Barnard v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2026] QIRC 230

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Barnard v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2026] QIRC 230 PARTIES: Barnard, Scott Alan (Applicant) v State of Queensland (Department of Education) (Respondent) CASE NO: PSA/2026/83 PROCEEDING: Interlocutory application – Application for suppression order DELIVERED ON: 28 July 2026 MEMBER: HEARD AT: O'Neill IC On the papers ORDER: 1. The Applicant's application for suppression orders is dismissed. 2. The Respondent's application for suppression orders is allowed. 3. Pursuant to s 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) and r 97(3)(a) of Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld), that the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools are suppressed. 4. Pursuant to s 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), I direct that all documents relevant to this matter be withheld from release, search or copy -- 1 of 17 -- 2 absolutely, or until further order of the Commission. CATCHWORDS: EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – APPLICATION IN EXISTING PROCEEDINGS – Application by the Applicant for suppression order – where the Applicant seeks orders suppressing or de- identifying the Appellant's name – where the Respondent opposes the application – where the Respondent seeks an order suppressing the names of students, witnesses, support persons and an order withholding the contents of the file from release or search – where principles of open justice apply – consideration of principles of open justice and circumstances where Commission may exercise discretion to suppress publication and order a closed hearing – Applicant's application for suppression order dismissed – Respondent's application for suppression orders granted. LEGISLATION: CASES: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), ss 451, 580 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) s 97 Alpert v Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence) [2023] FCA 784 Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263 J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10 Kemp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 164 Montesin v Brisbane City Council [2024] QIRC 68 -- 2 of 17 -- 3 Nesbit v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2021] ICQ 5 Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) [2021] QIRC 327 Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor [2024] QIRC 20 Reasons for Decision [1] Mr Scott Barnard ('the Applicant') is employed by the Department of Education ('the Respondent') as a Head of Department and commenced employment with the Respondent in 2005 as a Teacher. [2] The substantive appeal involves a public sector appeal filed by the Applicant against proposed disciplinary action as contained in a show cause notice ('the decision') provided to the Applicant on 18 March 2026. In the decision, an allegation against the Applicant was found to be substantiated. It is not necessary for the determination of the present application to descend into any detail regarding the nature of the allegations in this decision. [3] The Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Industrial Registry on 7 April 2026 appealing the decision of 18 March 2026 to impose disciplinary action. [4] A Directions Order was issued on 13 April 2026 requiring the parties to provide submissions in relation to the substantive appeal. [5] In accordance with the Directions Order the Respondent filed submissions in the Industrial Registry on 5 May 2026. As Attachment B to those submissions the Respondent sought the Commission to exercise a discretion to: • supress the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools prior to the publication of the decision; and • withhold the contents of the file held in the QIRC Registry from release or search. [6] On 15 May 2026 the Applicant filed in the Industrial Registry a Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings seeking orders: -- 3 of 17 -- 4 (a) supressing or de identifying the Appellant's name in any published decision; and (b) suppressing identifying information capable of identifying the Appellant indirectly through school or workplace details. [7] The Respondent opposes the application brought by the Applicant. [8] The issue for my determination is whether the Commission should exercise a discretion to make suppression orders in the terms sought by the respective parties. [9] For the reasons that follow: (a) I do not consider it appropriate to exercise a discretion to make suppression orders as sought by the Applicant and I dismiss the Applicant's application; (b) I consider that it is appropriate to exercise a discretion to make suppressions orders as sought by the Respondent. Relevant legislation and authorities [10] Section 451 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') bestows general powers on the commission, and relevantly provides: 451 General powers (1) The commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the commission in proceedings may— … (c) make an order it considers appropriate. [11] Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('the IRT Rules') provides the Commission with a power to de-identify judgements and redact information for judgements if there is good reason to do so. Rule 97 relevantly provides as follows: 97 Publishing decisions etc. (1) The registrar may publish on the QIRC website – (a) a decision of the court, commission, or registrar; and (b) the notice of the making or the amended of a bargaining instrument (2) The registrar must, if the commission directs, publish an amendment of an instrument on the QIRC website. Note - For other documents the registrar must publish on the QIRC website, see sections 160, 215, 230 and 459 of the Act. -- 4 of 17 -- 5 (3) The court, commission or registrar may, in the public interest or for another reason the court, commission or registrar considers appropriate – (a) withhold publication of a document; or (b) modify a document, before publication, in a way that does not affect the essence of the document. … [12] The Queensland Court of Appeal in the case of J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2),1 ('J v L& A Services Pty Ltd') established six principles governing the exercise of discretion to issue suppression orders which are as follows: 1. Although there is a public interest in avoiding and minimising disadvantages to private citizens from public activities, paramount public interest in the due administration of justice, freedom of speech, a free media and an open society require that court proceedings are able to be reported and discussed publicly. 2. The public may be excluded and publicity prohibited when public access or publicity would frustrate the purpose of a court proceeding by preventing the effective enforcement of some substantive law and depriving the court's decision of practical utility… 3. The permitted exceptions to the requirement of open justice are not based upon the premise that parties would be reasonably deterred from bringing court proceedings by an apprehension that public access or publicity would deprive the proceeding of practical utility, but upon the actual loss of utility which would occur, and the exceptions do not extend to proceedings which parties would be reasonably deterred from bringing if the utility of the proceedings would not be affected. Courts do not have access to the information needed to determine whether or not parties are reasonably deterred by openness or publicity from bringing particular kinds of proceedings; for example, sexual complaints. Legislatures are better equipped than courts to make informed decisions on such matters. 4. No unnecessary restriction upon public access or publicity in respect of court proceedings is permissible. 5. Different degrees of restraint are permissible for different purposes. Although the categories tend to coalesce, they are broadly as follows: (a) Exclusion of the public or a substantive restraint upon publicity is not permissible unless abstractly essential to the practical utility of a proceeding; for example, prosecutions for blackmail or proceedings for the legitimate protection of confidential information… (b) A limited exclusion or restraint is permissible if necessary to ensure that a proceeding is fair; for example, witnesses may be required to absent themselves from hearings, parts of jury trials may take place in the absence of the jury and limited or temporary restrictions on publicity may be imposed during the course of jury proceedings. (c) An incidental, procedural restriction is permissible if necessary in the interests of a party or witness in a particular proceeding; for example, identities of witnesses or details of particular activities which are not directly material such as engaging in 1 [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10. -- 5 of 17 -- 6 covert law enforcement operations or providing information to police may be suppressed. 6. ... information may not be withheld from the public merely to save a party or witness from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm, or other 'collateral disadvantage', to use the expression adopted in R. v. Tait. Additionally, when it is the interests of a party or a witness which is relied on as the basis for a proposed restraint, those considerations must be balanced against other factors, including the interests of others involved in the proceeding and others who may be affected. Open justice is non-discriminatory, whereas exceptions to the principle of open justice deny equal rights to the disputing litigants and provide a benefit to some litigants which is unavailable to members of the general public… [13] In Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd2 ('Aurizon') the respondent sought to have the names of the individual workers who were involved in the dispute to be de-identified. The application was supported by the applicant union. His Honour, Vice President O'Connor relevantly held as follows: [40] The starting point in considering an application to suppress or to withhold names of witnesses or parties is a fundamental principle of open justice; 'that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done'. This is a central feature of the administration of justice under the common law. [41] The open justice principle operates not only as an overarching principle guiding judicial decision-making and various aspects of procedure, it also gives rise to a number of substantive open justice rules that, in the usual course of events, a court must follow. Such rules include: first, that judicial proceedings are conducted, and decisions pronounced, in 'open court'; second, that evidence is communicated publicly to those present in the court; and third, that nothing should be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings, including by the media. [42] However, the rules to which the open justice principle gives rise are not absolute. Whilst the principles of open justice will usually require the publication of the names of those involved in the proceedings, there are numerous statutory exceptions. [43] The Commission has the power to de-identify judgments and redact information from judgments if there is a good reason to do so. Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) recognises that power. … [44] It is accepted that the discretion to anonymise a decision might be exercised in favour of not identifying persons who are the victim of sexual assault or discrimination, children, or persons whose private financial affairs are relevant to a decision. It is also accepted that the discretion may be exercised in circumstances where it is necessary to avoid prejudice to the administration of justice in particular proceedings or to avoid some other relevant harm. [45] In my opinion, the application to withhold the names of the two workers can be best explained on the basis that in the absence of a restriction on publicity, damage will be caused 2 [2021] QIRC 263 [40] – [46]. -- 6 of 17 -- 7 to the individuals to such an extent and of such a kind as requiring some relief, in the interests of justice [46] As was observed by Mahoney J in John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v The Local Court of New South Wales, these are the 'unacceptable' consequences that sometimes arise in litigation. Of course, as observed by Pincus JA in J v L A Services Pty Ltd (No 2), 'there is a balancing exercise involved, with an initial heavy weighting in favour of publicity – an exercise involving considerations of fairness'. (citations omitted) [14] In Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor3, Deputy President Merrell reviewed the principles of open justice and the power of the Commission to make a suppression order by reference to a number of authorities as follows: [14] The relevant principles were recently referred to by Snaden J in Alpert v Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence)4 where his Honour stated: 11 I recently had occasion to survey the authorities that establish the principles that govern applications such as this one. In Naude v DRA Global Limited [2023] FCA 493, [13]-[15], I made the following observations, namely: In R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 512 (Wilcox, Burchett and Hill JJ), this court observed (at 514): Whatever their motives in reporting, [the media’s] opportunity to do so arises out of a principle that is fundamental to our society and method of government: except in extraordinary circumstances, the courts of the land are open to the public. This principle arises out of the belief that exposure to public scrutiny is the surest safeguard against any risk of the courts abusing their considerable powers. As few members of the public have the time, or even the inclination, to attend courts in person, in a practical sense this principle demands that the media be free to report what goes on in them. The exclusion of public access to the processes with which a court deals is only to be effected in exceptional cases: The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377, 379 [8] (Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ; hereafter “Country Care Group”); David Syme & Co v General Motors-Holden’s Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294, 299 (Street CJ), 307 (Hutley AP, Samuels JA agreeing). In John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Local Court (NSW) (1991) 26 NSWLR 131, Kirby P (in dissent but not on this issue) said (at 142-143): It has often been acknowledged that an unfortunate incident of the open administration of justice is that embarrassing, damaging and even dangerous facts occasionally come to light. Such considerations have never been regarded as a reason for the closure of courts, or the issue of suppression orders in their various alternative forms… A significant reason for adhering to a stringent principle, despite sympathy for those who suffer embarrassment, invasions of privacy or even damage by publicity of their proceedings is that such interests must be sacrificed to the greater public interest in adhering to an open system of justice. Otherwise, powerful litigants may come to think that they can extract from courts or prosecuting authorities protection greater than that enjoyed by ordinary parties whose problems come before the courts and may be 3 [2024] QIRC 20. 4 [2023] FCA 784 ('Alpert'). -- 7 of 17 -- 8 openly reported. It is well accepted that “…mere embarrassment, inconvenience or annoyance will not suffice to ground an application for suppression or non-publication”: Keyzer v La Trobe University (2019) 165 ALD 93, 99 [29] (Anastassiou J). It is a feature of open justice that those to whom court processes refer may thereby suffer embarrassment or distress; but “…that is a price the community has to pay for the undoubted benefit of court proceedings being, except in very exceptional circumstances, conducted in public”: Williams v Forgie (2003) 54 ATR 236, 239 [14] (Heerey J). … 21 The propositions just stated were met with muted, if any opposition and, with respect, rightly so. This would not be the first time that a court should recognise what is inherent within them. In AA v BB (2013) 296 ALR 353, 389 [182], Bell J recognised that: Making a non-publication order may be necessary in cases where, in the absence of an order, parties would be deterred from bringing proceedings for the vindication of their legal rights, such as cases involving victims of blackmail, negligence or sexual assault where the person would suffer public ridicule or acute personal embarrassment if his or her identity were to be disclosed in legal proceedings... (references omitted) 22 Dixon J made an equivalent observation in PPP v QQQ (as the representative of the Estate of RRR (deceased)) [2011] VSC 186, [34], namely: Commonly, parties might be deterred from bringing or concluding proceedings unless public disclosure of their identities could be prevented or because part of the injury complained of may be exacerbated by public disclosure. Thus, it is regarded as being necessary in the interests of the proper administration of justice that orders be made to encourage such plaintiffs to litigate their allegations, seek redress through the courts and, in proper cases, do so without unreasonable risk of aggravation of their injuries… 23 So, too, has this court been moved to recognise the point of principle. In Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 (hereafter “Porter"), Jagot J observed (at [84]): …The administration of justice may be prejudiced in a variety of ways. If, for example, people cannot come to a court confident that some kinds of information can be protected from disclosure if necessary (such as commercially confidential information valuable to a person or a third party, or sensitive information about a person’s health, or personal information about parties or third parties of no more than prurient interest to others) then public confidence in and access to justice may itself be undermined. 24 Equivalent observations have been made in this court in connection with the disclosure of sensitive commercial information: Clark v Digital Wallet Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 877, [21] (Abraham J). In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Origin Energy Electricity Ltd [2015] FCA 278, Katzmann J observed (at [148]): It is in the interests of the proper administration of justice that the value of confidential information not be destroyed or diminished. Otherwise, the parties and members of the public might lose confidence in the Court and the Court’s processes “might open the way to abuse”… (My emphasis added) -- 8 of 17 -- 9 [15] I am also guided by the following observations made by His Honour, Deputy President Merrell in Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs)5 ('Smith'): (a) information may not be withheld from the public merely to save a party or witness from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm or other collateral disadvantage; (b) additionally, when it is the interests of a party or witness which is relied on as the basis for a proposed restraint, those considerations must be balanced against other factors, including the interests of others involved in the proceeding and others who may be affected; (c) open justice is non-discriminatory, whereas exceptions to the principle of open justice deny equal rights to the disputing litigants and provide a benefit to some litigants which is unavailable to members of the general public; (d) public scrutiny is a strong disincentive to false allegations and a powerful incentive to honest evidence, and publicity may attract the attention of persons with material information who are unaware of the proceeding; (e) if information is suppressed, proceedings would inevitably become the subject of rumours, misunderstandings, exaggerations and falsehoods, and a particular unsatisfactory manifestation of this difficulty occurs when uncertainty as to the particular person concerned lead to speculation concerning other members of a relevant group; (f) it is important to remember that what appears to be a more liberal approach involving the exercise of a discretionary power in the interests of an individual involves an erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms of the general public; (g) the occasional misuse or abuse of these rights and freedoms and other disadvantages associated with public information and discussion, which is sometimes misinformed, together with any resultant harm are part of the cost of living in a free, democratic society; and (h) it is common for sensitive issues to be litigated and for information, which is extremely personal or confidential to be disclosed, and it is of obvious concern that such a paramount principle as the requirement of open justice should not be 5 [2021] QIRC 327 at T.1-8, lines 12 to 39 citing J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10 at page 45. -- 9 of 17 -- 10 whittled away on a case-by-case basis according to individual judges’ subjective views on the merits or demerits of claims to privacy of individual litigants. [16] In the Smith decision, Deputy President Merrell also considered it to be a relevant factor to the exercise of the discretion that the nature of the appeal also militated against the making of an order sought by the Appellant. The Smith matter involved a public sector appeal against a disciplinary finding. Deputy President Merrell noted that disciplinary findings had been made against Ms Smith as a public service employee. His Honour noted that there can be no dispute that disciplinary proceedings are for the protection of the public.6 This was a further factor His Honour relied upon in rejecting the application for a suppression order. [17] Whilst expressing sympathy for the appellant, His Honour confirmed that the appellant's privacy concerns did not overcome the principles of open justice. His Honour noted that the publication of private and embarrassing information was part of the nature of public decisions.7 [18] In Montesin v Brisbane City Council ('Montesin'),8 Her Honour, Deputy President Hartigan rejected an application for re-opening of a re-instatement application and suppression orders. [19] In the substantive application there had been an application by the respondent, Brisbane City Council for leave to have legal representation. That application gave rise to a reported decision, which had been published on the Supreme Court library website in February 2022.9 [20] The applicant subsequently on 14 October 2022 requested that the substantive re- instatement application be discontinued. [21] The applicant via a google search became aware that a search of his name provided a link to the earlier decision on the Supreme Court library website. The applicant filed his application seeking a suppression of the decision on 13 December 2023, some 14 months after the substantive proceeding had been discontinued. [22] In support of the application the applicant referred to one occasion in which he was assaulted whilst working and other occasions where he was threatened by members of the public. The applicant also raised concerns regarding the safety of his school age children, because they used public transport, in particular, council buses. In addressing 6 Ibid, T.1-10, lines 30-41 citing Nesbit v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2021] ICQ 5, at paragraph 99. 7 Ibid, T.1-10, lines 16-30. 8 [2024] QIRC 68. 9 Montesin v Brisbane City Council [2022] QIRC 31. -- 10 of 17 -- 11 those concerns, Her Honour noted: [41] The Applicant then attempts to draw a connection between the fact that the Decision is available online as posing a safety risk to the Applicant as he is fearful it makes it possible for him to be identified as a local government employee and "possibly tracked down and harmed". [42] The Applicant also refers to the fact that his children catch public transport, and he fears for their safety as well. [43] Other than the Applicant's bare assertion that he holds a fear, there is no evidence relied on by him that provides a factual foundation for the concern that he holds. [44] Relevantly, the Applicant does not point to any occasion since 8 February 2022, when the Decision was published, to provide a basis for the relief sought.10 Respondent's suppression application [23] Attached to its submissions dated 5 May 2026, the Respondent has sought suppression of the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools as well as the withholding of the file from search or release. [24] The Respondent submits that whilst the fundamental principles of open justice will usually require the publication of the names of those involved in the proceedings, there are numerous statutory exceptions.11 [25] The Respondent contends that it is accepted that the discretion to anonymise a decision might be exercised in favour of not identifying persons who are the victim of sexual assault or discrimination, children ... or to avoid some other relevant harm.12 [26] The Respondent contends that the present decision should be modified before publication and has brought this to the attention of the Commission as required by Practice Direction Number 3 of 2023. [27] In relation to why the decision should be modified before publication to suppress the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools involved, and to withhold the contents of the file held in the QIRC Registry from release or search, the Respondent provided the following submissions: a) The Commissioner has sufficient power under the IR Act and the IR Tribunal Rules to make the orders sought; 10 Ibid, [41]-[44]. 11 Citing Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263 [42]. 12 Ibid, [44]. -- 11 of 17 -- 12 b) The requested orders are in line with the statutory exceptions to the principle of open justice and the guidance provided in PD 4 of 2023; c) The requested suppression order is limited in scope relating only to the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools. It is otherwise in the public interest to publish all other details of the matter, including the name of the Appellant, given the primacy given to the principle of open justice; d) The identification of the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools are not directly material to the proper determination of the Appeal before the QIRC; e) In the event the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools were to be published there is a risk that persons may, in the future, be discouraged from reporting such suspected misconduct; f) If the names of the students, witnesses, support persons were de-identified, but not the schools, the knowledge of the schools might act to negate the utility of de-identifying the names of the students, witnesses, support persons who attended the school or had children who attended the school; and g) the recent jurisprudence of the Commission includes Industrial Commissioner Power's suppression of the identities of school students and school names on the basis that it is not in the public interest, doing so had no impact on the essence of the decision and the documents filed ought to be withheld from release or search.13 [28] In email correspondence dated 12 May 2026, the Applicant advised the Registry that he did not oppose the suppression orders sought by the Respondent and sought to also have his name de-identified in this decision. Applicant's suppression application [29] Following on from the Applicant's email dated 12 May 2026, the Applicant then filed a Form 4 Application and supporting Affidavit on 15 May 2026 formally seeking suppression of his name in any released decision. The Applicant seeks orders: • Suppressing or de-identifying the Applicant's name in any published decision; and • Suppressing identifying information capable of identifying the Applicant indirectly through school or workplace details. [30] The Applicant did not provide submissions in support of the application. In the application the Application provided the following grounds in support of suppression of his name: • Publication of the Applicant's name in connection with the allegations may cause significant ongoing reputational and professional prejudice irrespective of the 13 Kemp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 164, [169]. -- 12 of 17 -- 13 outcome of the appeal; • De-identification of the Applicant's name would not materially prejudice the principles of open justice, particularly where the Respondent already seeks suppression of students, witnesses, support persons and school identities. [31] In the Applicant's Affidavit he states his belief that publication of his name in connection with the allegations may cause ongoing reputational damage and may adversely affect: • His professional reputation; • Future employment opportunities; • Workplace relationships; and • His family. [32] Following the filing of the Application, I issued a Directions Order inviting the parties to make submissions on the matter. The Respondent opposes the suppression sought by the Appellant and raises the following points: • The Appellant has no compelling ground for suppression. • The Respondent notes the Applicant's request must be considered in the context of the principles of open justice. The Respondent goes on to cite the observations of Deputy President Merrell regarding the principles of open justice in Smith.14 • The Appellant appears to rely on a concern that publication of his name may cause significant ongoing reputational and professional prejudice which is insufficient grounds for the suppression of their identity. The Respondent submits that the Applicant's request does not fall within any of the well-established grounds for the suppression of a party's name. • The Respondent contends that the request for suppression made by the Respondent does not confer any obligation for the Applicant's name to also be suppressed. The Respondent submits that its reasons for suppression are articulated at length with reference to students under the age of 18, and release of witness information not necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. The Respondent further contends that it is relevant that the Respondent has not requested the suppression of the department name, or key decision-makers involved during the disciplinary process. [33] The Applicant provided reply submissions which were filed on 1 June 2026. 14 Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) (n 5), T.1-4-5. -- 13 of 17 -- 14 [34] To support his application, the Appellant submits that publication of his name in connection with allegations of inappropriate conduct has the potential to create ongoing reputational consequences extending well beyond determination of the Appeal itself. [35] The Applicant contends that r 97(3) of the IRT Rules confers a discretion to the Commission which is broad and evaluative and is not limited to a number of closed categories. [36] The Applicant emphasises that the concern extends beyond mere embarrassment or loss of privacy and concerns the practical and continuing professional consequences arising from the publication of identifying information in circumstances where: • the allegations remain disputed; • the disciplinary findings are the subject of the present appeal;15 • the Applicant continues to work within school communities. [37] The Applicant submits that the Respondent has not identified any specific public interest requiring publication of the Applicant's personal identity beyond the general operation of open justice principles. The Applicant contends that the present application concerns a disciplinary and employment matter, not criminal proceedings. He submits that the balance between open justice and disproportionate reputational prejudice may properly be assessed differently in that context. Consideration [38] In the preparation of these reasons for decision, I have carefully considered the submissions provided by both parties. All relevant material has been considered although it may not be specifically referenced in these reasons for decision. [39] In relation to the Respondent's request for suppression, I have noted and taken into consideration that the Applicant does not oppose the Respondent's application. [40] In relation to the identities of the students and schools involved, I consider that there is a risk that if the schools are identified, this could lead to a chain of enquiry which could identify one or more of the student witnesses. [41] I agree with the observations of Power IC in Kemp v State of Queensland (Department of Education)16 that it would not be in the public interest for information to be published which would allow the identity of any of the student witnesses involved in this matter, or the schools that they relevantly attended to be identified. The identifying information is 15 It is noted that the substantive appeal is against the disciplinary action decision proposed by the Respondent. The Applicant did not lodge a fair treatment appeal seeking to challenge the disciplinary finding decision. 16 [2022] QIRC 164, [169]. -- 14 of 17 -- 15 not directly relevant or material to the decision. [42] As a consequence, I consider that the identity of each of the student witnesses and the schools should be de-identified pursuant to s 451(2)(c) of the IR Act and r 97(3) of the IRT Rules. [43] I also consider that it is appropriate that the appeal file and the submissions provided by the parties should be withheld from release or search given that the material identifies the names of the students, and the schools involved. [44] In relation to the Applicant's application for suppression, given the fundamental importance of the principle of open justice as confirmed in the summary of the authorities I have set out above, I have concerns that there is a lack of evidence supporting the application. [45] It appears that the fundamental basis of the suppression application is the risk of the Applicant suffering reputational damage and unparticularised professional prejudice if his identity is not suppressed. [46] To the extent that the Applicant in his affidavit deposes that publication of his name in connection with the allegations may adversely affect his workplace relationships and his family, the Applicant has not provided any evidence regarding this, or any further explanation as to how those relationships may be impacted. [47] In relation to the privacy concerns/risk of reputational damage raised by the Applicant, the authorities I have cited above confirm in no uncertain terms that an individual's privacy concerns are not a sound basis to set aside the principle of open justice. Information may not be withheld from the public to save a party from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm or other ''collateral disadvantage''.17 The type of reputational harm or professional prejudice the Applicant relies upon appears to be the type of "collateral disadvantage" which the Court of Appeal references in J v L & A Services as not being a sound basis for a suppression order.18 [48] The Applicant has raised the possibility of future employment opportunities being impacted if his name is published, but with respect, this appears to be speculative. Whilst I acknowledge the matters raised by the Applicant, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has satisfied his burden of proof of establishing a sound evidentiary basis for suppression orders being made by the Commission as sought by him. [49] Further, the summary of the authorities set out earlier in this decision also confirm the existence of a competing public interest that the Court of Appeal in J v L & A Services identified to be a paramount public interest in the due administration of justice, freedom of speech, a free media and an open society which require that court proceedings be open 17 J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10 at 44-45. 18 Ibid, p. 45, ll. 14-16 (Fitzgerald P. and Lee J.). -- 15 of 17 -- 16 to the public and able to be reported and discussed publicly. Given the evidence in support of the application, the Commission considers that the principle of open justice is the paramount public interest in this matter. [50] As noted in paragraph [16] above, in the Smith decision, Deputy President Merrell considered it to be a relevant factor to the exercise of the discretion that the nature of the appeal was a public sector appeal against a disciplinary finding (as does the present appeal). Deputy President Merrell noted that there can be no dispute that disciplinary proceedings are for the protection of the public.19 [51] In the present matter, disciplinary findings have also been made against the Applicant, and I am also satisfied that disciplinary proceedings against public sector employees are for the protection of the public. This is a relevant consideration in determining whether the Applicant is entitled to the exercise of a discretion suppressing his name. I am satisfied that this factor militates against making a suppression order as sought by the Applicant. [52] For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has established that it is appropriate for a discretion to be exercised in his favour to suppress his identity. Conclusion [53] I am satisfied that for the reasons set out above, the discretion for the Commission to make suppression orders sought by: (a) the Respondent has been enlivened and it is appropriate to make suppression orders as sought by the Respondent. (b) the Applicant has not been enlivened in this particular case, and it is not appropriate for suppression orders to be made in relation to his identity. [54] I consider that the Applicant has failed to establish a sound basis for the principle of open justice to be set aside in this matter. Order [55] Accordingly, I make the following orders: 1. The Applicant's application for suppression orders is dismissed. 19 Smith (n 5), T.1-10, lines 30-41 citing Nesbit v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2021] ICQ 5, at paragraph 99. -- 16 of 17 -- 17 2. The Respondent's application for suppression orders is allowed. 3. Pursuant to s 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) and r 97(3)(a) of Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld), that the names of the students, witnesses, support persons and schools are suppressed. 4. Pursuant to s 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), I direct that all documents relevant to this matter be withheld from release, search or copy absolutely, or until further order of the Commission. -- 17 of 17 --