Bohemian Raw Pty Ltd v Emprja Pty Ltd [2026] QCAT 369

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Bohemian Raw Pty Ltd v Emprja Pty Ltd [2026] QCAT 369 PARTIES: BOHEMIAN RAW PTY LTD (applicant) v EMPRJA PTY LTD (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: RSL063-26 MATTER TYPE: Retail shop leases matter DELIVERED ON: 24 July 2026 HEARING DATE: 15 July 2026 24 July 2026 (Judgment) HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Taylor ORDERS: The Application for an Interim Order (Injunction) dated 10 June 2026 filed by the applicant on 16 June 2026 is dismissed. The interim injunction granted by Order 2 of this Tribunal orders given 16 June 2026 is dissolved. Costs of the Application for an Interim Order (Injunction) are reserved. CATCHWORDS: LANDLORD AND TENANT – RETAIL AND COMMERCIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION – OTHER MATTERS – where parties were parties to a fixed terms lease which had expired – where the tenant argued that it had either exercised the option under that lease, or a new lease had been entered as if the option had been exercised – where the landlord argued that the tenancy arrangement was a month-to-month tenancy following expiry of the fixed term lease – where the tenant and the respondent were otherwise in dispute about outgoings and other issues – where the tenant commenced a dispute resolution process under the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) seeking mediation – where following the dispute resolution process being commenced, the landlord sought to terminate the period tenancy – where the tenant sought an injunction to prevent the landlord terminating the tenancy arrangement and permitting the tenant to stay in occupancy pending conclusion of the dispute resolution process -- 1 of 22 -- 2 EQUITY – EQUITABLE REMEDIES – INJUNCTIONS – INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS – INJUNCTIONS TO PRESERVE STATUS QUO OR PROPERTY PENDING DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS – where parties were parties to a fixed terms lease which had expired – where the tenant argued that it had either exercised the option under that lease, or a new lease had been entered as if the option had been exercised – where the landlord argued that the tenancy arrangement was a month-to-month tenancy following expiry of the fixed term lease – where the tenant and the respondent were otherwise in dispute about outgoings and other issues - where the tenant commenced a dispute resolution process under the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) seeking mediation – where following the dispute resolution process being commenced, the landlord sought to terminate the period tenancy – where the tenant sought an injunction to prevent the landlord terminating the tenancy arrangement and permitting the tenant to stay in occupancy pending conclusion of the dispute resolution process – where the applicant had failed to establish that there was a serious question to be tried – where the applicant had failed to establish that the balance of convenience dictated the granting of an interim injunction Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 3, s 59 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s 46, s 46AA, s 63, s 103 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 Barbagallo & Anor v J. & F. Catelan Pty Ltd & Ors [1986] 1 QdR 245 Duncan Properties v Hunter [1991] 1 QdR 101 Mobileworld Operating Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 1365 Nguyen v Nguyen & Anor [2013] QCAT 315 State Transport Authority v Apex Quarries Ltd [1988] VR 187 Topbeach Pty Ltd v Seafarer Investments Pty Ltd (2010) 110 QSC APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Applicant: Mr N. Rossi – Solicitor of Marino Law Respondent: Mr M.J. May – Counsel instructed by Cooper Grace and Ward Lawyers -- 2 of 22 -- 3 REASONS FOR DECISION Overview [1] From 1 April 2021, the applicant as tenant and the respondent as landlord were parties to a lease of premises in Airlie Beach from which the applicant owned and operated its business known as the Boho Café (the ‘Café’). It was for a fixed term of three (3) years, thus expiring on 1 April 2024, but it provided for an optional three (3) more years beyond the fixed term (the ‘2021 Lease’). [2] Since June 2023, discussions both orally and in writing ensued between them about the tenancy arrangement which was to continue beyond the expiry of the 2021 Lease. Whilst those discussions occurred, it is common ground in this proceeding that the applicant did not give formal written notice to exercise the option within the Lease. But notwithstanding that, and thus the expiry of the 2021 Lease at the end of the fixed term, the applicant has remained in occupancy of the premises and continuing to operate the Café. Yet no formal lease document was executed other than that for the 2021 Lease. Thus, a question that arises is the nature of the arrangement under which it did so. [3] Those discussions continued up to and including a mediation in May 2026 which came about because of the applicant having lodged a dispute notice with the Queensland Small Business Commissioner (the ‘QSBC’) under Part 8 of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) (the ‘RSLA’). That mediation was unsuccessful in resolving the dispute as it then existed, and accordingly the dispute was referred to this Tribunal. That became this proceeding. [4] Shortly thereafter, on 1 June 2026 the respondent sent a document described as a termination notice to the applicant. Therein it is said that, since the expiry of the 2021 Lease on 1 April 2024, the respondent had consented to the applicant continuing to occupy the premises on a month-to-month lease, and that it was terminating the monthly tenancy as of Wednesday, 1 July 2026. In that document the respondent expressed reliance on clause 2.2 of the 2021 Lease (the ‘Termination Notice’). [5] The applicant disputes the validity of the Termination Notice, and the purported termination said to arise thereunder. It asserts that either it exercised the option under the 2021 Lease; or a new lease had been entered into as if the option had been exercised. [6] In an expansion of the ambit of the dispute as it was referred to this Tribunal from the QSBC, the applicant seeks declaratory orders in terms of that purported termination. [7] Given the impending effect of the Termination Notice, and the resulting dispute, on 16 June 2026, the applicant filed an Application for an Interim Order (dated 10 June 2026) in this Tribunal seeking urgent injunctive relief to restrain the respondent from acting on the Termination Notice and thus preserving the applicant’s occupation of the Café pending determination of the substantive expanded dispute.1(the ‘Application for Injunction’) 1 I pause here to note confusion in the filing of the applicant’s application. It also filed an earlier application and supporting affidavit, being dated 9 June 2026, filed 10 June 2026, which was for all intent and purpose identical. At the hearing, the applicant’s legal representative confirmed his client relies only on the application and supporting affidavit filed 16 June 2026. -- 3 of 22 -- 4 [8] On 16 June of 2026, I acceded in part to that request ex-parte, that part being only on an interim basis pending a substantive hearing of the Application for Injunction (the ‘Interim-Interim Injunction’). [9] The Application for Injunction was then heard by me on 15 July 2026. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision informing the parties I would deliver the judgment today. This was because there were strengths and weaknesses in both sides of the contest, and given the somewhat draconian effect when an injunction is either allowed or denied it was my opinion that further consideration was warranted. [10] Having now considered the competing arguments, these are my reasons for the decision I made. [11] Because the injunction in this proceeding is sought when the evidence before this Tribunal is incomplete, and without the benefits of the substantive hearing where the merits of the contest may be thoroughly tested, a heavy burden is placed upon this Tribunal. This is because its decision could prejudice one of the parties. The main concern is that this Tribunal could make the wrong decision, either by granting the injunction in circumstances where the applicant would ultimately fail to establish its rights at the substantive hearing, or by not granting the injunction but then the applicant succeeding at the substantive hearing. [12] For that reason, this Tribunal must follow the course that carries the lowest risk of injustice or prejudice. [13] In navigating that course, it must be recognised that the applicant, being the moving party for injunctive relief, bears the onus of persuading this Tribunal that the relief should be granted.2 It is not for the respondent to have to demonstrate that it should not be granted. It must also be recognised that the aim of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo until the final hearing of the action or determination of the dispute to avoid irreparable harm to the parties’ respective rights prior to that outcome. But it is no easy task to determine how best to bring about that result, and that the application for such must be decided in accordance with established principles.3 [14] Those principles are found in the three-pronged approach refined in the High Court decision of Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (‘ABC v O’Neill’).4 This requires the following questions to be asked: (a) Has the applicant shown there is a serious question to be tried, which may also be considered in terms of whether the applicant has made out a prima-facie case, as to its entitlement to the relief sought? (b) Has the applicant shown that it is likely to suffer injury for which damages would not be an adequate remedy? and (c) Has the applicant shown that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction? [15] But these three questions do not necessarily stand in isolation of each other. Each factor has the capacity to influence one or both other. For example, the question of 2 Mobileworld Operating Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 1365, [213]. 3 Ibid, [212], [213]. 4 (2006) 227 CLR 57, [19] per Gleeson CJ and Crennan J; [65]-[72] per Gummow and Hayne JJ. -- 4 of 22 -- 5 whether damages would be an adequate remedy is sometimes considered by asking the question whether the applicant may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, which is often dealt with as part of the enquiry into the balance of convenience. [16] Having considered the premise for and the relief sought in the applicant’s Application for Injunction, the content of the affidavit material from both parties, the competing written submissions and oral argument, for the reasons which follow, the applicant fails. [17] It did not demonstrate that there is a prima-facie case and in turn a serious question to be tried that supports the granting of an injunction on an interim basis pending the outcome of a substantive hearing. Noting that the evidence is at an early stage and has not yet been fully tested in terms of the merits of the arguments presented, as it is presently before the Tribunal the overwhelming weight of that evidence is that the continued tenancy arrangements beyond 1 April 2024 were nothing more than a month-to-month tenancy governed by the provisions of clause 2.2 of the 2021 Lease, such which the respondent ultimately elected to terminate. [18] Save only for the election to terminate, this seems to have been the accepted position understood by the applicant, even up to and including the conduct of the mediation with the QSBC. It was only after it received the Termination Notice did it otherwise seek to argue that it had, in some way, a substantive right of continued occupancy up to the end of March 2027, such being that which it now asserts. [19] Nor did it demonstrate that damages would be inadequate. The applicant’s loss, if at law it is entitled to compensation for what it says is the loss it would suffer, is a loss which can be quantified by way of relevant and requisite forensic accounting evidence, albeit involving a complex calculation. It is a loss that would be quantifiable by reference to historical and forecast business trading results. There is simply no substance to the applicant’s argument to the contrary. [20] Finally, as to the issue of balance of convenience, given what I have already said about the first two prongs, the balance of convenience cannot fall in the applicant’s favour. But for completeness I should say this. The applicant has not demonstrated that it would suffer any irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. If it is entitled to compensation for harm suffered, it might be said that it is because of the respondent’s conduct which might sound in damages, although I do not make any definitive finding about that. [21] But there is also one other relevant factor, and one which in my opinion would prevail even if I were wrong about the outcome of the three-pronged test. As the respondent’s Counsel properly noted in his oral argument, given the applicant’s case is that it should be entitled to stay in occupation of the Café until the end of March 2027, the reality is that, most likely if not certainly, given the overstretched limited resources of this Tribunal and the current volume of civil matters presently listed awaiting hearing, it is simply not reasonable to expect that the substantive dispute could be heard and decided in this Tribunal before the end of March 2027 unless there was some justifiable reason for it to be expedited. [22] At present there is more than 500 civil matters ready to go to a substantive hearing and queued for listing of that hearing, but with the earliest presently available date for a civil matter listed for hearing being in March 2027. Thus, it is fair to say that it is almost an impossible task to expect that the current dispute between the parties, such which has only relevantly recently been filed and in terms of which the respondent is -- 5 of 22 -- 6 yet to formally respond, could be progressed and decided in a relatively short period. In the absence of the applicant demonstrating a serious question to be tried and other issues which indicate there is substantial commercial risk that could not otherwise be met with an order for damages, such which could be the premise for expediting progress of this dispute to an early decision, there is simply no substance to the need for further consideration of that aspect. It suffices to say that if the injunction sought by the applicant was to be granted, it would be tantamount to effectively granting, at least in part, but moreover the substantial part, the final relief sought without a proper hearing on the merits of the relevant arguments. [23] For completeness I should make one other observation. If the relevant facts as they are presently expressed in the material before this Tribunal suggest anything favourable to the applicant, at best it might be some argument about an equitable estoppel which might be the foundation for a claim in damages for the losses Ms Harrison suggests in her affidavit that the applicant is ‘likely to suffer’. But that is a claim which, as I currently understand it to be within the realms of the applicant’s argument, one potentially beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal as it is conferred by s 103 of the RSLA. Although my comment here must not be construed as me having made any definitive finding on that point. It remains an issue for the applicant to consider further should it press on beyond this point. [24] For all these reasons, the only appropriate orders are to dismiss the Application for Injunction and to dissolve the Interim-Interim Injunction granted by my orders of 16 June 2026. Orders were made to that effect. [25] Having then briefly heard from the parties following delivery of judgment to that effect, an order was made reserving costs of the Application for Injunction, with directions being given for the filing of written submissions on same should the respondent seek to press a claim for costs. Chronology of Relevant Events [26] On 1 April 2021, the parties entered into the 2021 Lease. [27] Under clause 2.3 of the conditions of that lease, if the applicant wished to exercise its option for the further term it was to give notice of that to the respondent not more than nine months nor less than six months before the expiry date. Under clause 16.1 of the conditions, all notices were required to be in writing. By operation of those terms, the requisite written notice would therefore have been required within the period 1 July to 1 October 2023. [28] If that option was not exercised and the respondent was to consent to the applicant continuing to occupy the premises after the expiry date, under clause 2.2 of the conditions of that lease, the applicant would occupy the Café for a fixed term of one month and then for successive periods of one month each, all on the terms of the lease in force as at the expiry date, but on the caveat that either party may end the tenancy at any time by giving one month’s notice to the other. [29] On 22 June 2023, in an email from the respondent’s Chief Executive Officer (Ms Preston (née Purdie)) to the applicant’s Director (Ms Harrison), Ms Preston expressed her positive feedback on the renovations of the Café and made this statement Now that the renovations are complete there are a few things I would like to follow-up on with you. Please let me know a time that would be convenient to meet next week. We can also discuss your new tenancy agreement then. -- 6 of 22 -- 7 [30] On 27 June 2023, in what I infer is an email sent as a follow-up to the meeting which occurred consistent with that earlier email, Ms Preston made this statement: As discussed, we will leave your current lease to run until it ends and can agree new terms at that time. [31] On 1 April 2024, the lease expired. It is common ground that the applicant did not give to the respondent notice in writing of its exercise of the available three-year option during the period 1 July to 1 October 2023, such which followed that exchange of emails in June. [32] On 26 March 2024, Ms Preston and Ms Harrison met. The discussions between them were recorded in a document entitled ‘Boho Café Annual Tenancy Review’. In that document the following appears recording one of the matters discussed, the reference therein to ‘Kat’ being a reference to Ms Harrison (the ‘2024 March Meeting’): Lease Options • Bo Ho Café has one option of three years that can be exercised on 0 1 April 2024. o Kat has confirmed she would like to exercise this option • Current rent is $644.57/sqm x 64 = $41,252.39/annum billed monthly as $3437.70 • the 4% annual increase as per the lease will be applied on 01 April 2024 making the new rate $670.35/sqm x 64 = $42,902.40/annum billed monthly as $3575.20. [33] On 17 June 2024, the respondent’s solicitor sent an email to the applicant’s Ms Harrison in which the following statement appears (the ‘2024 Draft Lease’): We have been instructed to prepare the attached draft new lease for your tenancy reflecting the exercise of your outstanding option. … for the financial year commencing 1 July 2024, for your reference, accompanied by a lessor disclosure statement (as applicable).… (emphasis in original) [34] That email requested the applicant, if all were in order, to print and sign the lease document and return the original thereof to the respondent’s office so that Ms Purdie could countersign it under power of attorney. The document which was attached to that email was a lease which provided for a commencement date of 1 April of 2024 and an expiry date of 31 March of 2027 but without any option for an extension. [35] The immediate day thereafter, being 18 June 2024, in an email from the applicant to the respondent’s Ms Purdie, such which I infer from the document exhibited to Ms Preston’s affidavit in this proceeding is an email sent in direct reply to the 17 June 2024 email from the respondent’s solicitor, the following statement was made. It is shown to have been authored by ‘Kat’ whom I understand to be Ms Harrison: Is it possible to meet with you to discuss the possibility of a month to month (sic) lease please. Sadly I am uncertain if little BOHO will be able to continue long-term. Obviously I will continue to do my best to ensure this isn’t the case however after just scraping through this quiet season and depleting our reserve funds it’s -- 7 of 22 -- 8 a week to week (month-to-month) scenario for that little place currently and I don’t want to overcommit and make things complicated should we not be able to continue trade. (emphasis added) [36] On that same day, only a few hours later Ms Preston responded by email with the following statement: Yes of course, we can organise a time to discuss your future plans and the viability of the business. We can also explore other lease options that afford more flexibility. [37] On the documentation that is before me, the next event in that line of communication appears to be a follow-up email from Ms Preston to Ms Harrison wherein she states: Just checking to see if you would like to still meet to discuss your lease. I am back in town now and can be available whenever you are. [38] On 4 September 2024, a further follow-up email was sent by Ms Preston in which the following statement was made: … Just checking in again about your lease. Your old lease expired at the end of March 2024 and you had an option to extend for three years. The new lease document we sent on 17 June was for the extension. Would you like to proceed with exercising that option for three more years, or do you prefer to continue on a month-to-month basis? Please let me know either way so we can finalise this [39] On 17 April of 2025, the following exchange of emails occurred, which on the face of the document exhibited to Ms Preston’s affidavit appears to be in furtherance of the email chain started on 17 June 2024: (a) From the respondent to the applicant: Just a courtesy reminder that April is your annual renewal month, so your rent will increase by 4% this month. This will be reflected in your invoice for April. I also had a look back and we never finalised the attached lease, so please let me know you would like to move off of the month-to-month verbal agreement and get something locked in now that you have decided not to sell. (b) From the applicant to the respondent reply: Are we able to negotiate any of the term (sic) for the lease as I have a few things on my mind I’d like to put forward prior to signing long-term. [40] What then followed was a further exchange of emails between Ms Preston and Ms Harrison on 22 and 24 April 2025 wherein Ms Preston expressed she was content to discuss Ms Harrison’s thoughts regarding the new lease, and Ms Harrison raising numerous suggestions but in terms of operating matters, including this statement: As we have operated in the marina for 10 years can we please take another look at the 4% yearly increase? It’s impossible for me to continue rising coffee prices 4% each year. We are already one of the most expensive places in town (sic) coffee. I don’t pay myself a wage from Bo Ho and as you’ve seen with our -- 8 of 22 -- 9 struggle to keep on top of rent could we consider a 2.5% increase for a couple of years and the (sic) reassess? [41] On 10 May of 2025, Ms Preston corresponded further by email in which the following statement appears: …as for your lease, I am happy to review those terms with you. I think the best starting point is to review the lease we last discussed. Please let me know if you want to move forward with three years plus a three-year option. That will help me to determine the other particulars. If you would prefer a shorter lease, pleased just let me know what would work best for you. [42] On 15 June of 2025, Ms Harrison then sent an email to Ms Preston in which the following statements appear: … it is imperative for me to discuss our current rent and outgoings costs. I wanted to give at least 12 months post referred and price increases to see what costs we could recover. It has been 18 months and unfortunately we have not recovered any of those costs. It is looking likely we will not be able to sustain our current trading with recent increases as well as develop the business to serve your marina tenants to the standard they deserve and have come accustomed to. I’m looking at all our fixed costs and send this email to you as a last resort. Is there a possibility of looking at our current rental and outgoings please? … Our gross income last FY was $650,400 and trading solely as a café (plus a conservative amount of retail) we just not cutting it. Is there a possibility to discuss future rent costs for the 64sm space we currently occupy at your earliest convenience please. [43] In what appears on the face of the documentation before me, the communications between the parties which followed is a continuation of the chain started on 17 June 2024 with Ms Preston sending an email to Ms Harrison on 20 November of 2025, wherein the following statement appears: In terms of the lease, I have been advised that we will need you to sign the current lease in the first instance rather than issuing a new one. I have attached the lease again here for you to sign. Should you sell, we will follow our standard business practice of allowing this lease to be taken over by the buyer, and we will commit to offering a new lease when this expires. [44] In an email shown as having been sent on 21 April 2026 under the hand of Ms Harrison to Ms Preston, the tone and context of which suggests some breakdown in relationship between the parties, Ms Harrison made this statement: In relation to your reference to the current monthly tenancy arrangement, within the scope of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), the existence of a periodic tenancy does not remove the application of the Act, and any actions taken must be consistent with its requirements. (emphasis added) -- 9 of 22 -- 10 [45] On 23 April of 2026, the applicant lodged a dispute notice with the QSBC by which the applicant invoked the dispute resolution mechanism under Part 8 of the RSLA, effectively applying for mediation. Therein the dispute was summarised as follows (the ‘Dispute’): Outgoings and electricity transparency dispute Note: a periodic lease is now in place. (emphasis added) [46] Within the application as lodged, in response to the request to provide a brief outline of the lease arrangement, the following was stated: Lease has been in place since 2015 1 x 5 year term 1 x 3 year term Lease now periodic in good faith (emphasis added) [47] In an email from Ms Preston dated 23 April 2026, in what appears to be a reply to Ms Harrison’s email of 21 April 2026, the following statement appears: You will otherwise note that clause 13.1 and 13.3 of the lease terms applicable to your monthly tenancy specifically allow us to enter the premises at any time… (emphasis added) [48] On 16 May 2026, in what is described within the subject line of that email as being been a reference to the QSBC process, Ms Harrison made the following request of, and statement to, Ms Preston: For mediation reference purposes, could you please provide a copy of the fully executed lease currently holding over on a month-to-month basis following expiry of the fixed term. I understand this to be the operative lease relevant to the present tenancy arrangement and mediation discussions. (emphasis added) [49] On 25 May 2026, mediation was conducted by a QSBC appointed mediator. That mediation was not successful. [50] On 28 May of 2026, the mediator referred the Dispute to this Tribunal under s 63 of the RSLA (the ‘Referral’). [51] On 1 June 2026, the respondent sent the Termination Notice in which the following is expressed: The Landlord notes that: (a) the expiry date of the Lease was 1 April 2024; and (b) the Tenant did not give a notice to the Landlord requesting a Lease of the Premises be granted to it for the further term of three years, as contemplated in clause 2.3 of the Lease. -- 10 of 22 -- 11 The landlord has (until now) consented to the tenant continuing to occupy the premises on and from 2 April 2024 for a further fixed term of one month and then four consecutive periods of one month each, in accordance with clause 2.2 of the lease… That clause notes that ‘either party may end the tenancy at any time by giving one month’s notice to the other’. The landlord hereby gives one months’ notice to the Tenant ending and terminating the Tenant’s monthly tenancy lease of the premises on Wednesday, 1 July 2026. (emphasis in original) [52] In response to the Termination Notice, on 4 June of 2026 Ms Harrison sent an email to Ms Preston in which the following statement appears: Please be advised that QCAT dispute proceedings have been formally filed and paid for the following QS BC dispute referral (reference: QS BC-15628)… As the matter regarding your statutory failure to provide a lessor disclosure statement, audited outgoings, and AER compliance is now formally before the Tribunal, your termination notice is disputed. We will continue to trade as normal and expected the status quo to be maintained pending QCAT determination. [53] On 8 June of 2026, Ms Preston responded via email to Ms Harrison making the following statement: The termination notice is valid. … The items you are disputing (and now seeking determination by QCAT in respect of) are separate and distinct from the right of either party under clause 2.2 of the lease terms to terminate the month-to-month tenancy arrangement in place by giving one month’s written notice to the other. The landlord does not need to have (or provide) a reason for such termination, nor identify or allege any breach or default on the part of the Tenant to exercise this right. [54] On 10 June 2026, the applicant filed the Application for Injunction reliant on s 59 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’). [55] On 16 June 2026, I gave the Interim-Interim Injunction. I also gave orders for the applicant to file its Statements of Contention in terms of the Referral in which it was to indicate the relief it sought of this Tribunal. [56] On 10 July 2026, the applicant filed that Statement of Contention. Therein the relief sought was expressed as follows:5 1. A declaration that the 2024 lease was unlawfully terminated by the respondent, or the Respondent otherwise repudiated the 2024 lease. 5 I pause here to observe that on my reading of that Statement of Contention, the applicant’s reference to the 2024 lease is to the 2024 Draft Lease which was attached to the 17 June 2024 e-mail from the respondent’s solicitor, albeit a lease document never executed. -- 11 of 22 -- 12 2. An order that the Respondent failed to comply with its obligation to give notice about when to renew or extend must be exercised. 3. An order the Respondent failed to comply with its disclosure obligations as they related to outgoings 4. (a) An order that the Respondent did not give the applicant an annual estimate the approved form of the Applicant’s apportionable outgoings and the proportion of those outgoings …. (b) An order that the Respondent did not give the applicant an audited statement of outgoings in the approved form … 5. (a) [An order] that the Respondent engaged in unconscionable conduct by issuing the termination notice on 1 June 2026 (b) [An order] the Respondent engaged in unconscionable conduct by engaging in the conduct relevant to the facts, matters and circumstances relevant to the orders ought (sic) in 2, 3, and 4. 6. That the Respondent pay the Applicant’s cost of the proceeding … . [57] On 15 July of 2026, I heard that application. Given that the asserted premise for the injunction sought, such to remain in place until final determination of the Dispute, went beyond the ambit of the Dispute as it was before the Tribunal by way of the Referral, on an oral application made by the applicant in that hearing, and with the consent of the respondent, I gave an order which provided for the applicant effectively amending the Referral such to expand its ambit to include that raised by Item 1 of Statement of Contention, such having the effect of incorporating Item 5(a). Save only for Item 6, the remainder of that raised in the Statement of Contention fell within the ambit of the Dispute. The Issues [58] The sole issue in this proceeding is not whether the applicant is entitled to the relief it seeks in the expanded ambit of the Referral, but rather whether the applicant has, in combination, sufficiently met the three-pronged approach as found in ABC v O’Neill, and demonstrated a prima-facie case such that it might succeed at the substantive hearing, and that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted such that the balance of convenience dictates the imposition of the requisite restraint until such time as the Tribunal makes its final decision on the expanded ambit of the Referral. The Competing Arguments Would the injunction be tantamount to final relief? [59] Before I embark on discussing the competing arguments on the Issue, I considered it appropriate to start with a critical factor raised by the respondent’s Counsel in the presentation of his oral argument. [60] The applicant’s case, as it is presently expressed, is that it should remain entitled until the end of what it says was the extended lease, such which is found in what is described as the ‘2024 Lease’, that being evidenced by the lease document the subject of the 2024 Draft Lease. It says that extended date is 31 March 2027. [61] The respondent appropriately and properly highlights that if this Tribunal were to grant the injunction sought, and for it to remain in place until final decision: -- 12 of 22 -- 13 (a) given the current progress of civil proceedings in this Tribunal it is doubtful, and more likely probable if not certain, that the final decision in the substantive proceeding would not be given until after that period; and (b) such would be tantamount to an order giving the substantive relief which is in effect that which is being sought save only for the issues the subject of what was the original Dispute. [62] In answer thereto, the applicant’s solicitor, who appeared as its advocate in the hearing, acknowledged that such is relevant but not determinative. He submitted that there remains a substantial period between now and then for the applicant to remain in possession but acknowledges that there is the need for an expedited hearing of the substantive claim. [63] I return to that argument later in these reasons. The Applicant’s Case [64] The applicant contends that the material before this Tribunal demonstrates either: (a) it exercised the option under the 2021 Lease; or (b) a new lease was entered into as if the option had been exercised; and in either event it is entitled to stay in occupation of the premises until 31 March of 2027. It says on that basis the injunctive relief sought by way of its Application for Injunction is required to preserve its position. It says that at a tribunal hearing it would be successful in arguing that there was a continued entitlement to occupy. [65] It also says that if there was no restraint it would suffer substantial losses due to the cost of relocation or other adverse effects on its business. In that regard it says that damages is not an adequate remedy because its case is a claim for an interest in land, such that is not compensable, nor quantifiable, by way of an order for damages. [66] As to whether it has shown a serious question to be tried, it agrees that it did not give notice to the respondent as required by the express terms of the 2021 Lease. In this regard it presents a two-pronged argument. [67] Firstly, it argues that the respondent (as lessor) did not give the applicant (as tenant) written notice of the option date, such being an express requirement of s 46 of the RSLA. As I understand that argument, it relies on this provision as somehow having granted it a right to an option notwithstanding the absence of it having given written notice under the express terms of the 2021 Lease. [68] Secondly, it argues that the respondent waived the requirement for the applicant to have given written notice of its exercise of the option, such being an express requirement of clause 2.3(b) of the 2021 Lease. It says such is found in that which is recorded as being discussed between the parties on 26 March 2024 and in turn found in the 17 June 2024 email. It says this shows either an exercise of the option or a waiver of the need for such exercise to be expressed by way of a written notice. [69] In terms of its argument as to exercise of the option, it relied on the Queensland Supreme Court in Duncan Properties v Hunter 6 (‘Duncan Properties’) in which the exercise of an option which occurred after the expiry date for same was found to be 6 [1991] 1 QdR 101. -- 13 of 22 -- 14 valid, but in circumstances where the parties had mutually backdated letters which were said to have recorded in writing the exercise of the option. [70] The applicant also argues that the respondent’s conduct after those events demonstrates that the extended lease arrangement was in place, in particular noting that reviews occurred consistent with the provisions of the 2024 Draft Lease as if the option under the 2021 Lease had been exercised. In that regard it particularly notes that the rights to review a lease on an annual basis in the manner contemplated by the lease document is not available for a month-to-month lease, and it must be found that the rent reviews implemented by the respondent were conduct consistent with the option having been exercised. [71] By way of the affidavit of Ms Harrison sworn 11 June 2026, the applicant presents evidence for the purposes of its Application for Injunction that: (a) the applicant remained in occupation following expiry of the previous lease and continued paying rent in accordance with the tenancy arrangements between the parties; (b) discussions occurred regarding the grant of a further lease, with draft lease documentation being provided by the respondent’s solicitor who also advised that the statutory disclosure statement follow; (c) that the applicant never received that disclosure statement and sought clarification regarding outgoings and electricity charges before executing any further lease documentation; (d) the applicant did not refuse to enter a further lease and continued engagement with the respondent regarding those matters; and (e) throughout this period the applicant sought to resolve these matters cooperatively through correspondence, requests for information, participation in QS PC mediation, and ultimately referral of the dispute to QCAT. [72] In that same affidavit, Miss Harrison asserts that if the applicant was required to vacate the Café before the substantive proceeding is heard, which I infer she means not only heard but decided, then the applicant is likely to suffer significant loss including: (a) loss of the location from which it has operated continuously for approximately 12 years; (b) loss of goodwill; (c) interruption to ongoing trading operations; (d) disruption of relationships with customers, suppliers, and staff; (e) cost associated with closure or relocation; and (f) the loss of the benefit of substantial capital investment made in the business and the premises. [73] Related to the issue of whether damages are an adequate remedy, the applicant submits that its claim is in effect an interest in land until 31 March of 2027, such is not compensable, or quantifiable, by way of an order for damages -- 14 of 22 -- 15 [74] Finally, in terms of what the lease arrangement was, it argues that to the extent the applicant’s director, Ms Harrison, has expressed references to a periodic tenancy, or a month-to-month tenancy, in her communications via email or in terms of the Dispute Notice to the QSBC, these can be explained on the basis that she did so without having received legal advice. The Respondent’s Case [75] The respondent’s case, as it was presented in its Outline of Argument dated 3 July 2026, raised many points that dealt with the circumstance that the interim relief sought was premised on an asserted entitlement which went beyond the ambit of the Dispute, and accordingly the injunctive relief sought was not based in any cause of action, thus it was appropriate and ripe for dismissal. In that regard it referred me to the decision of the High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd. (‘ABC v Lenah’)7 [76] That aspect was the subject of discussion at the start of the hearing as I noted it in paragraph [57] herein. For the reasons I mentioned therein, it was unnecessary for me to consider those aspects of the Outline. All I needed discuss in these reasons were those parts of the Outline, and the oral argument accompanying it, that addressed the Issues as I identified it earlier herein. [77] In that regard, the respondent’s primary submission was that the Application for Injunction fell to be decided with reference only to whether the option was exercised, or there was a new lease as if the option was exercised. The respondent’s Counsel presented his client’s case by separating it into those two parts. [78] Firstly, in addressing the question whether a lease had been entered into as if the option had been exercised, he submitted that the applicant’s case and its reliance on the decision in Duncan Properties is flawed. It submitted that this case is distinguishable on its facts such that the ultimate ratio of that decision is inapplicable to the circumstances as they exist in this proceeding, and as such it does not assist the applicant. However, it argues that it does assist the respondent because that case is authority for the proposition that once the date for exercise of the option has passed then the tenant’s entitlement to later exercise that option is non-existent and accordingly it is not possible to conclude that a new lease had been entered into either by way of exercise of the option or as if the option had been exercised. [79] Secondly, as to the question of whether a separate agreement had been reached as though the option had been exercised, whilst the respondent acknowledges that there were discussions between the parties about entry into a new lease, ultimately no agreement was struck. But more importantly and critically, the applicant at all times acted consistent with, and with express reference to, the existence of a periodic tenancy. [80] The respondent properly conceded that subsequent conduct is admissible to determine if an agreement had been reached, such being the essence of the applicant’s case, but contrary to that case the respondent submitted that the conduct of the parties, particularly the applicant, such which is demonstrated on the documentary material presently before the Tribunal, shows that there was the absence of the requisite agreement. In that regard, the respondent’s Counsel specifically referred me to those 7 (2001) 208 CLR 199. -- 15 of 22 -- 16 parts of Ms Harrison’s affidavit I referenced at paragraph [71] in these reasons, submitting that this evidence shows the applicant to have deliberately withheld agreement. [81] The respondent’s submission is that there is no serious question to be tried. This is because the evidence is presently demonstrating that the legal relationship between the parties was nothing more than a month-to-month tenancy, such which was effectively governed by clause 2.2 of the 2021 Lease, such which the respondent terminated as it was expressly entitled to do. [82] On the issue of the balance of convenience, the respondent also presented its case in two parts. [83] Firstly, it says that the imposition of the restraint sought by the applicant would be tantamount to final relief, such which I noted earlier in these reasons. As such the balance weighs against the injunction. [84] Secondly, and critically, to the extent the applicant asserts a loss of goodwill and other alleged losses as described by Ms Harrison in her affidavit, such arises out of the applicant’s own refusal to enter a new lease. In that regard I was specifically referred to the applicant’s email on 18 June of 2024 from which I extracted a short passage in paragraph [35] herein, particularly the statement by Ms Harrison that she wished to discuss the possibility of a month-to-month lease and that she did not want to overcommit. [85] As to the issue of prejudice, it says that the applicant’s assertion that the respondent would not suffer prejudice because it gets the protection of rent under the lease is without substance, because such does not properly address the respondent’s loss. That loss is the respondent’s freedom to deal with its own property. [86] Finally, the respondent also addresses what it says is an absence of an effective undertaking as to damages given by the applicant. It notes that the current undertaking is one given personally by Ms Harrison, not the company, albeit in a document signed by her as a Director of the applicant. Relevant to this, the respondent Counsel again referred me to Ms Harrison’s email of 18 June of 2024 wherein she expressed concern about the applicant’s financial viability and the depletion of the company’s reserved fund. But moreover, the respondent submitted that there is no evidence put before the Tribunal that supports any such undertaking, even if one given by Ms Harrison in her capacity as a Director of and on behalf of the applicant company. [87] It submits that to the extent there is some financial data accompanying her affidavit given in support of her company’s application, it is devoid of the requisite substance. At best it is merely a statement of current profit and loss for the period ending 31 May 2026 but absent a balance sheet which identifies assets and liabilities. The undertaking given, even if to be accepted as an undertaking by the company, has unproven value. [88] The respondent submits that the application for an interim order should be dismissed and the Interim-Interim Injunction given on 16 June 2026 should be discharged. Discussion on the Issue [89] The application before me is for interim injunctive relief. This Tribunal has power to grant such relief as found in s 59 of the QCAT Act. -- 16 of 22 -- 17 [90] As it was expressed in the various reasoning of the Justices of the High Court in ABC v Lenah, it is essential to identify the legal or equitable rights which are to be determined at trial and in respect of which there is support for final relief, which may or may not be injunctive, and in terms of which an applicant for an interlocutory injunction could show sufficient colour of right to the final relief in aid of which interlocutory relief is sought. Where the applicant is unable to do so, the foundation of the claim for interlocutory relief disappears.8 [91] Whilst such has been the subject of criticism on the grounds that it would fail to deal with Quia Timet Injunctions, such being where courts may grant an injunction even in the absence of an existing cause of action, such is not a criticism which arises for consideration in this proceeding. The nature of injunction sought by the applicant is not a Quia Timet Injunction, but rather is that it is said to fall within the ambit of the cause of action as it is found within the applicant’s Statement of Contention. Thus, I must look for that relevant ‘colour of right to the final relief’. [92] The relief sought in that Statement of Contention is as I have described it in paragraph [56] herein. The relevant parts of that are Items 1 and 2 therein which deal with the question of the renewal of the 2021 Lease by way of the 2024 Draft Lease. [93] Whilst there have been many arguments raised by the parties, of which I do not express criticism, it seemed to me that the question of whether injunctive relief should be granted for the duration of this proceeding could be answered relatively simply with reference only to the three-pronged approach as I described it in paragraph [14] herein. Serious question to be tried/ Prima-facie case [94] The arguments before me were delicately balanced. It should not be disputed that a new lease agreement was never concluded. The weight of the evidence as it is presently before me suggests otherwise. The question though is – what was the tenancy arrangement the parties were acting under following the expiry date of the 2021 Lease? [95] If one were to reference solely the communications from the applicant with references to a ‘periodic tenancy’ or a ‘month-to-month tenancy’; and noting the respondent’s assertion that such was the arrangement, one might readily conclude that this was the arrangement. [96] However, some aspects of the respondent’s conduct leave open the possibility that it was something beyond that. This is particularly found in that the presentation of the 2024 Draft Lease. As it was stated in the covering letter from the respondent’s solicitor, such was presented ‘reflecting the exercise of your outstanding option’. What later followed was conduct by the respondent, in particular that which I referred to in paragraphs [29], [30], [32], [33], and [39] herein, being consistent with an agreement between the parties providing for the arrangement beyond the expiry of the 2021 Lease which could be and ultimately might have been something greater than merely a periodic tenancy. [97] But I cannot accept on the face of such as being evidence of either the exercise of the option, nor an agreement to enter a new lease as if the option had been exercised or otherwise. I agree with the respondent’s Counsel’s submission that the reliance the 8 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 217, 218, 241. -- 17 of 22 -- 18 applicant places on the decision of de Jersey J (as His Honour then was) in Duncan Properties is misplaced. [98] Not only do the facts of that case sufficiently distinguish it from the facts of this case, noting therein that there was an express agreement to effectively backdate the written notice of the exercise of the option, but based on the conclusions expressed by his Honour therein in terms of the relevant legal theory the state of the law as it continues to be since then is that, when notice is not given by the end of the period in which it was to be given, the option lapses and it is no longer open to be exercised. As His Honour expressed therein:9 In my opinion, when notice was not given by 1 May 1989, the option lapsed completely …. Mr Brabazon Q.C., who appeared for the plaintiff, contended, in effect, that were such an option to renew not exercised in time, it would nevertheless in some way be suspended, available to be exercised out of time were the lessor subsequently agreeable. He sought to compare the case with the non-completion of a contract on the stipulated date for completion, where the parties extended time, preserving the contract and contemplating an ultimately effectual settlement. He also mentioned cases of voidability for non-fulfilment of conditions subsequent. But …, it is quite wrong to analyse so called ‘‘if contracts’’ – like the covenant in cl. 56 – by reference to principles governing true, mutual contracts. …. In terms of legal theory, the reliance by the plaintiff on the doctrine of waiver, contending that it had effectively, although out of time, waived the need for compliance with the time – notice requirement of cl. 56, was misconceived. As 1 May passed, so the option lapsed completely. (citations omitted) [99] In Topbeach Pty Ltd v Seafarer Investments Pty Ltd,10 (‘Topbeach’) Margaret Wilson J cited Duncan Properties as authority for the general law being that upon failure to exercise an option by the due date this results in the option lapsing. This is what occurred here. The operative provision of clause 2.2 of the 2021 Lease was such that notice of the exercise of the option must have been given not later than 1 October 2023. But it was not given, neither by way of the requisite written notice or even orally within that period. On the evidence as it was before me, at its earliest it was in the 2024 March Meeting that there is any indication of the option purportedly being exercised. There is nothing in the evidence to even suggest, let alone show, that the parties agreed to the alleged exercise being formally backdated to within the relevant period. That is, if there was a purported exercise of the option, it occurred well beyond the latest date for doing so. Therefore, the applicant’s entitlement to exercise the option was lost. To the extent it seeks to somehow rely on that which occurred and seemingly arose out of that meeting is misplaced and misconceived. [100] To the extent the applicant seeks to rely upon the operation of s 46 of the RSLA, it is also misconceived. The words of that section are no answer to the issue on the basis it is said that the respondent did not give the applicant written notice of the option date. Returning to the decision in Topbeach, after having noted the status of the general law, Margaret Wilson J then went on to consider the question whether the general law position is affected by s 46 of the RSLA. Her Honour expressed this opinion based on the submissions before her: 9 [1991] 1 QdR 101, 103. 10 (2010) 110 QSC. -- 18 of 22 -- 19 It is common ground that there has been non-compliance with Section 46. In the plaintiff's submission, where there has been non-compliance, so long as an option is exercised during the currency of the lease, it is validly exercised. The plaintiff's submission relied upon the general law that where there is no time for the exercise of an option, it is sufficient that the option be exercised during the currency of the lease. Section 46 creates an offence: it provides a penalty for non-compliance. It says nothing about the consequences of non-compliance as between the parties. …. [101] In Nguyen v Nguyen & Anor,11 a decision of this Tribunal, citing Topbeach as relevant authority, the learned Members made these observations: Failure to comply with section 46 renders the landlord liable to a maximum penal sanction of 40 penalty units, but no other adverse consequence is prescribed. Elsewhere, by way of comparison and contrast, the RLSA imposes clear civil law consequences for non-compliance with the provisions concerned. It is reasonable to infer that, if the legislature intended section 46 to be sanctioned other than by a fine, it would have expressly said so… … We reject the submission based on section 46. We do not consider that it relieves a tenant from the responsibility to note and observe the terms of his or her lease. (citations omitted) [102] The absence of the requisite notice from the respondent does not result in some exercise of the option provided for under clause 2.2 of the 2021 Lease. At best it might give rise to the applicant being entitled to damages payable by the respondent upon loss of its entitlement to exercise the option having failed to give the requisite written notice within the period specified under clause 2.2 whilst seemingly waiting for the respondent to provide it with written notice of a specific date. It might also have some relevance to any claim the applicant might press founded in a promissory estoppel argument. However, it seems to me that such a claim, if pressed, may have challenges being placed in front of the applicant given that the relevant date could readily be determined on the operative provision of clause 2.2. Although my observations in this regard should not be construed as me having reached any definitive finding or other conclusion on the point. [103] For completeness I should make one further observation notwithstanding that it was not the subject of submissions for me. The provisions of s 46AA of the RSLA potentially provided a mechanism available to the applicant once the option lapsed completely, thus resulting in a lease which did not provide for an option, which could have been utilised where there was the absence of an agreement for renewal or extension of the 2021 Lease. But there is nothing within the applicant’s material, or even the respondent’s material, in this proceeding in support of or response to the Application of Injunction that suggests the applicant availed itself of that mechanism. [104] Moreover, the applicant’s position up to and including the mediation was that it was operating under a periodic tenancy. Noting the arguments about the continued tenancy being a periodic tenancy, I say this as nothing more than a preliminary observation, as Margaret Wilson J observed in Topbeach:12 11 [2013] QCAT 315, [28], [29]. 12 (2010) 110 QSC. -- 19 of 22 -- 20 The application of section 46AA in the case of a monthly tenancy is to say the least problematic. [105] In all respects, the material before me demonstrated that the applicant was simply not willing to enter a fixed term lease after the expiry of the 2021 Lease, and it occupied the premises on a month-to-month tenancy consistent with and reliant upon the operative provisions of clause 2.2 of the 2021 Lease. That which I extracted earlier in these reasons under the heading ‘Chronology of Relevant Events’ shows this to be so, particularly those parts to which I have given emphasis. [106] I do not accept the submission for the applicant that Ms Harrison’s characterisation of the tenancy arrangement as being periodic, or month-to-month, is explainable on the basis that she did so without having received legal advice. Within the context of the occasion in which she expressed that arrangement as being such, including up to the submission of the dispute notice to the QSBC, I was left with a noticeably clear impression that she knew precisely the meaning she was attributing to the arrangement between the parties. She intentionally sought to continue in a periodic tenancy, only raising an argument otherwise when faced with termination of that arrangement. [107] The applicant has not demonstrated to me that there is a prima-facie case, and in turn a serious question to be tried, that supports the granting of the interim injunction sought. Is damages not an adequate remedy? [108] This can be disposed of with minimal discussion. The loss which the applicant submits it would suffer is a loss which can be quantified by way of the requisite forensic accounting evidence. These are losses quantifiable by reference to historical and the corresponding forecast trading results. [109] As to the applicant’s argument I noted in paragraph [73] herein about there being an interest in land which is not quantifiable, not only has such an argument been presented absent any substance with reference to relevant law, on its face it is devoid of any substance and I consider it to be without merit. The interest that the applicant says it would lose is an interest arising from a tenancy arrangement as a basis for the conduct of its business from the leased premises. It is a loss which can be quantified by way of the loss it would suffer in terms of business trade and/or capital loss when denied occupancy which says gives it that interest in land. [110] For these reasons, I do not accept the applicant’s submission that damages is an inadequate remedy. Notwithstanding that which I have already said about a serious question to be tried/prima-facie case, even if the applicant was to be successful in the substantive proceeding and obtain the orders it seeks from this Tribunal as expressed in its Statement of Contention about the 2024 Draft Lease, and in turn that which flows from the termination and the requirement for it to vacate the Cafe, it could be left with the pursuit of a quantifiable claim for damages. Thus, damages is an adequate remedy and so there is no basis upon which the injunctive relief sought could be granted. [111] For completeness I should also touch on the submission made about the inadequacy of the undertaking as to damages. I agree with the respondent. Whilst the absence of an undertaking, or the inadequacy of the undertaking, is not of itself a sufficient ground for denying or discharging an order for an interlocutory injunction, it remains a relevant factor in terms of weight. -- 20 of 22 -- 21 [112] The undertaking as it is presently before the Tribunal is insufficient. I say that because, at best, it can only be shown to be supported by the remainder of the applicant’s material as filed. As the respondent’s Counsel properly and appropriately identified, as I noted it in paragraphs [86] and [87] herein, not only do Ms Harrison’s own words as they appear in her email raise concerns about the applicant’s financial viability and the depletion of its financial reserves, overall the undertaking has unproven value. In the absence of anything further, if ultimately the undertaking was to be called upon then potentially there could be a failure in it being satisfied. The balance of convenience [113] This then leaves only the third prong. [114] It is here that the question of whether the injunction would be tantamount to final relief, as I noted the submissions before me at paragraphs [59] to [62] herein come into play. [115] As the applicant’s solicitor properly and appropriately submitted, it is relevant but not determinative. It is a matter which goes to discretion, not to jurisdiction. It is necessary for this Tribunal to consider the overall justice of the matter and all relevant circumstances.13 [116] While it might be said that it should be of no concern to the applicant, it being a party entitled to expect prompt and efficient progress of its claim in this jurisdiction consistent with the objects as laid out in s 3(b) of the QCAT Act, it is a relevant factor. [117] On relatively recent statistics I have seen, current in this month, there is in excess of 500 civil matters (such which includes retail shop lease disputes) ready for and queued awaiting listing for hearing with an approximate wait time of just under 14 months to get a hearing date from being ready for hearing, and critically with the next available date being early in March 2027. Thus unless there was some exceptional reason from a commercial perspective for this matter to be expedited to hearing, with priority being given above many of those queued which would of themselves have some commercial need for expediency, the very real probability, if not absolute certainty, is that the final determination of the substantive dispute between the parties would not occur until after, and most likely well after, the expiry of the new or extended lease which the applicant says provides it an entitlement to occupy the premises until 31 March 2027. [118] Such a reality dictates against the balance of convenience favouring the applicant. [119] But this is not the sole reason. For the reasons I have already discussed about damages being an adequate remedy, and the absence of a viable undertaking as to damages, the applicant has failed to demonstrate the balance of convenience falls in its favour. Concluding Remarks [120] The applicant has failed to demonstrate the need for the interim injunctive relief that it sought by its application. The relevant and appropriate orders which follow are to dismiss the application and to dissolve, or in the words of the respondent’s counsel discharge, the interim injunction granted by my orders of 16 June of 2026. Orders were made to that effect. 13 See Barbagallo & Anor v J. & F. Catelan Pty Ltd & Ors [1986] 1 QdR 245, 253; State Transport Authority v Apex Quarries Ltd [1988] VR 187, 191, 192. -- 21 of 22 -- 22 [121] In terms of costs of the Application for Injunction, the respondent’s Counsel proposed that his client should be afforded the opportunity to consider my reasons for the decision reached, and in turn if it decides to press for an order for costs in its favour, then a timeline for the provision of written submissions, both for and in response of, should be provided. The applicant did not oppose such an approach. Accordingly, I gave an order that costs of the Application for Injunction were reserved. [122] Separately, following conclusion of giving of judgment and making the orders recorded herein, I discussed with the parties the future conduct of the expanded Referral as the substantive proceeding, and gave relevant orders for same including orders for the provision of submissions on costs. -- 22 of 22 --