LUKIN PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) -v- BRISTOW [2026] WASC 326

[2026] WASC 326 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CIVIL CITATION : LUKIN PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) -v- BRISTOW [No 2] [2026] WASC 326 CORAM : GETHING J HEARD : 3 AUGUST 2026 DELIVERED : 3 AUGUST 2026 PUBLISHED : 7 AUGUST 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 2159 of 2025 BETWEEN : LUKIN PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) Plaintiff AND ANGELA VIOLET BRISTOW Defendant Catchwords: Practice and procedure - Enforcement of judgments - Whether there are special circumstances to justify suspending enforcement action Legislation: Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) s 15 Civil Judgment Enforcement Regulations 2005 (WA) reg 9 -- 1 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 Page 2 Result: Suspension order granted Category: B Representation: Counsel: Plaintiff : Ms S Taylor Defendant : In Person Solicitors: Plaintiff : Edwards Mac Scovell Legal Defendant : In Person Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Lukin Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Bristow [2026] WASC 325 National Australia Bank Limited v RGP Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] WASC 102 Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Lock [2022] WASC 276 Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd (Receivers And Managers Appointed) atf The Warwick Entertainment Centre Unit Trust v Silkchime Pty Ltd (Receivers And Managers Appointed) atf The Silkchime Unit Trust [No 4] [2018] WASC 120 -- 2 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 GETHING J Page 3 GETHING J: (This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 3 August 2026 and has been edited to correct grammar and infelicities of language and to include full references to relevant evidence and authorities). 1 On 31 October 2025, the plaintiff, Lukin Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (Lukin), obtained Default Judgment against the defendant, Angela Bristow. Ms Bristow was the sole director of Lukin. Lukin went into liquidation on 18 July 2025. The Default Judgment was for a sum just under $970,000 together with interest and costs. By application filed 29 July 2026, Ms Bristow seeks to suspend enforcement of the Default Judgment (July Suspension Application). The July Suspension Application was listed on an urgent basis as an auction of the subject property is scheduled for 4 August 2026 (tomorrow). 2 To place the July Suspension Application in context, it is necessary to consider the procedural history. 3 The statement of claim endorsed on the writ filed on 9 October 2025 pleaded that over the period from July 2022 to February 2025, Lukin loaned Ms Bristow the amount of $970,000 claimed, which, despite demand, had not been repaid. 4 There is an affidavit of service on the file of Ross Thomas Cutter, a process server, that was filed on 13 October 2025. Mr Cutter deposes that he personally served the writ on Ms Bristow, specifically on a person who identified herself as Angela Violet Bristow, on 10 October 2025. The Default Judgment was then obtained, as I said, on 31 October 2025. 5 There is a second affidavit of Mr Cutter, this time filed on 17 November 2025, where he deposes that he served the Default Judgment on a person who identified herself as Angela Violet Bristow on 16 November 2025. The Default Judgment had the usual notice to the defendant: NOTICE TO DEFENDANT Lukin Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (ACN 009 434 566) has obtained this judgment against you. This notice contains important information about your rights. Please read it carefully. If you believe that Lukin Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (ACN 009 434 566) was not entitled to obtain this judgment against you or if you believe -- 3 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 GETHING J Page 4 that Lukin Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (ACN 009 434 566) should not be allowed to enforce this judgment against you then – • you may apply to the Court for an order setting aside or varying the judgment under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 Order 13 rule 14; • or you may apply to the Court for an order suspending the enforcement of all or part of the judgment under the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 section 15. You should seek legal advice before applying to the Court for orders setting aside or varying the judgment, or suspending the enforcement of all or part of the judgment, because these applications may be complex and you may be ordered to pay costs to Lukin Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (ACN 009 434 566) if your application does not succeed. The Court cannot suspend the enforcement of all or part of a judgment unless there are special circumstances. 6 To date, no application is made to set aside the Default Judgment. 7 On 7 November 2025, Lukin obtained a property (seizure and delivery) order (PSDO). The property the subject of the PSDO was an address in Roleystone, which is Ms Bristow's residence. 8 In affidavit material before the court on earlier matters, I am told that on 6 March 2026, Lukin wrote to Ms Bristow on a without prejudice basis for the purpose of providing her with a final opportunity to attempt to settle the judgment debt without necessitating the sale of the property. This effectively put a pause on enforcement to allow her to respond. She did not respond to that correspondence. 9 On 18 May 2026, Ms Bristow lodged an application pursuant to Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2001 (WA) (CJEA) s 15 to suspend the enforcement of the PSDO (May Suspension Application). 10 On 20 May 2026, Acting Registrar Hill suspended enforcement of the PSDO to 24 June 2026 to allow for the May Suspension Application to be heard, and made programming orders. 11 On 23 June 2026, Acting Registrar Hill dismissed the May Suspension Application (June Decision). 12 As there was an appeal from the June Decision foreshadowed on 14 July 2026, I listed the action for directions on 16 July 2026. -- 4 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 GETHING J Page 5 13 On 16 July 2026, Ms Bristow lodged an appeal from the June Decision which came before me later that day, the day of the directions hearing I had scheduled. I dealt with the application and dealt with the appeal at the directions hearing and dismissed it during my reasons orally.1 14 As mentioned, the July Suspension Application was filed on 29 July 2026. Ms Bristow filed an affidavit in support on the same day. In it, she deposes: Serious Issues to be Determined • I became aware of the present proceedings only after default judgment had been entered against me. • I did not receive personal service of the originating process commencing these proceedings. • During proceedings before this Honourable Court, it was acknowledged that I had not been served with documents from the Plaintiff. • Following those proceedings, I made further enquiries and discovered that documents had allegedly been transmitted to an email address that was not my nominated email address and which I had never authorised or registered for the purpose of service. • Since approximately 2023, my nominated email address has remained the email address recorded with the Supreme Court of Western Australia's eCourts electronic filing system. • At no time before 28th April 2026 was I aware that default judgment had been entered against me. • Had I been made aware of these proceedings before judgment was entered, I would have defended the claim and taken immediate steps to protect my legal position. • As a consequence, I have not previously had the opportunity to place before the Court evidence concerning the basis upon which the Plaintiff alleges that I am personally liable for debts said to be owed by Lukin Pty Ltd. • I respectfully believe that these matters warrant determination before enforcement proceeds, particularly where the sale of my residential property is imminent. 1 Now published as Lukin Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Bristow [2026] WASC 325. -- 5 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 GETHING J Page 6 … Fresh Evidence • Since the determination of my earlier applications, I have obtained additional information that was not before the Court when those applications were determined. • That information includes my discovery that documents had allegedly been transmitted to an email address that was not my nominated or registered email address for service, my subsequent enquiries concerning the legal basis of my alleged personal liability, and the ASIC Company Extract in relation to Lukin Pty Ltd. • The ASIC Company Extract confirms that Lukin Pty Ltd is a separate Australian proprietary company limited by shares. While it identifies me as a shareholder, I have not been provided with documentation identifying the legal basis upon which the Plaintiff alleges that I am personally liable for the company's debts. • Following receipt of that information, I requested that the Plaintiff provide documentation establishing the legal and factual basis upon which it alleges that I am personally liable. As at the date of swearing this affidavit, I have not received those documents. • In my belief, these matters are directly relevant to whether there is a proper legal foundation for enforcement against me personally and were not before the Court when my previous applications were determined. • Had this information been available to me before judgment was entered, I would have relied upon it in defending the proceedings and in seeking disclosure of the legal basis upon which the Plaintiff claims I am personally liable. 15 Ms Bristow then goes on to contest the basis on which the debt, the subject of the Default Judgment, was owed. She complains, among other things, of not having access to the books and records of Lukin so as to be able to identify the legal and factual basis on which the debt is said to be owing. 16 The power to suspend enforcement is contained in CJEA s 15(1). The Supreme Court has this power, which I may exercise in this case. However, by CJEA s 15(3), 'the court may only make such order if there are special circumstances that justify doing so'. -- 6 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 GETHING J Page 7 17 Ms Bristow was required to have personally served a copy of the application on Lukin not less than three working days before the hearing of the application.2 This did not occur. I proceed on the basis that the Supreme Court has the power to waive this requirement in an appropriate case, and I so do. 18 The general principles governing the ground of a suspension order in relation to a final judgment are well settled. A successful litigant will ordinarily be entitled to enforce the judgment. It is for the applicant to move the court to a favourable exercise of its discretion, that is, to establish that there are special circumstances that justify the departure from the ordinary rule. The court will not exercise the discretion unless special circumstances are shown which justify departure from the ordinary rule reflecting what I have just quoted from the CJEA. The classes of cases which meet this test of special circumstances are not closed and each case must be determined on its merits. Delay on the part of the judgment debtor will weigh against the exercise of the discretion. The court may consider the balance of the convenience, including the hardship to the judgment debtor.3 19 In the present case, there are a number of factors pointing against a suspension order being made: (a) Lukin is entitled to enforce the Default Judgment as obtained; (b) Ms Bristow is delayed in making the application; (c) this is the second application for a suspension order, the first having failed; and (d) there has been no application to have the Default Judgment set aside. 20 On the other hand, where the judgment is a default judgment, the central issue will be whether the grant of a suspension order is perceived to be necessary to preserve the subject matter or integrity of the litigation or whether a refusal to make a suspension order could create practical difficulties in respect of any relief which may be 2 Civil Judgment Enforcement Regulations 2005 (WA) reg 9(2). 3 See for example: National Australia Bank Limited v RGP Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] WASC 102 [32]; Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Lock [2022] WASC 276 [19]; Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd (Receivers And Managers Appointed) atf The Warwick Entertainment Centre Unit Trust v Silkchime Pty Ltd (Receivers And Managers Appointed) atf The Silkchime Unit Trust [No 4] [2018] WASC 120 [48]. -- 7 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 GETHING J Page 8 granted following any successful application to set aside or vary the judgment. 4 21 On the material before the court as it stands now, there is a factual dispute as to whether or not Ms Bristow was served with the originating process and with the Default Judgment. Her affidavit says she was not. Mr Cutter says that each document was served on someone who identified herself as Angela Violet Bristow. Ms Bristow in her submissions today provided some context as to what may have happened. In summary terms, that seems to be based on the arrangements she has put in place because of issues relating to her ex-husband which are currently proceeding their way through the Family Court system. 22 If it is the case that Ms Bristow was not personally served with the writ, then the Default Judgment becomes irregular and must be set aside. The balance of convenience is in Ms Bristow's favour for this reason. I accept what she says in her affidavit that if her home is sold while there are outstanding issues, then she will suffer irreversible prejudice. The loss of a home is not something that can be compensated by an order flowing from the setting aside of a default judgement. Given that, there is an issue as to whether or not the Default Judgement is regularly obtained. 23 I am of the view that there are sufficiently special circumstances to justify suspending enforcement of the PSDO. However, I am only prepared to do that on strict terms requiring Ms Bristow to commence an application very quickly to have the Default Judgment set aside. 4 Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Lock [2022] WASC 276 [19] (Derrick J). -- 8 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 326 GETHING J Page 9 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. OB Associate to the Hon Justice Gething 7 AUGUST 2026 -- 9 of 9 --