MANSFIELD and CITY OF ARMADALE [2026] WASAT 92

[2026] WASAT 92 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA) CITATION : MANSFIELD and CITY OF ARMADALE [2026] WASAT 92 MEMBER : DR M EVANS-BONNER, SENIOR MEMBER HEARD : 5 MAY 2026 DELIVERED : 4 AUGUST 2026 FILE NO/S : EOA 22 of 2025 BETWEEN : DECLAN MANSFIELD Applicant AND CITY OF ARMADALE Respondent Catchwords: Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) - Application for dismissal or strike out of whole or part of the proceeding - Claim of discrimination on the basis of political conviction in employment and victimisation for making a complaint - where Commissioner for Equal Opportunity made a 'good cause' decision about the 12 month period in which the conduct the subject of the complaint could be considered - Statutory construction of when the 12 month period starts and ends - Applicant conceded he cannot prove causation but wants to proceed to a final hearing to cross-examine witnesses to establish causation and identify a comparator - Where orders sought by the Applicant would have the effect of directing the Respondent not to comply with the law, or to breach the law - Proceeding found to be frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance, -- 1 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 2 is being used for an improper purpose and is otherwise an abuse of process - Proceeding dismissed in its entirety pursuant to s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) Legislation: Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 3, s 53(1), s 53(2), s 54(2), s 53, s 54, s 67, s 67(1), s 83(1), s 83(4), s 83(5), s 89(1), s 90(1), s 90(2), s 127, s 127(b), s 127(b)(i), s 127(b)(ii), s 127(b)(iii), s 127(b)(iv), s 161 Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 61(1)(b), s 61(1)(c), s 62(3) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 47, s 47(1), s 47(1)(a), s 47(1)(b), s 47(1)(c), s 47(2) Work Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA), reg 39, reg 55A(a)(iv), reg 55D(2)(1) Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), s 19(3)(f) Result: Proceeding dismissed in its entirety pursuant to s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) on the basis that it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance, is being used for an improper purpose and is otherwise an abuse of process Category: B Representation: Counsel: Applicant : Mr S Young Respondent : Mr T Houweling Solicitors: Applicant : Allen Law Respondent : Cornerstone Legal Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Aderemi and TAFE International WA [2024] WASAT 141 Edoo and Minister for Health [2010] WASAT 74 -- 2 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 3 Ellis and Director General of the Department of Transport [2011] WASAT 142 Folan v Commissioner of Police [2026] WASAT 41 Laurent and Commissioner of Police & Ors [2013] WASAT 10 Lovejoy v Myer Store Ltd (1996) EOC 92-813 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 Summerville and Department of Education & Ors [2006] WASAT 174 Winter and Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service [2006] WASAT 87 -- 3 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 4 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: Introduction 1 On 27 February 2026, the City of Armadale (Respondent) made an application pursuant to s 47 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), asking the Tribunal to strike out or dismiss the whole or part of a proceeding in which Mr Mansfield is the Applicant. 2 For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the proceeding should be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to s 47(2) of the SAT Act, on the basis that it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance, because it is being used for an improper purpose and is otherwise an abuse of process, within the meaning of s 47(1) of the SAT Act. The complaint 3 On 18 October 2024, Mr Mansfield made a complaint to the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity (Commissioner) about his former employer, the City of Armadale. 4 Mr Mansfield had worked as a circulation clerk in the Respondent's library from approximately January 20101 until he resigned on 24 October 2023, with effect from 22 November 2023.2 5 Mr Mansfield's complaint to the Commissioner alleged discrimination contrary to the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) (EO Act) based on age, family responsibility, family status, impairment or disability, political conviction, race, religious conviction, sex, and sexual orientation in employment. He also alleged racial harassment and victimisation. 6 The Commissioner dismissed Mr Mansfield's complaint under s 89(1) of the EO Act on 22 September 2025 on the basis that it was 'lacking in substance'. 1 Report of the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity dated 22 December 2025 (Tribunal Report), page 573. Section 90(2) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) provides that the Commissioner will provide a report relating to the investigation made by the Commissioner into the complaint with the referral of the complaint to the Tribunal pursuant to s 90(1). 2 Tribunal Report, page 573. -- 4 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 5 7 Following a request from Mr Mansfield's legal representative to do so,3 on 22 December 2025, the Commissioner referred the complaint to this Tribunal pursuant to s 90(2) of the EO Act. The Tribunal proceeding 8 After the complaint was referred to this Tribunal, an initial directions hearing was held on 23 January 2026. 9 At that directions hearing Mr Mansfield's legal representative, Mr Allen, stated that Mr Mansfield had revised and narrowed his complaint to be one of discrimination based on political conviction in employment. I discuss the revised complaint in the following section of these reasons. 10 I made programming orders requiring Mr Mansfield to file a statement of facts, issues and contentions by 16 February 2026, and for a further directions hearing on 20 February 2026. 11 On 16 February 2026, Mr Mansfield filed a document titled, 'Statement of Material facts, issues and contentions'. 12 Although that document was not a statement of issues, facts and contentions that complies with the relevant Tribunal Guide, it confirmed that Mr Mansfield was alleging: • that the Respondent had discriminated against him based on his political convictions in the area of employment, which contravened s 53 and s 54 of the EO Act; and • victimisation under s 67 of the EO Act. 13 At the directions hearing on 20 February 2026, the Respondent indicated that they intended to lodge a dismissal or strike out application. I made orders programming that application to an interlocutory hearing. 14 In accordance with those orders on: • 27 February 2026, the Respondent filed an application titled 'Section 47 application to strike out'; 3 Section 90(1) of the EO Act provides that if the Commissioner dismisses a complaint under s 89(1) of the EO Act, the complainant may make a written request for the Commissioner to refer the complaint to the Tribunal. The complainant must make the request within 21 days after the complainant has received a notice from the Commissioner that their complaint has been dismissed. -- 5 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 6 • 13 March 2026, the Respondent filed submissions titled 'Submission section 47 application to strike out'; and • 3 April 2026, the Applicant filed submissions titled, 'Applicant's outline of submissions in opposition to the Respondent's application pursuant to section 47 of the State Administrative Act 2005 (WA)'.4 15 The interlocutory hearing took place on 5 May 2026. The revised complaint 16 The revised complaint alleges that Mr Mansfield was forced to resign from his position because he experienced detrimental treatment by the Respondent due to his political beliefs. 17 In the documentation Mr Mansfield submitted to the Commissioner he described his beliefs as 'moderate centrist political views' which included the rejection of 'Equity, Diversity and Inclusion … and other pseudo-anti-discrimination law movements'.5 18 Mr Mansfield alleged that he experienced detrimental treatment after he initially refused to participate in equity, diversity and inclusion (EDI) training mandated by the City of Armadale.6 He attended the EDI training on 26 July 2023.7 19 Mr Mansfield says that he was discriminated against and victimised based on his political beliefs because, following his refusal to participate in the EDI training, a colleague, K, made a trivial complaint to human resources about him in September 2023.8 20 The complaint alleged that, amongst other things, he had discussed the colleague's work performance in a disparaging manner with other colleagues in breach of the Respondent's Code of Conduct.9 21 Mr Mansfield alleges that the complaint was made against him to victimise him because of his political beliefs. Further, he alleges that 4 Errors in original. 5 Tribunal Report, pages 8 and 13. 6 Email from the Applicant to G dated 28 June 2023, Tribunal Report, page 538. 7 Tribunal Report, page 541. 8 Tribunal Report, page 552. The letter advising Mr Mansfield of the complaint is dated 27 September 2023, and the conduct the subject of the complaint occurred up to 5 September 2023. The complaint was therefore made during that period of time. See also, statement of Mr Mansfield dated 27 April 2025, Tribunal Report, pages 648 - 650. 9 Tribunal Report, pages 552 - 555. -- 6 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 7 he was discriminated against and victimised because the complaint was investigated, which culminated in his being invited to a human resources meeting on 18 October 2024 where an outcome letter was given to him at the end of the meeting that was drafted the day before.10 The outcome was a verbal warning and counselling.11 Mr Mansfield says that he was subject to a campaign that led to his forced resignation.12 22 Mr Mansfield also seeks to join the manager, G and the human resources staff member, L, who both decided the outcome and conducted the human resources meeting. Dismissal or strike out 23 Section 47 of the SAT Act provides that a legally qualified member of the Tribunal may order that a proceeding be dismissed or struck out if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, being used for an improper purpose, or is otherwise an abuse of process. 24 Specifically, s 47 provides: (1) This section applies if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding - (a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or (b) is being used for an improper purpose; or (c) is otherwise an abuse of process. (2) If this section applies, the Tribunal may order that the proceeding be dismissed or struck out and make any appropriate orders. (3) The Tribunal's powers to act under subsection (2) are exercisable only by a legally qualified member. (4) The Tribunal may act under subsection (2) on the application of a party or on its own initiative. 25 When considering a dismissal application, the Tribunal will be mindful of certain principles. In summary, they include that:13 10 ts 66, 5 May 2026. 11 Tribunal Report, page 696. 12 Tribunal Report, page 8. 13 Aderemi and TAFE International WA [2024] WASAT 141 at [48] citing Ellis and Director General of the Department of Transport [2011] WASAT 142 at [63] and Laurent and Commissioner of Police [2009] WASAT 254 (Laurent No 1); see also Folan v Commissioner of Police [2026] WASAT 41 (Folan) at [10]. -- 7 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 8 • The power is analogous to the power of a court to summarily dismiss proceedings at an interlocutory stage before the substantive hearing. • A decision to dismiss should be exercised with caution, particularly if a party is unrepresented, and only in circumstances where it is evident that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success. If a proceeding has no reasonable prospect of success, it is likely to cause substantial prejudicial to the respondent for the matter to proceed to a final hearing. • The Tribunal should assume that all factual allegations made by an applicant would be made out at a final hearing, and consider whether the proceeding is nevertheless frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance, has been brought for an improper purpose or is otherwise an abuse of process. • If there are factual issues in dispute which need to be determined with reference to evidence, it may not be appropriate to dismiss the proceeding at an interlocutory stage. 26 There is substantial overlap in the meaning of the terms, frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, improper purpose or abuse of process, and the terms are often used interchangeably. 27 In summary, frivolous or vexatious proceedings include those that cannot possibly succeed, have no reasonable prospects of success or are groundless. Similarly, a proceeding that is misconceived or lacking in substance includes one that is based on the misunderstanding of a legal principle or a case that is not arguable. If a proceeding falls outside of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it will be misconceived. 28 A proceeding will be used for an improper purpose, or will be an abuse of process, if it is brought for a purpose that is unsuitable or inappropriate including where the applicant is pursuing the proceeding other than for which the proceeding is properly designed, to gain some collateral advantage, or to re-litigate a matter that has already been finally determined.14 14 This is a short summary. See Folan, at [13] - [17] for a more detailed analysis of the meaning of frivolous and vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, improper purpose, and abuse of process in s 47(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). -- 8 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 9 The facts alleged by Mr Mansfield 29 In considering and determining this dismissal or strike out application, I have proceeded on the basis that the factual allegations made by Mr Mansfield would be made out at a final hearing. 30 The essential facts of the events that occurred are not, however, in dispute between the parties. However, the intentions and motivations of the Respondent, and specifically K, G and L, that can be inferred from the facts are in dispute. 31 In summarising the essential facts below, I have referred to some of the correspondence in the Commissioner's Tribunal Report to ensure the accuracy of dates. I have also referred to, and have accepted the facts in, Mr Mansfield's statements, as well as a statement from his sister who attended the 18 October 2023 human resources meeting as a support person. 32 The Tribunal Report is an extensive document which comprises 790 pages. It consists of the complaint to the Commissioner, submissions made to the Commissioner and Mr Mansfield by his representatives, numerous online opinion articles written by Mr Mansfield, responses to the Commissioner from the Respondent, and copies of documents relating to the complaint and the investigation, as well as documents obtained by Mr Mansfield via freedom of information. 33 The chronology of facts is as follows: (a) On 19 May 2023, an email was sent to library staff to remind them they were required to attend mandatory 'EEO' [equity and equal opportunity] training.15 (b) On 28 June 2023, a further email was sent to library staff reminding them that they must attend the EDI training.16 (c) Around this time, K started working at the library.17 K was a colleague of Mr Mansfield's. Mr Mansfield was critical of K's work performance. 15 Tribunal Report, page 536. 16 Tribunal Report, pages 444 - 445. 17 Statement of Mr Mansfield made on 27 April 2025; Tribunal Report, page 649. -- 9 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 10 (d) On 28 June 2023, Mr Mansfield emailed G to advise that he refused to attend any training course where the underlying philosophy was based on diversity, equity and inclusion.18 (e) On 12 July 2023, Mr Mansfield met with a Manager, S, and L from human resources, to discuss his refusal to attend the training. He was told the training was mandatory and that he was being requested to complete it.19 (f) On 19 July 2023, Mr Mansfield advised L that he had enrolled in the training for 26 July 2023.20 (g) He attended and participated in the EDI training on 26 July 2023. (h) In a letter from the Human Resources Manager, R, to Mr Mansfield dated 27 September 2023 (Letter of Allegation), he was advised that the Respondent had received a formal complaint which alleged that, amongst other things, Mr Mansfield had discussed the work performance of a colleague, K, in a negative manner with other colleagues in breach of the Respondent's Code of Conduct.21 (i) The complaint was not related to the EDI training. The Letter of Allegation stated that Mr Mansfield had seen K inserting a USB into a computer at the library which he had discussed negatively with a colleague. It also described an email interaction Mr Mansfield had with K about the USB incident, and an allegation that Mr Mansfield had engaged in discussions with other colleagues concerning their covering K's shifts.22 (j) The complaint was made by K sometime in August.23 (k) On 5 October 2023 Mr Mansfield was invited to a meeting on 10 October 2023 to discuss the Letter of Allegation.24 (l) Mr Mansfield took personal leave from 8 October 2023 to 14 October 2023, citing 'extreme stress' due to the allegations.25 18 Tribunal Report, page 444. 19 Tribunal Report, page 541. 20 Tribunal Report, page 541. 21 Tribunal Report, pages 681 - 684. 22 Tribunal Report, pages 681 - 684. 23 Statement of Mr Mansfield made on 27 April 2025; Tribunal Report, page 649. 24 Tribunal Report, page 563. 25 Tribunal Report, pages 685 and 688. -- 10 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 11 (m) On 9 October 2023, Mr Mansfield provided a written response to the Letter of Allegation.26 (n) The Respondent cancelled the meeting scheduled for 10 October 2023 stating the reason as being that Mr Mansfield was on personal leave. Mr Mansfield stated that he wanted to proceed with the meeting.27 (o) The meeting was rescheduled by the Respondent to 18 October 2023.28 (p) On 17 October 2023, a draft 'outcome letter' was prepared and circulated in advance of the meeting.29 (q) On 18 October 2023, Mr Mansfield attended the meeting. His sister attended as his support person.30 G and L facilitated the meeting. (r) During the meeting, G shouted at Mr Mansfield, stating, '[s]hut up Declan, just shut up. You wrote an article for a magazine and said you were going to be sacked'. L immediately changed the subject of the conversation.31 (s) G was referring to an online article dated 30 September 2023 titled, 'By the time you read this I may have been sacked … Free speech is dead in Australia'. In the article Mr Mansfield says he was coerced into attending EDI Training.32 The article had come to the attention of the Respondent when it was emailed to a human resources staff member.33 (t) The outcome letter that had been circulated on 17 October 2023 was given to Mr Mansfield at the end of the meeting on 18 October 2023. G and L left the meeting for a brief period to confer, before returning and giving Mr Mansfield the letter. The outcome was a verbal warning and counselling. 26 Tribunal Report, pages 565 - 568. 27 Tribunal Report, page 561. 28 Tribunal Report, page 569. 29 Tribunal Report, page 570. 30 Tribunal Report, page 647. 31 Statement of Mr Mansfield's sister dated 23 April 2025, Tribunal Report, page 647. Statement of Mr Mansfield dated 2 December 2024; Tribunal Report, page 27. 32 Tribunal Report, pages 129 - 130. 33 Tribunal Report, page 557. -- 11 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 12 (u) Mr Mansfield emailed notice of his resignation to the Respondent on 24 October 2023, advising that his last day of work would be 22 November 2023. He attached a medical certificate which covered his absence from work until the day of his resignation.34 (v) Mr Mansfield's resignation was accepted by the Respondent on 26 October 2023.35 The submissions 34 The Respondent made lengthy and extensive written and oral submissions as to why the proceeding should be dismissed. 35 Broadly speaking, these included that: • the incidents that Mr Mansfield relies upon as being discrimination and victimisation occurred outside of the 12-month statutory time-limit for the lodgement of complaints to the Commissioner; • G and L should not be joined as parties because the incidents they were involved with occurred outside of that 12-month statutory time-limit; • the investigation was a standard human resources response to a standard workplace disciplinary and policy process and that consequently, the matters are industrial matters and not political in nature; • Mr Mansfield cannot demonstrate discrimination because he has not identified a comparator who was treated differently; • there is no causal nexus between the refusal to attend the EDI training and the alleged adverse treatment; • the proceeding is being brought for an improper purpose of Mr Mansfield pursuing a broader ideological campaign against what he perceives as 'woke ideology' rather than to resolve a genuine equal opportunity complaint. This is evident from the remedies he is seeking from the Tribunal, which include requesting the Tribunal to make orders which, amongst other 34 Tribunal Report, page 704. 35 Tribunal Report, page 706. -- 12 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 13 things, would require the Respondent to abolish EDI training in the workplace.36 36 Mr Mansfield says that the proceeding should not be dismissed and that he should be allowed to proceed to a final hearing. His submissions included that: • he has a prima facie case which is not so obviously untenable that it should not be able to proceed; • there is a public benefit in discrimination claims, particularly those involving novel or significant questions of law and the conduct of government entities, being determined at a final hearing on their merits, and not being summarily dismissed at an interlocutory stage; • he has a different view about when the 12-month statutory time-limit for the lodgement of complaints to the Commissioner commenced; • his views are 'political beliefs' because matters of equity and diversity are issues that the State and Federal Parliaments have legislated about; • there is a comparator, namely, a person who does not share his political beliefs; and • he will be able to prove causation at a final hearing by cross-examining witnesses to establish that the motive and purpose of the complaint, investigation and human resources meeting was to discriminate against him and to victimise him because of his political views which he alleges were different to those of his colleagues. 37 Despite the extensive nature of the submissions, it is not necessary for me to consider all of them to determine whether the proceeding should be dismissed. That is because I am satisfied that there are three fundamental flaws in Mr Mansfield's case which render it, amongst other things, untenable and as having no reasonable prospects of success, with the consequence being that it would not be appropriate for the matter to proceed to a final hearing. 36 See Applicant's 'Statement of Material Facts, Issues and Contentions', page 28, para I. -- 13 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 14 38 These are the lack of an arguable case with respect to causation, the lack of a factual basis for a comparator, and the effect of three of the orders sought being to prevent the Respondent from engaging in lawful training which, amongst other things, amounts to an abuse of process and demonstrates that the proceeding is being used for an improper purpose. Jurisdiction of the Commission and the Tribunal with respect to the time frame 39 It is not in contention that Mr Mansfield's representative made an online complaint to the Commissioner on his behalf on Friday 18 October 2024 at 11.39 am.37 40 However, the parties disagree as to the timeframe of the complaint that was accepted by the Commissioner. 41 That timeframe is relevant to the Tribunal's jurisdiction because the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to the complaint referred to it by the Commissioner.38 42 Mr Mansfield says that the timeframe accepted by the Commissioner was 17 October 2023 to 25 October 2023, which was the date of Mr Mansfield's resignation. 43 The Respondent says that the timeframe accepted by the Commissioner was 19 October 2023 to when Mr Mansfield resigned on 25 October 2023. 44 Section 83(1) of the EO Act generally provides that a person can make a complaint in writing to the Commissioner about a contravention of the EO Act. 45 Section 83(4) of the EO Act provides for a 12-month timeframe for making a complaint to the Commissioner: (4) A complaint made under subsection (1) or (1a) shall be lodged within 12 months after the date on which the contravention of this Act which is the subject of that complaint is alleged to have been committed. 37 Tribunal Report, page 5. 38 Laurent and Commissioner of Police & Ors [2013] WASAT 10 at [20], citing Winter and Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service [2006] WASAT 87 (Winter) at [4] and Summerville and Department of Education & Ors [2006] WASAT 174 at [11]. -- 14 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 15 46 Section 83(5) of the EO Act provides that the Commissioner may extend the time if there is good cause to do so: (5) Notwithstanding subsection (4), the Commissioner, on good cause being shown, may accept a complaint which is lodged more than 12 months after the date referred to in that subsection. 47 To determine the scope of the complaint accepted by the Commissioner, I will commence by reviewing the relevant correspondence now to ascertain what the Commissioner's decision was with respect to the timeframe of the complaint he accepted, investigated and decided, and ultimately, what the scope of the complaint was that the Commissioner referred to this Tribunal. 48 There is a discrepancy in some of the correspondence from the Commissioner's office about the commencement date of the timeframe. The correspondence variously refers to 17, 18 and 19 October 2023 as being the commencement of the timeframe considered by the Commissioner. I have therefore considered that correspondence to determine the date range decided by the Commissioner. I also explain more about why that is relevant below. 49 On 25 October 2024, a conciliation officer at the Equal Opportunity Commission (Commission) emailed Mr Mansfield to ask him to confirm if he wishes to seek 'good cause' to have any incidents that occurred prior to 18 October 2023 form part of the matter.39 50 In a letter from the Commissioner to Mr Mansfield dated 5 February 2025, the Commissioner stated:40 I note the matter/s you complain about, that is your termination, took place on 24 October 2023 and is the only matter that falls within time under the Equal opportunity Act 1984 [the Act], and all matters you will need to rely upon to support your allegation of political conviction discrimination in employment took place prior to this date. 51 In an undated letter from the Commissioner, emailed to Mr Mansfield and his previous representative on 23 May 2025 by the conciliation officer, the Commissioner stated:41 I have now considered your good cause submissions in relation to matters that took place prior to 19 October 2023, in relation to your complaint 39 Tribunal Report, page 590 (duplicated at pages 596, 600, 605 - 606, 611 - 612, 616 - 617, 622 - 623 and 628). 40 Tribunal Report, page 632. The dates are in bold font in the original correspondence from the Commissioner's office. 41 Tribunal Report, page 654 (duplicated at pages 721 - 722). -- 15 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 16 lodged with this Commission against the City of Armadale on 19 October 2024. 52 The letter continues to explain that good cause has not been shown. It then stated, under the bold and underlined heading, 'Allegations from 19 October 2023 onwards':42 Your allegations from 19 October 2023 onwards have been accepted as a complaint on the grounds of age, family responsibility, family status, impairment, political conviction, race, racial harassment, religious conviction, sex, sexual orientation, and victimisation in the area of employment. 53 In a letter to the Chief Executive Officer of the Respondent (CEO) dated 11 June 2025, the Commissioner advised:43 On 5 February 2025 Mr Mansfield was given the opportunity to provide me with his reasons for the delay in lodging this complaint, and after considering his submissions I advised him on 23 May 2025 that I found good cause had not been shown so only allegations from 18 October 2023 have been accepted as a complaint. 54 To confuse matters further, on 24 July 2025, the conciliation officer sent an email to Mr Mansfield and his representative with different dates stated to be part of the complaint. The relevant part of that email states:44 As the 'out of time' allegations were not accepted as part of this complaint, and you were advised of this by letter on 23May25 (attached) the only claims that fall within time are evets between 17 and 25 October 2023. This includes a meeting that was supposed to take place on 18 October 2023; a letter of outcome that may have been delivered to Mr Mansfield dated 17 October 2023 (which the Commission has not received a copy of); and Mr Mansfield's decision to resign from his employment on 25 October 2023. 55 As I outlined above, the letter dated 23 May 2025 from the Commissioner to Mr Mansfield stated that the date range commenced on 19 October 2023, whereas the letter from the Commissioner to the CEO stated that the date range commenced on 18 October 2023. 56 In a further letter to the CEO dated 19 August 2025, the Commissioner stated that, 'as previously advised, only allegations from 18 October 2023 have been accepted as a complaint'.45 42 Tribunal Report, page 655. 43 Tribunal Report, page 662 (duplicated at page 745). 44 Tribunal Report, page 725 (duplicated at pages 734 - 735). Errors in original. 45 Tribunal Report, page 740. -- 16 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 17 57 Finally, in a letter from the Commissioner dated 22 September 2025 to Mr Mansfield, in which Mr Mansfield was advised by the Commissioner that his complaint was being dismissed, the Commissioner repeated that his 23 May 2025 letter had stated that 'only allegations from 18 October 2023 onward had been accepted as a complaint'.46 58 On the second page of the letter, as part of his reasons for dismissing the complaint, the Commissioner referred to incidents from 17 October 2023 as being part of the complaint. The relevant paragraph is as follows:47 You lodged this matter on 18 October 2024 and advised you had resigned from your employment with the City of Armadale on 25 October 2023. On 23 May 2025 I advised you 'good cause' had not been shown, so only matters that took place between 17 and 25 October 2023 formed part of this complaint. I now advise you none of the multiple grounds of unlawful behaviour you have alleged have been substantiated in the 'within time' component of this matter. 59 A complaint about a contravention of the EO Act is made to the Commissioner pursuant to s 83(1), and it is the Commissioner who makes the decision about whether there is good cause under s 83(5) of the EO Act. I am therefore satisfied that I should place less weight on what the conciliation officer stated the timeframe to be and give greater weight to the Commissioner's correspondence in determining what the specific timeframe accepted by the Commissioner was. 60 The date of 19 October 2023, referred to in the Commissioner's letter emailed on 23 May 2025 appears to be an error, based on the date of the complaint being incorrectly stated as 19 October 2024. That conclusion is supported by the Commissioner stating in subsequent correspondence (on 19 August 2025 and 22 September 2025) that only allegations from 18 October 2023 had been accepted as part of the complaint. 61 Further, in the Commissioner's summary of the investigation of the complaint dated 22 December 2025, which refers the complaint to the Tribunal, the Commissioner referred to the 23 May 2025 correspondence as stating that 'only allegations from 19 October 2023 onwards had been accepted as a complaint'.48 However, in this report the 46 Tribunal Report, page 761. 47 Tribunal Report, page 762. 48 Tribunal Report, page 1. -- 17 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 18 Commissioner was describing the chronology of the correspondence, and had most likely repeated the date of 19 October 2023 from the 23 May 2025 letter which was based on the date of the complaint being incorrectly stated as 19 October 2024. 62 I am therefore satisfied that the complaint accepted by, investigated and ultimately referred to this Tribunal by the Commissioner concerned events starting from 18 October 2023 and concluding with Mr Mansfield's resignation on 25 October 2023. Consequently, any events before 18 October 2023 are out of time and, consequently, cannot constitute unlawful discrimination or victimisation. 63 The disagreement between the parties about the date range accepted by the Commissioner is also understandable by virtue of the wording of s 83(4) of the EO Act. 64 As I mentioned above, s 83(4) states that the complaint 'shall be lodged within 12 months after the date on which the contravention of this Act which is the subject of the complaint is alleged to have been committed' (my emphasis underlined). 65 In oral submissions the parties referred to s 61(1)(b) and s 61(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), (Interpretation Act) with Mr Mansfield relying on s 61(1)(b) which focuses on the word 'after', and the Respondent relying on s 61(1)(c) which focuses on the word 'within'. Those provisions are as follows: (1) In computing time for the purposes of a written law - … (b) where a period of time is expressed to be reckoned from, or after, a specified day, that day shall not be included in the period; (c) where anything is to be done within a time before a specified day, the time shall not include that day; … 66 However, both 'within' and 'after' are used in s 83(4). As Brennan J observed in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority,49 when a court (or in this case a Tribunal), is construing a statutory provision, it 'must strive to give meaning to every word'. 49 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 (Project Blue Sky) at [71]. -- 18 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 19 67 Further, when interpreting a statutory provision, regard should be had to the grammatical meaning of the words, the context of the words and the purpose of the statute.50 68 The EO Act is beneficial legislation. The EO Act's objects include to eliminate specified types of discrimination and to promote recognition and acceptance in the community of all persons.51 69 Considering this context, I am satisfied that the proper construction of s 83(4) of the EO Act is as follows. 70 First, the starting point in construing s 83(4) of the EO Act should be 'the date on which the [alleged] contravention of this Act which is the subject of the complaint is alleged to have been committed'. 71 Second, the complaint about that contravention must then 'be lodged within 12 months after' the date of the alleged contravention. This means that the date of the contravention is not counted, and the next day will be counted as 'day 1'.52 72 Third, the Interpretation Act assists in calculating the end of the 12-month period. Section 62(3) of the Interpretation Act provides that where a statutory provision refers to a period of 2, 3 or more months, one day is to be deducted from the date on which the timeframe is to begin to be the last day of the month. The example, given in the Interpretation Act is a period of 6 months beginning on 15 August ends on 14 February.53 73 In summary, this construction means that if an alleged contravention of the EO Act occurred on 18 December 2023, day 1 would be 19 December 2023, and 12 months from 19 December 2023 would be 18 December 2024. The complaint of conduct occurring on 18 December 2023 would therefore be within time, but the Commissioner would not accept the complaint if the conduct occurred prior to 18 December 2023, unless the Commissioner made a good cause decision under s 83(5) of the EO Act. Put simply, the 12-month period can be calculated as starting and ending on the same day. 50 Project Blue Sky, per Brennan J at [78]. 51 See generally, EO Act, s 3. 52 This is consistent with s 61(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act. Further, s 61(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act does not assist in interpreting the time frame in s 83(4) of the EO Act, because s 83(4) refers to the complaint having to be 'lodged within 12 months after' and s 61(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act refers to 'where anything is to be done within a time before a specified day' (my emphasis). 53 Interpretation Act, s 62(3). -- 19 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 20 74 The caselaw that deals with s 83(4) of the EO Act does not contain any analysis concerning the interpretation of the 12-month period. However, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the 12-month period in s 83(4) of the EO Act started and ended on the same day. 75 For example, in Winter and Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service54 the complaint was made to the Commissioner on 18 March 2004.55 The Commissioner, and later the Tribunal, found that they could not inquire into alleged contraventions of the EO Act which occurred before 18 March 2003.56 76 In Laurent and Commissioner of Police & Ors,57 the complaint was lodged with the Commissioner on 9 July 2009.58 The Tribunal found that events occurring prior to 9 July 2008 were not matters that were before the Tribunal for inquiry.59 77 Returning to Mr Mansfield's complaints, it is only the human resources meeting which occurred on 18 October 2023, and his subsequent resignation on 24 October 2023 and the Respondent's acceptance of his resignation that were accepted by the Commissioner, and that are therefore before this Tribunal. 78 The direction that Mr Mansfield attend the EDI training in July 2023, his colleague making a complaint about him sometime in September 2023, and the investigation of that complaint from approximately September 2023 until approximately 17 October 2023 (being the date of a draft letter which was handed to him during the human resources meeting on 18 October 2023) therefore cannot be the subject of a complaint of unlawful discrimination or victimisation because they occurred before 18 October 2023 and were not accepted as part of the complaint by the Commissioner. 79 This does not mean that the facts relating to matters that occurred prior to 18 December 2023 cannot be considered by the Tribunal at all. They can be considered as background facts to help understand the alleged discriminatory conduct that is within time.60 In other words:61 54 Winter and Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service [2006] WASAT 87. 55 Winter at [1]. 56 Winter at [2] and [36]. 57 Laurent and Commissioner of Police & Ors [2013] WASAT 10 (Laurent). 58 Laurent at [1]. 59 Laurent at [23]. 60 Laurent at [23]. 61 Winter at [40] citing Lovejoy v Myer Store Ltd (1996) EOC 92-813 at 79,010. -- 20 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 21 an act occurring more than 12 months before the date of lodgement of the complaint cannot be relied on to found an act of discrimination but can be taken into account to determine the context and surrounding circumstances of an alleged act of discrimination that is within time. Is there a basis for dismissal or strike-out? 80 The crux of Mr Mansfield's case is that he was discriminated against and victimised because of his initial refusal to go to the EDI training in approximately June 2023. 81 He argues that he was subjected to an 'extensive campaign' which led to his forced resignation including a vexatious complaint being made by K against him, and a 'maliciously conducted investigation' in which G, L and another human resources manager, S, investigated the complaint.62 82 As is evident from the above findings about the relevant time frame, the requirement that Mr Mansfield attend EDI training, his participation in that training, K making a complaint against him, and the investigation of the complaint are not before this Tribunal as allegations of unlawful discrimination or victimisation. They can, however, be considered as background facts to inform the Tribunal's inquiry into the allegations of unlawful discrimination or victimisation that are before the Tribunal. 83 What remains is the allegation of discrimination and victimisation by virtue of, or arising from, the human resources meeting on 18 October 2023 and Mr Mansfield's resignation which was accepted by the Respondent. 84 In oral submissions, Mr Mansfield's counsel submitted that Mr Mansfield was required to attend the human resources meeting 'because the applicant had previously asserted a right to refuse to be subjected to that training'.63 85 Before I consider whether there is a basis for dismissal, I will outline the relevant statutory provisions of the EO Act. 86 Section 54(2) of the EO Act is the relevant provision concerning discrimination by an employer against an employee on the ground of religious or political conviction. It provides: 62 Tribunal Report, page 8. 63 ts 71, 5 May 2026. -- 21 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 22 (2) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the ground of the employee's religious or political conviction - (a) in the terms or conditions of employment that the employer affords the employee; or (b) by denying the employee access, or limiting the employee's access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or to any other benefits associated with employment; or (c) by dismissing the employee; or (d) by subjecting the employee to any other detriment. 87 Section 53(1) of the EO Act defines when the discrimination will occur, and notably, it requires the complainant to identify what is known as a 'comparator'. It provides: (1) For the purposes of this Act, a person (in this subsection referred to as the discriminator) discriminates against another person (in this subsection referred to as the aggrieved person) on the ground of religious or political conviction if, on the ground of - (a) the religious or political conviction of the aggrieved person; or (b) a characteristic that appertains generally to persons of the religious or political conviction of the aggrieved person; or (c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of the religious or political conviction of the aggrieved person, the discriminator treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in the same circumstances or in circumstances that are not materially different, the discriminator treats or would treat a person of a different religious or political conviction. 88 Section 53(2) of the EO Act also defines when discrimination will occur, in the context of the person having to comply with a requirement or a condition. It provides: (2) For the purposes of this Act, a person (in this subsection referred to as the discriminator) discriminates against another person (in this subsection referred to as the aggrieved person) on the ground of religious or political conviction if the discriminator requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition - -- 22 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 23 (a) with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who are of a different religious or political conviction comply or are able to comply; and (b) which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case; and (c) with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply. 89 Section 67(1) of the EO Act concerns victimisation. It provides: (1) It is unlawful for a person (in this section referred to as the victimiser) to subject, or threaten to subject, another person (in this subsection referred to as the person victimised) to any detriment on the ground that the person victimised - (a) has made, or proposes to make, a complaint under this Act; or (b) has brought, or proposes to bring, proceedings against the victimiser or any other person under this Act; or (c) has furnished, or proposes to furnish, any information, or has produced or proposes to produce, any documents to a person exercising or performing any function under this Act; or (d) has appeared, or proposes to appear, as a witness before the Tribunal in a proceeding commenced under this Act; or (e) has reasonably asserted, or proposes to assert, any rights of the person victimised or the rights of any other person under this Act; or (f) has made an allegation that a person has done an act that is unlawful by reason of a provision of Part II, IIAA, IIA, IIB, III, IV, IVA, IVB or IVC, or on the ground that the victimiser believes that the person victimised has done, or proposes to do, an act or thing referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (f). 90 I will now consider whether there is a basis for dismissal. 91 There are, in my view, three fundamental flaws in Mr Mansfield's case which provide a basis for the proceeding to be dismissed in its entirety without proceeding to a final hearing. -- 23 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 24 92 The first flaw is that there is no causal nexus between Mr Mansfield's refusal to attend the EDI training, the 18 October 2023 meeting and the events that occurred at that meeting. None of the facts alleged by Mr Mansfield support an inference of any connection between those events. 93 K's complaint was about a matter entirely unrelated to the EDI training (which primarily concerned allegations that Mr Mansfield had voiced criticisms about K to other colleagues). Additionally, there is no evidence or suggestion that K knew about Mr Mansfield's refusal to attend the training or giving any indication as to why she would bring an unrelated complaint in response to his refusal to attend the training. Although Mr Mansfield's counsel sought to draw a temporal inference from the timing of the EDI training (26 July 2023) and the timing of the initial complaint (sometime in August or early September 2023) to demonstrate that the complaint and the 18 October 2023 meeting were acts of discrimination or victimisation, there is no logical correlation between the two events, and any connection is entirely speculative.64 The fact that two events occur close in time does not necessarily mean they are related. 94 Also, there is no causal connection between the conduct of G and L at the human resources meeting and Mr Mansfield's resignation. The outcome was that three of the four allegations were substantiated he was issued with a 'verbal warning and counselling'.65 It was not suggested by G or L at the human resources meeting that he should resign, nor was it suggested in the previously prepared outcome letter he was given at the meeting. The only suggestion that Mr Mansfield was being forced to leave his employment with the Respondent came from Mr Mansfield himself in the online article he wrote which stated he may be 'sacked', which G referred to when he yelled at Mr Mansfield during the meeting. Any suggestion that there was a campaign to force him to resign is, on the accepted facts, fanciful. Indeed, the outcome letter concluded by stating: Declan, thank you for your time and considered response to these matters. We hope that we can work together to overcome and continue the exceptional customer service which we know you are capable of delivering.66 64 ts 71, 5 May 2026. 65 Tribunal Report, page 696. It is unclear whether the reference to 'counselling' refers to the content of the human resources meeting or whether Mr Mansfield was required to attend further counselling. 66 Tribunal Report, page 697. -- 24 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 25 95 As part of establishing a victimisation claim, an applicant must prove that the victimiser intended to cause the complainant detriment for the dominant or substantial reason that the complainant has made or proposes to make a complaint under the EO Act.67 If there are no facts from which to prove or infer such an inference, there is no basis for a victimisation complaint.68 96 The facts alleged by Mr Mansfield do not support a logical inference that the dominant or substantial reason for the complaint, investigation and human resources meeting were to victimise him for his views about EDI training. As I have already stated, there is no logical connection between those events, and any such connection is entirely a matter of conjecture and speculation. Nor do the facts support a conclusion that there was an intentional campaign against Mr Mansfield to cause him detriment by forcing his resignation because of his views about the EDI training. Instead, the facts support an inference that Mr Mansfield's resignation was his own voluntary decision. Further, they support an inference that the Respondent expected Mr Mansfield would continue in his employment with the Respondent, as indicated by the wording of the outcome letter which expressed the hope that the Respondent would continue to 'work together' with Mr Mansfield. The Respondent's acceptance of Mr Manfield's voluntary resignation is also of no significance and does not raise any inference that there was a concerted campaign to force his resignation. 97 In his written submissions Mr Mansfield admits that he does not have evidence of the causative link between the conduct complained of and the victimisation and discrimination alleged. He wants to make his case by looking at any evidence filed by the Respondent and by cross-examining the Respondent's witnesses to ascertain their political views and their motivations towards Mr Mansfield.69 I am therefore satisfied that Mr Mansfield wants to proceed to a final hearing of this matter based on assumption, conjecture and speculation in the hope that he can find some evidence to prove causation at the hearing. 98 The second flaw concerns the identification of a comparator. Specifically, to establish discrimination pursuant to s 53(1) of the EO Act, Mr Mansfield must establish, on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent treated him differently (that is, less favourably) than 67 Folan at [61] - [63]. 68 Laurent No 1 at [67] cited in Folan at [62]. 69 'Applicant's Outline of Submissions in opposition to the Respondent's application pursuant to s 47 of the State Administrative [sic] Act 2005 [sic] WA' dated 3 April 2026, paras 9, 10, 13, 14. -- 25 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 26 another person in the same or similar circumstances. That other person is referred to as a 'comparator'. 99 In his complaint to the Commissioner and in his written submissions in this Tribunal, Mr Mansfield did not identify a comparator. 100 In his written submissions to this Tribunal, Mr Mansfield submitted that the issue of the comparator 'is a matter which [is] more appropriately addressed at a final hearing, where cross-examination of the respondent's witnesses can take place'.70 101 In oral submissions, it was submitted by counsel for Mr Mansfield that Mr Mansfield is to be compared to a person who does not share his political beliefs. He also invited a comparison between Mr Mansfield and the individuals named in his statement of issues, facts and contentions, which included G, L, S and K. It was submitted that G was a comparator because he did not share Mr Mansfield's political beliefs and was not subject to a disciplinary process.71 However, it is a matter of conjecture as to what G's political beliefs are and whether he was subject to a disciplinary process. Similarly, it is a matter of conjecture as to what the political beliefs of Mr Mansfield's other co-workers are. 102 When pressed by the Tribunal about the issue of a comparator, Mr Mansfield's counsel stated in oral submissions that Mr Mansfield could be compared to a hypothetical person who does not share his political beliefs and who was the subject of a similar complaint, and to ask how that hypothetical person would have been treated.72 103 The comparator may be a hypothetical person, but there must be a factual basis for the comparator. Relevantly, in Edoo v Minister for Health73 the Tribunal observed: It is not necessary to identify an actual person in comparison with whom a complainant is less favourably treated. It may be that the comparator is hypothetical. … Nevertheless, the factual foundation for conclusions about the way in which the comparator is, or would be, treated, must be established.74 70 'Applicant's Outline of Submissions in opposition to the Respondent's application pursuant to s 47 of the State Administrative [sic] Act 2005 [sic] WA' dated 3 April 2026, para 51. 71 ts 75, 5 May 2026. 72 ts 73 - 75, 5 May 2026. 73 Edoo and Minister for Health [2010] WASAT 74 (Edoo). 74 Edoo at [162]. References omitted. -- 26 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 27 104 With respect, Mr Mansfield has not been able to identify a comparator with any specificity, nor has he identified a factual foundation for a comparator. According to Mr Mansfield, the comparator is either an actual person, namely one of his colleagues, G, L, S and/or K, or a hypothetical comparator. Mr Mansfield relies on the Respondent filing evidence and calling witnesses so that he can cross-examine them to identify further facts as a foundation from which to draw his conclusions about a comparator. This approach is prejudicial to the Respondent being able to answer Mr Mansfield's case because the Respondent will not know who Mr Mansfield contends the comparator is until at some point during the final hearing. Fundamentally, and regardless of a specific comparator being identified by Mr Mansfield, there is nothing in the facts alleged by Mr Mansfield that suggest that a hypothetical comparator, or a comparator who is an actual person, would be or has been treated differently or more favourably than in the manner in which Mr Mansfield was treated. 105 Similarly, and with respect to causation more generally, Mr Mansfield wants the matter to proceed to a final hearing so he can question the Respondent's witnesses regarding their political beliefs and motivations to ascertain whether they sought to discriminate against him or victimise him due to his views about EDI training. However, Mr Mansfield is the applicant in this proceeding and has the burden of proving his discrimination and victimisation complaints on the balance of probabilities. If the matter proceeds to a hearing, it is plausible that at the close of Mr Mansfield's case the Respondent may again seek dismissal if the state of the evidence demonstrates that the proceeding is lacking in substance75, without the Respondent having to call any witnesses or to positively answer Mr Mansfield's case. 106 Even if the Respondent did not seek dismissal at the close of Mr Mansfield's case at a final hearing, the Respondent may decide not to call the witnesses Mr Mansfield wants to cross-examine. If the Tribunal were to give leave to Mr Mansfield to summons those witnesses, he would not be able to cross-examine them and could only ask questions by way of examination-in-chief. 107 I am satisfied that it would not be consistent with the main objectives of the Tribunal in s 9 of the SAT Act to proceed with a substantive hearing based on a mere hope of establishing a causative link. Those objectives include to achieve the resolution of complaints 75 Laurent No 1 at [19]. -- 27 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 28 fairly and speedily, in accordance with the substantial merits of the case, and to minimise the cost to the parties. Mr Mansfield admits that he cannot currently prove a causative link between his refusal to attend the EDI training and the subsequent events (including the human resources meeting, his resignation and the acceptance of his resignation) which he alleges constitute discrimination and/or victimisation. He is seeking to use the final hearing to attempt to confirm his suspicions and assumptions about his colleagues' political beliefs and motivations for their actions. Proceeding to a substantive hearing in these circumstances would be prejudicial to the Respondent. The Respondent would have to either incur the time and cost of preparing for and attending a hearing to answer a case that is entirely speculative, or in bringing a further dismissal application at the close of Mr Mansfield's case. Allowing a matter to proceed to a substantive hearing in these circumstances would also burden the Tribunal's limited resources by taking up valuable hearing time and delaying other meritorious matters from being determined. 108 Consequently, with respect to the first and second flaw I have identified, I am satisfied that Mr Mansfield's case, with respect to both victimisation and discrimination, is based on conjecture, assumption and speculation and that it is therefore untenable, groundless, not arguable and has no reasonable prospects of success. I therefore find that the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived and lacking in substance, within the meaning of s 47(1)(a) of the SAT Act. 109 The third flaw in Mr Mansfield's application is with respect to three of the proposed orders he is seeking from this Tribunal. The proposed orders could not be made by the Tribunal under s 127(b) of the EO Act because they would amount to an abuse of process. They also indicate that Mr Mansfield is bringing the proceeding for an improper purpose. 110 Before considering these three orders, and to clarify, one of the other remedies Mr Mansfield is seeking is for the Respondent to pay him compensation for loss and damages he has suffered due to his resignation. Mr Mansfield is also seeking that G and L be joined as parties and is seeking orders requiring them to pay him compensation.76 Seeking compensation for discrimination or victimisation is unproblematic because the payment of compensation is a commonly 76 G and L were not parties to the complaint before the Commissioner and no formal joinder application has been made. Given this, and the outcome of this matter, it has not been necessary to consider whether G and L should be joined as parties to this proceeding. -- 28 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 29 sought remedy if unlawful discrimination or victimisation is established under s 127(b)(i) of the EO Act. 111 However, for the reasons set out below, the remainder of the relief sought by Mr Mansfield in the three other proposed orders is problematic. 112 The three proposed orders in question that Mr Mansfield is seeking are77: An order pursuant to s 127(b)(ii) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) that the respondent be enjoined, prohibited and prevented from: (a) subjecting its employees to training courses which are based upon, whether in part or in full, an underlying political or philosophical belief; and (b) disregarding its employees' personal political beliefs and convictions when requiring an employee to undertake a specified training course. An order pursuant to s 127(b)(iii) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), that the Respondent: (a) abolish all workplace training which is, or which a reasonable person would believe is, based upon, whether in part or in full, a political or philosophical belief; (b) ensures its work environment remains politically neutral and is otherwise devoid of political or philosophical propaganda; (c) remove all posters, flyers or other symbols that a reasonable person would consider to have, or be based upon, a political or philosophical belief; and (d) require its employees to attend an approved training course on respect for other persons' political beliefs and convictions. An order pursuant to subsection 127(b)(iv) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) that any policy of the respondent incorporated pursuant to an employment contract which forces or subjects an employee to comply or attend workplace training based upon, whether in part or in full, an underlying political or philosophical belief, be declared null and void ab initio. 77 Applicant's 'Statement of Material Facts, Issues and Contentions', pages 27 - 28, paras H, I and J. -- 29 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 30 113 Section 127 of the EO Act sets out the orders that the Tribunal can make after holding an inquiry into an equal opportunity complaint referred to it by the Commissioner: After holding an inquiry, the Tribunal may - (a) dismiss the complaint that is the subject of the inquiry; or (b) find the complaint substantiated and do any one or more of the following - (i) except in respect of a representative complaint or a matter referred to the Tribunal for inquiry as a complaint pursuant to section 107(1), order the respondent to pay to the complainant damages not exceeding $40 000 by way of compensation for any loss or damage suffered by reason of the respondent's conduct; or (ii) make an order enjoining the respondent from continuing or repeating any conduct rendered unlawful by this Act; or (iii) except in respect of a representative complaint or a matter referred to the Tribunal for inquiry as a complaint pursuant to section 107(1), order the respondent to perform any reasonable act or course of conduct to redress any loss or damage suffered by the complainant; or (iv) make an order declaring void in whole or in part and either ab initio or from such other time as is specified in the order any contract or agreement made in contravention of this Act; or (v) decline to take any further action in the matter. 114 Section 161 of the EO Act provides that employers may be vicariously liable for the acts of their employees which contravene the EO Act. It provides: (1) Subject to subsection (2), where an employee or agent of a person does, in connection with the employment of the employee or with the duties of the agent as an agent - (a) an act that would, if it were done by the person, be unlawful under this Act (whether or not the act done by the employee or agent is unlawful under this Act); or (b) an act that is unlawful under this Act, -- 30 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 31 this Act applies in relation to that person as if that person had also done the act. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to an act of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection done by an employee or agent of a person if it is established that the person took all reasonable steps to prevent the employee or agent from doing acts of the kind referred to in that paragraph. 115 The orders sought by Mr Mansfield are subjectively expressed. What is more problematic is their effect. Firstly, the proposed orders seek to prevent the Respondent from engaging in lawful training which the Respondent has a statutory duty to undertake. The proposed orders would also prevent the Respondent from taking reasonable steps to avoid being vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. Secondly, one of the proposed orders seeks to interfere with future employment contracts between the Respondent and third parties (future employees) by making any contractual requirement to attend training 'based upon an underlying political or philosophical belief' (by which I understand Mr Mansfield is referring to EDI training), as 'null and void ab initio'. 116 It is apparent from the volume of online opinion pieces written by Mr Mansfield that he submitted to the Commissioner which span over 200 pages which, amongst other things, criticise EDI laws and requirements as curtailing freedom of speech and individual rights,78 that Mr Mansfield strongly disagrees with EDI training and with what he sees as the 'woke' philosophy behind that training. 117 Further, these proposed orders are being sought despite Mr Mansfield having resigned from his employment with the Respondent. They are broad and far reaching in that they do not involve Mr Mansfield and, as I stated above, seek to restrict the Respondent from providing lawful training to its employees, as well as restricting the Respondent's freedom to agree lawful contractual terms with future employees. 118 Overall, I am satisfied, and find, that Mr Mansfield is not bringing a genuine equal opportunity complaint to the Tribunal but rather, that he is pursuing these proceedings to prevent the Respondent from engaging in lawful EO training because he has a philosophical disagreement with 78 See, for example, 'The Library Association's double standard on free speech', Tribunal Report, page 28 - 30; 'When even media watch almost gets it', Tribunal Report, page 95. -- 31 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 32 it. I find that this constitutes an improper purpose within the meaning of s 47(1)(b) of the SAT Act. 119 In addition, the proposed orders would inhibit or prevent the Respondent from complying with workplace health and safety laws. Section 161 of the EO Act, stated above, requires an employer to take all reasonable steps to prevent their employees from doing acts that would be unlawful under the EO Act. The EO Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against persons in employment based on sex, marital status, pregnancy, breastfeeding, gender history, family responsibility, sexual orientation, race, religious or political conviction, impairment and age. It also makes sexual harassment in employment unlawful. 120 A common 'reasonable step' by which an employer can meet their obligations under the EO Act is to provide training to their employees on their obligations under the EO Act, something that is often referred to as EDI training. Offering training about respect at work is also common and reasonable step to comply with other legislative requirements which impose obligations on the Respondent to provide a safe workplace for their employees including psycho-social hazards such as bullying.79 121 I am satisfied, and find, that asking for relief in the form of orders that would prevent the Respondent from complying with their statutory obligations, which include providing lawful training to their staff in these circumstances, would also amount to an abuse of process within the meaning of s 47(1)(c) of the SAT Act. The Tribunal cannot make an order directing the Respondent not to comply with the law, or which would require the Respondent to breach the law or expose themselves to legal liability by preventing them from fulfilling their statutory obligations. Conclusion 122 For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied, and I find, that because s 47(1)(a), s 47(1)(b) and s 47(1)(c) of the SAT Act apply, the proceeding should be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to s 47(2) of the SAT Act on the ground that it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, 79 See also, the Work, Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), s 19(3)(f), which provides that a person conducting a business has a primary duty of care to ensure the health and safety of its workers which includes the provision of training about workplace health and safety. Further, the Work, Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA) provide that an employer must provide suitable and adequate information, training or instruction in a way that is readily understandable, r 39. They also require employers to eliminate psycho-social hazards (which can include workplace interactions or behaviours - see r 55A(a)(iv)) as far as is reasonably practicable, with the possible measures to be taken including the provision of information, training and instruction, r 55D(2)(1). -- 32 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 92 Page 33 lacking in substance, because it is being used for an improper purpose, and because it is otherwise an abuse of process. 123 I therefore make the following order: Order The Tribunal orders: 1. The proceeding is dismissed pursuant to s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) on the ground that it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance, is being used for an improper purpose and is otherwise an abuse of process. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. DR M EVANS-BONNER, SENIOR MEMBER 4 AUGUST 2026 -- 33 of 33 --