Clarke v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2024] QIRC 36

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: PARTIES: Clarke v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2024] QIRC 036 Clarke, Dhana Martine (Applicant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (Respondent) CASE NO: TD/2023/50 PROCEEDING: Application for reinstatement DELIVERED ON: 14 February 2024 MEMBER: HEARD AT: McLennan IC On the papers ORDERS: 1. The Application is dismissed. 2. I will hear the parties as to costs. CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND DISMISSAL – UNFAIR DISMISSAL – application for reinstatement – where the applicant claims the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable – where the applicant failed to comply with the vaccination requirements under the Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12 and the Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 issued under the Police Service Administration Act 1990 – where directions were issued for the applicant to show cause why the Commission should not dismiss the application or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the application – where further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest -- 1 of 13 -- 2 LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS: CASES: Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 331 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 316, s 541 Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) s 4.9 Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 91, s 312, s 313 Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 187 Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12 paras 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 para 10 Brasell-Dellow v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 356 Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18 Harris v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 342 R v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighter; ex parte Halliday and Sullivan (1948) 60 CLR 601 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] Ms Dhana Clarke (the Applicant) was employed by the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (the Respondent) as an Administration Officer (AO3) in the Maroochydore Criminal Investigation Branch. [2] On 7 September 2021, pursuant to s 4.9 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), the Commissioner of the Service (the Commissioner) issued the Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12 (Direction No. 12) pertaining to "mandatory COVID- 19 vaccination and mask requirements for police officers and certain staff members." -- 2 of 13 -- 3 [3] Paragraph 6 of Direction No. 12 relevantly provides that it applies to all staff members appointed pursuant to the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) and/or the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld)1 who are frontline staff members, or frontline support staff members, as defined in paragraph 15 of Direction No. 12. [4] In accordance with the 'definitions' contained within Direction No. 12, the Applicant was a staff member to whom the Direction applied. [5] The "requirements for vaccination against COVID-19" are provided in paragraph 7 of Direction No. 12, which states: Unless a police officer or staff member is exempt under paragraph 8 or 9, all police officers and staff members must: a) receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 4 October 2021; and b) receive a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 24 January 2022; and c) provide evidence of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine if requested by the Commissioner of Police (or delegate). [6] Direction No.12 provides an exemption from vaccination requirements, if the police officer or staff member is unable to be vaccinated due to a medical contraindication and they provide medical evidence to this effect in accordance with the Direction, or if the Commissioner or the Commissioner's delegate grants an exemption due to a genuine religious objective or due to other exceptional circumstances.2 [7] Between 7 September 2021 and 14 December 2021, the Applicant did not receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine or provide evidence of having received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine in accordance with the Commissioner's direction in Direction No. 12. [8] The Applicant did not apply to the Vaccination Exemption Committee (VEC) for an exemption from the requirements of Direction No.12 or have an exemption from compliance. [9] On 14 December 2021, Direction No. 12 was rescinded and replaced by the Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 (Direction No. 14). Direction No. 14 mirrored the requirements of Direction No. 12, however, new dates for vaccine compliance were introduced. [10] The Applicant failed to comply with Direction No. 14, in that she did not produce evidence of having received the vaccine, nor apply or be granted an exemption from compliance. [11] The Applicant's failure to comply with Direction No. 12 and Direction No. 14 resulted in the commencement of disciplinary processes, having failed to comply with the lawful 1 Now repealed and replaced with the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld). 2 Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12, [8]-[11]. -- 3 of 13 -- 4 directions of the Commissioner. The Respondent alleged that the Applicant's refusal to follow a lawful direction fell within the ground of 'misconduct' pursuant to s 187(1)(b) of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld). [12] In March 2023, the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) was replaced with the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (the PS Act) and in accordance with the transitional provisions ss 312 and 313 of the PS Act, the disciplinary action continued under s 91(1)(b) of the PS Act. [13] On 12 April 2023, the Applicant was dismissed after failing to provide responses to the show cause notice.3 [14] On 3 May 2023, the Applicant lodged this reinstatement application. Background [15] Direction No. 12 was issued and took effect on 7 September 2021. Paragraphs 1 to 5 of Direction No. 12 set out the reasons why the Commissioner made the Direction, in respect of the police officers and staff members to whom Direction No. 12 applies. [16] Those paragraphs provide: Background 1. A public health emergency was declared on 29 January 2020 for the whole of Queensland, under the Public Health Act 2005, due to the outbreak of COVID-19 and the health implications to Queensland. The risk presented by COVID-19 is heightened by the increased transmissibility and secondary attack rate of the delta variant, its increased virulence and severity of disease and the reduction in neutralising antibody activity. 2. In order to fulfil the functions of the Queensland Police Service under section 2.3 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990, police officers must be frontline-ready and available for deployment. The Queensland Police Service has particular responsibilities during the declared public health emergency, including deployment of police officers and staff members to quarantine facilities as well as to COVID-19 border compliance duties. More broadly, the nature and frequency of police officers' interactions with members of the community, particularly vulnerable members of the community, results in a significantly increased risk of police officers contracting or transmitting COVID-19. Rapid transmission of COVID-19 through the Queensland Police Service would take police officers and staff members out of service while they undertake quarantine periods or recover from COVID- 19. In an extreme scenario, this could reduce the availability of police officers and staff members for deployment, and threaten the ability of the Queensland Police Service to serve the community. 3. While it is primarily police officers who are on the front line, many staff members: a) have close working relationships with police officers; b) interact with members of the community (including vulnerable members of the community) in roles such as Police Liaison Officers as well as in public-facing roles at police stations; and, c) are mission critical, such as staff members stationed at Communications Centres, Policelink, fleet maintenance facilities and Queensland Government Air (QGAir). 3 The Respondent noted that the Applicant did write to the Decision Maker, claiming that as the QPS held an A.B.N, it was operating as a private business and requested full insurance details. -- 4 of 13 -- 5 4. The Work Health and Safety Act 2011 places a responsibility on me as the Commissioner of Police, so far as is reasonably practicable, to ensure the health and safety of police officers and staff members. That Act also requires me to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of other people with whom police officers and staff members interact when performing the functions of the Queensland Police Service. 5. While individual police officers and staff members have important human rights, those rights must be weighed against the interests of the community, including the human rights of others and the need to ensure that the Queensland Police Service is able to serve the community during a public health emergency. [17] The Applicant failed to receive the vaccination in accordance with Direction No. 12, nor did she apply for or produce an exemption. Further, she did not receive the vaccination, nor apply for or produce an exemption within the next dates for compliance introduced in Direction No. 14. The Applicant's refusal to follow lawful directions falls within the grounds of 'misconduct' under s 91(1)(b) of the PS Act. [18] The mandatory requirement for vaccination under Direction No. 12 has been decided by the Commission in Brassell-Dell & Ors v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) & Ors (Brassell-Dell)4 as being a lawful direction, to which employees must comply. The Full Bench held (citations omitted): [84] Therefore, on a proper construction of the PSA Act as a whole, and taken in the context of the QPS being maintained as a disciplined force: 1. within the restrictions that have been explained, the Commissioner may give a lawful direction to employees; 2. the direction is given by the Commissioner in her capacity as the effective employer or the employees; 3. unless there is "reasonable excuse" not to comply, the employee must comply.5 [19] On 14 August 2023, a conference was held before me where I informed the parties of my assessment of the merits of the matter and the possible consequences of further proceeding with the application, given that the lawfulness of Direction No. 12 has already been established by the Commission. [20] The Applicant advised that she wished to proceed with this matter. Directions Order [21] On 14 August 2023, I issued a Directions Order requiring the Applicant to file in the Industrial Registry and serve on the Respondent, written submissions to show cause pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (the IR Act), why the Commission should not dismiss the application, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the application, if the Commission considers further proceedings by the 4 [2021] QIRC 356. 5 Ibid. -- 5 of 13 -- 6 Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest, by 4.00 pm on 28 August 2023. [22] The Applicant sent an email to the Industrial Registry on 28 August 2023 seeking an extension of time. She provided: I respectfully request a one month extension as I am still waiting on my attorney's advice, I am feeling overwhelmed and unwell and can not write a response without all the information and advice I require. I was expecting an answer by Friday but they are obviously very busy. [23] The Industrial Registry responded to the Applicant's correspondence, relaying that I was willing to grant an extension of two weeks to allow the Applicant to file her submissions, and conveyed the following:6 … The Applicant’s request has been considered by Commissioner McLennan. She notes the matter has been on foot for some time and a conference has been held, where she advised the parties on prospects of success and the consequences of proceeding. As such, the submissions sought are confined to show cause pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), which states: The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following— (b) dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers— … (ii) further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest; If the Applicant intends to obtain legal advice to prepare any written submissions, she should urgently advise them of the new timeframes for the submissions to be filed and served. [24] On 11 September 2023, the Applicant sent an email to the Industrial Registry and the Respondent, challenging the validity of the Respondent's claims that Direction No. 12 was lawful and requested that they provide an authority for this proposition.7 [25] The Respondent promptly responded to the Applicant's enquiries and again, drew her attention to s 4.9 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), which provides:8 (1) In discharging the prescribed responsibility, the commissioner may give, and cause to be issued, to officers, staff members or police recruits, such directions, written or oral, general or particular as the commissioner considers necessary or convenient for the efficient and proper functioning of the police service. (2) A direction of the commissioner is of no effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with this Act. (3) Subject to subsection (2), every officer or staff member to whom a direction of the commissioner is addressed is to comply in all respects with the direction. 6 Correspondence from the Industrial Registry to all parties dated 1 September 2023. 7 Correspondence from the Applicant to the Industrial Registry and the Respondent dated 11 September 2023. 8 Correspondence from the Respondent to the Applicant and Industrial Registry dated 11 September 2023. -- 6 of 13 -- 7 (4) A direction issued under subsection (1) to officers about functions, powers or responsibilities that are also functions, powers or responsibilities of watch-house officers is taken to be also issued to watch-house officers. (5) In all proceedings— (a) a document purporting to be certified by the commissioner to be a true copy of a direction under subsection (1) is admissible as evidence of the direction; and (b) a direction under subsection (1) is to be taken as effectual until the contrary is proved. [26] On 18 September 2023, the Respondent wrote to the Commission advising they had not been served with the Applicant's written submissions. [27] The Applicant had not filed any written submissions in the Industrial Registry in accordance with the Directions Order. [28] Later that day, the Applicant emailed the Industrial Registry and Respondent, attaching a screenshot which said: I note and acknowledge receipt of Queensland Industrial Relations Commission Directions Order dated 14th August 2023, Order No. TD/2023/50. This Order is accepted and as I have fulfilled my obligations regarding this matter and have now processed said Order, I requisition payment for services rendered, restitution and compensation as outlined in the following charges/schedule of fees: Court appearance schedule – My appearance in court (for up to one hour) time usage; documents produced by me; study/research time usage/preparation of documents and/or material for court = total sum of seventy-five-thousand-dollars Australian. $75,000.00 AUD I authorise payment for the sum of $75,000.00 to be paid within fifteen days, which ought to be paid by way of cheque made out/posted to: Dhana Clarke, c/- … [29] In accordance with the Directions Order, the Respondent filed written submissions on 27 September 2023. [30] The Applicant did not file any submissions in reply, or otherwise correspond with the Industrial Registry after receiving the Respondent's submissions. [31] Despite the extension of time afforded to the Applicant, the screen shot she filed failed to comply with the Directions Order. [32] Rather, the Applicant claimed to have fulfilled her obligations with respect to the Directions Order, in the absence of any written submissions being filed or served as to why these proceedings should not be dismissed. She then proceeded to demand payment of $75,000.00 for her appearance, the documents she produced and preparation for the proceedings. [33] While this point of non-compliance alone is not sufficient to enliven the Commission's discretion under s 541 of the IR Act, such conduct clearly demonstrates the disregard the Applicant has for the prosecution of her case and the Commission's time, particularly given the extension of time she was granted and the guidance provided from the Respondent, again drawing her attention to well-settled case law from the Commission. -- 7 of 13 -- 8 Submissions Reinstatement Application [34] While the Applicant did not file any submissions as to why the proceeding should not be dismissed under s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act, within the Application she listed three reasons as to why her dismissal was unfair, namely: • The demand for the Applicant to be vaccinated breached the Employment Contract between her and the Respondent. • That the Respondent was a for-profit organisation with an A.B.N. which the Applicant did not agree to be a member of. • The Applicant had received influenza vaccinations at work, under coercion, which equates to being an employee for life in line with work health and safety issues. [35] The Respondent submits that each of these grounds has no rational correlation between the reason for the dismissal which was 'misconduct' for failing to follow a lawful direction, and the contention that it was harsh, unjust or unreasonable within the meaning of s 316 of the IR Act. [36] The Respondent raised that QPS is a government agency, not a corporation, and the holding of an A.B.N does not make the QPS a corporation. They clarified that the Applicant's "employment contract" was initiated upon the Applicant receiving her appointment letter, which outlined who the Applicant would be working for, the industrial instruments applicable to the Applicant's employment, and the legislation she would be working under. The Respondent stated that there was no direction issued to take the influenza vaccination, and the Applicant's contention that she had been 'forced' into taking it is contrary to the argument she raised against taking the COVID-19 vaccination. [37] The Respondent submitted that: • Direction No. 12 and Direction No. 14 were lawful directions requiring compliance from staff. • Exemptions were available to the Applicant, but no exemption was ever sought. • The Applicant was subject to the provisions of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) and later the new PS Act, in addition to the directions issued by the Commissioner. • The Applicant has not in their application for reinstatement presented any cogent arguments that their dismissal was unfair, unjust or unreasonable. • The Applicant failed to meet the requirements of the Directions Order. -- 8 of 13 -- 9 Section 541 of the IR Act [38] Further, the Respondent submitted that the matter ought to be dismissed as: • The legal precedent handed down by the Commissioner in Brassell-Dellow9 directly mirrors the issues in this matter. • There is a lack of logical reasoning underpinning the Applicant's initial claim for unfair dismissal. • The absence of a rational argument from the Applicant demonstrates that the Applicant's unfair dismissal claim is trivial, frivolous and that further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest. [39] The Respondent also submitted that the Commission should consider awarding costs against the Applicant in accordance with s 541(c) of the IR Act. Relevant Principles Section 541 of the IR Act [40] Section 541 of the IR Act provides: The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following— (a) make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause; (b) dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers— (i) the cause is trivial; or (ii) further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest; (c) order a party to the cause to pay another party the expenses, including witness expenses, it considers appropriate. Direction No. 12 and Direction No. 14 [41] Paragraph 7 of Direction No. 12 sets out the vaccination requirements for vaccination: 7. Unless a police officer or staff member is exempt under paragraph 8 or 9, all police officers and staff members must: a) receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 4 October 2021; and 9 [2021] QIRC 356. -- 9 of 13 -- 10 b) receive a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 24 January 2022; and c) provide evidence of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine if requested by the Commissioner of Police (or delegate). [42] Paragraph 10 of Direction No. 14, sets out new dates for compliance with the vaccination requirements: 10. Unless a police officer or staff member is exempt under paragraph 11 or 13, all police officers and staff members must: a) receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 4 October 2021; b) receive a second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 17 December 2021, or if ineligible to do so by that date, within 48 hours of becoming eligible to do so; c) receive a booster dose of a COVID-19 vaccine no more than one month after they become eligible to do so, in accordance with ATAGI's advice on the use of a booster dose of COVID-19 vaccine at that time, or if already eligible to do so, no more than one month after the date of this direction; and d) show or provide evidence of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine (including a booster) to their direct report and record the information on the Employee Self Service within two days of receiving the vaccine, unless otherwise agreed with their direct report. [43] Paragraph 15 of Direction No. 12 provides for the definition of a 'staff member', which is mirrored in Direction No. 14: staff member means a frontline staff member or frontline support staff member to whom this Direction applies, under paragraph 6. Consideration Should these proceedings be dismissed? [44] The Commission has the discretion to dismiss a cause, or refrain from hearing or deciding a cause, if the Commission considers that further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.10 [45] The Applicant did not comply with the Directions Order as to why the application should not be dismissed. That point of non-compliance alone is not sufficient to enliven the Commission's discretion under s 541 of the IR Act. However, combined with the fact that the Applicant has not raised any logical argument in support of her application that is novel or unique, as well as her ventilation of arguments that have been the subject of many previous decisions of this Commission, in my view, is sufficient to dismiss these proceedings under s 541 of the IR Act. 10 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 541. -- 10 of 13 -- 11 [46] In Harris v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)11 Vice President O'Connor when considering dismissing proceedings under s 541 of the IR Act provided that (emphasis added): In exercising the discretion, the Commission is mindful that the power to dismiss or refrain from hearing a cause is to be sparingly employed and is not to be used except in circumstances where the Commission is satisfied that on the material the matter is obviously untenable or groundless and cannot succeed.12 [47] In Brasell-Dellow13 a Full Bench of this Commission considered the lawfulness of Direction No. 12 and held: A direction given to an employee does not, without more, become a term or condition of employment. This is made clear in the management prerogative cases. Where a directive is within the scope of employment and it is not contrary to the employment contract, the award or any certified agreement, the direction must be obeyed provided compliance does not involve illegality and the directive is reasonable.14 [48] It is well accepted that Direction No. 12 was a lawful direction that required compliance from staff. The underlying rationale for Directive No. 12 is that the relevant staff must be vaccinated against COVID-19 in order to minimise the effects of the virus on the employees and the public. [49] The Applicant has not raised any rational or coherent argument as to why her dismissal was unfair, unjust or unreasonable. She rather raises arguments that are irrelevant and misconceived, which would make further proceedings not necessary or desirable in the public interest. [50] In Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General),15 Justice Martin provided (emphasis added) (citations omitted): [25] Similarly, in Prange v Brisbane City Council, Hall P held at [3] that: "The power to dismiss proceedings pursuant to s. 331 of the Act, on the ground that further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest, is a discretionary power. The discretion is not vested in this Court. The discretion is vested in the Commission. Only in limited circumstances may this Court intervene. In House v The King at 504 to 506, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ explained: 'The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take 11 [2023] QIRC 342. 12 Ibid [20]. 13 [2021] QIRC 356. 14 Ibid [65], citing R v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighter; ex parte Halliday and Sullivan (1948) 60 CLR 601 at 621-622. 15 [2019] ICQ 18. -- 11 of 13 -- 12 into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.’ [26] In the earlier case of Quaedvlieg & Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd Hall P, in dealing with an application to strike out for want of prosecution, cited with approval the reasoning of Thomas JA in Quinlan v Rothwell as follows: "There is now a consciousness of the need for some level of efficiency in the use of the courts as a public resource. That, of course, must not displace the need for reasonable access to the courts and the provision of justice according to law in each matter, but it highlights the fact that the former laissez faire attitude by courts towards the leisurely conduct of actions at the will of the parties has ended. At the same time the rules of court are not an end in themselves. They do not exist for the discipline of practitioners or clients, or for the protection of courts from inefficient litigants, but rather as a means of ensuring that issues will be defined in an orderly way and that parties have the opportunity of full preparation of their case before the trial commences. The rules also afford defendants the means of bringing to an end actions in which the other party will not abide by the rules." [27] Insofar as it may confine the exercise of discretion under s 541, the purpose of the Act is stated as follows: “3 Main purpose of Act The main purpose of this Act is to provide for a framework for cooperative industrial relations that— (a) is fair and balanced; and (b) supports the delivery of high quality services, economic prosperity and social justice for Queenslanders.” [28] The process for consideration of an application under s 541 does not require that the respondent’s case be taken at its highest. The cognate provisions in federal legislation were frequently considered by Full Benches of the federal tribunal, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia. The accepted approach was that the applicant bore the onus of making the claim for relief. But the ascertainment in any particular case of where the public interest lay often depended on a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and was very much a question of fact and degree. [29] As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials. A “proper consideration” cannot be made where the case for the respondent is simply taken at its highest. While the onus remains on an applicant, the requirement to consider the “public interest” cannot be satisfied if an artificial inflation of the respondent’s case is applied. Indeed, to take a respondent’s case at its highest would almost always result in the dismissal of an application under this section. On an application of this type, a respondent is not relieved of any requirement to advance a case. [51] Section 541 of the IR Act is indistinguishable from its predecessor, namely s 331 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld). Section 331 relevantly provided: The court or commission may, in an industrial cause - -- 12 of 13 -- 13 … (b) dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers - (i) the cause is trivial; or (ii) further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest. [52] The notion of 'public interest' is broad enough that it can incorporate consideration of the public interest with respect to both the efficient use of the Commission's resources and the likely impact that dealing with one proceeding will have on the Commission's capacity to efficiently deal with other proceedings. [53] Given the lack of rational argument raised by the Applicant throughout these proceedings and that the Applicant has demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with Directions issued by the Commission, it can be concluded that any further proceedings would be a waste of the Commission's resources. Costs [54] The Respondent has submitted that the Commission should consider awarding costs. [55] Given this is a matter in which it was reasonably apparent to the Applicant that it had no reasonable prospect of success, and in circumstances where the Applicant has been non- compliant in prosecuting her case, I will hear the parties as to costs. Conclusion [56] It has been well accepted by the Commission that Direction No. 12 and Direction No. 14 were lawful directions that required compliance from staff.16 [57] For the reasons outlined above, there is not any material before the Commission that would justify progressing this matter to hearing. I am satisfied that any further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act. [58] I order accordingly. Orders 1. The Application is dismissed. 2. I will hear the parties as to costs. 16 Brassell-Dell & Ors v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) & Ors [2021] QIRC 356. -- 13 of 13 --