K [2026] WASAT 95

[2026] WASAT 95 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) CITATION : K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 95 MEMBER : JUDGE H JACKSON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT MS C CONLEY, MEMBER MS V HAIGH, MEMBER HEARD : 30 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 13 AUGUST 2026 FILE NO/S : GAA 2066 of 2026 K Represented Person C Applicant Catchwords: Guardianship and administration - Intellectual disability - Previous appointment of mother as both guardian and administrator - Repeated applications by brother for appointment - Criticism of performance of functions by public bodies - Brother withdrew consent for appointment - Mother found unsuitable - Public bodies appointed Legislation: Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 3, s 4, s 17A, s 44, s 44(1), s 44(2), s 64, s 68(1), s 68(3), s 68(5), s 84, s 85, s 85(1)(a), s 85(1)(b), s 85(1)(c), s 86, s 87 -- 1 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 2 Result: The Public Advocate is appointed as K's limited guardian for a period of five years The Public Trustee is appointed as plenary administrator of K's estate for a period of five years Category: B Representation: Counsel: Represented Person : In Person Applicant : In Person Solicitors: Represented Person : N/A Applicant : N/A Case(s) referred to in decision(s): K [2025] WASAT 67 K [2026] WASAT 16 K [2026] WASAT 46 K [2026] WASAT 63 K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23 -- 2 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 3 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: Introduction 1 K is a 42-year-old woman who is intellectually disabled and profoundly deaf. 2 She has been the subject of guardianship and administration orders since 2015. 3 Since 2024, there have been nine applications for review of the orders in place at the time. All but two have been brought by K's brother, C. 4 The present application was made by C on 12 April 2026, pursuant to s 17A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act). By that application he sought review of orders made by Member Bunney in March 2026. 5 In May 2026, C sought numerous interlocutory orders. All but one of those were refused by Deputy President Judge Jackson, who determined the application 'on the papers': K [2026] WASAT 63. 6 In those reasons, his Honour noted his concern that many of the orders sought appeared to be directed to issues beyond the scope of the application. That is, they appeared to be concerned with allegations of neglect, misconduct and other inadequacies and wrongdoing that C makes against the Public Advocate and Public Trustee (collectively, the Public Bodies). As will be seen, C has made several applications by which he has made those allegations and sought the review of the appropriateness of the appointments of the Public Bodies. 7 In his reasons, his Honour also noted that C did not, in the application form, indicate a desire for appointment as his sister's guardian or administrator. 8 In documents filed subsequent to the application form, C confirmed that he wished to be appointed as K's guardian and administrator. 9 The first day of the hearing, on 29 June 2026, proceeded on that basis. Amongst other things, C confirmed that he consented to his appointment. -- 3 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 4 10 On the same day D, who is mother to both K and C, and their brother N, also indicated that she wished to be appointed as K's guardian and administrator. 11 In addition to hearing from C and D, we also heard from N and the delegated guardian, AR. It may have been possible to hear from C again, by way of reply, on the afternoon of the first day, but we determined it appropriate to adjourn the hearing and to hear from C, by way of reply, on the second day. 12 Amongst other things, by doing so we allowed him time to file documents which he said were relevant to an issue which had been the subject of questions by the Tribunal (C's Purchase and Sale of K's Art). 13 However, soon after commencement of the second day of hearing, C read a statement by which he announced that he withdrew his consent to appointment as K's guardian and administrator. 14 He said, however, that he did not withdraw his application for review as a whole, as he was of the view that it was necessary to review the orders made. 15 Following an exchange between the panel and C, it was clear that he was not aware that D had indicated her desire for appointment. That is, we understood his position to be that, with his consent withdrawn (and no one else consenting to appointment), the only task before the Tribunal was the review of the appropriateness of the appointment of the Public Bodies, and the terms on which they are appointed. 16 That became clear when he was invited to make submissions on the question of duration - how long any appointment should last before the orders are reviewed. His submissions were to the effect that the Public Bodies should only be appointed for so long as is necessary to investigate, and remedy, the various allegations he has made against those bodies. 17 Were we of the view that it was always C's intention to withdraw his candidacy, we would conclude that his application was an abuse of process. 18 However, C advised that he withdrew his consent to appointment due to what he described as the 'serious accusations' concerning C's Purchase and Sale of K's Art which, he said, were made against him during the first day of the hearing. -- 4 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 5 19 We accept that as an explanation for the withdrawal of his consent, although we reject the suggestion that we accused him of anything. 20 We will discuss the issue of C's Purchase and Sale of K's Art in more detail in the main body of these reasons. 21 In these reasons we will: a. provide a brief overview of previous applications concerning K since 2024; b. outline the scope of the review and explain why the allegations C makes against the Public Bodies are beyond the scope of the review in these proceedings; c. briefly address the issues of K's capacity, whether there is a need for formal orders and the scope of such orders; d. explain why we consider that D is not suitable for appointment; and e. make some observations regarding certain issues which arose during the hearing, including C's Purchase and Sale of K's Art. A Brief History of Applications Concerning K Since 2024 22 As noted above, K has been the subject of guardianship and administration orders since 2015. 23 The reasons given by Member Bunney in K [2026] WASAT 16 contain a thorough examination of the history of what has happened since 2024, including the various proceedings. We gratefully adopt that summary. What follows is provided by way of context for some of our own observations. 24 In or about 2024, it would appear that C, who lives in Sydney, spent some time in Perth. During that time, he appears to have become concerned with various matters concerning K, including the conditions in which she was living. 25 At the time, K was living with her mother, D who was appointed as K's guardian and administrator. 26 On 26 May 2024, C applied to be appointed as K's guardian and administrator. -- 5 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 6 27 On 22 July 2024, a hearing was held before Member Loh to determine that application. Following that hearing, orders were made by which: a. the Public Advocate was appointed K's plenary administrator with powers of investigation to determine whether: i. K had suffered loss or damage as a result of D's action or inaction; and ii. K had suffered loss or damage as a result of the Public Trustee's failure to properly oversee D's administration of K's estate. b. the Public Advocate was appointed K's limited guardian. 28 However, the next day (23 July 2024) the Public Advocate applied for orders to be made relieving her of her role as administrator. 29 Following a hearing on 23 August 2024, again before Member Loh, orders were made by which the administration orders made on 22 July 2024 were revoked and substituted with orders by which: a. the Public Trustee was appointed limited administrator of K's estate, with all powers save those granted to the Public Advocate; and b. the Public Advocate was appointed limited administrator of K's estate, with the power to seek legal advice on K's behalf as to any claim she may have against the Public Trustee and, if there was merit in such a claim, to pursue it. 30 On 20 November 2024, D applied under s 17A of the GA Act for review of the orders made on 23 August 2024. 31 C's initial position was that he sought appointment. However, as Member Bunney notes in K [2026] WASAT 16, [90] C made a strategic decision to withdraw his consent for appointment as K's guardian and administrator only two days prior to the hearing. 32 Following the hearing on 19 March 2025, before a panel of three members, presided over by Deputy President Judge Vernon, orders were made by which: -- 6 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 7 a. The Public Trustee was appointed plenary administrator of K's estate with a direction to investigate whether K had suffered loss or damage as a result of action or inaction of: i. CBUS (as to the payment of the death benefit of R, another of K's brothers); or ii. D, as administrator of K's estate. b. The Public Advocate was appointed K's limited guardian. 33 On 4 May 2025, C applied for review of those orders under s 85 of the GA Act. 34 That section requires the Tribunal to review orders previously made if one of six criteria are met. 35 As Member Bunney noted in K [2026] WASAT 16, [27], satisfying four of those criteria is 'straightforward'. So, for example, s 85(1)(a) provides for the review of the orders if the guardian or administrator dies, while s 85(1)(b) provides for review of the orders if the guardian or administrator 'wishes to be discharged'. 36 However, two criteria require the Tribunal to first form a view about whether the guardian or administrator can or should continue in the role before a mandatory review will occur. One of those criteria, s 85(1)(c), requires review to occur where it 'appears to the Tribunal' that the guardian or administrator 'has been guilty of such neglect or misconduct or of such default as … renders him unfit to continue…' 37 It is that section that C relied upon in his application of 4 May 2025 and, indeed, has continued to pursue. 38 By orders made on 22 May 2025, C's application was taken to be made under s 87 of the GA Act, being an application for leave to seek review of the existing orders under s 86 of the GA Act. 39 On 10 July 2025, leave was refused. In her reasons for that refusal of leave, published as K [2025] WASAT 67, Senior Member Marillier found that the application did not disclose any relevant change in circumstances or any other reason for review. 40 On 13 July 2025, C applied again under s 85 of the GA Act. -- 7 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 8 41 On 1 August 2025, the application was taken to be an application under s 17A of the GA Act. 42 The application was heard before a full Tribunal, presided over by the President of the Tribunal, Justice Glancy, on 29 August 2025, as a review of the orders made by the Senior Member Marillier on 10 July 2025. 43 Orders were made on 29 August 2025 following that hearing which: a. dismissed the application for a mandatory review under s 85 of the GA Act; and b. granted C leave to seek review under s 86 of the GA Act provided that he do so within 28 days. 44 On 25 September 2025, pursuant to the leave granted by the full Tribunal, C sought review under s 86 of the GA Act of the orders made on 19 March 2025. On the same day, orders were made for the hearing of the application on 28 November 2025. 45 On 25 November 2025, C was granted leave to withdraw his application. 46 Less than two weeks later, on 8 December 2025, C made another application, again seeking review under s 85 of the GA Act. 47 That application was heard on 24 February 2026. 48 For reasons delivered on 3 March 2026 and published on 11 March 2026 Member Bunney dismissed the s 85 application as an abuse of process: K [2026] WASAT 16. 49 The Tribunal then proceeded with a review under s 84 of the GA Act, which was heard on 5 March 2026. 50 By reasons delivered and published on 18 March 2026 Member Bunney appointed the Public Trustee as the plenary administrator of K's estate and the Public Advocate as K's limited guardian: K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23. 51 On 22 March 2026, C applied under s 17A of the GA Act for review of Member Bunney's decision to dismiss the s 85 application. That application was determined 'on the papers' by Senior Member Evans-Bonner on 5 May 2026 and the reasons published as -- 8 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 9 K [2026] WASAT 46. C has since appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. 52 On 12 April 2026, C applied under s 17A of the GA Act for review of Member Bunney's decision to appoint the Public Trustee as the plenary administrator of K's estate and the Public Advocate as K's limited guardian. 53 It is that application with which we are concerned. 54 We make the following observations about the proceeding chronology. 55 First, C's application to commence this proceeding was the ninth application since May 2024. It is almost certain to say that at no time in the last two years has there not been proceedings on foot in this Tribunal under the GA Act, concerning K. 56 Secondly, it bears repeating that all but two of those applications have been brought by C. 57 Thirdly, six substantive hearings have been held in less than 12 months. 58 Fourthly, although we have not detailed them, several of the applications have involved various interlocutory applications, many of which have necessitated various directions and other hearings, and have involved considerable complexity and required the expenditure of considerable time, effort and other resources. 59 One example, which falls at the lower end of the spectrum as to the expenditure of various resources, may be taken from this proceeding. On 11 May 2026, C applied for a large number of interlocutory orders of various types. The application occupied 15 pages. Amongst other things, the application sought an order for a directions hearing. Judge Jackson, as presiding member, refused to make that order and, indeed, all but one of the orders sought. His reasons were published as K [2026] WASAT 63, occupying more than 17 pages. 60 Fifthly, the preceding summary does not attempt to describe the truly enormous volume of material filed by C over the last couple of years. The hearing book prepared for the hearing in this proceeding occupies nearly 1200 pages. That is far from a complete record of the material filed by C since 2024. -- 9 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 10 61 In finding that the s 85 application before her was an abuse of process, Member Bunney found that the various s 85 applications brought by C were 'seriously and unfairly burdensome'. Amongst other things, she notes that C had 'filed well over 1,500 pages of submissions, documents and applications' in the four applications under s 85: K [2026] WASAT 16, [214]. 62 In circumstances where there is no dispute: (1) that K lacks capacity; (2) that there is a need for formal orders to be made; and (3) that the functions granted are appropriate, that is an extraordinary amount of material. That is, it is an extraordinary amount of material filed in circumstances where the only real dispute concerns the identity of the person to be appointed as K's guardian and as administrator of K's estate. 63 Sixthly, in three of those proceedings, including the present, C has withdrawn either the application as a whole or his consent for appointment as K's guardian or the administrator of K's estate, and in each case has done so late in the day such that the considerable effort of other parties, and the Tribunal, has been wasted. 64 In short, a vast, and vastly disproportionate, amount of the Tribunal's resources has been devoted to the question of who should be appointed as substitute decision-maker of K. 65 In that regard, we note that others have also devoted very considerable resources to these matters including the Public Bodies whose resources are both provided by the taxpayer and are already stretched beyond what should be considered reasonable and acceptable. 66 At the conclusion of the hearing, C said that he would not make any application for at least 12 months. Such restraint would represent a change in approach. Throughout the past two years C has appeared impervious to criticism. Indeed, he has appeared incapable of recognising the value of the views of others, where they differ from his own, and has appeared to consider himself to be on some sort of quest to 'save' his sister from what he sees to be State-sanctioned neglect and abuse. As will be seen, we have a very different view of both K's current circumstances and of the merits of C's approach to date. Our Role on Review 67 Our role on review is to remake the decision under review. In doing so, our task is not dependent upon error in the earlier decision. -- 10 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 11 68 As such, no one needs to prove that the earlier decision was wrong. Rather, we have started again. 69 We have done so having regard to all of the material that was before the original decision-maker. 70 We also have had regard to: a. the transcript of the hearing held by the original decision-maker; b. any other documents filed by any of the parties since the original hearing; and c. anything that was said at the hearing before us. 71 Having taken all of that material into account: a. as to administration, we are satisfied that: i. K suffers from a mental disability, specifically an intellectual disability; ii. K is unable to make reasonable decisions in respect of matters relating to her estate; and iii. That inability is due to her intellectual disability. b. As to guardianship, we are satisfied that K is: i. Not capable of looking after her own health and safety; ii. Not able to make reasonable decisions in respect of matters relating to her person, and iii. In need of oversight, care or control in the interests of her own health and safety. 72 We are also satisfied that there is a need for formal orders to be made, and that: a. The Public Trustee should be granted plenary powers of administration in respect of K's estate; and b. The Public Advocate should be granted limited powers of guardianship in respect of K's person. -- 11 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 12 Principles 73 There are four principles which have guided our decision-making. 74 They were explained at the beginning of the hearing but for the purposes of these reasons, we will briefly explain them again. 75 Each is derived from s 4 of the GA Act. 76 The first is that all persons, including K, are presumed to be capable of making reasonable decisions in relation to both their own person and their estate. 77 That presumption may be displaced but only by cogent evidence to the contrary. 78 The second is that to the extent that we are able to do so, we must try to obtain and understand K's wishes. 79 That does not require us to follow or enact K's wishes, but we must seek to ascertain what they are. 80 The third is that all decisions that we make must be made with a view to furthering K's best interests. 81 The fourth is that any decision we make must limit K's freedoms and liberties as little as possible and only to the extent that it is necessary to pursue her best interests. Issues to be resolved 82 The present application requires the resolution of five issues: Capacity; Need; Function; Identity; and Duration. 83 'Capacity' asks whether K has the ability to make reasonable decisions in respect of both her person and her estate. 84 We ask first whether K has capacity to make those reasonable decisions because we start with the presumption that she does. 85 Unless that presumption is displaced, we cannot go any further. 86 Only if we decide that K lacks capacity do we look at need. 87 'Need' asks whether there are less formal and less intrusive means by which decisions can be made for K other than formal orders of guardianship and administration. -- 12 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 13 88 'Function' looks to the type of decision that a substitute decision-maker can make for K. That is important because, again, we must not make orders that impinge on someone's liberty unless we must do so to look after their best interests. 89 'Identity' asks who should be appointed to be the guardian and/or administrator. The GA Act sets out criteria that must be met. In the case of a guardian, they must not have a conflict of interest. In either case, they must be considered suitable. If no one else is suitable, we will appoint the Public Advocate or the Public Trustee. 90 'Duration' is the maximum length of the order. It sets the date by which the orders must be reviewed. Issues that need not be resolved 91 It is convenient to note here that in these reasons we are not concerned with the adequacy or otherwise of the actions taken by the Public Advocate (or her delegate) or the Public Trustee. 92 There are several reasons for that. 93 First is that they are not relevant to the proceeding. 94 As noted above, this proceeding concerns a review of the orders made by Member Bunney explained in her reasons published as K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23. It is not a review of the orders made by Member Bunney explained in her reasons published as K [2026] WASAT 16. 95 The latter was an application under s 85 of the GA Act. C applied for review of the appointment of the Public Advocate and the Public Trustee on the basis that they were guilty of various matters. 96 C sought review of K [2026] WASAT 16, which application was dismissed: K [2026] WASAT 46. He has now appealed that dismissal. 97 In those circumstances, an attempt to litigate the same complaints in these proceedings might reasonably be said to be an abuse of process. -- 13 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 14 98 In any event, the suitability or otherwise of the Public Bodies for appointment is not a relevant factor in a review of orders of guardianship and/or administration. That is because they are appointees of last resort.1 99 That is, if no one is nominated for appointment or there is no one else that is suitable for appointment, the Public Bodies will be appointed. As such, their suitability is beside the point because if no one else is considered suitable, and the Public Bodies are not appointed, the represented person will be left without a guardian or administrator. 100 These matters have previously been explained to C on several occasions; in K [2026] WASAT 16, Member Bunney notes the explanations given by Senior Member Marillier (at [96]), President Glancy (at [99]), and Senior Member Evans-Bonner (at [105]). Judge Jackson's reasons in K [2026] WASAT 63 also set these matters out in some detail. 101 That is not to suggest that the Public Advocate or the Public Trustee are beyond critique. Again, Member Bunney explained the various ways in which such criticism might be ventilated - K [2026] WASAT 16, [65]. However, proceedings under s 17A of the GA Act, seeking review of orders made appointing those bodies as guardian and administrator, are not an appropriate forum for such a critique. K's Wishes 102 Before going any further we repeat that we are obliged to ascertain K's wishes to the extent that we can do so. 103 K attended the hearing. She did so because, as the person for whom orders may be made, she should be able to participate in the hearing to the extent that that is possible.2 104 As we have previously indicated, K is profoundly deaf. She also has limited knowledge of Auslan and communicates through her own form of sign language and, also, through an iPad. 105 To facilitate her participation in the hearing, arrangements were made where an Auslan interpreter would translate what was spoken in the hearing room into Auslan. The deaf interpreter, in their capacity as 1 We note here that by s 68(5) of the GA Act, it is the Public Advocate, rather than the Public Trustee, that is the administrator of last resort. However, the reality is that the Public Trustee will be appointed in the absence of a conflict of interest or something similar - see K [2026] WASAT 63, [16] - [17]. 2 See the Australian Guardianship and Administration Council 'Maximising the participation of the Person in guardianship proceedings', June 2019. -- 14 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 15 a 'communication support aid' would then 'unpack the meaning' of the Auslan in a way that K could understand, given the limitations of her understanding of Auslan. K was further assisted to communicate via an iPad, which conveyed things in pictorial form. 106 Unfortunately, and despite the best endeavours of all of the interpreters involved, we were unable to effectively communicate with K at all, let alone to do so sufficiently to allow us to understand her wishes. Capacity 107 We repeat that we start with the presumption that K is capable of making reasonable decisions in respect of her estate. 108 We also note that, in respect of administration, s 64 requires a three- part test which must be satisfied in order to displace that presumption. We must be satisfied that: a. K is incapable of making reasonable decisions in respect of her estate; b. K has a mental disability; and c. That K's incapacity is due to, or because of, that mental disability. 109 Mental disability is defined in s 3 of the GA Act. It is an inclusive definition so it is not limited to the examples given. But in this case the examples are relevant and include 'an intellectual disability'. 110 The test for guardianship is simpler. It asks only whether we are satisfied that K is either: a. incapable of looking after her own health and safety b. unable to make reasonable decisions in respect of matters relating to her person; or c. in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of her own health and safety. 111 We are satisfied of each of those matters. 112 First, there was agreement by everyone at the hearing, save for K, that K lacks capacity to make any reasonable decision at all, whether about her person or her estate. -- 15 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 16 113 Secondly, the medical evidence is to the same effect. a. A letter of 5 March 2025 from Dr T states that K has been under his care since November 2024 and that she 'has an intellectual disability with sensorineural deafness'. b. A record dated 30 January 2026 from the medical centre from which Dr T practises also gives a diagnosis of intellectual disability and sensorineural deafness. 114 Thirdly, the evidence of various service providers is to the same effect. a. The most recent report is dated 13 February 2026 from Ms B who describes her position as Home and Community Leader. She had known K for 12 months at the time of her report. She says that: i. K is provided with 24/7 support with all daily living skills, managing money, social interaction, personal care and medical appointments; ii. K is unable to make even simple decisions regarding finances, that she is unable to look after her own interests regarding finances and that she (i.e. K) 'does not understand the value of money'; iii. K is unable to understand her medical treatments and is unable to follow medical advice, and lacks the 'cognitive ability to understand or have insight into her medical condition or the support required for her accommodation'. b. Another recent report, dated 16 February 2026, from Ms S, who describes herself as K's support coordinator, is to the same effect. Ms S says that: i. K has a 'severe intellectual disability'; ii. K lacks capacity to 'independently manage budgeting or financial tasks. She does not understand the value of money or the distinction between low- and high- cost items. She is unable to identify or manage household bills … and does not understand the differences between them …'. -- 16 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 17 iii. K is 'unable to effectively communicate her basic needs and preferences.' iv. K 'appears to have limited insight into the impact of her disability on her daily functioning and support needs. She presents as passive and generally agreeable to any recommendations made, showing minimal self-advocacy or independent decision-making'. c. An occupational therapy report dated 17 February 2025 says, by way of background information, that K has a 'severe intellectual disability' which impacts her in various ways including that she is 'not able to implement executive functioning skills in daily living' and requires 24/7 supports to complete all activities of daily living. As to her decision-making capacity regarding her finances, it says that K is: unable to budget for activities and grocery shopping as she does not understand the value of money and differentiate between an item that is cheap or expensive. She does not remember when to pay bills … and does not know the difference between these bills. [K] does not have the skills to count, add, minus, divide or calculate the costs of items. 115 Accordingly, we are satisfied that: a. K has a mental disability; specifically, an intellectual disability; b. K lacks the ability to make reasonable decisions in respect of her estate; and c. That lack of ability is due to her intellectual disability. 116 K also lacks the ability to make reasonable decisions as to her own person and, in fact, requires 24/7 care in that regard, including as to medical decisions and the supports that she needs. Need 117 We are also satisfied that there is a need for formal orders. 118 First, we are satisfied that there is no less formal option available in that there is no enduring power of attorney or enduring power of guardianship and, indeed, K clearly lacks the cognitive ability to execute either of those documents. -- 17 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 18 119 Second, we are satisfied that K's best interests require decisions to be made for which formal authority is necessary. Decisions about her housing, medical treatment and service provision are all examples of decisions that are likely to require the decision-maker to hold formal authority to make decisions on her behalf. 120 Third, we are not satisfied that decisions will be made in K's best interests in the absence of formal orders. As we will explain in some detail below, there is considerable evidence of conflict between members of K's family. We are satisfied that that conflict would impede the proper making of decisions in K's best interests if formal orders are not made. Function Guardianship 121 The orders under review include orders granting limited powers of guardianship to the Public Advocate with the following functions: Accommodation - both where and with whom K is to live; Medical Treatment decisions; Contact; Services; and Travel. 122 We agree that those functions should be granted to K's guardian for the following reasons. 123 Accommodation: K's accommodation needs are currently taken care of. The delegated guardian advises that she is happy and safe in her Supported Independent Living (SIL) accommodation, which she shares with other residents. She has 'developed a good relationship with the women residing there', and the staff advise that she is 'quite independent and helpful, she seems very comfortable in the house and happy to help herself to the things she needs'. However, D wants K removed from her current accommodation and for her to live with D at 'home'. Further, as we will address in more detail below, C clearly has plans for K to live with him in Sydney, albeit not 'immediately'. Given those different views, we are satisfied that the guardian should be granted an accommodation function. 124 Medical treatment: as we have mentioned, the service providers have noted that K requires 24/7 care and assistance with all daily living activities. She shows 'minimal self-advocacy and independent decision making' as to her medical needs. We are, therefore, satisfied that she requires someone to identify her need for medical advice, to listen to and understand that advice and to give effect to it. -- 18 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 19 125 Services: equally, the evidence is that K's passivity means that while she accepts direction and advice as to her service needs, it also makes her vulnerable to undue influence or exploitation. We are therefore satisfied that she requires a substitute decision-maker in this regard. 126 Contact: at the hearing, evidence was given that restrictions had been imposed on K's contact with C and that, pursuant to those restrictions he has been prevented from removing K from her SIL accommodation. We are therefore satisfied that she requires a substitute decision-maker in this regard. 127 Travel: C lives in Sydney. K has previously travelled to Sydney to spend time with C. Without making findings about what happened and who was at fault, that trip was the genesis of much angst and conflict. In our view, K's guardian should retain a 'travel' function. 128 At the hearing, three other functions were also the subject of evidence and discussion. 129 Work: at the hearing, the panel enquired of various parties whether a work function might be appropriate, given the evidence that K enjoys painting and other art and that her pieces have been exhibited and sold, including for considerable sums. 130 Having considered the answers given, we are satisfied that it is not necessary for such a function to be granted. We agree with the delegated guardian's views that, while K's art has significant value, she engages in art for pleasure, not reward and that there is no need to regulate her art practice. Further, to the extent that K's art generates income, that is a matter for the administrator. 131 Next Friend: C asked that the guardian be granted this function. We understand his position to be that K may have causes of action against the Public Advocate and/or the Public Trustee, which a next friend would be able to pursue. 132 We are not satisfied on the evidence before the Tribunal that there is a need for this function. Rather, it represents another attempt to pursue his allegations against the Public Bodies. 133 Restrictive Practices: C alleged that, during a visit by him to K's SIL accommodation, C was not permitted to take K from the premises. On that basis he said that K was subject to restrictions on her movements. -- 19 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 20 We asked the delegated guardian whether there was a need for a 'restrictive practices' function. She said that there was no need because K was not subject to any limits on where she could go within her shared accommodation, subject to the need to respect the privacy of other residents, and that she could leave the premises at any time, as long as she was accompanied by a carer. 134 The delegated guardian advised that the incident to which C was referring occurred as a result of conditions imposed on C's contact with K; he is allowed to visit K under supervision only. 135 We accept the delegated guardian's explanation and find no need for the granting of such a function. Administration 136 As we have identified, K has no understanding of even basic financial concepts. She is entirely unable to make reasonable decisions in respect of her estate. In those circumstances, there is no alternative but to grant plenary powers to an administrator. Identity 137 As was noted in K [2026] WASAT 63, [7], although C is the applicant in this proceeding, his application form did not indicate whether or not he seeks appointment as either K's guardian or administrator. 138 However, in submissions filed on 5 June 2026 (C's Submissions), C confirmed that he sought appointment both as K's guardian and as the administrator of her estate. 139 As we have previously noted, C maintained his position that he was suitable for those two appointments for the entirety of the first day of the hearing but withdrew his consent to appointment at the beginning of the second day of hearing. 140 He did not, however, withdraw his application for review of the orders made by Member Bunney on 18 March 2025. 141 Even if he had sought to withdraw the application as a whole, we are unlikely to have granted leave for him to do so for two reasons. -- 20 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 21 142 First, during the hearing D indicated her desire for appointment as K's guardian and as the administrator of K's estate and we must, therefore, consider D's suitability for appointment to those roles. 143 Secondly, in any event, we consider it appropriate to record certain matters, particularly concerning C's Purchase and Sale of K's Art. The Requirements of Suitability 144 Section 44(1) provides that we may appoint a person as guardian only if we are satisfied of certain things: that they are 18 years of age; that they consent to the appointment; that they will act in the best interests of the represented person; that they are not in a position of a conflict of interest; and that they are otherwise suitable to act as guardian. 145 In considering whether someone is suitable, s 44(2) provides that we may have regard to four things: (a) the desirability of preserving existing relationships within the family of the person in respect of whom the application is made; (b) the compatibility of the proposed appointee with that person and with the administrator (if any) of that person's estate; (c) the wishes of the person in respect of whom the application is made; and (d) whether the proposed appointee will be able to perform the functions vested in him. 146 If we are not satisfied that anyone meets those criteria, we must appoint the Public Advocate. 147 Section 68(1) sets out the requirements that must be met for appointment as the administrator of someone's estate. It is in very similar terms to s 44. It provides that we may appoint a person as an administrator only if we are satisfied of certain things: that they are 18 years of age; that they consent to the appointment; that they will act in the best interests of the represented person; and that they are otherwise suitable to act as the administrator. 148 In considering whether someone is suitable, s 68(3) provides that we may have regard to four things: (a) the compatibility of the proposed appointee with that person and with the guardian (if any) of that person; (b) the wishes of the person in respect of whom the application is made; and (c) whether the proposed appointee will be able to perform the functions vested in her/him. -- 21 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 22 149 If we are not satisfied that anyone willing to act meets those criteria, we will appoint the Public Trustee.3 D is Unsuitable for Appointment as K's Guardian 150 D did not file any documents ahead of the hearing and her evidence at the hearing was brief and was almost entirely concerned with disparaging C or addressing matters that were largely peripheral. 151 She did not address her own suitability at all and was not prepared to engage with the Tribunal in order for us to be able to assess her current suitability. Rather, she expressed anger and frustration at various matters, primarily focused on what she sees as K's 'removal' from her care. 152 In K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23, Member Bunney found D unsuitable for appointment as K's guardian for three reasons. 153 The third concerned the 'significant conflict in the family' such that, Member Bunney found, 'D would not be able to communicate effectively with C and N or consult with them about important decisions she would make for K': K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23, [61]. 154 At least as between D and C, we agree. In her evidence D's anger with, and contempt for, C was very obvious. 155 Her evidence started by saying that C had given her, that morning, a statement which he told her she should read out to us. She then took out and read the document (Exhibit 2), which occupied about half an A4 page of typed (i.e. not handwritten) text, inserting her own commentary after many of the sentences. 156 Amongst other things, the statement that she read out described previous allegations she had made against C as 'untrue and hurtful', and said that she has made them when she was 'angry, distressed, and unwell', that she 'deeply regret[s]' making them and that they were 'not true'. It also expressed the view that C has 'always acted to protect' K, that he has shown dedication and commitment to K's welfare and that she [D] supported C's application to be appointed K's guardian and the administrator of her estate. 157 By her comments made during her reading of that statement, we understand her to say that she does not regret making those previous 3 See footnote 1, above. -- 22 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 23 allegations about C, that she does not agree that they were untrue, that she disagreed that C had always acted to protect K and that she opposed C's appointment as K's guardian and the administrator of K's estate. 158 She then went on to accuse C of having 'big plans' and that C has no understanding of K's limited abilities. She finished by saying that she would immediately leave the hearing to return home, that she would put C's belongings out the front of the house and that he could find somewhere else to stay. 159 C later denied giving his mother Exhibit 2, although he agreed that he had told her what he thought she should say to us, which largely mirrored the contents of that statement, and which she had noted down. He indicated that she may have taken those notes to Legal Aid, which may have written them down for her. 160 We find it most unlikely that Legal Aid would simply type up a statement with which D disagreed. Rather, it seems much more likely that it would provide advice to her as to how she might proceed. Equally, we find it unlikely that D typed the statement herself. Almost every aspect of the document stands in stark contrast to the (hand)written documents filed by D in this and other proceedings. 161 This aspect of the hearing highlights the deeply complex, conflictual, relationship between C and D between whom there is obviously deep mutual distrust. 162 There is also deep distrust between C and N. While that goes primarily to C's unsuitability, it also reinforces the family dynamic more generally. 163 In short, we are satisfied that it would not be in K's best interests for any member of the family to be appointed to either position due to the complex relationships of conflict between various members. 164 The second reason for finding D as unsuitable for appointment as K's guardian is that we are satisfied that she would be unable to engage in an appropriate manner with others providing support to K. Indeed, we are satisfied that D would likely end K's engagement with many of her service providers. 165 D's involvement at the hearing was characterised by dysregulated anger directed at almost everyone else in the room. We have briefly -- 23 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 24 described what she said about C. She also shouted and swore at and about the delegated guardian and, indeed, the Tribunal itself. 166 We understand that D feels deeply wronged by those who have been responsible for the removal of K from her care and from her removal as K's guardian and administrator. We do not find her unsuitable due to her anger but, rather, due to her inability to regulate her emotions when dealing with those with whom she disagrees about K's best interests. 167 As Member Bunney said in K [2026] WASAT 23, [65]: an essential personal attribute of a guardian is their ability to advocate for the represented person and engage cooperatively with others. The guardian must manage disagreements or differences of opinion with a range of third parties, such as service providers and health professionals. The guardian must be able to work within a network of providers to ensure the represented person derives optimal benefit from the services they access. 168 We are satisfied that D is unable to do that. 169 Those reasons are sufficient for us to find that D is unsuitable for appointment as K's guardian. However, we also note the other reasons given by Member Bunney: that D is unable to separate her own needs from those of K and that their interests are in conflict: K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23, [59] - [60]. 170 D removed herself from the hearing soon after reading and commenting on Exhibit 2. We were able to ask her a couple of quick questions, but she made it clear that she was not interested in staying any longer. As such, she did not address us on those matters. 171 While we are, therefore, reluctant to make firm findings on those matters, we consider that what she said at the hearing and how she said it are sufficient to allow us to agree with Member Bunney's observation that 'D does not appreciate the positive changes in K's life since moving to her [SIL accommodation], particularly in relation to her health': K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23, [59]. 172 The evidence before us is clear that K is doing very well in her new home. Amongst other things, she is described as being content, having made friends and having increased in independence. She is learning new skills, including Auslan. In those circumstances, D's insistence that K should live with her 'at home', strongly suggests to us that she is unable to identify or prioritise K's best interests. -- 24 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 25 173 As D is unsuitable, and no one else consents to the appointment, we will appoint the Public Advocate as K's guardian. D is Unsuitable for Appointment as Administrator of K's Estate 174 For at least two reasons, we are satisfied that D is unsuitable to act as the administrator of K's estate. 175 First, during D's time as administrator of K's estate, which finished in 2024, she appears to have been unable or unwilling to properly account for and report on K's estate. The Public Trustee's report of 18 June 2026 notes that, prior to being exempted from providing accounts in 2019, D 'had poor record keeping and had failed to adequately submit accounts' and that she had 'a long-standing habit of making cash withdrawals from [K's] bank account and never kept any receipts'. The report notes that the Public Trustee's investigation indicates that that practice continued after the exemption was put in place. 176 D has not put on any evidence to suggest that she understands the inadequacy and inappropriateness of her practice nor that she is willing and able to change. 177 We are also satisfied that, if appointed administrator of K's estate, D would not be compatible with the Public Advocate as K's guardian. As we have noted, at the hearing she was aggressive in the way she spoke to and about the delegated guardian and we have no doubt that she would be unable to cooperate with her (or, indeed, any delegate of the Public Advocate) in K's best interests. 178 Finally, we find D unsuitable because we are satisfied that she is unable to act in the best interests of K's estate. The example of C's Purchase and Sale of K's Art will suffice. 179 As we discuss in more detail below, it would appear that in January 2024 C purchased about 50 pieces of art created by K at a fraction of their market value, and has then gone on to try to sell them for his own profit through a website created by him. 180 As the administrator of K's estate at the time, we are satisfied that D failed to ensure that C paid fair value for K's work. 181 In short, we are satisfied that D is unsuitable to act as the administrator of K's estate. As a result, we will appoint the Public Trustee. -- 25 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 26 Other matters The Nature of, and Reasons for, C's Withdrawal 182 As C has withdrawn his consent to appointment, there is no need to make findings about his suitability. Nonetheless, we consider it appropriate to do so. 183 There are several reasons for that, one of which is that we are concerned that C withdrew his consent to appointment in order to avoid adverse findings against him. 184 C has taken similar action twice before. The first was on 17 March 2025 when, in proceedings before a three-member panel, he withdrew his consent to appointment. As we have previously noted, Member Bunney described that withdrawal as 'strategic': K [2026] WASAT 16, [90]. 185 The second was on 25 November 2025 in proceedings before Senior Member Evans-Bonner, when he withdrew the third of his s 85 applications: K [2026] WASAT 16, [109]. In this case, he gave a change in his 'personal circumstances' as the reason for the withdrawal and yet, two weeks later, he filed a further application. 186 In this case, C's withdrawal of his consent was stated by him to be as a result of, or in response to 'serious accusations' made against him during the hearing. 187 We will explain that reference below but, in short, we are concerned that he has withdrawn his consent in an attempt to avoid adverse findings against him, which approach appears to be consistent with previous actions. C's Withdrawal Represents his Further Refusal to Accept Legal Realities 188 As we have noted, C's 'withdrawal' was limited to his consent to appointment; he made clear that he wanted us to continue with the review of the orders appointing the Public Bodies. 189 That approach represents yet another example of his refusal to accept the legal realities associated with the appointment of those bodies. 190 In K [2026] WASAT 16, [96] and [99] Member Bunney recorded previous attempts by members of this Tribunal to explain the relevant legal position to C. At [212] she also found C's fourth attempt to bring -- 26 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 27 an application under s 85 was an abuse of process for reasons that included his numerous attempts to engage the Tribunal in a review of the suitability of the appointment of those Public Bodies. 191 The situation was also explained in Judge Jackon's reasons given in this proceeding in K [2026] WASAT 63, [15] - [19]. 192 The written material filed by C in this proceeding pays lip service to the issues described above. That is, he says repeatedly that he does not seek to use this proceeding as an attempt to relitigate the matters the subject of the s 85 applications. However, that is precisely what he has done in the written material he filed ahead of the hearing. 193 That is most obvious in the document filed on 24 June 2026, titled Applicant's Supplementary Submissions in Response to Guardian Reports Dated 11 February 2026 and 15 June 2026 (C's Supplementary Submissions). 194 Para 2 of that document stated expressly that the document is 'filed on the limited footing identified in K [2026] WASAT 63…'. However, what follows is entirely inconsistent with that position. 195 So, in section 3 of C's Supplementary Submissions, C complains that the Public Advocate: is not a neutral reporter in this review. It is the current guardian and an institutional party with a direct interest in the outcome of the application to continue its own appointment. 196 We disagree with the suggestion inherent in that passage that a benefit accrues to the Public Advocate from her appointment as guardian. Given that her appointment results in the expenditure of scarce public resources, the opposite might be said to be the case. 197 The Public Advocate performs the vital statutory role of guardian of last resort and, as has been explained to C numerous times, her re-appointment simply represents a finding that no one else is suitable. 198 In the balance of C's Supplementary Submissions, he raises several matters which he has sought to litigate many times over. They are put on the basis that, if the Public Advocate seeks to rely on certain allegations against him, we must critically engage with those allegations before finding him unsuitable. That may be so, but in our view he has put that position in an attempt to disguise his desire to relitigate his allegations against the delegated guardian. -- 27 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 28 199 Examples can be given from each of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the document but we will limit ourselves to one from Section 4. In that section, C refers to the delegated guardian's report of 11 February 2026, which states that there is 'no evidence that [C] warned the delegated guardian' about LR as K's carer for her trip to Sydney in the summer of 2024/25. Despite that, the four subsequent paragraphs insist that the 'real issue' is that the delegated guardian was aware of those concerns. 200 That is, despite having the legal position explained to him several times, and understanding it enough to insist that he is abiding by it, this proceeding represents yet another attempt by C to have the Tribunal investigate his concerns with the Public Bodies. His insistence that that occur after he had withdrawn his consent for appointment confirms that is so. C's Purchase of K's Art 201 In the delegated guardian's report of 11 February 2026, it is said that C 'has not provided any clear explanation regarding any income or funds received, for a website which appears to have been set up to sell [K's] artwork, and has [C's] mobile number as the contact provided'. 202 That issue does not appear to have been pursued previously. By that we mean no criticism of Member Bunney. 203 In his Submissions filed 5 June 2026, C states that in January 2024 he 'preserved K's artwork, arranged for works to be signed, framed and photographed and created a platform to showcase K's artistic talent'. 204 On the basis that that passage appears to have been included to demonstrate C's bona fides, we asked C at the hearing whether he had advised the Public Trustee of any income received from the sale of K's art. 205 In answer, he said that he had not and that he did not need to because he owned the art shown on the website and that, therefore, any income was his own. 206 When asked to explain that statement further, he said that there were photos showing K holding $1,100 in cash, which he said was the amount he paid for 'about' 50 pieces of K's art. 207 The photos in question were not before us but we were able to locate them in materials filed for other proceedings. The photo previously -- 28 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 29 described shows K holding a wad of $50 notes and what appears to be a receipt. 208 In the photo, K is standing next to D and next to both of them are about 15 pieces of art, all of which are 'bubble-wrapped', some of which are framed, while others appear to be on stretched canvas not needing a frame. Another photo shows D apparently completing or signing the receipt, which is also shown in close up and which records the payment of $1,100 plus $300 (which may be the value of 'new shoes, dresses and casual wear') described as 'being for' K's 'Art as in Pictures'. 209 C was unable to provide any reasonable explanation why he thought it appropriate to give K that much in cash in circumstances where he agreed that she did not understand the value of money. 210 Those photos, which we made Exhibit 1 in these proceedings, were marked as 'A8.3 and A8.4' in a document filed in other proceedings on 4 August 2025. The next pages in that document include a photo of N standing in front of an art piece said to be made by K which C says is valued at $4,500. He accuses N of, effectively, stealing it. C gives that value by reference to a website which he reproduced from a Melbourne based art gallery, which was selling similar pieces by K for comparable prices. 211 C agreed that K's art sells for such prices and agreed that K's pieces displayed on his website are priced at between about $500 and $5,000. 212 However, he said that he had accorded them those prices in order to discourage potential purchasers. He also said that the sold stickers on some of the pieces did not indicate actual sales. Rather, he said that he had falsely marked them as sold in order to ensure that they were not sold. 213 We do not believe that evidence. Whether he is acting in K's best interests or his own, it is implausible that C would go to the trouble of setting up a website purporting to sell K's art but then set prices so high as to discourage buyers and falsely indicate some pieces are sold when they are not. 214 Rather, we consider that evidence to be an attempt to explain away what appears to be an attempt to personally profit from K's artwork. 215 At $1,100 for 'about' 50 pieces, C appears to have paid about $20 each for works which appear worth 25 to 250 times that price. -- 29 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 30 216 When given the opportunity to explain the basis on which he paid $1,100 for ~50 pieces, he said that the pieces were of poor quality, sun-damaged and unframed and that, having spoken with a person described as K's art 'mentor', he was advised that they were worth a few dollars each, such that the price paid was well in excess of their true value. 217 We also do not accept that evidence. Amongst other reasons for that decision, we do not accept that he would have incurred the cost of framing art so described. 218 Further, Exhibit 1 shows about 15 pieces that appear to be in good condition. As noted, some are in frames and some are stretched canvas, but all are bubble-wrapped. In our view, that indicates that some care has been taken to protect them, which we infer indicates that they are valuable and were recognised as such at the time. 219 When asked why he had filed material to demonstrate the price paid but not any material to demonstrate the value of the pieces, C indicated that he had records on his phone, which he offered to read out, which he said confirmed his conversation with K's mentor. He was invited to file them with the Tribunal overnight. He did not do so. Rather, he withdrew his consent for appointment. 220 As we have said, he explained that he withdrew his consent because of the 'serious accusations' made against him. 221 As we said at the time, no accusations were made against him. It is not our job to make accusations. Rather, we asked him questions about the website, the circumstances in which he took possession of K's art, the price paid and the basis for that price, in order to afford him an opportunity to put his position. 222 By doing so, we sought to provide him procedural fairness in circumstances where the material before us appeared to allow inferences to be drawn that were adverse to his interests. 223 In our view, K's art represents both a wonderful way for her to express herself, as well as an opportunity for others to exploit her financially. We recommend that the Public Trustee make its own enquiries into the location of K's art and ensure that any proceeds realised from its sale is properly recorded as K's income. -- 30 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 31 C Does Not Appear to Recognise or Appreciate K's Capacities 224 In her reasons, Member Bunney noted that C 'has expressed on numerous occasions that he would move K to Sydney to live with him': K [No 2] [2026] WASAT 23, [80]. 225 She went on to describe his evidence in this regard at the hearing before her in March 2026. She described that evidence as 'confusing and contradictory' and said that she 'formed a strong impression' that C 'changed the subject to avoid directly answering the question about whether he intended to move K to Sydney if he was the guardian': [83]. 226 In Annexure A to C's Submissions, C says that he 'does not intend to immediately remove K from her current accommodation'. Rather he says that his 'initial objectives' would be to 'stabilise' K's 'daily routines', review her supports, consult relevant professionals and family members and 'assess whether the current placement' meets K's individual needs. 227 Those statements proceed on an unstated assumption that there is a need for K's daily routines to be stabilised and a need for her supports to be reviewed. That is, C appears to be working from the basis that K's daily routines are unstable and that her supports need to be reviewed. 228 There is no evidence to support this view. Rather, as have already noted, the evidence from both the accommodation provider and the delegated guardian is that K is happy where she is, that she gets on well with the other residents and is otherwise doing well, including that she is learning Auslan. 229 In those circumstances, a move to Sydney would be disruptive and disorienting. It would require a complete overhaul of K's accommodation and supports. In those circumstances, there would need to be good reason for such a move. 230 The evidence also supports a finding that K has a close bond with N, and her removal to Sydney would impact the relationship between K and N. 231 We therefore sought to better understand C's intentions and motivations. 232 In answer to questions from the panel, C indicated that he was looking to the not-too-distant future when, perhaps, there was less family around her than is presently the case. In those circumstances, he said, it would make sense for her to move to Sydney to be with him. -- 31 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 32 233 In our view, so much does not necessarily follow. Rather, in our view, there would need to be a process of reasonably regular review to ensure that K's circumstances continue to reflect her best interests. 234 In any event, having considered C's hypothetical, we asked him who would care for K should she move to live with him in a few years' time. 235 In answer, he said, amongst other things, that he worked 12-hour shifts, he was the father of an 11-week-old baby, and that the baby's mother was a 'stay-at-home' mother who would also care for K. He also, confusingly, suggested that K might assist with the child's care. 236 In our view, those answers confirm D's evidence that C does not appreciate K's limitations. 237 The evidence is that K requires 24/7 care and oversight. To suggest that someone with such significant needs might be cared for by someone who is otherwise parenting a small child reflects a fundamental failure to appreciate the reality of caring for K. Equally, the suggestion that K might be capable of assisting with the care of a small child reflects the same fundamental failure. Duration 238 Following his withdrawal of his consent to appointment, C submitted that the orders of guardianship and administration should be made subject to a requirement that they be reviewed in no later than three to six months. 239 That submission was made, in effect, on the basis that the Tribunal still had not reviewed the orders appointing the Public Bodies in 2025. 240 Having engaged with C in an attempt to explain that the current proceedings were a review of the orders made by Member Bunney whose decision was a review of the 2025 orders, we are satisfied that C's position is, in effect, as we have said, a reiteration of his insistence that the Public Bodies are unsuitable due to what he says are various breaches of their obligations. 241 We have addressed that claim and we do not need to say anything more about it here. 242 For various reasons, including the extraordinary number of applications made in relation to K in the last two years, we are very strongly of the view that the orders we will make should last for the -- 32 of 33 -- [2026] WASAT 95 Page 33 maximum of 5 years. Only in the event of a material change in circumstances should they be reviewed before then. Orders 243 The orders we make will reflect our findings made above. 244 In addition, Member Bunney made orders by which the Public Trustee was authorised to spend up to $200 per annum on gifts and that it was authorised to liaise with and share information and documents with N in respect of K's estate. 245 Nothing put before us suggested any basis to vary those orders. 246 Member Bunney also directed the Public Trustee to investigate whether K's estate has suffered loss or damage by reason of the action or inaction of any person since 6 May 2015. 247 As should be apparent, orders similar to those have been in place since July 2024. 248 The Public Trustee's in-house solicitor described, in correspondence to the Tribunal on 19 June 2026, the investigation as 'complex and protracted' and 'ongoing', but that it is hoped the investigation 'will be concluded within the next year'. 249 On that basis, we will make orders for the investigation to continue. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. DM Associate 13 AUGUST 2026 -- 33 of 33 --