MOYLE -v- QUARLES [2026] WASC 321

[2026] WASC 321 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CIVIL CITATION : MOYLE -v- QUARLES [No 6] [2026] WASC 321 CORAM : LUNDBERG J HEARD : 3 AUGUST 2026 DELIVERED : 5 AUGUST 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 1770 of 2016 (Consolidated with CIV 1279 of 2022) BETWEEN : ALAN LESLIE MOYLE Plaintiff AND ALEXANDER FRANS HENRI QUARLES DE QUARLES as executor of the estate of LESLIE MOYLE First Defendant CHERIE PATRICIA CAMPBELL in her own capacity and as trustee for THE TESTAMENTARY TRUST CREATED IN THE WILL OF THE LATE LESLIE MOYLE FOR THE BENEFIT OF JOANNE MARGARET CAMPBELL Second Defendant FILE NO/S : CIV 2197 of 2022 BETWEEN : MOYLE HOLDINGS PTY LTD Plaintiff AND -- 1 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 Page 2 ALEXANDER FRANS HENRI QUARLES DE QUARLES First Defendant QUARLES PTY LTD Second Defendant Catchwords: Estates - Account as to loss and damage - Further disputes between parties as to the proper basis for account to be performed - Turns on own facts Legislation: Nil Result: Issues resolved on the basis set out in the reasons. Category: B Representation: CIV 1770 of 2016 (Consolidated with CIV 1279 of 2022) Counsel: Plaintiff : S P Tomasich First Defendant : S M Standing Second Defendant : No appearance Solicitors: Plaintiff : Croftbridge First Defendant : Arns & Associates Second Defendant : Mossensons -- 2 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 Page 3 CIV 2197 of 2022 Counsel: Plaintiff : S P Tomasich First Defendant : S M Standing Second Defendant : No appearance Solicitors: Plaintiff : Croftbridge First Defendant : Arns & Associates Second Defendant : Barry Nilsson Lawyers (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Moyle v Quarles [No 3] [2025] WASC 443 Moyle v Quarles [No 5] [2026] WASC 167 -- 3 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 LUNDBERG J Page 4 LUNDBERG J: Introduction 1 These reasons concern further disputes which have arisen between the plaintiffs in both proceedings and the first defendant (Mr Quarles), as to the basis on which the account in the proceedings, ordered by the court in favour of the plaintiffs, should be taken. 2 These reasons should be read together with the primary reasons delivered by the court on 17 October 2025 following trial, recording the court's findings on liability (Primary Reasons),1 and the further reasons delivered on 4 May 2026 which resolved disputes between the parties as to the proper basis for the account to be performed (Further Reasons).2 3 The Further Reasons of the court were delivered following a two day hearing on 25 and 26 March 2026. The court had expected that the two day hearing would resolve all outstanding issues between the parties as to the process by which the account would be taken. The reasons published by the court addressed seven issues which were then in dispute. The court's expectation was overly optimistic, it would seem. Mr Moyle has identified further points of disagreement as to the manner in which the account should proceed. 4 These further points of disagreement were dealt with at a hearing on 3 August 2026, and are the subject of these reasons.3 Prior to the hearing, the parties filed written submissions and affidavit material, together with detailed spreadsheets setting out the parties' respective calculations. 5 In summary, there are three issues requiring determination by the court, two concerning the Estate Proceeding and one concerning the Company Proceeding. 6 The first issue concerns Account 1936 in the Estate Proceeding. The second issue concerns the timing of the distribution from the Estate, and related to the Estate Proceeding. The third issue concerns the rate of interest to be applied in the Company Proceeding. 1 Moyle v Quarles [No 3] [2025] WASC 443. 2 Moyle v Quarles [No 5] [2026] WASC 167. 3 I will use the defined terms identified in the earlier reasons of the court. -- 4 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 LUNDBERG J Page 5 7 Each of these issues was either agitated at the earlier hearing in March 2026, or could reasonably have been agitated at that point. In some respects, the points reflect a change in position on the part of the plaintiffs. In assessing the issues raised by the plaintiffs, I have accordingly had regard to the principle of finality in litigation and to the principle that a party is bound by the conduct of his or her case, which point against permitting the plaintiffs adopting a new stance in these proceedings, absent some compelling reason. 8 The overall financial effect of the three issues, in terms of the impact on the parties' calculations of loss, is not substantial. In the Estate Proceeding, the difference is $13,514. In the Company Proceeding, the difference is $17,095. The quantum involved is relevant from a case management perspective, although I do not consider it is determinative, in circumstances where the plaintiffs are seeking to modify a previously held position in the litigation, or to raise a matter which could have been addressed in the course of the earlier hearing. 9 I turn to address the three issues. First issue – lockstep deposits 10 This issue arises in the Estate Proceeding, and concerns Issue 7 as addressed in the Further Reasons: Further Reasons [114] – [117]. 11 This issue relates to Account 1936, which was a term deposit established prior to Mr Quarles' appointment as executor. 12 The term deposit was for six months, maturing in March 2015. 13 The plaintiffs observe that, in his calculations, Mr Quarles has purported to give effect to the court's finding at [117] of the Further Reasons by creating a two-month term deposit from March/April 2015 to April/May 2015, and thereafter reverting to six-month term deposits. This is done so as to bring that term deposit into 'lockstep' with the other term deposit. 14 Mr Moyle says this approach is inconsistent with the finding that the term deposits should be for six month periods save where the parties have otherwise agreed: Further Reasons [76]. 15 Mr Moyle submits that this approach has the result of 'locking up' funds in the working account for longer than necessary, in that funds need to be retained to cover the entire six month period (and to ensure -- 5 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 LUNDBERG J Page 6 there remains $30,000 in the working account at the end of the period). This means that, effectively, the Estate has a single term deposit rather than two staggered term deposits. 16 Mr Moyle says he should be entitled to change his position with respect to this matter:4 It is a relatively minor point and is not 'new', in that it was Mr Quarles who decided to make the change to bring the term deposits into lockstep and thus must have already considered the arguments for and against doing so (and indeed explained them in the 'explanatory document' attached as ALM-6 to the Moyle Affidavit). It is difficult to identify any real prejudice to Mr Quarles if Mr Moyle is permitted to re-enliven the issue. 17 Mr Quarles notes it is largely common ground that the assumed term deposits are for terms of six months, with term deposit 1 commencing 17 November 2014. Mr Quarles' model proposes two exceptions to this for term deposit 2, namely, that the first term deposit be for two months, and the last term deposit be for five months. He says that this brings term deposit 1 and term deposit 2 into lockstep so that the subsequent six month term deposits would commence and end on the same dates. 18 Mr Quarles' submit that this approach to the modelling uses parameters reflecting likely real world conduct, which he says should be done wherever possible:5 In the real world, it would be much more likely that an executor would seek to bring the separate term deposits into lockstep as soon as possible, because this would involve far fewer renewal dates and would accordingly minimise the work involved in administering the estate's funds. 19 I agree with the first defendant's approach on this issue, which accords with the methodology identified in the Further Reasons of the court and there is no proper justification to modify that methodology. In particular, it should be observed that the court's conclusion [117] of the Further Reasons was as follows: The account process in the Estate Proceeding should therefore proceed on the basis that the funds in Account 1936 became available in March 2015, being the first period the term deposit matured, and be treated in 4 PS [13]. 5 DS [24]. -- 6 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 LUNDBERG J Page 7 the manner set out elsewhere in these reasons as to the interest rate and length of the term deposit going forward. 20 Adopting the lockstep approach proposed by Mr Quarles will bring the second term deposit for Account 1936 into line with the other funds of the Estate, reflecting an efficient approach which would likely be adopted by a hypothetical executor. Second issue – timing of the distribution 21 The second issue also arises in the Estate Proceeding. It concerns the distribution made to the beneficiaries from the Estate on 26 October 2018. The distribution was in the sum of $1,749,805.6 22 Mr Moyle has explained that this distribution falls within the last month of the six month term that resulted from the account process, being the period May/June 2018 to October/November 2018. Mr Moyle deposes that, on the approach adopted by the first defendant, given the need to maintain $30,000 in the working account, funds of nearly $1.0 million are retained in the working account during this period. He says this is unrealistic. 23 Mr Moyle deposes that Mr Quarles would not have known, in May/June 2018 when the term deposit was being created, that a substantial distribution was going to be made towards the end of that period. Further, he deposes that, if a distribution was to be contemplated but the monies were held in a term deposit which was due to expire in less than a month, the parties would have agreed to hold off the distribution until that term deposit matured. 24 Accordingly, Mr Moyle has prepared a spreadsheet which makes an adjustment such that the distribution is deferred by one month, to the November/December 2018 period. 25 In effect, Mr Moyle submits that a rigid approach to the account should not be maintained in circumstances where the results would be unrealistic. He says the effect of having to take that the distribution into account is that, in that one period, unrealistic sums are maintained in the working account. In practice, this would not have occurred – the distribution would have been made once the term deposit matured and before the next term deposit was rolled over. 6 Moyle Affidavit [13]. -- 7 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 LUNDBERG J Page 8 26 Further, Mr Moyle emphasises that it was possible for Mr Quarles to break term deposits with no penalty: Primary Reasons [555]. Thus, there is no need for such substantial sums to be held in the working account to permit the payment of the hotchpot distribution calculated in accordance with the Hotchpot Adjustment clause in the will of the Deceased (Hotchpot Distribution). 27 The approach which has now been suggested by Mr Moyle, which involves deferring the payment of the Hotchpot Distribution, is a practical solution to the issue, it is submitted. Alternatively, if the court does not accept that the Hotchpot Distribution could have been deferred a month, then the term deposit should be treated as a five-month term deposit to reflect the 'breaking' of a six month term deposit to facilitate the payment of the Hotchpot Distribution. 28 In opposing the above approach, Mr Quarles says, among other things, that the plaintiffs are seeking to retrofit this particular term deposit period, with the benefit of hindsight.7 He says this would be inconsistent with the conceptual basis upon which the calculations have been made - being that the hypothetical term deposits should have a consistent period which should not be adjusted with the benefit of hindsight to distort the returns earned on the hypothetical term deposit model. 29 I agree with the submissions advanced by Mr Quarles. The plaintiffs' suggested approach is inconsistent with the conceptual basis on which the court has required the account be undertaken. That basis was addressed in the Further Reasons and included that the account in both proceedings should be undertaken on an assumed basis that the term deposits are for six month periods, save where the parties have otherwise agreed: Further Reasons [76]. 30 There is no proper justification to change the conceptual basis on which the court has already determined the account should be undertaken. Third issue – rate of interest 31 The third issue arises in the Company Proceeding. This issue concerns Issue 2 in the Further Reasons, as to the rate of interest to be applied on losses up to September/October 2018: Further Reasons [77] to [90]. 7 DS [17]. -- 8 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 LUNDBERG J Page 9 32 The court found that the interest rate in both proceedings should be varied in the manner which was sought by Mr Quarles, so that the best available interest rate was to be applied until the September/October 2018 period, and from that period (and including that period) the rate of 6% p.a. should then be applied: Further Reasons [90]. 33 This issue was fulsomely debated during the hearing in March. 34 The plaintiffs now submit that the arguments in favour of Mr Quarles' position applied only to the Estate Proceeding, where it is accepted the monies were properly not distributed until the calculation for the Hotchpot Distribution had been determined. The same principle does not apply to the Company Proceeding, they submit. 35 The plaintiffs justify this submission by reference to the finding of the court at [756] of the Primary Reasons that 'the management of funds in Moyle Holdings was not tied to the administration of the Estate, although in general terms Mr Quarles approached the matters as though they were connected'. 36 The plaintiffs say that, in these circumstances, it follows that there was no impediment on the distribution to shareholders of the funds in Moyle Holdings to justify limiting the interest payable. The plaintiffs submit that the variation to order 1(e), made in May 2026, which effectively connects the loss to the Hotchpot Distribution, should apply to the Estate only and not also to Moyle Holdings. 37 The position proposed by the plaintiffs is inconsistent with the determination made by the court as found in the Further Reasons at [90]. The reasons for that determination are explained at [83] to [89] of the Further Reasons. There is no cogent reason for the court to now reverse or vary that determination, the reliance on the finding at [756] of the Primary Reasons being an inadequate factual basis. The reality is that the funds were dealt with by Mr Quarles as one collection of legacy funds, as submitted by counsel for the first defendant. Conclusion and orders 38 For these reasons, I would reject the further contentions raised by the plaintiffs concerning the three particular issues. 39 The parties should proceed to prepare the calculation for the account in each proceeding on the basis identified in the Further -- 9 of 10 -- [2026] WASC 321 LUNDBERG J Page 10 Reasons (and as ordered on 28 May 2026), save where there has been agreement by the parties to adopt a different basis. 40 I will hear from the parties as to the costs of the hearing on 3 August 2026. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. IR Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg 5 AUGUST 2026 -- 10 of 10 --