPP. I will refer to these filed objections collectively as the 'Health Service's December objections' and I will refer to them individually as 'the first December objection' and 'the second December objection.' [40] By the first December objection, the Health Service objected to all the categories of documents contained in the first November NNPP. [41] By the second December objection, the Health Service objected to both categories of documents contained in the second November NNPP. [42] From the submissions filed by Mr Corney, there is no dispute that the December objections were served on him. [43] On 5 December 2024, Mr Corney, pursuant to r 64G(1) of the Rules, applied to the Commission for a decision about the objections, which I have taken to be Mr Corney seeking a decision about the first December objection to the first November NNPP and about the second December objection to the second November NNPP. Are the November NNPPs an abuse of the Commission's process? The Commission's express and incidental powers in the face of an abuse of its procedures [44] Relevantly to Mr Corney's substantive appeal, the Commission is an appeal body for the purposes of ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act.8 The Commission is established as a court of record in Queensland.9 Section 447(1)(p) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') provides that the Commission's functions include '…any other function conferred on the commission under this Act or another Act.' Section 448(1)(d) of the IR Act provides that the Commission's jurisdiction includes that the Commission may hear and decide '… all appeals properly made to it under this Act or another Act.' [45] By s 553 of the IR Act, the provisions of the IR Act providing for the powers of and procedures before the Commission apply in relation to the jurisdiction of the Commission under the IR Act or another Act, unless the contrary intention appears. [46] As a statutory court, the Commission, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, has the powers, expressly or impliedly conferred on it by the legislation that governs it. The determination of such powers is a matter of statutory construction.10 Section 451(1) of the IR Act [47] Section 451(1) of the IR Act provides that the Commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions. In Re: Applications to vary the Building, Engineering and Maintenance Services Employees 8 Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 548A(1). 9 Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 429. 10 DJL v The Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; (2000) 201 CLR 226, [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). -- 11 of 24 -- 12 (Queensland Government) Award - State 2016,11 I relevantly stated of the power in s 451(1) of the IR Act:12 [44] However, by virtue of s 451(1) of the Act, the Commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions. This is a common way to describe such a power as conferred on a statutory body. A description similar to s 451(1) of the Act has been considered by the High Court. In Northern Land Council v Quall, Kiefel CJ and Gageler and Keane JJ relevantly stated: [33] The power conferred on a representative body by s 203BK(1) in the familiar terms of a power “to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its functions”, though “broad”, is “strictly ancillary”, authorising “the provision of subsidiary means of carrying into effect what is enacted in the statute itself” and encompassing “what is incidental to the execution of its specific provisions”. The power does “not support the doing of a thing which departs from the scheme of the enactment by which the power is conferred”. [45] Later, their Honours stated: A "necessary or convenient" power of that nature has already been emphasised to be ancillary, subsidiary or incidental. [48] I am not aware of any provision in the WCR Act which, having regard to s 553 of the IR Act, would demonstrate a contrary intention that s 451(1) of the IR Act would not apply to the Commission exercising its power, pursuant to r 64G of the Rules, in respect of an appeal to the Commission under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. In my view, the power to prevent an abuse of process is a necessary or convenient power of the Commission in that it is ancillary to the performance of its power under r 64G of the Rules or ancillary to the performance of its power under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. The Regulator, in its written submissions, submits that s 451 of the IR Act is a source of power for the Commission to make an order to prevent an abuse of its process in the present circumstances. Rule 64G(1) of the Rules [49] By his present application, the power Mr Corney requests the Commission to exercise is its power pursuant to r 64G(1) of the Rules. Rule 64G of the Rules provides: 64G Industrial tribunal’s decision about objection (1) Within 7 days after service of an objection under rule 64E, the party may apply to the industrial tribunal for a decision about the objection. (2) The industrial tribunal may make any order it considers appropriate including, but not limited to, an order– (a) lifting the stay; or (b) varying the notice; or (c) setting aside the notice. (3) Unless the industrial tribunal otherwise orders, each party to an application to decide an objection must bear the party’s own costs of the application. 11 [2024] QIRC 064. 12 Citations omitted. -- 12 of 24 -- 13 [50] Section 553(1) of the WCR Act provides the Rules apply to an appeal under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act '… with necessary changes.' There are no necessary changes apparent in respect of the application of r 64G of the Rules to the present matter. [51] The Commission, pursuant to r 64G(2) of the Rules, has an express discretion to make any order it considers appropriate. In my view, given the obvious purpose of r 64G(2) of the Rules, such a broad power would clearly include a power to set aside a notice of non- party production because such a notice amounts to an abuse of the process of the Commission. Incidental and necessary powers [52] Independent of such express power, the Commission also has such powers as are incidental and necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction or power so conferred.13 Even if I am wrong about the Commission's express powers to deal with an abuse of process (about a notice of non-party production) as set out above, the Commission also has such powers as are incidental and necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction or power so conferred on it. That is to say, the Commission, in respect of the power to make a decision pursuant to r 64G of the Rules (about an objection to a notice of non-party production), would have a power that is incidental and necessary to the exercise of that power. In my view, a power to prevent an abuse of the process of the Commission would be incidental and necessary to the exercise of the Commission's power pursuant to r 64G of the Rules. What is an abuse of process? [53] In Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health),14 a Full Bench of the Commission15 relevantly stated (footnotes omitted): Abuse of process [41] The varied circumstances in which the use of a court's processes will amount to an abuse of process, notwithstanding that the use is consistent with the literal application of the court's rules, cannot be exhaustively stated. However, two conditions enliven the power of a court to permanently stay proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court; first, where the use of the court's procedures occasions unjustifiable oppression to a party or, secondly, where the use of the court's procedures serves to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [42] Certainly, the raising of issues in successive proceedings can amount to an abuse of process. In Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited, the majority of the High Court relevantly held: Accordingly, it has been recognised that making a claim or raising an issue which was made or raised and determined in an earlier proceeding, or which ought reasonably to have been made or raised for determination in that earlier proceeding, can constitute an abuse of process even where the earlier proceeding might not have given rise to an estoppel. [43] The rationale as to why the bringing of successive proceedings amounts to an abuse of process is in the underlying public interest that there should be finality in litigation, that a 13 Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23: (1987) 162 CLR 612, 623-624 (Deane J, with whom Mason CJ and Wilson and Dawson JJ, at 616, agreed) and 630-631 (Toohey J) and DJL v The Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; (2000) 201 CLR 226, [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 14 [2021] QIRC 059. 15 Deputy President Merrell, Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon and Industrial Commissioner Dwyer. -- 13 of 24 -- 14 party should not be twice vexed in the same matter and where the public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy, in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The November NNPPs, and the application for a decision under r 64G(1) of the Rules about the Health Service's December objections, amount to an abuse of process [54] Mr Corney did not address this issue in his submissions. Both the Regulator and the Health Service submit it is open for the Commission to conclude that the November NNPPs amount to an abuse of the Commission's process because Mr Corney did not make an application under r 64G of the Rules in relation to the Health Service's October objections. In particular, the Regulator submits the November NNPPs are not relevant to any issue in Mr Corney's appeal which strengthens the case to conclude that the November NNPPs are an abuse of process. [55] In all the circumstances of the present case, the November NNPPs requested by Mr Corney, and his application to make a decision about the Health Service's December objections, amount to an abuse of the Commission's procedures which serves to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [56] Mr Corney requested the October NNPPs and they were issued on 14 October 2024. By the first October objection, the Health Service served objections in respect of the first and third categories of documents sought by the first October NNPP. By the second October objection, the Health Service served objections to both categories of documents sought by the second October NNPP. [57] The service on Mr Corney, of the Health Service's October objections, operated as a stay of the October NNPPs to the extent of the objections that were made to the October NNPPs. While Mr Corney had the right, within seven days of the service on him of the Health Service's October objections, to apply to the Commission, pursuant to r 64G(1) of the Rules, for a decision about those objections, he did not make such an application. [58] The consequence of that was that the stays of the October NNPPs, brought about by the service on Mr Corney of the Health Service's October objections to the October NNPPs, were operative pursuant to r 64F of the Rules as from the date of their service on Mr Corney. [59] By the November NNPPs, Mr Corney sought exactly the same categories of documents as contained in the October NNPPs. This was the case even though the Health Service in its October objections, did not object to the second and fourth categories of documents contained in the first October NNPP. [60] Mr Corney did not, pursuant to r 64G(1) of the Rules, apply for a decision about the Health Service's October objections to the October NNPPs, by making an application within 7 days of the service of those objections on him. [61] In my view, it is clear that the request by Mr Corney for the November NNPPs, and his subsequent application for a decision about the Health Service's December objections, is a device by Mr Corney to circumvent the operation of the stays, brought about by the service on him of the Health Service's October objections to the October NNPPs; being stays that were operative from the date the Health Service's October objections were -- 14 of 24 -- 15 served on him. This is an abuse of the Commission's process and serves to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [62] By his written submissions, Mr Corney provides no cogent reason for requesting the November NNPPs and then applying for a decision about the Health Service's December objections as served on him, in light of the October NNPPs, the Health Service's October objections and his failure to make an application under r 64G about the Health Service's October objections. [63] I have express or incidental power to set aside the November NNPPs. For the reasons I have given: • the request by Mr Corney for the November NNPPs, and his application for a decision about the Health Service's December objections to them, is an abuse of process; and, for that reason, • I will set aside the November NNPPs. [64] The consequence of that is that the operation of the stays of the October NNPPs, brought about by the service on Mr Corney of the Health Service's October objections, continue. Other reasons to set aside Mr Corney's November notices of non-party production [65] Even if I am wrong, and the November NNPPs and Mr Corney's present application do not amount to an abuse of process such that the November NNPPs should be set aside, there are other reasons why I would set aside the November NNPPs. [66] The principles in relation to civil proceedings about the power to set aside a subpoena for the production of documents were recently addressed by the Queensland Court of Appeal in McEwan v Rains.16 [67] In that case, Bond JA,17 by reference to the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Secretary of the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council18 stated (footnotes omitted): [46] The following propositions may be derived from Blacktown City Council: (a) The power of the Court to set aside a subpoena, in whole or in part, is an instance of its power to regulate its processes and, in particular, to intervene in a case of abuse of its process. (b) The exercise of that power is not to be restricted to defined and closed categories. Accordingly, the use of the language of “tests” for the setting aside of subpoenas should be avoided. (c) Examples justifying the exercise of power to set aside subpoenas include: (i) where the subpoena is not used for a pending trial hearing or application; 16 [2023] QCA 135; (2023) 15 QR 251. 17 McMurdo JA at [1] and Callaghan J at [53] agreeing. 18 [2021] NSWCA 145. -- 15 of 24 -- 16 (ii) where compliance with the subpoena would be oppressive in some way; (iii) where the subpoena has not been issued in good faith for the purpose of obtaining relevant evidence and the respondent to the subpoena is unable to give relevant evidence; (iv) where the subpoena has been used to obtain further discovery against a party or against a third party; (v) where the subpoena has been issued for an impermissible purpose, for example "fishing"; (vi) where the evidence sought lacks apparent relevance. (d) A subpoena will self-evidently be an abuse of process if it is not issued for a legitimate forensic purpose. (e) However, a subpoena will be presumed to have been issued for a legitimate forensic purpose: (i) if the documents sought are “apparently relevant” to the issues in the proceeding; or (ii) if the documents sought are capable of providing a legitimate basis for cross- examination, or go to credit, and notwithstanding that they are inadmissible according to the rules of evidence; or (iii) if it can be seen that the documents sought to be produced by way of subpoena will (or there is a reasonable basis beyond speculation that they will) materially assist on an identified issue. (f) As to "apparent relevance": (i) The conception refers to adjectival rather than substantive relevance. It is to be understood as conveying the notion that the evidence sought could reasonably be expected to “throw some light” on some of the issues in the proceeding. (ii) Apparent relevance should be able to be ascertained by an examination of the description or identification of evidence sought by the subpoena in light of the issues in the case, as they present themselves on the pleadings, in particulars and/or in affidavits or witness statements if they have been filed or served at the time of the issue of the subpoena. (g) Moreover, it will not be fishing, manifesting an illegitimate forensic purpose, to seek to subpoena apparently relevant documents for the purposes of cross-examining an important witness, even if the subpoenaing party does not know whether those documents will assist or advance its case. A party may be materially assisted in its case by knowing what apparently relevant documents say, even if those documents may not ultimately materially advance that party’s case. (h) An issuing party’s inability to show that the subpoenaed documents are likely to assist its case will not necessarily mean that the subpoena has not been issued for a legitimate forensic purpose, and will not automatically require either that the subpoena be set aside or that access to the documents produced be refused. (i) However, the absence of any apparent relevance of the documents sought to be subpoenaed to the issues in the case may warrant a conclusion of a lack of legitimate forensic purpose and be a sufficient ground to set aside a subpoena or part of a subpoena. -- 16 of 24 -- 17 [47] I would follow Blacktown City Council, at least, as Brereton JA noted, in civil cases and in the absence of any question of public interest immunity. I would caution that, since the juridical basis for the power to set aside a subpoena is that identified, and "legitimate forensic purpose" is to be treated as the converse of "abuse of process", the views there expressed, and those recorded above, are not to be treated as if they were expressed in a statute. The Court’s power should not be so confined. Further, relevant considerations might not all point one way, so that the exercise of the discretion might require the formation of an evaluative judgment. For example, in a particular case the documents sought might be apparently relevant, but the subpoena expressed in such vague terms that it would be oppressive to require the recipient to comply with it, thereby necessitating an order that it be set aside. [68] In my view, these principles are equally applicable to the exercise of the Commission's discretion in making a decision about an objection to a notice of non-party production, served on a non-party, within the meaning of pt 2, div 2, sub-div 7A of the Rules. [69] As set out above, by r 64G(2) of the Rules, the Commission '… may make any order it considers appropriate including, but not limited to, an order' lifting the stay, varying the notice of non-party production or setting aside the notice of non-party production. The first November NNPP [70] The four categories of documents sought by the first November NNPP, in respect of the period 1 July 2021 to '… 2024', are set out earlier in these reasons. The four categories of documents in the first November NNPP are the same as contained in the first October NNPP. [71] The Health Service now objects to all four categories of documents contained in the first November NNPP. [72] In the first November NNPP, Mr Corney relevantly contends that: • there are mandatory notifications required to be made when '… serious breaches of the Mental Health Act are made.'; • the Chief Psychiatrist has to be notified of the event and the patient is required to be notified that their human rights '…may have been breached'; • PDSU (which Mr Corney defines as 'Predischarge Discharge Satellite Unit') patients were unlawfully detained at the TCCU in contravention of s 358 of the Criminal Code Act 189919 and, in such circumstances, a mandatory notification has to be made to the Crime and Corruption Commission and the Health Ombudsman of such possible criminal acts by Queensland Health staff; and • if the Hospital has not made these required notifications, '…it shows a possible conspiracy to cover up potential criminal activity by certain staff members.' 19 Section 358 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 provides: 358 Unlawful custody of particular persons Any person who detains or assumes the custody of an involuntary patient under the Mental Health Act 2016 or a forensic disability client under the Forensic Disability Act 2011 contrary to the provisions of the laws relating to such persons is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for 2 years. -- 17 of 24 -- 18 [73] The Health Service objects to the provision of these documents on various grounds, namely: • a lack of relevance to Mr Corney's appeal; • the breadth of the date range; and, or in the alternative, • that documents that post-date the date of Mr Corney's injury are irrelevant. [74] Mr Corney: • submits that in relation to the first category, the scope of time should be July 2021 to July 2022 and that some of the documents sought have already been '…shared with' the Regulator. • in relation to the second category, refers to an incident between him and a Ms Anderson between 17 August 2021 and 16 June 2022 that he says is relevant to his appeal but does not say how it is relevant; • in relation to the third category, asserts that the Health Service has not made mandatory notifications required by law which is official corruption and could be considered to be motivation to make false allegations against him alleging he breached confidentiality to '… destroy my reputation' but he does not say who was so motivated and when all these events occurred; and • in relation to the fourth category, asserts because Mr Keyes confirmed in writing with the Regulator that he did not breach confidentiality, then anyone who said to the Regulator he did would be in breach of the WCR Act and would have engaged in official misconduct. [75] The Health Service submits that the first November NNPP should be set aside because Mr Corney is seeking documents that are wholly irrelevant to his appeal and that he is 'fishing' in that he is seeking documents to discover if there is a case at all, rather than seeking documents that support the case he has made. [76] The Regulator submits that the first November NNPP should be set aside because: • none of the documents sought in the first and third categories have any relevance to Mr Corney's appeal; • in relation to the fourth category, documents about communications between the Health Service, WorkCover Queensland and it, that post-date his application for compensation, cannot be relevant for that reason; and • in relation to the second category, the lack of relevance, the lack of particularity and the breadth of the scope of time over which the documents are sought. [77] Earlier in these reasons I gave an outline of Mr Corney's case in respect of his appeal to this Commission against the review decision. -- 18 of 24 -- 19 [78] There are five reasons why I would set aside the first November NNPP, even if I did not find it, and Mr Corney's request for a decision about the first December objection, amounted to an abuse of process for the reasons I have given earlier. [79] First, the descriptions of the documents in the second and fourth categories of the November NNPP are exactly the same as the descriptions of the documents in the second and fourth categories contained in the first October NNPP. There was no objection by the Health Service to those two categories in the first October objection. [80] Secondly, the documents described in the second and fourth categories of the first November NNPP, to the extent that they are of direct relevance to a matter in issue in Mr Corney's appeal, would have already been disclosed by the Regulator. For that reason, the notice to produce those documents by the Health Service is being used to obtain further discovery against the Regulator or against the Health Service as a non-party. It is not explained why the issue with Ms Anderson, referred to by Mr Corney in his submissions, is relevant to anything in issue in his appeal. Allegations of breaches of the WCR Act and of official misconduct by unnamed staff are irrelevant to his appeal. [81] Thirdly, no explanation has been advanced by Mr Corney, when the date of his injury was 16 June 2022 or when the date of his application for compensation was June 2022, as to why documents that came into existence after those dates would have any relevance to his appeal. [82] Fourthly, because the description of documents in the first and third categories of the first November NNPP are so broadly expressed, and concern such a broad and uncertain period of time (commencing on 1 July 2021 up to some unspecified date this year) this persuades me that Mr Corney is not seeking documents that support his case but rather that he is fishing for a case. [83] Fifthly, in respect of the descriptions of documents in the first and third categories of the first November NNPP, I am not persuaded by Mr Corney's own explanation in the first November NNPP that they are sought for a legitimate forensic purpose. The first category of documents in the first November NNPP [84] In relation to the first category of documents, again, the breadth and uncertainty of the period of time in respect of which the documents are sought, and the vague description of the documents, persuade me that Mr Corney is not seeking those documents to support his case but rather to see if some other case can be made by him. Further, Mr Corney does not state why documents that came into existence after the date of his injury are relevant. [85] In particular, the description of this category of documents (leaving aside the broad and uncertain date range) is entirely vague, namely: 'All complaint letters/emails submitted by Steven Corney about patients [sic] mental health paper work being unlawful to detain the patient at PDSU.' The obvious questions about this vague description are: • submitted to whom? and • what patient? -- 19 of 24 -- 20 The third category of documents in the first November NNPP [86] In relation to the third category of documents, the documents sought by Mr Corney seem to be for some other purpose, namely, demonstrating alleged criminal activity or alleged contraventions of patients' human rights by other unnamed staff members employed in the Hospital. Whether such conduct occurred, whether or not the Hospital and Health Service conducted investigations of those matters, or there was notification by the Health Service about such matters, and whether or not such investigations or notifications were at the instigation of complaints made by Mr Corney, are not relevant to the question of whether any psychiatric injury sustained by Mr Corney arose out of or in the course of his employment and whether his employment was a significant contributing factor to his injury. [87] Mr Corney's case, as best as I can make out, is that his injury arose out of false allegations being made against him about accessing the electronic medical records of two PDSU consumers, the investigation of those allegations was procedurally unfair, and that any disciplinary action he is facing is because of the (alleged) fact he had made complaints to the Health Service about breaches of legislation by other staff. That is, Mr Corney's case, in relation to alleged retaliation by the making of false allegations, is not based on the contention that such alleged breaches of legislation by other employees were actually investigated or that relevant notifications were made by the Hospital of such breaches, or indeed that such breaches of legislation occurred, but that he has made complaints about such allegations. [88] It is also the case, from the explanation given by Mr Corney in the first November NNPP, about the direct relevance of this third category of documents, that Mr Corney wants such documents for a purpose not connected with his appeal under the WCR Act; namely to prove an alleged conspiracy to cover up criminal activity by unnamed staff members. [89] Again, there is no explanation how documents that post-date his injury or his workers' compensation application are relevant. [90] For all these reasons, even if I am wrong and that Mr Corney's request for the first November NNPP, and his application for a decision about the objection to it, was not an abuse of process, I would have still set aside the first November NNPP. The second November NNPP [91] The date range and description of the two categories of documents sought by the second November NNPP are the same as contained in the second October NNPP. The date range is 1 July 2021 to '…2024' and the description is: 1… Handover entries in the shared handover sheet for TCCU for patient: [patient's name deleted] 2… Medication record showing Nursing signatures for patient: [patient's name deleted] [92] The Health Service objects to the provision of these documents: • because of a lack of relevance to Mr Corney's appeal; and • because of the confidential nature of the documents requested given: -- 20 of 24 -- 21 - that they relate to a deceased patient; and - that patients who receive treatment at public hospitals expect that their records will remain confidential, and that confidentiality should not be displaced in the present circumstances. [93] Mr Corney contends that: • the documents of the first category '… will show that the PDSU nurses were actively sharing confidential patient information' with the nurses of the TCCU '… as we were part of the team involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients' in accordance with s 145 of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011;20 and • the documents of the second category: - will refute '…the claims by Mr Baird, Ms Mallett and Mr Eaton' that he breached confidentiality and that their management actions were unreasonable; - will prove that TCCU nurses were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients and that certain medications are required by law to be double checked by a second nurse before being administered; and - will prove that some of the medication of the patient was required to be double checked, proving TCCU nurses were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients; and • it is in the '… public interest to clear my name and reputation about the false claims by the Townsville University Hospital staff that I breached patients confidentiality by looking at patients documents to report unlawful detention of PDSU' patients and the '… obvious retaliation by the TUH for making the complains to discredit me and my reputation in what I believe is an attempt to cover up a possible' contravention of s 358 of the Criminal Code Act 1899. [94] Mr Corney's submissions about why these documents are relevant reflect the reasons he set out in the second November NNPP. [95] Mr Corney submits in relation to the first category, the documents will prove that confidential patient information of PDSU patients was handed over to TCCU nurses three times a day, which was lawful under s 145 of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 and which will prove the allegations, he breached confidentiality by accessing the electronic medical records of two PDSU patients, were false. [96] Mr Corney submits in relation to the second category, the documents will prove '…TCCU nurses were directly involved with the care and treatment of PDSU patients'; however, Mr Corney does not submit he was a TCCU nurse who cared for the specific patient named in the second November NNPP. 20 Section 145 of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 provides: 145 Disclosure of confidential information for care or treatment of person A designated person or prescribed health professional may disclose confidential information if the disclosure is for the care or treatment of the person to whom the information relates. -- 21 of 24 -- 22 [97] The Health Service and the Regulator both submit the documents sought have no relevance to any issue in Mr Corney's appeal. [98] I agree with the Health Service and the Regulator. [99] For the following reasons, I would also set aside the second November NNPP if I am wrong about my earlier reasons concerning an abuse of process. The first category of documents in the second November NNPP [100] Mr Corney's explanation about the direct relevance of the first category of documents he seeks does not persuade me that the documents would have any relevance to the case he is making to the Commission. [101] On Mr Corney's case, as best as I understand his statement of facts and contentions, he says his accessing of the electronic medical records of the two consumers, who were PDSU patients (and not TCCU patients),21 was not a breach of confidentiality.22 This is because Mr Corney alleges, as facts, that: • '…TCCU nurses had a shared care responsibility to PDSU patients to support the PDSU nurse;'23 and • '… there was already established information sharing of PDSU patients to TCCU staff via written handover sheet'.24 [102] However: • Mr Corney was not a PDSU nurse, but was an Enrolled Nurse employed in the TCCU; and • the allegation made against him was that he accessed the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients, not that he accessed their handover sheets. [103] Whether or not other unnamed '…PDSU nurses were actively sharing confidential patient information' with the nurses of the TCCU (about PDSU patients) does not persuade me that such handover entries in the shared handover sheet for one specifically named TCCU patient, in respect of which Mr Corney does not submit he provided any nursing care, have any apparent relevance to Mr Corney's contention that he did not breach confidentiality by accessing the electronic medical records of two PDSU patients. [104] That is, I fail to see how the handover entries in the shared handover sheet, for one named TCCU patient, over the very long period from 1 July 2021 to some unspecified date this year, would throw some light on Mr Corney's contention that he did not breach confidentiality by accessing the electronic medical records of two PDSU patients. 21 Mr Corney's contentions, page 1, second paragraph. 22 Mr Corney's contentions, page 1, second paragraph. 23 Mr Corney's contentions, page 1, second paragraph. 24 Mr Corney's contentions, page 2, the paragraph numbered '1.'. -- 22 of 24 -- 23 [105] In addition, the breadth and uncertainty of the time frame of the documents does not persuade me these documents have any apparent relevance to Mr Corney's appeal under the WCR Act. Such breadth and uncertainty persuades me that Mr Corney is fishing for some other case to be made. [106] Again, there is no explanation how documents that post-date his injury, or his workers' compensation application, are relevant. The second category of documents in the second November NNPP [107] Mr Corney's explanation about the direct relevance of the second category of documents he seeks does not persuade me that the documents would have any apparent relevance to the case he is making to the Commission. [108] Again, Mr Corney's contention is that he did not breach confidentiality by accessing the electronic medical records of two PDSU patients. [109] Mr Corney alleges in the second November NNPP, that the medication record showing nursing signatures for one specific patient from 1 July 2021, to some unspecified date this year, proves that: • TCCU nurses were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients; • that certain medications are required by law to be double checked by a second nurse before being administered; and • because some of the medication of the patient was required to be double checked, TCCU nurses were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients. [110] Assuming the medication records for this one patient proves these matters, that does not throw some light on proving the legitimacy of his alleged actions in accessing the electronic medical records of two PDSU patients. This is because: • the facts he says these documents will prove have no relevance to the issue of why it was legitimate for Mr Corney to access the electronic medical records of two unnamed PDSU patients; and • Mr Corney does not allege in his statement of facts and contentions that he was a TCCU nurse that double checked the medications to be administered to any PDSU patient. [111] Further, Mr Corney alleges in the second November NNPP that the medication record for this one patient would assist him in clearing his name and reputation. If that is the case, then the documents are not being sought for use in his appeal to this Commission under the WCR Act. The purpose of Mr Corney's appeal to this Commission is to determine whether or not he has an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act, not to try to restore any lost reputation he has allegedly suffered or to prove his allegations of criminal behaviour of others. For these reasons, my view is that Mr Corney seeks the second category of documents in the second November NNPP to restore his reputation, -- 23 of 24 -- 24 and to defend possible disciplinary action, and not for advancing his case before this Commission about his alleged compensable injury. [112] Again, there is no explanation how documents that post-date his injury, or his workers' compensation application, are relevant. [113] For all these reasons, even if I am wrong and that Mr Corney's request for the second November NNPP, and his application for a decision about the Health Service's December objection to it, was not an abuse of process, I would have still set aside the second November NNPP. Conclusion [114] For the reasons I have given, the November NNPPs will be set aside. [115] The consequence of this decision is that the stays of the October NNPPs, brought about by the service on Mr Corney of the Health Service's October objections, remain in operation. Orders [116] I make the following orders: 1. The Notice of non-party production, dated 27 November 2024 in Matter No. WC/2022/201, seeking four categories of documents, is set aside. 2. The Notice of non-party production, dated 27 November 2024 in Matter No. WC/2022/201, seeking two categories of documents, is set aside. -- 24 of 24 --