WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION -v- FARRANT [2026] WASC 322

[2026] WASC 322 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CIVIL CITATION : WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION -v- FARRANT [No 4] [2026] WASC 322 CORAM : GETHING J HEARD : 24 JULY 2026 DELIVERED : 24 JULY 2026 PUBLISHED : 5 AUGUST 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 1316 of 2023 BETWEEN : WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION Plaintiff AND MEHRZAD FARRANT Defendant Catchwords: Application for recusal - Actual bias - Reasonable apprehension of bias Legislation: Nil Result: Application refused -- 1 of 5 -- [2026] WASC 322 Page 2 Category: B Representation: Counsel: Plaintiff : Ms C Guy Defendant : In Person Solicitors: Plaintiff : Faculti Lawyers Defendant : In Person Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Armet v Stephen Browne [2024] WASCA 44 Clark v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2025] WASCA 127 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 Frigger v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 159 Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 22 Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant [No 2] [2026] WASC 253 WKS v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 178 WKS v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2020] WASCA 178 Zaghloul v Bradley Bayly Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 81 -- 2 of 5 -- [2026] WASC 322 GETHING J Page 3 GETHING J: (This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 24 July 2026 and has been edited to correct grammar and infelicities of language and to include full references to relevant evidence and authorities). 1 On 25 June 2026, the Defendant, Mehrzad Farrant, filed an application seeking an order that I recuse myself from any further hearings in this action on the grounds of 'bias, prejudice and conflict of interest' (Recusal Application). In support of the Recusal Application, she filed an affidavit sworn 25 June 2026. 2 Where a recusal application is made on the grounds of bias, it should be dealt with in the first instance by the judge against whom the assertion of bias is made.1 3 There are two bases on which bias may be asserted against a judge, actual bias and apparent bias. I will proceed on the basis that the Defendant asserts both forms. 4 The finding of actual bias is a grave matter. An allegation of actual bias must be distinctly made and clearly proved. Such a finding should not be made lightly and cogent evidence is required. It may arise from the judge having an interest in the outcome. It may arise from the judge pre-judging an issue. The inquiry requires an assessment of the state of mind of the judge in question. However, it is not confined to a consideration of the intentional state of mind of the judge. Actual bias may be subconscious. Generally speaking, that inquiry has to be undertaken based on what the judge has said and done.2 5 In my view, nothing in the Defendant's affidavit or my review of the transcript of the hearing of 22 June 2026 provides any basis for an assertion of actual bias. The Defendant does not assert that I have any interest in the outcome. To the extent that there is a suggestion of prejudgment, it is in relation to comments by me to the effect that if I am asked the same question in a future application, I will give the same answer as I have already done. 6 Reasonable apprehension of bias will be established if a fair- minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might 1 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 [175] (Kirby J). 2 See generally: Armet v Stephen Browne [2024] WASCA 44 [57]; Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 22 [18]; WKS v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2020] WASCA 178 [341]. -- 3 of 5 -- [2026] WASC 322 GETHING J Page 4 not bring an impartial mind the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. In applying this principle, it is necessary to identify what is said that might lead a judge to decide a case other than non-legal or factual merits, and to articulate a logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on the merits. The reasonableness of the apprehension may then be assessed. The test is objective and the fair-minded observer is someone who is aware that the person who is being observed is a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require him or her to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. However, the observer is cognisant of human frailty and understands that information and attitudes, consciously and conscientiously discarded, might still sometimes have a subconscious effect on even the most professional of decision makers.3 7 There is nothing in the Defendant's affidavit that would cause a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the remaining questions I am required to decide. 8 The matters set out in the Defendant's affidavit are essentially challenges to the merits of the decision I made on 22 June 2026, which is reported as Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant [No 2] [2026] WASC 253. This was also evident in submissions made by Ms Farrant this morning. However, merely because a court has decided matters against a party and that party feels aggrieved, does not mean the party has a basis for a claim of actual or reasonable apprehension of bias.4 The concerns of the Defendant are, in my view, concerns that ought properly be raised in an appeal from my decision. 9 The recusal application is dismissed. 3 Zaghloul v Bradley Bayly Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 81 [79] (the court); Frigger v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 159 [59] - [69] (the court). 4 Clark v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2025] WASCA 127 [17] (the court); Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 21 [23] (Quinlan CJ); WKS v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 178 [345] (the court). -- 4 of 5 -- [2026] WASC 322 GETHING J Page 5 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. CC Associate to the Hon Justice Gething 5 AUGUST 2026 -- 5 of 5 --