AMY MICHELLE LOHF v THE KING [2026] SASCA 87

Applicant: AMY MICHELLE LOHF Counsel: MR A TOKLEY KC WITH MR G AITKEN - Solicitor: COATES LAWYERS Respondent: THE KING Counsel: MS Z SMITH - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 31/07/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-26-025641 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. LOHF v THE KING [2026] SASCA 87 Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice S Doyle (ex tempore) 31 July 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - BAIL - AFTER CONVICTION - GENERALLY The applicant was convicted and sentenced for a single count of aggravated causing serious harm by dangerous driving. She seeks permission to appeal the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. The applicant applied for bail pending that appeal. Held: The application for bail is dismissed. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19A(3), referred to. R v Hevko (2018) 272 A Crim R 191, considered. -- 1 of 4 -- -- 2 of 4 -- LOHF v THE KING [2026] SASCA 87 Court of Appeal – Criminal – Application 1 S DOYLE JA (ex tempore): I have before me an application for bail. 2 The applicant was convicted and sentenced for a single count of aggravated causing serious harm by dangerous driving, pursuant to s 19A(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1936 (SA). The offence was aggravated by reason that she committed the offence with a blood alcohol concentration in her blood which exceeded the prescribed minimum. 3 The maximum penalty was life imprisonment. 4 The offending has been described in the sentencing judge’s remarks, but in short, it occurred when the applicant drove a boat over the victim. The victim was swimming close to the riverbank at the time, and was hit by the propeller of the boat. The propellor cut through her torso and she suffered extensive and serious injuries. On the evidence of Professor White, the applicant was likely to have had a blood alcohol concentration of about 0.17 at the time of the accident. On any view, whilst it took only a few seconds, this was a serious instance of a serious offence. 5 The applicant’s personal circumstances are set out in the judge’s sentencing remarks. They were generally deserving of sympathy. She has not previously offended and has good prospects of rehabilitation. 6 The judge imposed a head sentence of three years’ imprisonment, which he reduced to two years, eight months and 13 days on account of the applicant’s plea of guilty. His Honour fixed a non-parole period of one year and four months. The judge declined to order that this sentenced be served on home detention on the basis that this would not adequately reflect the need for general deterrence and punishment. 7 The applicant seeks permission to appeal her sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive, in that the judge erred in declining to order that it be served on home detention. 8 The principles governing an application for bail pending appeal are well settled and need no repetition. 9 There is no presumption of bail. The court has an unfettered discretion. That said, the authorities suggest several relevant considerations, which I address as follows. 10 The applicant’s appeal is genuine and indeed reasonably arguable. However, having regard to the limits upon the Court’s ability to assess the merits of an appeal at this early stage, and in the absence of full submissions, I do not think it can be -- 3 of 4 -- [2026] SASCA 87 S Doyle JA 2 said that the appeal is one with obvious or strong prospects of success. That is so, despite the force of some of the submissions made by Mr Tokley KC by reference the decision of this Court in R v Hevko.1 11 The applicant has been in custody since sentence was pronounced in early June of this year. Given that the applicant contends that a custodial sentence should not have been imposed, the Court must be conscious of the risk of the proposed appeal being rendered nugatory, or at least the practical effect of success being significantly undermined. 12 However, it is significant in this context that I have indicated my preparedness to ensure the expedition of this appeal so that it can be heard in September of this year. By then, the applicant will have served over three months of her sentence. Although only a modest proportion of her overall sentence, it is appropriate to take account of the consideration that, if the appeal succeeds, then it will have involved establishing that the applicant ought not have been imprisoned at all. This risk is a significant consideration in a case such as the present where the applicant has not previously offended, and hence has not previously faced any period of imprisonment. 13 This risk needs to be balanced against the public interest in ensuring that sentencing decisions are not seen as preliminary decisions pending appeal, and in sentences being served promptly. Whilst the nature and weight of this consideration differs slightly where the complaint on appeal is not about the conviction but the location in which the sentence is to be served, it nevertheless remains a weighty consideration. There is also the related concern that, were bail to be granted, but the appeal ultimately to fail, the Court would be left in the invidious position of having to return the applicant to custody. 14 In circumstances where the Court can and will accommodate a September listing of the appeal, I am not persuaded it is appropriate to grant bail pending appeal. 15 The application for bail is refused. 1 R v Hevko (2018) 272 A Crim R 191. -- 4 of 4 --