Bunney v Nominal Defendant (Queensland) [1990] QSC 58

10 20 30 40 50 60 ; OC 90/ 58"" I REVGED -c;-;;i; s·ts.~~1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CIVIL JURISDICTION BEFORE MR. JUSTICE AMBROSE BRISBANE, 23 FEBRUARY 1990 t_;'~;;'~~~ _;~~J No. 2439 of 1986 (Copyright in this transcript is vested i 10 the Crown. Copies thereof must not be mad BETWEEN: or sold without the written authority of th Chief Court Reporter,Court Reporting Burea. MICHAEL WAYNE DOUGLAS BUNNEY -and- THE NOMINAL DEFENDANT (QUEENSLAND) JUDGMENT Plaintiff Defendant HIS HONOUR: In this matter, I give judgment for the plaintiff for $145,646.92 and I publish my reasons. I order that the defendant pay to the plaintiff his costs of and incidental to the action to be taxed. I make an order staying execution of the judgment until further order. I will remove the stay when I have got the protection order. -Govt. Printer, Old. 20 30 40 50 60 -- 1 of 21 -- 90 \o58; IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND No. 2349 of 1986 Before Mr. Justice Ambrose BETWEEN: MICHAEL WAYNE DOUGLAS BUNNEY Plaintiff AND: THE NOMINAL DEFENDANT (QUEENSLAND) Defendant REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - AMBROSE J. Delivered the 23rd day of February, 1990 Counsel: Solicitors: Hearing dates: Mr. S. Williams Q.C. and W.A. Martin for the Plaintiff Mr. D. Tait for the Defendant Lyons for the Plaintiff Seymour Nulty & Co. for the Defendant 5th, 6th and 7th February, 1990 -- 2 of 21 -- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND No. 2349 of 1986 BETWEEN: MICHAEL WAYNE DOUGLAS BUNNEY Plaintiff AND: THE NOMINAL DEFENDANT (QUEENSLAND) Defendant REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - AMBROSE J. Delivered the 23rd day of February, 1990 At about 7.30 p.m. on the evenin~ of Monday, 11th November, 1985 the plaintiff was walking towards the Woodridge Railway Station along the left hand side of the bitumen carriageway on Mayes Avenue, Woodridge when he was struck from behind by a dark coloured Valiant Sedan motorcar travelling on the same side of the carriageway and in the same direction. He was thrown over the top of the motor vehicle which slowed momentarily but then continued on its way without stopping. The defendant is sued on the basis that due inquiry and search does not enable the identification of the motor vehicle which collided with him. The evidence discloses in my view that due inquiry and search was made and the plaintiff has complied with the statutory conditions precedent to pursuing action against the defendant for the injuries he received. There was no real contest at trial on this point. -- 3 of 21 -- 2 At the time of his injury the plaintiff was about 18 and a half years of age. He had recently commenced to live with a girlfriend named Shelley Lewis in a flat in Heather Street at Woodridge only a short distance from the scene of his injury. She was then approaching 16 years of age. About a week before his injury the plaintiff had lost his job when his employer ceased business. During the afternoon of the day of his injury the plaintiff became involved in a fight and was hit on the nose with a skateboard. This caused his nose to swell and to bleed. His nose was still swollen apparently at the time he was struck by the unidentified vehicle. Prior to 7.00 p.m. Shaun Cochran then about 17 years of age visited the flat being occupied by the plaintiff and his girlfriend and there consumed with the plaintiff a couple of stubbies of beer. The three of them then had a meal and set out together to walk to the Woodridge Railway Station. At some stage of the evening the plaintiff had a disagreement with his girlfriend and after they left the flat in Heather Street, he proceeded to walk along the left hand edge of the carriageway in Mayes Street about six feet out from the concrete kerb and about 20 feet in front of his girlfriend and Mr. Cochran who together walked along the footpath near the kerbing. He walked the best part of a block in this fashion until he reached the junction of Leichhardt Street and Mayes Avenue. He then proceeded to walk across that junction - still following a course parallel with the concrete kerbing in Mayes Avenue and about six feet out into the carriageway from that kerb. He was struck by the unidentified motor vehicle shortly after he had crossed over -- 4 of 21 -- 3 the junction of Mayes Avenue and Leichhardt Street. I accept generally the evidence of Mr. Cochran as to the events that led to the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff received a serious head injury which produced a post traumatic retrograde amnesia. He has no recollection of the events of the day preceding his injury.· I accept that shortly before the unidentified motor vehicle struck the plaintiff a taxi driving along Mayes Avenue in the same direction swerved to avoid colliding with him. I am satisfied that it swerved over on to the traffic lane on the other side of the road to avoid him and that at least on this occasion Mr. Cochran told the plaintiff to get off the road. The footpath at about the scene of the plaintiff's injury appears to me to be at least four metres in width and there was plenty of room for the plaintiff to walk on it rather than six feet out on the bitumen carriageway. I infer that the reason for his refusing to walk on the footpath was his desire to demonstrate his displeasure at the disagreement he.had had with his girlfriend a short time previously. In any event the plaintiff refused to heed the advice given to him by Mr. Cochran who then heard another vehicle approaching from behind. He turned around and looked towards the vehicle which was then approaching the plaintiff and was about sixty metres away from him. It had its lights on and he thought that they were on low beam. At this stage the plaintiff had gone a couple of metres past the junction of Leichhardt Street and Mayes Avenue and he simply kept walking straight along the carriageway as he had been doing previously. When Mr. Cochran saw the other vehicle approaching from behind the plaintiff he again shouted out to the plaintiff and told him to get off the road. The -- 5 of 21 -- 4 plaintiff however took no notice and shortly after that the unidentified vehicle ran into the plaintiff causing him to be thrown over it and on to the road. I accept the evidence of Mr. Cochran that it was travelling at about 80 k.p.h. The plaintiff's girlfriend gave evidence that it was in fact travelling only at about 60 k.p.h. I prefer the evidence of Mr. Cochran to that of Miss Lewis on this point. The plaintiff was dressed in quite dark clothing as was his companion Cochran. The evidence is silent as to the way in which the plaintiff's girlfriend was dressed. There were two street lights in the vicinity of the intersection which may perhaps ordinarily have given some general illumination to the area. One light, some distance down Leichhardt Street from the junction, was not working and another one in Mayes Avenue, some distance from where the plaintiff was struck, threw only a very dim light apparently. I am persuaded upon the evidence however that without the assistance of any headlights whatever there was sufficient illumination at the time in question from the light that was operating in Mayes Avenue some distance away from the point of impact to permit Mr. Cochran and Miss Lewis to observe the kerbing and to be able to see the plaintiff walking down the road. Of course they knew that he was walking down the road in front of them. They were obviously watching him do it - as no doubt he intended they should - and I conclude that they would have been able to keep him under observation with that knowledge even if visibility was not very good at the time. Their ability to see him walking down the road when he was not illuminated by headlights does not persuade me that he would have been readily visible to anybody driving down -- 6 of 21 -- 5 the roadway who did not know he was there and who did not expect ' to find him there. On the other hand the driver of the taxi which swerved to avoid hitting the plaintiff must have been able to observe him when he was illuminated by the taxi's headlights. Apparently that taxi driver was travelling in Mr. Cochran's estimation at a speed of about 60 k.p.h. To my mind whether or not Mr. Cochran's evidence as to the speed of the taxi cab and the speed of the unidentified vehicle was accurate, I infer from the fact that he estimated that the unidentified motor vehicle was travelling at 20 k.p.h. faster than the taxi cab that in fact the unidentified motor vehicle was travelling noticeably faster than the taxi had been travelling. I am not persuaded that Miss Lewis had either the opportunity or the experience necessary to make a reliable estimate of speed and I prefer the evidence of Mr. Cochran on this point. I am of the view however that Miss Lewis is reliable when she says that she also told the plaintiff prior to his being hit by the unidentified motor vehicle not to be stupid and to get off the road. I infer that the very reason that the plaintiff was walking along the road the way he was, obviously exposing himself to danger, was to prompt such a reaction from his girlfriend. According to Mr. Cochran there had been no dispute between him and the plaintiff. The only dispute had been between the plaintiff and his girlfriend. Precisely how many warnings all told were given by Mr. Cochran and Miss Lewis and just when they were given in relation to the passing of the taxi cab or another vehicle, if there was one, does not really seem to be terribly significant in determining the only question to which the giving of such -- 7 of 21 -- 6 warnings is relevant - that of contributory negligence. The events all happened within a minute or so. A period of more than six years has elapsed since those events which must have been emotionally stressful for both Mr. Cochran and Miss Lewis and I find it unnecessary to determine whether in fact another vehicle before the taxi cab had also swerved to avoid colliding with the plaintiff. Miss Lewis said that it had and Mr. Cochran said that he could not remember whether there had been other cars although I rather gain the impression that he was of the view that there had not been. In all the circumstances however I am persuaded that both Mr. Cochran and Miss Lewis between them did shout out to the plaintiff to get off the road where he insisted on walking on at least three occasions within a minute or thereabouts of the unidentified motor vehicle eventually colliding with and causing him the injuries in respect of which he brings this action. It was agreed at the trial that the width of the road at the site of the plaintiff's injury was between 10.3 and 10.4 metres from kerb to kerb. The road had a broken white centre line in a place that appears to be midway between the kerbs on either side and I would infer from that that the width of the traffic lane along which the plaintiff was walking at the time of his injury was about 5.2 metres which is about 17 feet. Accepting then the evidence of Mr. Cochran which was really confirmed I think by the evidence of Miss Lewis, the plaintiff walking six feet out from the kerb in that traffic lane would have been directly in the path of a motor vehicle approaching from behind him travelling in the centre of that lane. -- 8 of 21 -- 7 I accept the evidence of Mr. Cochran that the motor vehicle which struck the plaintiff came into contact with him at a point between the middle of the bonnet and the passenger side headlight. It seems clear then that the driver of the unidentified motor vehicle simply ran into the back of the plaintiff while proceeding more or less down the centre of his traffic lane. I infer from the momentary application of brakes demonstrated by the appearance of brake lights observed by both Mr. Cochran and Miss Lewis that that driver simply did not see the plaintiff in time to avoid colliding with him. I am persuaded that if he had been keeping a proper lookout - the sort of lookout that on Mr. Cochran's evidence the taxi driver had obviously been keeping and upon the evidence of Miss Lewis the sort of lookout that the driver of the other car also had been keeping then he too could have taken similar action to avoid colliding with the plaintiff. I infer from the fact that he did not take this action that he was not keeping a proper lookout in all the circumstances. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the driver of the unidentified motor vehicle was required to have his headlights when dipped illuminate the roadway ahead of him for a distance of 25 metres under the relevant traffic regulations. However had the driver been travelling only at 60 k.p.h. it seems clear that he would have had little more than a second from the time when the plaintiff would first have been illuminated by his headlights until he reached him. In this time he would have had to either _apply his brakes sufficiently to bring his vehicle to a halt and/or take action to avoid colliding with the plaintiff -- 9 of 21 -- 8 by swerving to his right as had the taxi driver at least and perhaps the other driver to which Miss Lewis referred. I am persuaded that had the driver of the unidentified motor vehicle been travelling at the same "normal speed" as was the taxi driver he would have had a better opportunity to avoid colliding with the plaintiff. I find therefore on the evidence that the driver of the unidentified motor vehicle was both travelling at an excessive speed in all the circumstances and failing to keep a proper lookout. I make a finding therefore of negligence on the part of that driver for which the defendant is liable. I am persuaded in all the circumstances that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence to a significant extent. He was walking on the bitumen carriageway about six feet out from the kerb with his back towards traffic travelling in the traffic lane in which he was walking. He was in such a position, and he should have realised he was in such a position, as to place him directly in the path of a motor vehicle travelling along the centre of the carriageway in the same direction as he was walking. Upon the evidence it was quite a dark night and the illumination from the only traffic light working in the vicinity was so slight as to provide little assistance to a person driving a motor vehicle beyond that part of the roadway illuminated by the headlights of that vehicle. The plaintiff was wearing dark coloured clothing. According to Mr. Cochran he had warned the plaintiff on two occasions before he was eventually struck by the unidentified vehicle and according to the plaintiff's girlfriend Miss Lewis she had warned him once. The evidence shows that the -- 10 of 21 -- 9 plaintiff ignored all the warnings that he was given about the danger of walking on the road and his companions' request that he walk on the footpath. As well as that the taxi cab which preceded the unidentified vehicle by perhaps a minute or so had had to swerve onto its incorrect side of the roadway to avoid colliding with the plaintiff. He must have been aware of this. Another vehicle had also to swerve to avoid the plaintiff according to the recollection of Miss Lewis and this also was the clearest indication to the plaintiff that he was putting himself at very significant danger of injury for no valid reason. Had he been keeping any lookout the plaintiff must have been aware of the approach of the unidentified vehicle because its headlights must have illuminated the surface of the roadway upon which he was walking for a second or so before he was struck. I am persuaded also that the plaintiff must have heard the approach of the unidentified vehicle from behind him. The sound had been sufficiently loud to attract the attention of Mr. Cochran long before there was any immediate danger of a collision. I accept Mr. Cochran's evidence that it was in fact after the sound of the approaching vehicle had come to his attention that he turned and saw it approaching and then shouted a warning to the plaintiff which was ignored. It is clear on the evidence that there was no reason why the plaintiff should not have walked on the footpath upon which his two friends were walking as he proceeded towards the Woodridge Railway Station. The footpath seems to have been quite a wide footpath - perhaps three or four metres wide having regard to the photographs in ex. 1. The footpath seems to have been unobstructed and had the plaintiff wished to walk apart from his -- 11 of 21 -- 10 two companions to demonstrate his displeasure with his girlfriend there seems no reason why he could not have walked ahead of them on the footpath rather than ahead of them out upon the trafficable surface of the roadway. There are many cases where appellate courts have given consideration to the appropriate apportionment of responsibility where a plaintiff pedestrian injured in a road traffic accident has been found guilty of contributory negligence. Every case must of course be considered on its own facts and although I have been assisted by the authorities to which counsel have referred I make mention only of Purcell v. Watson (1979) 26 A.L.R. 235. The driver of a motor vehicle on a suburban street upon - which common experience shows people walk in dark coloured clothing must keep a proper lookout and drive at a reasonable speed. On the other hand on the facts of this case I am persuaded that the plaintiff deliberately and without any reasonable cause placed himself in a position of extreme danger and kept himself in that position in spite of warnings from his companions who were walking on the footpath and in spite of the fact that shortly before his injury two motor vehicles a minute or so apart had swerved onto the incorrect side of the roadway to avoid hitting him. The only plausible explanation for this behaviour is the desire of the plaintiff to proceed along a roadway in a very dangerous manner for the purpose of causing concern to his companions. This motivation must have arisen from the argument that he had had with his girlfriend before setting out for Woodridge Railway Station. -- 12 of 21 -- 1 1 In all the circumstances I am persuaded that responsibility for the plaintiff's injury ought be apportioned equally between the plaintiff and the defendant. At the time he was injured the plaintiff was 18~ years of age. He had left school when he was 16 years of age having obtained a Junior Certificate in 1983. The evidence discloses that the plaintiff' s school results were poor. He was unemployed for a period of about 18 months obtaining his first job in April 1985. Prior to his injury he had developed an alcohol dependence problem for which he was referred to The Alcohol and Drug Dependence Unit at Biala. Apparently however he did not receive treatment for this condition. He had broken and entered a school to which a companion had set fire. He was convicted of breaking and entering and was placed on probation. The assistance he obtained from the probation officer was of great value to him and I am persuaded having considered her evidence that he would probably have avoided further significant anti-social conduct had he been fortunate enough to control his alcohol dependence. Looking at the whole of the material however I am persuaded that it is unlikely that he would ever have obtained employment other than in some sort of labouring capacity or as a storeman. Counsel for the plaintiff placed before me information as to what he may have earned as a storeman and the defendant conceded that consideration of the Storeman's Award was relevant in determining what economic loss had been and would be suffered by the plaintiff. He was unemployed at the time of his injury having shortly before lost his job due to his employer's lQss of business. I am satisfied having regard to the evidence called from his former -- 13 of 21 -- 12 employer that the plaintiff demonstrated that he was a wiling worker and indeed a very competent one managing in the restricted space of a cold room, forklifts etc. with a dexterity that augured well for his future employment in that capacity when it next became available. The plaintiff's present girlfriend gave evidence and it emerged generally that there is some prospect of the plaintiff becoming engaged to this young lady. It is clear that the plaintiff suffered significant brain damage as the result of the collision. I am satisfied that psychiatric problems and personality changes flow from this brain damage. He also suffered some minor back injury and he has been left with some scarring. I am not persuaded on the whole of the evidence that he suffered any nose injury in the accident. It seems to me that while he did suffer significant injury to the head the evidence discloses clearly enough that he had a swollen and bleeding nose just before the accident as the result of his involvement in some altercation during the afternoon when he was hit on the nose with a skateboard. There is no evidence from which I am prepared to infer that the "moderate deformity of his nasal septal cartilage causing some degree of nasal obstruction" more probably resulted from injury he received when he was thrown on the roadway after being hit by the unidentified vehicle than from injury when hit on the nose by the skateboard. There is no reference in the hospital report to any injury to his nose. There is no evidence as to the degree of force necessary to produce the deformity to his nasal septal cartilage. No doubt the other very serious injuries noted in the hospital report so far outweighed any swelling about the nose that it was not -- 14 of 21 -- 13 thought worth recording it at the time. In all the circumstances I am unpersuaded that any nasal deformity from which the plaintiff presently suffers is attributable to any negligence on the part of the unidentified driver of the motor vehicle which collided with him. In any event the injury to the plaintiff's nose and back pale into insignificance when compared to his brain injury and what has resulted from it. As the result of his injury he has a mild to moderate intellectual blunting. He does not appear to have been highly intelligent prior to the accident and would in any event probably only ever have achieved a semi skilled labouring occupation. However the intellectual blunting which has resulted from his brain injury has significantly reduced his former competency. He has a very significant short term memory deficit and this affects his capacity to remember what he is supposed to do and the order in which he is supposed to do it when performing even the most simple tasks. Psychologically he has been adversely affected. Prior to the injury he had little problem apparently getting along with people. He is now unable to get along with workmates. Moreover headaches prevent him from continuing to work at any task without interruption. Doctor James and Dr. Mulholland both expect that as bleak as the plaintiff's present employment prospects are they will deteriorate in the future. After he recuperated from his injury he obtained employment with the assistance of his father for some time performing very undemanding work in a furniture factory. He was unable however to perform even the simplest tasks with sufficient skill and -- 15 of 21 -- 14 application to retain that employment. I accept that he eventually lost his employment because in spite of his anxiety and that of his father that he keep the job the employer found him unacceptable as an employee. I am satisfied that had it not been for the charity of the employer who was prepared to go as far as possible to assist the plaintiff to be retrained in some sort of income earning activity he would have been put off long before he was eventually dismissed. The plaintiff at the time of trial had been employed for a week or so in another factory labouring position. He is obviously anxious to keep his employment however I am persuaded that he will have difficulty in keeping it for the reasons given by Dr. James and Dr. Mulholland. It emerged, apparently only shortly before the trial, that the plaintiff has suffered from some epileptic seizures. I am satisfied on the evidence that he does suffer from epilepsy which however will probably be controllable by drugs. It will be many years however before it can be determined whether his epileptic condition has been so successfully controlled that it is safe for him to drive a motor vehicle or work with equipment that may be a danger to him or to others should he have a turn while he is using it. It seems to me that he will not in the foreseeable future be able to drive forklift equipment or use saws or other woodworking equipment. He will not be able to drive a motor car safely for many years and this will restrict his capacity to obtain what employment he is capable of maintaining. If he has any stress at work or any domestic stress then this may well produce paranoia from which he has already suffered and for which he has already obtained treatment. The probability -- 16 of 21 -- 15 is that he will again suffer paranoid illness during his lifetime. If he does it may require institutional treatment and drug therapy. Special damages are agreed in the sum of $7,899.45. It is also agreed that interest on part only of those special damages should be assessed at $121.45. Exhibits 41 and 42 calculate the plaintiff's past economic loss on the basis that he would have been employed between time of injury and time of trial as a storeman. It was pointed out that the actual income that he earned during part of that time when he was employed was in excess of the Storeman's Award and indeed that he is presently earning in excess of the Storeman's Award. I am persuaded that the approach taken on behalf of the plaintiff is a proper one and that to calculate past economic loss on the basis that he would have earned only at the award rate of a storeman - which is less than the rates at which he has in fact earned since his injury is to discount sufficiently his past economic loss for the possibility that from time to time he may have lost his position as a storeman - as indeed he had just prior to the accident. I therefore assess $18,635.00 as the sum to compensate for past economic loss. He obtained sickness benefits of $11,179.00. Interest therefore ought be awarded on the sum of $7,456.00 for a period of four years and four months at six per cent per annum which I assess in the sum of $1,938.55. The assessment of the plaintiff's future economic loss is a difficult task. If one were to assume that apart from his accident he would have worked until aged 65 years as a storeman -- 17 of 21 -- 16 then using the award rates he would have suffered a loss of $272.00 per week for a period of 41 years. Using the five per cent tables the present value of that loss is $247,248.00. I make no discount of that sum to allow for possible periods off work etc. because the figure I have taken is in fact the very minimum that I think he probably could have earned. As well as that the adoption of this figure makes no allowances for contributions that his employer would probably have made towards superannuation and no allowance for possible bonuses, holiday loadings, promotion prospects etc. Having made no positive allowances in favour of the plaintiff to compensate for this loss I propose not to make any discount for the possibility that from time to time he would have been without employment in any event as a storeman or labourer had he not been injured. The figure of $247,248.00 makes no allowance however for income that the plaintiff may be able to earn from time to time in spite of his disability which will get worse. At the present time he is earning $269.00 a week. I take the view that the plaintiff is anxious to work, will be assisted and motivated to do so by his parents and probably by his girlfriend and I think on this basis he will probably be employed from time to time over the next 10 years. I think the likelihood is that in 10 years time for the reasons I have indicated he will find it much more difficult to obtain and retain employment. If over the next 10 years he is employed for half the time that he would have been employed had he not been injured then the present value of what he will earn is one half of the present -- 18 of 21 -- 17 value of the loss of $272.00 per week for 10 years using the five per cent tables. I calculate this sum to be $55,760.00. Doing the best I can then I propose to assess the plaintiff's future economic loss by deducting from the present value of the loss of $272.00 per week for 41 years - $247,248.00 the sum of $55,760.00 (one half of the present value of $272.00 per week for 10 years). The difference between those sums being $191,488.00 I assess that sum as the present value of the plaintiff's future economic loss. With respect to pain suffering and loss of amenities of life I assess the sum of $45,000.00. I am persuaded that the plaintiff is unable to take proper care of his own financial affairs and it is conceded that a protection order ought be made appointing the Public Trustee to manage any award of damages that the plaintiff recovers. It is conceded that the costs of this management will be about $15,000.00 and it is conceded that this is an appropriate sum to include in the damages to cover this outgoing. I am not persuaded on the whole of the material that the plaintiff has established any claim under the Griffith v. Kirkemeyer principle. The fact that his mother massaged his back a couple of times a month seems to me not to warrant any allowance. I am persuaded that from time to time the plaintiff in the future will need to take drugs and receive psychological counselling and consult with his general practitioner. Exhibit 43 demonstrates what the like-ly costs will be and the present value of those costs in the future I assess at $1,011.00. rt seems likely that the plaintiff will from time to time need -- 19 of 21 -- 18 future hospital treatment and psychiatric treatment and counselling etc. It seems likely that he will suffer from bouts of paranoia in the future which will be triggered by stresses caused by his domestic relations and also by his inability to hold down positions of employment and these will require that he receive hospital treatment. Just how much this will cost in the future or when the costs are likely to be incurred it is difficult to say. Doing the best I can I assess the present value of this expense that will recur irregularly in the future in the sum of $5,000.00. With respect to the assessment for pain, suffering and loss of amenities of life I apportion the sum of $45,000.00 as to $20,000.00 pre-trial and $25,000.00 post trial. I assess interest on the pre-trial component in the sum of $5,200.00. In total then I assess the plaintiff's damages as follows:- Special damages Interest on part thereof Pre-trial economic loss Interest on $7,456.00 thereof Future economic loss Pain, suffering and loss of amenities Interest on pre-trial pain, suffering and loss of amenities Future medical and drug treatment and hospital treatment Future costs of administration of damages by Public Trustee Total $ 7,899.45 $ 121 . 45 $ 18,635.00 $ 1,938.55 $191,488.00 $ 45,000.00 $ 5,200.00 $ 6,011.00 $15,000.00 $291,293.45 There will be judgment for the plaintiff for half this sum which is for $145,646.92. -- 20 of 21 -- 19 I order that the defendant pay to the plaintiff his costs of and incidental to the action to be taxed. -- 21 of 21 --