COMMUNITY CORPORATION 27862 INC v WATKINS [2026] SADC 89

Appellant: COMMUNITY CORPORATION 27862 INC Counsel: MR B JAMES - Solicitor: JONES HARLEY TOOLE Respondent: BENJAMIN ALEXANDER WATKINS Counsel: MS G GRAY - Solicitor: LYNCH MEYER Hearing Date/s: 18/12/2025 File No/s: CIV-25-011875 B DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Civil: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. COMMUNITY CORPORATION 27862 INC v WATKINS [2026] SADC 89 Judgment of Her Honour Judge Mackenzie 30 July 2026 MINOR CIVIL REVIEW - INSPECTION RIGHTS - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION The applicant sought review of a decision of the Magistrate ordering the community corporation to refrain from interfering with Mr Watkins' right to inspect the lot owner register as far as permitting him to make a record (oral or in writing). Following the Magistrate's decision the issue of whether Mr Watkins is entitled to scan, photograph or otherwise copy the register remained extant. Mr Watkins contended that his right to inspect pursuant to s 139(1)(e) of the Community Titles Act encompassed a right to copy all or part of the register, but at the very least he had a right to make a record of the register during inspection in terms ordered by the Magistrate. Mr Watkins relied upon authorities that had held similar rights of inspection as also permitting copying and the need to interpret the right of inspection so as to give it practical utility. The community corporation contended that Mr Watkins had no right to copy the register and questioned the extent to which making a record during inspection would amount to copying all or part of the register. The community corporation relied on principles of statutory construction and emphasised the constraint needed because of the personal and private nature of the lot owner details (including telephone numbers and email addresses) revealed on inspection. Held: affirming the judgment of the Magistrate: (1) Properly construed s 139(1)(e) of the Community Titles Act does not permit the lot owner register to be copied, and the community corporation is entitled to restrain Mr Watkins from using a smartphone or imaging device to take photographs or scan copies of the register. (2) To give practical utility to the right of inspection, Mr Watkins is permitted to make a note or record (by oral or written means) during his inspection of the register. -- 1 of 24 -- (3) Note taking, as opposed to taking wholesale copies of the register (or extracts of it), allows s 139(1)(e) to fulfil its purpose with respect to communications between lot owners and prospective lot owners and others with an interest in a lot. (4) It was open for the Magistrate to deploy s 142 of the Community Titles Act in the manner he did because the orders made were not inconsistent with the substantive rights of inspection under s 139(1)(e) of the CT Act. Community Titles Act 1996 (SA); Strata Titles Act 1988 (SA); Statutes Amendment (Community and Strata Titles) Act 2012 (SA); Real Property Act 1886 (SA); Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA); Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW); Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth); Unit Titles (Management Act) 2011 (ACT); Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA); Community Titles Regulations 2011 (SA); Companies Clauses Act 1863 (UK), referred to. Mutter v Eastern and Midlands Railway Company (1888) 38 ChD 92; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384; Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia [2023] HCA 22; Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd [1997] HCA 53; Ormerod, Grierson & Co. v St. George’s Ironworks, Limited (1905) ChD 505; Boord v African Consolidated Land and Trading Co [1898] 1 Ch. 596; Downey v Pryor, Woodward and Hunt (1960) 103 CLR 353; The Owners – Units Plan No 1475 v Davidson & Anor (Appeal) [2022] ACAT 10; Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; Mills v Meeking [1990] HCA 6; Taylor v Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 (2014) 253 CLR 531; McKay v Australian Alpaca Association (1997) 69 SASR 218, considered. -- 2 of 24 -- COMMUNITY CORPORATION 27862 INC v WATKINS [2026] SADC 89 Introduction 1 The appellant, Community Corporation 27862 Inc., was established to manage and administer 207 community lots and common property at Pelican Drive, Mannum Waters, South Australia. The respondent, Mr Watkins, is the registered proprietor of Lot 98. 2 Mr Watkins had sought to exercise his right to inspect the lot owner register maintained and held by the Corporation pursuant to s 139(1)(e) of the Community Titles Act 1996 (SA) (CT Act). A question then arose as to whether this right of inspection also entitled him to copy the register; the Corporation maintained that it did not and stopped Mr Watkins from taking photos of the register using his phone. Mr Watkins instituted a claim in the minor civil jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court pursuing, amongst other orders, a right to take a copy of the register upon inspection. 3 The matter was heard by Magistrate Barnett on 2 October 2025 and ex tempore reasons for decision were delivered. The Magistrate determined that Mr Watkins’ right to inspect also entitled him to make a record of what he inspects, including by speaking into a recording device during inspection. The Magistrate accepted that different considerations may apply to taking a photograph or video of the register but preferred not to express a concluded view about this. Instead, the Magistrate made orders pursuant to dispute resolution provisions under s 142 of the CT Act requiring the Corporation to make the register available for inspection to Mr Watkins and directing the Corporation not to impose any condition or term of such inspection that would prevent him from making a handwritten or oral record of the information contained on the register. 4 The Corporation was not satisfied with the judgment and sought review of the matter pursuant to s 38(6) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA). At the review hearing it became apparent that the key issue for consideration was the extent to which s 139(1)(e) of the CT Act requires a community corporation, when making a lot owner register available for inspection, to permit the lot owner to make a record of the register whether by note taking or by otherwise copying it. 5 A subsidiary issue was whether it was appropriate for the Magistrate to have deployed s 142 of the CT Act to make orders regulating the inspection of the lot owner register by framing his orders as resolving a dispute under s 142. Section 142 is a dispute resolution provision which enlivens certain powers of the Court, including to make orders to resolve a dispute by requiring a party to take action or refrain from any further action. -- 3 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 2 Review procedure 6 This matter falls within the minor civil action jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court Act by operation of s 149A of the CT Act. It was dealt with as such in the Magistrates Court. 7 The review of the matter is governed by s 38(7) of the Magistrates Court Act which relevantly provides that the Court may inform itself as it thinks fit and must act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms. Further, in determining the matter, the Court may: (i) affirm the judgment; or (ii) rescind the judgment and substitute a judgment that the Court considers appropriate. There is no power to remit the matter back to the Magistrates Court because the review did not arise from a default or summary judgment. 8 As the matter before me was principally one of statutory interpretation there was no application made for me to rehear evidence. The parties referred to some relevant aspects of their written submissions before the Magistrate and their oral submissions at the review hearing. 9 Both parties were granted permission to be legally represented. Parties’ submissions Overview of the Corporation’s submissions 10 The Corporation sought orders rescinding the judgment of the Magistrate contending that no order should be made permitting copying, or copying-like conduct, beyond bare inspection of the lot owner register. The Corporation’s case was that the proper interpretation of the language used, particularly the word “inspect”, in s 139(1)(e) does not disclose an intention to permit copying of the register. The Corporation maintained that where courts had construed similar provisions in other legislation to extend the meaning of “inspect” to also permit copying, those cases, many of which were very old Chancery authorities, should be distinguished on the basis that they derive from a different legislative context and different period. 11 Further, the Corporation submitted that s 142 is a procedural mechanism under the CT Act for resolving disputes and it does not independently permit the Court to create a substantive right to copy the lot register that is not available under s 139(1)(e). Overview of Mr Watkins’ submissions 12 Mr Watkins sought orders affirming the judgment of the Magistrate. 13 Mr Watkins submitted that the Court ought to adopt a practical approach to the construction of s 139(1)(e) to enable the information on the lot owner register to be meaningfully used following inspection. Mr Watkins submitted that the Court could rely upon the line of authorities, beginning with Mutter v Eastern and -- 4 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 3 Midlands Railway Company,1 that had interpreted a right to copy to be incidental to a right to inspect. Ultimately, I understood Mr Watkins to contend that the Corporation is required to allow Mr Watkins to inspect the register and it is then up to Mr Watkins as to how he records the information available during the inspection, including as to whether he commits it to memory, takes a written or oral note of it or copies it via his iPhone or other electronic or digital means. Mr Watkins acknowledged that the right should not be entirely unfettered but he did not seek to define any appropriate guard rails beyond accepting that the Corporation might properly refuse inspection for some improper or nefarious purpose, which he submitted could be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 14 Further, Mr Watkins submitted that even if s 139 is insufficient to enable a record of the lot owner register to be made, s 142 provided a means for the Court to make practical orders to resolve the dispute with the Corporation and to thereby allow Mr Watkins to make a record of the register. Community Titles Act 15 In 1996 the CT Act shaped what was developing reform of property law for non-traditional ownership of land. It was stated to be introduced to ‘provide more flexibility, accommodating mixed use developments in a way that strata had not done, and also to promote good planning and innovation’.2 Prior to 1996, the Strata Titles Act 1988 (SA) and predecessor strata laws forming part of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) had governed this kind of common interest property law. 16 The long title to the CT Act describes it as: An Act to provide for the division of land into lots and common property; to provide for the administration of the land by the owners of the lots; and for other purposes. 17 Section 5 of the CT Act provides for it to be read together with the Real Property Act ‘as a single Act’. 18 Section 10 of the CT Act provides for the establishment of community corporations when a plan of community division is deposited with the Registrar- General in the Lands Titles Registration Office. The owners of the community lots are the members of the community corporation (s 10(2)). The corporation is the mechanism by which the owners of community lots participate in the administration of the community parcel (s 10(3)). 19 Part 13 of the CT Act is headed “Records, audit and information to be provided by corporation”. Division 1 of Part 13 is headed “Records”. Section 135 provides: 1 (1888) 38 ChD 92. 2 Hon KT Griffin, Attorney-General, Community Title Bill, Second Reading Explanation, Attorney- General’s Department, South Australia, 1996. -- 5 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 4 135—Register of owners of lots (1) A community corporation must maintain a register of the names of the owners of the community lots which shows— (a) the owner's last contact address, telephone number and email address known to the corporation; and (b) the owner's lot entitlement. (2) A corporation must keep a record of the information used to compile the register for the period required by the regulations. 20 Pursuant to s 136 a community corporation is also obliged to make and keep other records, including accounting records and records of any notice or order served on the corporation, all correspondence received and sent by the corporation, and copies of all notices of meetings. Section 137 requires a community corporation to also prepare and keep statements of accounts in respect of each financial year and to have them audited pursuant to s 138. 21 Division 3 of Part 13 is headed “Information to be provided by corporation”. Section 139, being the subject of this case, provides: (emphasis added) 139—Information to be provided by corporation (1) A community corporation must, on application by or on behalf of the owner or prospective owner or the registered mortgagee or prospective mortgagee of a community lot or a development lot, within 5 business days after the making of the application— (a) provide a statement setting out— (i) particulars of any contribution payable in relation to the lot (including details of any arrears of contributions in relation to the lot); and (ii) particulars of the assets and liabilities of the corporation; and (iii) particulars of any expenditure that the corporation has incurred, or has resolved to incur, and to which the owner of the lot must contribute, or is likely to be required to contribute; and (iv) particulars in relation to any other matter prescribed by regulation; and (b) provide copies of— (i) the minutes of general meetings of the corporation and meetings of its management committee (if any) for such period, not exceeding two years, specified in the application; and (ii) the statement of accounts of the corporation last prepared by the corporation; and -- 6 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 5 (iii) current policies of insurance taken out by the corporation; and (c) make available for inspection such information as is required to establish the current financial position of the corporation including— (i) a copy of the accounting records of the corporation; and (ii) the minute books of the corporation; and (iii) any other documentary material prescribed by regulation; and (d) if the community corporation is a party to a contract with a body corporate manager—make available for inspection a copy of the contract; and (e) make available for inspection the register maintained under section 135. Maximum penalty: $500. (1a) A community corporation must, on application by an owner of a community lot or a development lot provide the applicant, on a quarterly basis, with ADI statements for all accounts maintained by the corporation (and must continue to so provide the statements until the applicant ceases to be an owner or revokes the application). Maximum penalty: $500. (1b) Subsection (1a) does not apply to a community corporation if a body corporate manager maintains the accounts on behalf of the corporation. (2) An application under this section must be accompanied by the fee prescribed by regulation. (3) A community corporation must not charge more than the fee prescribed by regulation in respect of a service provided in pursuance of an application under this section. Maximum penalty: $500. (4) The application is duly made if given or sent to— (a) the secretary of the community corporation; (b) if the community corporation has a management committee—any member of the management committee. (5) A person to whom a statement of a community corporation is provided under subsection (1)(a) may, as against the corporation, rely on the statement as conclusive evidence (as at the date of the statement) of the matters contained in the statement. -- 7 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 6 22 It is the interpretation of sub-paragraph (1)(e) above, which requires the community corporation to make available for inspection the lot owner register maintained under s 135, that is at the heart of this case. Sub-paragraph (1)(e) was introduced into the CT Act by the Statutes Amendment (Community and Strata Titles) Act 2012 (SA) (Statutes Amendment Act) as an addition to the pre-existing provisions for information to be given to lot owners and others. At that time the second reading speech described the amendment as follows: (emphasis added) 37—Amendment of section 139—Information to be provided by corporation This clause amends section 139 to require a community corporation to provide information under the section within 5 business days of the application for the information. This amendment also includes additional documents that must be made available for inspection on application by an owner, prospective owner, mortgagee or prospective mortgagee (being any contract entered into with a body corporate manager under proposed section 78B and the register of owners kept under section 135). This amendment also provides for the community corporation to provide an owner of a community or development lot, on application, with statements for all bank accounts maintained by the corporation (unless a body corporate manager maintains the accounts on behalf of the corporation). 23 The 2012 amendments also amended s 135(1) of the CT Act to require that the register also record the telephone number and email address of each member and their lot entitlement. Before 2012 the register had only recorded each lot owner’s name and last known address. 24 It can be seen that s 139 sets out how different information is to be provided by a community corporation to an applicant, including the owner of a community lot. 25 For contributions payable in relation to a lot, assets and liabilities of the corporation and expenditure of the corporation, the information is to be given to the applicant by way of a statement (s 139(1)(a)). That statement can then be relied upon, as against the corporation, as conclusive evidence of the matters contained in the statement (s 139(5)). 26 For minutes of general meetings, and meetings of the management committee, the latest statement of accounts and current policies of insurance, the corporation is to provide copies to the applicant (s 139(1)(b)). Similarly copies of quarterly ADI statements are to be provided unless a body corporate manager maintains the accounts on behalf of the corporation (s 139(1a) and (1b)). 27 For information required to establish the current financial position of the corporation, including accounting records and minute books, the information is to be made available for inspection by the applicant (s 139(1)(c)). 28 And if the corporation is a party to a contract with a body corporate manager, a copy of the contract is to be made available for inspection by the applicant -- 8 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 7 (s 139(1)(d)). Likewise, as already noted, the lot owner register is required to be made available for inspection by the applicant (s 139(1)(e)). 29 A penalty of $500 applies for breach of those provisions. 30 An application for information made under s 139 must be made to the secretary of the corporation (or any member of the management committee, if any) and be accompanied by the fee prescribed by regulation (ss 139(2) and (4)). The corporation cannot charge more than the fee prescribed (s 139(3)). Regulation 25 of the Community Titles Regulations 2011 (SA) prescribes fees for the provision of statements under s 139(1)(a), ADI statements under s 139(1a), copies of minutes, statements of account and insurance policies under s 139(1)(b) and for the inspection of documents relating to the current financial position of the corporation under s 139(1)(c). Either no fee or a lesser fee is prescribed where the applicant is a lot owner. No fee is prescribed for inspection of the lot owner register under s 139(1)(e). 31 Regulation 23(2) of the Community Titles Regulations also requires: (emphasis added) (2) All documents and records to be kept by a corporation must be kept in an orderly manner to enable them to be found easily for the purposes of inspection or copying. 32 Regulation 23(3) then prescribes the periods for which a corporation must keep its ‘records and documents’. No reference is made to the register of lot owners; instead, regulation 22 provides: 22-Register of owners of community lots (section 135(2) of Act) A community corporation must keep a record of information used to compile its register of the names and addresses of the owners of the community lots for a period of at least 7 years. 33 This indicates that the legislature has deliberately treated the information making up the register of lot owners under s 135 differently from other documents and records required to be kept by a corporation. 34 Other provisions of the CT Act also make reference to information being made available by way of inspection: s 44 provides for a corporation to make available for inspection or purchase up-to-date copies of the by-laws; s 51 requires a community corporation to make an up-to-date copy of a development contract that is in force and relates to a lot or the common property available for inspection or purchase by owners of lots; s 108 provides lot owners with an entitlement to inspect polices of insurance that are in force and were taken out by or on behalf of the community corporation. Section 108(4) provides that a request made under s 108 for the inspection of policies of insurance must be complied with within 5 business days after the making of the request. A $500 penalty applies for a breach of s 108. -- 9 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 8 35 Division 1A (Delegations by corporation) of Part 9 of the CT Act was also introduced in 2012 by the Statutes Amendment Act. It includes s 78B, which provides for the delegation of functions or powers from a community corporation to a body corporate manager, including for specific provision to be set out in a written contract between them. At subsections (8) and (9) of s 78B there is provision for copies of certain documents to be made available to members (ie lot owners) of the community corporation in the following terms: (8) The body corporate manager must ensure that a copy of the contract, and any other prescribed information or document of a kind prescribed by regulation is available for inspection by members of the corporation at least 5 clear days before the date of the meeting at which the corporation is to consider whether or not to enter into the contract. (9) The body corporate manager must, at the request of any member of the corporation, make a copy of the body corporate manager’s policy of professional indemnity insurance available for inspection and copying by the member within 3 business days of the request. (emphasis added) 36 Again, there is a maximum penalty of $500 for a breach of these provisions. 37 A similar distinction is drawn between inspection and copying in Division 1A, s 78D (Offences), which provides at subsection (7): (emphasis added) (7) A delegate of a community corporation who holds records of the corporation must, at the request of any member of the corporation – (a) make those records available for the member to inspect within 10 business days of the request; and (b) provide the member with a copy of any of the records on payment of a fee (not exceeding a fee calculated in accordance with the regulations). 38 A $500 penalty also applies for a breach of this requirement. 39 Also introduced by the 2012 amendments is a provision entitling members to inspect copies of nominations and appointments of powers of attorney given by owners to a person for the purpose of attending and voting at meetings (s 84(10a)). 40 Similarly, provisions also appear in the Real Property Act that would seem to emphasise a difference between inspection and copying: ss 213(d) (‘and each party shall have liberty to inspect the same, and take copies thereof, at his own expense’); 220A(3) (‘enabling the instrument, document or item to be inspected and enabling copies of, or extracts or notes from, the instrument, document or item to be made or taken’). Given the application of s 5 of the CT Act these provisions are to be read as forming part of a single Act (refer to paragraph 17 above). -- 10 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 9 Principles for statutory interpretation 41 It is the duty of the Court ‘to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have’.3 42 The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose.4 Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense.5 This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction.6 Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.7 43 The discernment of statutory purpose is integral to the making of a constructional choice, presented by a statutory text read in context, between the ordinary or grammatical meaning of the text and another meaning.8 This is reinforced by the unqualified statutory instruction that, in interpreting a provision of an Act, the interpretation that best achieves the purpose or object of the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to any other interpretation.9 The Court may consider the purposes of the relevant legislation in determining whether there is more than one possible construction but may not rewrite legislation in the light of its purposes.10 Any meaning must be consistent with the language in fact used in the relevant legislation.11 44 Extrinsic materials are a ‘useful guide to purpose’ and their consideration therefore speaks to the essence of Australia’s statutory interpretation function.12 3 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) (‘Project Blue Sky’). See also at 366 [13], 374–5 [41] (Brennan CJ). However, the difficulties in ascribing intention to Parliament as a collective are duly noted: Stephen Gageler, ‘Legislative Intention’ (2015) 41(1) Monash University Law Review 1, 10–13. 4 SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, 368 [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ), 374–5 [37]–[38] (Gageler J), 388–9 [82]–[83], 392 [92] (Edelman J); Project Blue Sky at 381-382 [69]-[71]; [1998] HCA 28; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46-47 [47]; [2009] HCA 41. 5 CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408; [1997] HCA 2. 6 SZTAL at [14]. 7 SZTAL at [14]. 8 SZTAL at [37]-[38] (Gageler J). 9 Section 14 of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA). 10 Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia [2023] HCA 22 at [15]; Mills v Meeking [1990] HCA 6; (1990) 169 CLR 214 at 235. 11 Disorganized Developments at [15]; Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd [1997] HCA 53; (1997) 191 CLR 85 at 113; Taylor (2014) 253 CLR 531 at 549 [39]. 12 Lisa Burton Crawford et al, Public Law and Statutory Interpretation: Principles and Practice (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2021) 267. -- 11 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 10 To assist in the ascertainment of the meaning of a provision, s 16 of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) permits the Court to consider extrinsic materials: (a) to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision (taking into account its context in the Act … and the purpose or object underlying the Act …); or (b) to determine the meaning of the provision – (i) if the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or (ii) if the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision … leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable. 45 The extrinsic materials that can be considered include the second reading speech made to a House of Parliament by a Minister or other member of Parliament.13 Care must be taken when adopting a meaning not easily taken from the words of a provision; s 16(3) of the Interpretation Act provides: In determining whether consideration should be given to any material, or in considering the weight to be given to any material, regard must be had, in addition to any other relevant matters, to – (a) the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision (taking into account its context in the Act …); and (b) the need to avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating advantage. Relevant authorities 46 There is no authority directly addressing the construction of s 139(1)(e) of the CT Act and what is meant by the requirement to “make available for inspection” the register of members maintained under s 135. 47 A number of authorities have, in the context of other similar statutory and contractual provisions, addressed the issue of what is contemplated by a provision that requires documents to be made available for inspection. Whilst the answer has typically been to give such a provision broad compass to contemplate copying, the answer may differ depending upon the relevant statutory text, context and purpose. 48 Mindful of the limited assistance that can therefore be gained from the exercise, it is nevertheless useful to address some of the key authorities before considering the present statutory construction exercise. 49 Mutter v Eastern and Midlands Railway Company14 is an early English case frequently cited as authority for taking a pragmatic approach to determining the extent of the rights of members to inspect a register of members maintained by a 13 Section 16(2)(f) of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA). 14 See note 1. -- 12 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 11 body corporate. In that case Mr Mutter was a shareholder in the Eastern and Midlands Railway Company. He had sought to inspect various company documents, including the register of debenture stockholders, and to be allowed to take copies and notes having regard to the terms of s 28 of the Companies Clauses Act 1863 (UK). That provision was in terms that a register of debenture stock shall be kept and shall be accessible for inspection and perusal at all reasonable times, without express provision as to copying. It was in contrast to s 10 of that Act which provided for the keeping of a shareholders’ address book and enabled any shareholder to peruse the address book gratis, and require a copy of all or any part of it for a sum to be paid. 50 The principal matter decided was that access to the register of debenture stockholders could not be denied on the basis that the holder of stock in the company wishing to exercise the right held the stock at the instance of the rival company and for the purpose of serving the interests of that rival company. At first instance, Chitty J observed:15 according to the mere words of the enactment, it is a right to inspect, and to inspect only, but there is no prohibition on the shareholder, during the time that he makes his inspection, making notes of that which he inspects. As was said, he might, if he could, commit the whole register to memory. That of course would be a difficult thing to do. But there is nothing in the Act which prevents his making a note, and if he may make a note, I do not see why he may not make a complete note of any particular part: in other words, why he may not make an extract, and from that it seems to follow that he may make a reasonable use of the inspection and take a copy. So far from the provision of sect. 10 being in favour of Mr Wright’s argument it appears to me to be against him, because that section alone, applied to a particular case, imposes on the company a liability to give a copy, and the company are not under any liability to give copies under the other section. The silence of the Legislature as to taking copies appears to me to be immaterial. I think that when a man is inspecting he may make bona fide use of his inspection, and it follows from his right to inspect that he can make copies. 51 On appeal, in the course of his judgment, with which Cotton and Bowen LJ agreed, Lindley LJ observed:16 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted) I have not been able to find a single case either at law or in equity in the court has ever held that a person having a right to inspect a document has not also a right to take a copy of it, or so much of it as he requires for some legitimate purpose. The right to take a copy is treated as incidental to the right to inspect, and the common form of orders to inspect is to inspect and take copies. This seems to be the common form at law when a mandamus is granted, and when an order is made on a motion in a pending action, and this is, and, so far as I have been able to discover, always has been, the common form of an order to inspect when made in Chancery. A great number of cases on this subject will be found collected in the well-known note to Rex v Fraternity of Hostmen in Newcastle-upon-Tyne and in Chitty's Archbold; and an examination of these and other authorities has led me to the conclusion that, speaking generally, a right to take copies is always treated as incidental to 15 Mutter at 98. 16 Mutter at 105. -- 13 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 12 a right to inspect. (See also Browning v Aylwin; Rex v Lucas; Rex v Merchant Tailors' Company; In re Burton and The Saddlers' Company.) 52 He went on to observe:17 (footnotes omitted) When the right to inspect and take a copy is expressly conferred by statute the limit of the right depends on the true construction of the statute. When the right to inspect and take a copy is not expressly conferred the extent of such right depends on the interest which the applicant has in what he wants to copy, and on what is reasonably necessary for the protection of such interest. The common law right to inspect and take copies of public documents is limited by this principle, as is shewn by the judgment in Rex v Justices of Staffordshire; so is the common law right of the member of a corporation to inspect and take copies of the documents of the corporation: Rex v Merchant Tailors' Company. Bearing in mind these principles it is necessary to turn to the statute on which the Plaintiff relies, and to see what right it confers upon him. The section which gives him the right to inspect is silent on the subject of taking copies. There is, however, a section relating to another matter in the Companies Clauses Act, 1845, viz., sect 119, which expressly gives a right to take copies as well as a right to inspect. But this section imposes a penalty, and as it was intended to impose a penalty not only in the case of a refusal to allow inspection, but also in the case of a refusal to allow a copy to be taken, it was necessary to say so in express words, and to mention both inspection and taking copies. The fact, therefore, that both are mentioned in this section, whilst inspection only is mentioned in sect. 28 of the Act of 1863, does not shew that in framing this last section a right to take copies was intended to be excluded. 53 In another early case, Ormerod, Grierson & Co. v St. George’s Ironworks, Limited,18 the court had ordered that the applicants, their solicitors and agents were at liberty to inspect and peruse documents produced by the defendants in the process of discovery prior to trial. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to make copies of the documents produced in accordance with the order despite changes in the procedural rules under the Judicature Act, which the defendants had argued only permitted copies to be taken from another party and not made by the inspecting party. In so finding, Vaughan-Williams LJ cited Mutter and found that the order took its ordinary meaning from prior to the Judicature Act giving the plaintiffs the power to go themselves and make copies and extracts, though the usual practice was to take the copies from the solicitors of the defendants.19 The Court acknowledged that where the right to inspect is a statutory right it is always necessary to look to the statute to see whether a right to make copies was also given citing Boord v African Consolidated Land and Trading Co.20 as a case where the court ought to have found the true construction of the statute, on which alone the right to copies of the register depends, did not entitle a person inspecting the register to also take copies. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams described it as follows:21 17 Mutter at 106. 18 (1905) ChD 505. 19 Stirling LJ agreeing at 513. 20 [1898] 1 Ch. 596. 21 Ormerod at 512. -- 14 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 13 It seems to me that the statute fenced the right of the person inspecting, with regard to copies, by saying that he may require a copy of any portion of the register. That is not language to describe taking a copy, and, further, there is another restriction that he is to pay 6d. per hundred words for such portions of the register as he requires to be copied. 54 In Australia, the High Court considered a statutory right of inspection of local government books of account and the report of the auditor, in Downey v Pryor, Woodward and Hunt.22 The case turned on the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) providing for a prescribed method of inspection where no such method had been prescribed. Justices Kitto and Windeyer found that in those circumstances the method of inspection could be exercised by an elector in any appropriate manner.23 In that case Windeyer J also addressed the penalty aspects of the provision if the council refused an elector to make an inspection, noting that requiring an elector to come at a convenient time ‘is not necessarily a refusal of permission’ and stating:24 The right of an elector to see the council’s books of account is an important safeguard of the integrity of the system of local government. And, speaking generally and not in relation to this particular case, its importance would be much diminished if it enabled an elector to ascertain only that certain sums of money had been collected and disbursed. The public value of the safeguard may lie in electors being able to ascertain to whom funds in the control of a council have been paid. 55 Following those observations, Windeyer J, citing Mutter, said that he agreed with the trial judge, Kinsella J, that a right of inspection carries by implication a right to take copies or extracts.25 However, he went on to note the following exception: A right to take copies does not accompany a right of inspection if it be impliedly excluded by express provisions in the statute enabling copies to be had on payment: In re Balaghat Gold Mining Company.26 56 Justice Perry reached a similar conclusion to Kitto and Windeyer JJ when construing the rules of the Australian Alpaca Association in McKay v Australian Alpaca Association.27 In that case Mrs McKay had sought a declaration that she was entitled to inspect the books of the Association, more particularly a pedigree register maintained by the Association. Justice Perry found that the model rules expressly provided members of the Association with a right to inspect and copy the register. Justice Perry remarked that if it was necessary (which it was not in that case) to do so, he would have found that there was an implied contractual right of access by reason of the nature of the contract which exists between the members for the time being and the Association, being the rules of the Association.28 This was said in view of his finding as to the purpose of the pedigree information 22 (1960) 103 CLR 353. 23 Downey at 362 (Kitto J); at 365-366 (Windeyer J). 24 Downey at 366 (Windeyer J). 25 Ibid. 26 (1901) 2 KB 665. 27 (1997) 69 SASR 218. 28 McKay at 228. -- 15 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 14 maintained on the database being to make it available to its members. He also cited Mutter to support that the implied contractual right would have also entitled Mrs McKay to take a copy of the register, stating:29 the “interest” which she is entitled to further by inspecting the register in question is an interest the reasonable exercise of which ought to carry with it a right to take a copy. Her desire to do so for the purpose of what I have held to be genuine research is, as I have already found, entirely consistent with the purpose and objects of the Association. When the cases speak of taking a copy, it seems to me that in 1997 that should be regarded as carrying with it the right to use such technical aids, whether electronic or mechanical, as may reasonably be made available for that purpose. We are past the age of Dickens when clerks sat at high desks using quill pens to make copies. 57 Justice Perry eschewed any notion that Mrs McKay had to disclose the purpose for which she requested inspection of the register, distinguishing the cases referable to the records of a company and directors who owe fiduciary duties to it.30 He found Mrs McKay and other members of the Association were entitled to use the information available through the Association in the pursuit of their own business or personal interests because the establishment of the register was for their benefit. 58 My attention was also drawn to the more recent decision of the Appeal Tribunal of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal in The Owners – Units Plan No 1475 v Davidson & Anor (Appeal)31 where the right of access to a unit holder register was addressed. I found that case to be of little assistance to resolution of the issue before me because the Unit Titles (Management) Act 2011 (ACT) in that case expressly provided unit holders with a right to both inspect and take a copy of the register (s 116). The decision ultimately turned on the meaning of an ‘eligible person’ making a request and found that access to the information was limited to the unit in which the eligible person had an interest and common property. That legislation was also found to be difficult to decipher and the Appeal Tribunal called upon the Attorney-General to amend Part 7 to clarify the regime for access to information, citing the New South Wales legislation as having provisions that may be readily considered.32 59 Several observations may be made following this survey of the key authorities. The first is that Mutter has been frequently cited by judges as authority for a right to make (or take) a copy of documents as ordinarily being incidental to the right to inspect those documents. However, perhaps more consistently with modern principles of statutory construction, the authorities have not ignored that the ambit of a statutory right to inspect documents will depend upon the text, context and purpose of the provision in the statute from which that right derives. 29 McKay at 231. 30 Ibid. 31 [2022] ACAT 10. 32 For example, Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) sections 182-183. -- 16 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 15 60 Further, none of the authorities have grappled with the construction of a right to inspect personal contact details of members of a body corporate in the modern world of the internet and the phenomenon of identity theft. The Corporation submitted that this was a matter of significance when considering the application of the older authorities. As I understood Mr Watkins’ submissions, he did not resile from the proposition that phone numbers and email addresses of lot owners represent information of a more private kind than their postal addresses. Mr Watkins contended there were obvious practical and appropriate reasons for a lot owner to take a record of personal email or phone details of other lot owners from the register in order to contact them, being likely to be the most usual means. I return to consider these submissions below. Interpretation of s 139(1)(e) Text 61 Submissions were made by both parties as to their competing constructions of s 139(1)(e) of the CT Act from its text. 62 Relying upon Mutter and the later authorities which had confirmed it, Mr Watkins submitted that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words “make available for inspection” carry with them the incidental right to take a copy, at least unless the legislation expressly limits that right. In reliance upon those authorities, Mr Watkins also contended that if Parliament intended to exclude copying it could have expressly said so by using words such as “make available for inspection but not copying”. 63 Mr Watkins relied on that broader understanding of the right to inspect by drawing an analogy with other statutory rights to inspect. Mr Watkins referred the Court to s 90A of the Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which provides that a copy of the electoral roll is available for public inspection during ordinary office hours. He said that s 90A initially speaks simply in terms of ‘inspection’, without separately spelling out a right to copy. He then pointed to s 90A(5), which says that a right of inspection under that section does not include the right to copy or record by electronic means the roll or part of it. His submission was that this wording is significant because it shows Parliament thought it necessary to exclude electronic copying expressly. On his argument, that only makes sense if ‘inspection’ would otherwise naturally include some ability to copy or record information. Having regard to these provisions, Mr Watkins said the Electoral Act demonstrates a legislative assumption that inspection is not confined to merely looking and allows for a person to make some form of record. The Electoral Act expressly drew the line at electronic copying meaning that a person was still able to take handwritten notes. By analogy for the community titles context, if handwritten noting is compatible with ‘inspection’ of the electoral roll, then inspection of the lot owner register should likewise allow at least handwritten or oral recording. -- 17 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 16 64 As outlined above, the Corporation resisted the broader Mutter construction of the text, submitting that the natural meaning of the words ought not be extended from the bench and any such extension requires the imprimatur of Parliament. 65 The Corporation submitted that the word ‘inspect’ speaks for itself; it has an ordinary, natural meaning that does not include ‘copy’. The Corporation noted that by any ordinary or dictionary meaning, ‘to inspect’ is to look at, examine or check, and is not to make or take a copy. The Corporation argued that the absence of any definition of ‘inspect’ or its analogues in the CT Act does not create ambiguity; the word is clear and unambiguous on its face, so there is no textual warrant to extend it beyond its ordinary meaning. 66 In that regard, I note that the Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘inspection’ as follows: inspection 1. inspecting, especially careful or critical inspecting or viewing. 2. formal or official viewing or examination: an inspection of the troops. 67 A similar dictionary definition applies to other inflected forms of the word ‘inspection’. 68 The Corporation rejected any analogy with the Electoral Act provisions or other statutes. The Corporation submitted that those statutes either expressly permitted copying or set out specific guard rails. 69 On the Corporation’s construction the literal meaning of the words ‘make available for inspection’ reveals Parliament’s intention and there is genuine difficulty in giving the words a broader meaning without Parliament having expressed any guard rails. On the other hand, Mr Watkins’ construction gives practical meaning to the text supported by Mutter and the line of authorities which followed. 70 Resolution of this issue presented by these competing constructions presents the Court with difficulty. Consistently with the modern approach to statutory construction, it is necessary to undertake consideration of the text also having regard to its relevant context and purpose. Context 71 To understand s 139(1)(e) it is important that s 139 is read as a whole and in the context provided by the whole of the statutory framework. 72 Both parties made submissions about the provisions surrounding s 139(1)(e), particularly those provisions that have been set out above that make express reference to community corporations being required to provide copies of certain -- 18 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 17 information, records or documents. As noted, the CT Act does appear to draw a deliberate textual distinction between ‘copy’ and ‘inspect’. 73 The Corporation pointed to the nature of the register to be maintained under s 135 of the CT Act requiring the recording of telephone numbers and email addresses, which ought to be characterised as personal or private information. As such, the Corporation claimed that statutory context tells against construing s 139(1)(e) as authorising the copying of the register. In this regard, it is perhaps relevant to note that s 65 of the Real Property Act makes express provision for a registered proprietor to seek to have access to their details restricted from searches of the Register Book held by the Lands Titles Office: (emphasis added) 65—Search allowed (1) Subject to this section, any person may have access to the Register Book, and to all instruments lodged or deposited in the Lands Titles Registration Office, for the purpose of inspection during the hours, and on the days, appointed for search. (1a) If an instrument is lodged electronically, the Registrar-General may determine that only the instrument as registered is to be accessed. (2) If, on the application of a person whose particulars are, or are to be, contained in the Register Book or in any instruments lodged or deposited in the Lands Titles Registration Office, the Registrar-General is satisfied that access under this section to any such particulars would be likely to place at risk the personal safety of the person, a member of the person's family or any other person, the Registrar-General may take such measures as he or she thinks fit to prevent or to restrict access to those particulars. … 74 The Corporation also pointed to the distinct and careful use in the CT Act and Regulations of the differing concepts of purchase, inspection and copying by Parliament. Similar distinctions are also present in the Real Property Act, which is to be read together with the CT Act.33 75 The Corporation emphasised that in s 139(1)(b), for example, Parliament expressly used language requiring a corporation to provide copies of particular documents, whereas in ss 139(1)(c), (d) and (e) it used only the language of making material available for inspection. The proposition was that, as a matter of text, that contrast must be meaningful: if ‘inspect’ already included ‘copy’, then the express use of ‘copy’ elsewhere in the same section would be unnecessary. The Corporation argued it was telling that Parliament adopted the different terms, and sometimes both terms, in the CT Act but chose not to use ‘copy’ in s 139(1)(e). 76 The Corporation pointed to s 139(1)(d), which provides only for inspection of the contract to which a corporation is party with a body corporate manager, suggesting that if making available for inspection of a copy of the contract also 33 See s 5 of the CT Act. -- 19 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 18 impliedly permitted copies of the contract to be made, that would likely be problematic for confidentiality obligations to the body corporate manager who would not wish the contract terms to be copied exposing them to a heightened risk of publication. 77 The Corporation contended that Parliament could easily have said ‘inspect and/or copy’ if that is what it meant. As noted above, this phrase is reflected in s 78B(9) which refers to the policy of professional indemnity insurance of the body corporate manager being made ‘available for inspection and copying’ within three business days of the request; and reg 23(2) of the CT Regulations, which directs community corporations to maintain ‘documents and records’ so that they can be found easily for the purposes of ‘inspection or copying’. 78 Mr Watkins cautioned against this contextual approach to the construction of s 139(1)(e). Mr Watkins relied upon the different kind of language in ss 139(1)(c), (d) and (e) which is to ‘make available for’ inspection as being distinct from compelling a community corporation to provide copies of documents and records under s 139(1)(b). Mr Watkins argued that read together these provisions present an active obligation on a community corporation to provide copies of certain documents and records under s 139(1)(b) but only a passive obligation to ‘open up the books’ under ss 139(1)(c), (d) and (e), which he then contended entitles the lot owner to take notes or copies or whatever they wish in relation to that inspection exercise. 79 To my mind the most compelling context for s 139(1)(e) derives from its inclusion in the CT Act in 2012, together with other amendments made pursuant to the Statutes Amendment Act – including to s 78B(9), which expressly refers to enabling lot owners to both inspect and copy the body corporate manager’s policy of professional indemnity insurance. Given that express language used differently by amendments introduced by the same amending Act, it is difficult to envisage that Parliament intended the reference to a lot owner’s right to inspect to mean something different under ss 78B(9) and 139(1)(e) such that it was necessary to expand the former to include an express right to copy. Purpose 80 As to the purpose of s 139(1)(e), Mr Watkins made submissions that it was introduced to permit lot owners to communicate with other lot owners whether to address complaints between lot owners or whether to gauge the views of other lot owners to the management of the community corporation or a body corporate manager. Mr Watkins submitted that the purpose of the CT Act is to manage and administer community corporations, including – in part – facilitation of communication and correspondence between lot owners to either resolve issues (eg complaints about loud music) or have conversations about their body corporate manager or other matters affecting their interest. He maintained that it was entirely consistent with the nature of a community scheme that lot owners would be entitled to not only view but also take a record of contact details of other lot owners, -- 20 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 19 whether that be of their email address or their phone number. He said it would be absurd if a lot owner’s inspection rights were so limited that they could not make some kind of handwritten note or otherwise copy or record what is on the register; without that facility, he said the provision is rendered ‘utterly useless’.34 81 It was Mr Watkins’ case that without an expansive application of the right to inspect, lot owners would be reliant upon the Corporation or a body corporate manager to pass on complaints or to arrange meetings of lot owners and for other communications between them, even in cases where lot owners were raising concerns about the Corporation or the body corporate manager or in other circumstances where there might be a self-serving reluctance to communicate such matters. 82 In response to the Corporation’s submissions that the legislature could not have intended that lot owners would have carte blanche access to the phone numbers and email addresses of other lot owners or prospective lot owners, Mr Watkins said there could be practical mechanisms introduced by the Corporation to address this. For example, Mr Watkins thought it would be prudent for the Corporation to first check with a lot owner if a person was seeking to inspect the register on the basis that they were interested in acquiring that lot owner’s interest.35 83 Mr Watkins also pointed to those community schemes where there is no body corporate manager and only a small number of lot owners which are self-managed and there is a greater need for the exchange of contact information between lot owners to prevent dysfunctional scenarios where only the presiding officer can contact lot owners. Conversely, he submitted that a narrow reading would also be unrealistic in a scheme with hundreds of lots, where an owner may need contact details of multiple lot owners for legitimate statutory purposes such as communicating with neighbours or convening a meeting and would not be able to remember multiple contact details upon inspection of the register. 84 The Corporation submitted that the inspection right under s 139(1)(e) exists to enable a legitimate check of corporation-related information and is not designed to permit copying or broader use of the information beyond the CT Act’s administrative purposes. The Corporation acknowledged that the purpose of s 139 is to make certain information available to persons with a relevant interest, being lot owners, prospective lot owners, mortgagees or prospective mortgagees; however, from the Corporation’s perspective the language used made it clear that Parliament deliberately distinguished between documents for which copies must be provided and documents merely made available for inspection, and any broad purpose attributed to the provision could not alter the language used. It contended that the right to inspect essentially permits people with a relevant interest to have a checking mechanism so that they can confirm a particular detail for a lot owner 34 T63.21. 35 T62.32. -- 21 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 20 or to check the register more generally and this was quite a different perspective from allowing a relevant person to take copies of names, email addresses and telephone numbers for all lots. Mr James for the Corporation said that allowing an expansive approach, which might enable private information about lot owners, including telephone numbers and email addresses, to be used for purposes unrelated to the CT Act, such as marketing, harassment, lobbying or other inappropriate distribution, would be inconsistent with the administrative purposes of the CT Act. 85 I am reminded that, ultimately, it is necessary to find the purpose of a provision within what the legislation actually says.36 Little is to be gained from the consideration of the extrinsic materials in this case, and it is difficult to discern the desired reach or operation of s 139(1)(e) from them. For instance, the reference in the second reading speech to the inclusion of provisions to allow additional documents to be made available for inspection on application by an owner, prospective owner, mortgagee or prospective mortgagee gives no indication of the desired breadth of that right of inspection. Consideration 86 I am confronted with the obvious tension between giving s 139(1)(e), a broad or narrow interpretation. At one extreme Mr Watkins would be permitted to view the register but would not be able to take any notes; at the other extreme he would be entitled to use his smartphone to scan or photograph the entire register without any limitation. Ultimately I prefer a construction that sits at neither end of these extremes, and is consistent with the practical effect of the Magistrate’s orders to allow Mr Watkins to view the register and make handwritten notes or to take an oral record. 87 To my mind, limiting a relevant person wishing to inspect the register to the taking of notes (written or oral) limits the extent to which the private information of lot owners contained on the register can be misused, including by being posted online or on-sold for marketing purposes. This interpretation means that there is practical utility given to the right to inspect, and avoids it being a literal absurdity that would only serve people with photographic memories. However, it also means that a person cannot leave the inspection after a few minutes with an unauthorised duplicate of the register. The person inspecting is necessarily required to exert physical effort into the inspection process, which is more likely to naturally limit the kind of information taken to that which is specifically needed and thereby avoids release of an easily shareable permanent copy of all lot owners’ private contact details. 88 My preferred construction of s 139(1)(e) necessarily rejects Mr Watkins’ submissions that a right to take a copy of the register (or a part of it) is incidental to the right to inspect. This is a clear case where it is necessary to examine the terms of the statute to determine whether Parliament intended to grant relevant 36 Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378 at [25]-[26] (French CJ and Hayne J). -- 22 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 21 persons a right to take copies of the register. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation laid out above to the construction of s 139(1)(e) I am satisfied that the right to inspect does not also encompass a right to take wholesale copies of the register (or extracts of it) because the text of the provision when read in the context of the entirety of the CT Act (also incorporating the Real Property Act) gives force to the process of copying being distinct from the process of inspecting. The purpose of s 139(1)(e) can also be met by allowing inspection to entail note taking without permitting wholesale copying; note taking allows the provision to fulfil its purpose with respect to communications between lot owners and prospective lot owners and others with an interest in a lot. 89 Implicit in this conclusion is also my finding that, for the purposes of the CT Act, copying is different from the act of note taking during an inspection. My preferred construction also has regard to the personal nature of the information available on the register, particularly the telephone numbers and email addresses of lot owners, which I accept is of a more private kind of information than a contact address. In this regard I adopt the submission of the Corporation that the legislature had cause to be more protective of this kind of private information. 90 I am fortified in my conclusion by s 139(1)(e) having been introduced in 2012 under the Statutes Amendment Act together with other new provisions explicitly using words like ‘provide copies’ or ‘inspect and copy’ which indicates that Parliament had an eye to there being a difference between a right to inspect a document and the taking of a copy. While there was already a dichotomy between the two concepts in the CT Act, the difference was sharpened by the 2012 amendments. I also observe that by 2012 the use of smart phones was prevalent in our community and it is doubtful that Parliament would not have understood the ease by which an individual could take photographs of documents in the course of an inspection by way of copying them; by that time it would have been apparent to Parliament that it was no longer necessary to have access to a traditional form of photocopying machine. As such, I consider Parliament deliberately refrained from giving lot owners a right to take photographs or scanned images of the lot owner register. Section 142 – dispute resolution 91 In view of the conclusion I have reached, the subsidiary issue as to whether s 142 of the CT Act can be deployed to grant substantive rights not otherwise available on the face of the litigation does not arise. There was nothing inconsistent with s 139(1)(e) in the orders made by Magistrate to the extent Mr Watkins was permitted to make a record of what he inspected; or, as the Magistrate characterised it, to cause the Corporation to refrain from imposing any condition on Mr Watkins that would prevent him from making a handwritten note or oral record of the information contained on the register. Had the Magistrate expressly enabled Mr Watkins to scan or photograph the register I would have had difficulty with such deployment of s 142 of the CT Act. -- 23 of 24 -- [2026] SADC 89 22 Conclusion 92 Therefore, in my opinion the Magistrate was correct to allow Mr Watkins to take a note (written or oral) of the lot owner register because this was not inconsistent with the register being made available for inspection pursuant to s 139(1)(e) of the CT Act. This is so, even though the Magistrate purported to do so pursuant to s 142(8) of the CT Act without making any finding as to the proper construction of s 139(1)(e). 93 In view of the conclusions I have reached as to the proper construction of s 139(1)(e) of the CT Act, Mr Watkins is not permitted to take a copy of the register by using his smart phone or any other imaging device by way of photographs or scanned images of the register and the Corporation is entitled to restrain him from doing so. 94 I will therefore make orders affirming the judgment of the Magistrate and to the extent the parties consider it necessary I will hear their submissions as to costs. -- 24 of 24 --