Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2026] QIRC 251

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2026] QIRC 251 PARTIES: Algahamdi, Lina Saleh Ahmed (Applicant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Respondent) CASE NO: B/2021/37 PROCEEDING: Application in existing proceedings DELIVERED ON: 14 August 2026 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Dwyer IC Brisbane ORDER: 1. The application to strike out B/2021/37 is allowed. 2. Matter number B/2021/37 is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – application in existing proceedings – consideration under s 331(b)(ii) Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) – where the applicant was temporarily employed by Queensland Health – where Queensland Health provided visa sponsorship for the applicant – where Queensland Health terminated the applicant's employment – where the applicant was unsuccessful in proceedings relating to unfair dismissal – where applicant now seeking to recover unpaid wages etc – where Queensland Health applied for the unpaid wages application to be struck out or dismissed – where discretion to dismiss proceedings – where unpaid wages application not necessary or -- 1 of 15 -- 2 desirable in the public interest – where proceedings dismissed LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) ss 278(4), 329(e), 331(b)(ii), sch 5 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 475(1a), 1024 CASES: Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) [2021] QIRC 223 Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] ICQ 010 Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2022] ICQ 019 Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18 Department of Education and Training v Hart [2011] QIRC 5 Lamb-Miller v Maranoa Regional Council [2016] QIRC 070 Robertson v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) (No 2) [2019] QIRC 196 State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) v Algahamdi [2016] QIRC 057 B. Tweddell v Ehle Pty Ltd (1993) 142 QGIG 397 Wayne Smith AND GSM (Operations) Pty Ltd (No. B687 of 2002) Reasons for Decision [1] This is an application by the State of Queensland (Queensland Health) ('the respondent') seeking to strike out an application for unpaid wages made by Dr Lina Saleh Ahmed Algahamdi ('Dr Algahamdi'). -- 2 of 15 -- 3 Background [2] Dr Algahamdi was temporarily engaged as a full-time Senior House Officer by the respondent under the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011. Her letter of appointment provided for a commencement date of 5 October 2014 and an end date of 17 January 2016. [3] On 19 May 2015, the respondent terminated Dr Algahamdi's employment citing concerns about her clinical practice and professional performance. Dr Algahamdi was paid four weeks' compensation in lieu of notice on termination. [4] On 18 June 2015, Dr Algahamdi filed an application for reinstatement ('reinstatement application') in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission'). After filing her reinstatement application Dr Algahamdi ceased engaging with the respondent and the Commission. The respondent subsequently made an application to dismiss the reinstatement application ('dismissal application'). Dr Algahamdi did not appear at the hearing of the dismissal application nor did she provide an explanation for her absence. [5] On 19 May 2016, the reinstatement application was dismissed by (then) Deputy President O'Connor ('the 2016 decision').1 [6] After the 2016 decision Dr Algahamdi remained incommunicado until, over four years later on 16 November 2020, Dr Algahamdi suddenly resumed contact by filing an application seeking to set aside the 2016 decision and reopen her reinstatement application ('reopening application'). The matter was assigned to me to be determined. [7] The parties were directed to file written submission in respect of the reopening application. During the conduct of the reopening application Dr Algahamdi was residing overseas. The reopening application was to be determined on the papers. [8] On 19 April 2021, following the filing of submissions but before a decision was made on the reopening application, Dr Algahamdi filed an application to recover unpaid wages pursuant to s 475(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the 2016 IR Act') ('unpaid wages application'). [9] On 22 June 2021, the reopening application was dismissed ('the 2021 decision').2 In doing so, the Commission as presently constituted found that Dr Algahamdi had taken no steps to prosecute her reinstatement application after filing it on 18 June 2015. Dr Algahamdi subsequently appealed the 2021 decision ('the appeal'). Given that Dr Algahamdi's ability to recover unpaid wages was premised upon whether her employment was validly 1 State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) v Algahamdi [2016] QIRC 057. 2 Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) [2021] QIRC 223. -- 3 of 15 -- 4 terminated, I stayed the proceedings relating to the unpaid wages application pending the outcome of the appeal.3 [10] By decision dated 22 April 2022, His Honour Davis J, President, dismissed the appeal, finding each of the six grounds of appeal nominated by Dr Algahamdi either misconceived or not relevant to the appeal.4 On 17 June 2022, His Honour ordered Dr Algahamdi pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal.5 [11] On 30 October 2022, Dr Algahamdi contacted the Industrial Registry to progress her unpaid wages application. [12] On 3 November 2022, the respondent made an application pursuant to s 331(b)(ii) Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) ('the 1999 IR Act') for orders that the unpaid wages application be struck out or dismissed on the basis that further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest ('the strikeout application'). It is the strikeout application that is the subject of this decision. Section 1024 of the IR 2016 Act [13] The respondent posits that the 1999 IR Act applies to this proceeding by virtue of s 1024 of the 2016 IR Act. Section 1024 of the 2016 IR Act provides: 1024 Proceedings not yet started (1) This section applies if— (a) immediately before the commencement, a person could, under the repealed Act, have started a proceeding within a particular period; and (b) on the commencement, the person has not started the proceeding. (2) The Industrial Relations Act 2016 does not apply to the proceeding. (3) The person may, within the period mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), start the proceeding under the repealed Act, and the proceeding must be heard and decided, as if the Industrial Relations Act 2016 had not commenced. [14] The effect of s 1024 of the 2016 IR Act is clear. Dr Algahamdi commenced the unpaid wages application after the commencement of the 2016 IR Act. Therefore, her claim can only be heard and decided under the 1999 IR Act.6 Dr Algahemdi has therefore erroneously relied on the wrong statutory provisions and forms to pursue the recovery of (alleged) unpaid wages. 3 Transcript from mention on 19 July 2021, page 2, lines 36-45 and page 3, lines 1-4. 4 Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] ICQ 010. 5 Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2022] ICQ 019. 6 Robertson v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) (No 2) [2019] QIRC 196. -- 4 of 15 -- 5 [15] Dr Algahamdi’s unpaid wages claim is a claim more properly brought under the 1999 IR Act. Pursuant to s 329(e) of the 1999 IR Act the Commission has the power to waive an error, defect or irregularity in proceedings whether substantive or formal pursuant to s 329(e) of the 1999 IR Act. Given the relevant provisions of the 2016 IR Act concerning claims for unpaid wages do not materially differ from the 1999 IR Act7 and in circumstances where the parties rely on the 1999 IR Act throughout their submissions, I will exercise my discretion to waive the irregularity and deal with the unpaid wages application as though it were filed in accordance with the 1999 IR Act.8 Legal framework [16] Section 331(b)(ii) of the 1999 IR Act gives the Commission the power to dismiss proceedings that are not in the public interest: 331 Decisions generally The court or commission may, in an industrial cause— (a) … (b) dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers— (i) the cause is trivial; or (ii) further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest. (c) … (Emphasis added) [17] In Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General),9 His Honour Justice Martin considered the power in s 541 of the IR with reference to s 331 of the 1999 IR Act: [23] Section 541 of the Act is relevantly indistinguishable from its predecessor – s 331 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999… [24] Consideration given to s 331 in earlier decisions can inform the resolution of this ground of appeal. In State of Queensland v Lockhart, Deputy President O'Connor summarised the meaning of “public interest” in relation to the exercise of discretion under s 331 in the following terms: 7 See Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 278 and Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 475(1)(a); See Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 331 and Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 541. 8 Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 329(e). 9 [2019] ICQ 18 at [23] – [26]. -- 5 of 15 -- 6 [21] In O'Sullivan v Farrer, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ considered the expression ‘in the public interest’. Their Honours wrote: ‘Indeed, the expression, ‘in the public interest’, when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only ‘in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view.’ [22] In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in considering what constitutes ‘the public interest’ wrote: ‘Appeals have lain on the ground that it is in the public interest that leave should be granted in the predecessors to the Act for decades. It has not been considered useful or appropriate to define the concept in other than the most general terms and we do not intend to do so. The expression ‘in the public interest’, when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question. Although the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters, it seems to us that none of those elements is present in this case.’ … [26] In the earlier case of Quaedvlieg & Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd Hall P, in dealing with an application to strike out for want of prosecution, cited with approval the reasoning of Thomas JA in Quinlan v Rothwell as follows: “There is now a consciousness of the need for some level of efficiency in the use of the courts as a public resource. That, of course, must not displace the need for reasonable access to the courts and the provision of justice according to law in each matter, but it highlights the fact that the former laissez faire attitude by courts towards the leisurely conduct of actions at the will of the parties has ended. At the same time the rules of court are not an end in themselves. They do not exist for the discipline of practitioners or clients, or for the protection of courts from inefficient litigants, but rather as a means of ensuring that issues will be defined in an orderly way and that parties have the opportunity of full preparation of their case before the trial commences. The rules also afford defendants the means of bringing to an end actions in which the other party will not abide by the rules.” (Emphasis added, citations omitted) -- 6 of 15 -- 7 [18] While the power in s 331 is to be exercised with due care on a proper consideration of relevant materials,10 the value judgement incorporated in s 331(b)(ii) is a broad one.11 [19] Section 331 of the 1999 IR Act has also been utilised to dismissed proceedings in circumstances where the Commission has deemed an originating application unable to succeed.12 The Strikeout Application [20] The respondent submits the discretion to dismiss proceedings is enlivened because: (a) the unpaid wages application is misconceived and has no prospects of success; and/or (b) the unpaid wages application is an impermissible attempt to reagitate the reinstatement application. Misconceived and/or No Prospects [21] The respondent argues the unpaid wages application is misconceived and has no prospects of success because it is in substance, a claim for damages for an alleged breach of contract. [22] The respondent refers to B. Tweddell v Ehle Pty Ltd13 ('Tweddell'). In Tweddell, the question on appeal before the Queensland Industrial Court ('the Court') was whether a claim by an employee (which was in essence a claim for damages for breach of contract) was competently determined by an Industrial Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the combined effect of s 5.3(a)(vi) and s 17.20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990 ('the 1990 IR Act'). Section 5.3(a)(vi) of the 1990 IR Act conferred jurisdiction on the Industrial Magistrate to hear and determine proceedings relating to claims for inter alia wages 'due and payable', while s 17.20 provided for the recovery of wages 'due and payable to an employee, or payable on account of the employee and unpaid'. [23] Section 2.1 of the 1990 IR Act provided the following definition of 'wages': "wages" means moneys (whether called wages or salary) payable to an employee in respect of— (i) work performed, or to be performed, by the employee; … 10 Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2019] ICQ 18 [29]. 11 Ibid [32]. 12 Lamb-Miller v Maranoa Regional Council [2016] QIRC 070, [12]-[13]; Wayne Smith AND GSM (Operations) Pty Ltd (No. B687 of 2002). 13 (1993) 142 QGIG 397. -- 7 of 15 -- 8 [24] The Court ultimately found the claim was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrate and held: For wages to be due and payable they must have been earned by work done in accordance with the contract of employment. The claim in this case is really for the loss of an opportunity to earn wages in the future, the loss being due, on the appellant's case, to the respondent's wrongful repudiation of the contract before performance became due; i.e. it is an action for breach of contract; see for example the discussion in The Law of Employment by Macken & Ors 3rd ed. p. 283 as to the distinction. (Emphasis added) [25] Similarly to s 2.1 of the 1990 IR Act, sch 5 of the 1999 IR Act defines 'wages' to mean: "wages" means— (a) an amount payable to an employee for— (i) work performed, or to be performed, by the employee; or (ii) a public holiday; or (iii) leave the employee is entitled to; or (iv) termination of employment; or (b) a salary; or (c) an amount payable from wages for the employee, with the employee's written consent. (Emphasis added) [26] The respondent says Dr Algahamdi's temporary employment was lawfully terminated on 19 May 2015. On termination, the respondent paid Dr Algahamdi four weeks' compensation in lieu of notice. The respondent argues that this amount concludes the wages due and payable for her performance of the employment contract. Therefore, the claim for unpaid wages is really for the loss of opportunity to earn wages in the future, which is a loss (allegedly) due to wrongful repudiation of the contract.14 [27] Furthermore, the respondent notes the six-year limitation period provided by s 278(4) of the 1999 IR Act and argues that, given Dr Algahamdi filed her unpaid wages application on 19 April 2021, she can only claim any unpaid wages that became payable as far back as 19 April 2015 until the date her employment was terminated on 19 May 2015 (being a four-week period).15 The respondent argues that such a claim is futile in circumstances where Dr Algahamdi was paid four weeks' compensation in lieu of notice upon dismissal. 14 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 3 November 2022 at [28]. 15 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 3 November 2022 at [34]. -- 8 of 15 -- 9 Attempted Re-agitation [28] The respondent also argues the unpaid wages application ought to be dismissed because it is an impermissible attempt to obtain the remedies sought in the reinstatement application. [29] The respondent observes that there is a substantial factual crossover between the reinstatement application and the unpaid wages application, and that in both, Dr Algahamdi has sought compensation.16 The respondent argues that if the unpaid wages application were allowed to proceed, it will serve as a further opportunity for Dr Algahamdi to make the case that she was "unfairly dismissed". [30] The respondent contends there is public interest in the finality of litigation. The State of Queensland is put to considerable expense in responding to each application made by Dr Algahamdi.17 [31] The respondent refers to Department of Education and Training AND Nicolaas Hart (B/2010/31) ('Hart').18 In that case the applicant commenced various proceedings, including two, separate unpaid wages proceedings (B/2008/38 and B/2010/25). The subsequent application comprised of the same substance as the previous but involved different legal arguments. Deputy President Bloomfield dismissed the matter pursuant to s 331(b)(ii) of the 1999 IR Act and the decision was later upheld on appeal. Relevantly, His Honour said: [45] Save and except for the arguments he wishes to (now) mount in support of his claim, there is nothing different in the subject matter of matter nos. B/2010/25 and B/2008/38. The only difference, or so it appears, is the way Mr Hard intends to argue his case the second time around compared to the way he ran it in the first instance. [46] Having identified the mistakes he made in presenting his case in August 2008 he now seeks to overcome those failures and deficiencies by presenting fresh argument(s) about material(s) which has been in existence from the day he lodged his fist application. [47] In my view it would be wrong to permit Mr Hart to prosecute the same application again in circumstances where, firstly he elected to "discontinue" his earlier proceedings because he had not established the necessary evidentiary foundation to support it and, secondly, where, with due care and diligence he could have presented the argument(s) he now wishes to mount. (Anshun, per Murphy J at [2] and Brennan J at [20]; Henderson v Henderson.) [48] Equally, it would be wrong to require the Department, some two and a-half years down the track, to have to (again) spend time, effort and resources in defending a claim which it has already been required to respond to. It is not the Department's fault that Mr Hart did not present his case in an appropriate way when he had the opportunity to do so. 16 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 3 November 2022 at [35] and [37]. 17 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 3 November 2022 at [36]. 18 Department of Education and Training v Hart [2011] QIRC 5. -- 9 of 15 -- 10 [49] Finally, it would be a waste of taxpayer monies to require the Commission to reconsider a matter which has already been before it … [50] For the foregoing reasons I order, pursuant to s 331(b)(ii), that the Commission refrain from hearing, further hearing or deciding matter no. B/2010/25 on the basis that further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest. [32] The respondent submits that it would be wrong to permit Dr Algahamdi to prosecute the unpaid wages application in circumstances where the reinstatement application has been dismissed.19 To allow the current matter to proceed would set the precedent that, should a litigant fail in their reinstatement application, then they will be at liberty to seek the same remedies via an unpaid wages claim.20 [33] Finally, the respondent notes that Dr Algahamdi does not explain the five years and eleven-month delay in commencing her unpaid wages proceedings. This is far lengthier than the two-and-a-half-year delay Deputy President Bloomfield was critical of in Hart. If Dr Algahamdi genuinely believed she was owed outstanding wages it is unlikely that she would have waited almost six years before filing that claim.21 [34] Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the unpaid wages application is a misconceived attempt to obtain the remedies she was unable to obtain via her reinstatement application. The parties’ submissions on s 331 of the 1999 IR Act [35] The Commission directed the parties to file and serve written submissions. The matter has been decided on the papers.22 Dr Algahamdi's submissions [36] Dr Algahamdi filed her submissions in response to the strike out application on 12 January 2023. She argues the strike out application ought to be dismissed on the basis that it is "wrong and speculative in nature". [37] Dr Algahamdi denies that the unpaid wages claim is an attempt to reagitate the reinstatement application. She submits that the power granted to the Commission to dismiss proceedings that are not in the public interest pursuant to s 331 of the 1999 IR Act requires the party making the strike out application to provide supporting material. She contends the respondent did not provide any material evidence to explain how the claim for unpaid wages could constitute an act of 're-agitation'.23 Dr Algahamdi denies having ever claimed unpaid wages, collateral damages or compensation for the 19 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 3 November 2022 at [40]. 20 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 3 November 2022 at [40]. 21 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 3 November 2022 at [42]. 22 Transcript from mention on 29 March 2023, page 7, lines 6-16. 23 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 12 January 2023 at [4] – [5]. -- 10 of 15 -- 11 termination of her employment,24 and describes her unpaid wages claim as an "independent" and "very separate claim". [38] Dr Algahamdi clarifies that her unpaid wages application is not an attempt to claim damages for breach of contract. Rather, her claim is comprised of the following items and is governed by legislation relating to industrial relations and immigration:25 • unpaid wages that became due both before and after the termination of her employment contract; • payment equivalent to three months' salary on termination, not four weeks' salary, because she was a holder of a subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa ('subclass 457 visa'); • the cost of repatriation flights; and • withheld superannuation. [39] Dr Algahamdi asserts that given she has not received any of the items outlined above, there is a high chance her claim will succeed.26 [40] Further, Dr Algahamdi argues there is no delay because she filed her unpaid wages application within the statutory limitation period of six years.27 [41] Dr Algahamdi requests that the Commission consider her circumstances as a worker holding a subclass 457 visa when exercising the broad discretion imparted by 331 of the 1999 IR Act. She argues that her visa status renders her "totally different" from local workers the subject of the cases referred to by the respondent and therefore, she ought to be afforded deferential treatment.28 [42] Dr Algahamdi concludes her submissions by requesting disclosure take place before a decision is made. Respondent's submissions [43] The respondent filed their reply to the submissions of Dr Algahamdi on 20 January 2023. The reply is brief and merely addresses the items Dr Algahamdi alleges she is entitled to claim, outlined above. The respondent denies they owe Dr Algahamdi any outstanding monetary entitlement: 24 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 12 January 2023 at [7]. 25 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 12 January 2023 at [9]. It is believed Dr Algahamdi is referring to the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) or the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) and the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 26 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 12 January 2023 at [7]. 27 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 12 January 2023 at [10]. 28 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 12 January 2023 at [8]. -- 11 of 15 -- 12 (a) there is no entitlement to three months' salary on termination. Dr Algahamdi was employed under the District Health Services – Senior Medical Officers' and Resident Medical Officers' Award – State 2012 ('the award') which provides for termination of employment by four weeks' notice by either party.29 As Dr Algahamdi was paid four weeks' salary in lieu of notice in accordance with the award, she has been paid for all wages due and payable;30 (b) neither the award nor her letter of offer of employment provide for an obligation to pay repatriation flight costs;31 and (c) there is no superannuation owing to Dr Algahamdi.32 [44] The respondent does not address Dr Algahamdi's vague assertion of an entitlement to unpaid wages pre-dating and post-dating the date of dismissal. Dr Algahamdi's reply submissions [45] Dr Algahamdi was granted leave to file a further reply to the respondent's reply submissions and did so on 13 March 2023. The further reply submissions are extensive and consists of authorities that Dr Algahamdi alleges create obligations on the respondent to pay certain entitlements. [46] Throughout the submissions, Dr Algahamdi recites various provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ('the FW Act'), the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), and the Fair Work Amendment (Protection of Vulnerable Workers) Bill 2017 (Cth). She also refers to generalised information published in online articles as authority for her alleged entitlements. [47] Dr Algahamdi's position can be summarised as follows: (a) Dr Algahamdi alleges she was not given prior notice or warning of her dismissal by the Acting Executive Director of the Cairns Based Hospital on 19 May 2015 and therefore was 'summarily dismissed';33 (b) Dr Algahamdi alleges her summary dismissal was unlawful because the respondent erroneously believed her employment contract was one "for a specific period or task", and thus excluded from the operation of the 'unfair 29 State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) v Algahamdi [2016] QIRC 057, [13]. 30 Submissions filed by the Respondent on 20 January 2023 at [6]. 31 Submissions filed by the Respondent on 20 January 2023 at [7] – [8]. 32 Submissions filed by the Respondent on 20 January 2023 at [9]. 33 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023 at [5] – [6]. -- 12 of 15 -- 13 dismissal' protections afforded to workers in Chapter 3 of the 1999 IR Act.34 Deputy President O'Connor (as he then was) has since rejected the notion that the contract was one "for a specific period or task".35 (c) Dr Algahamdi then argues that her unpaid wages claim ought to be calculated on the date that she received a termination notice, but because she did not receive one, she must be paid for the full duration of her contract (2 years). Dr Algahamdi argues that, in the alternative, the respondent must pay at least 12 months' wages in accordance with their obligations as a sponsor of a subclass 457 visa holder.36 (d) Dr Algahamdi also notes that in the same decision, (then) Deputy President O'Connor observed that industrial instruments and awards governed Ms Algahamdi's employment.37 Dr Algahamdi leverages this observation to claim various forms of 'entitlements': i. travel costs for her and her family to leave Australia upon termination of her employment and sponsorship pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or repatriation costs for her and her family members pursuant to the Fair Work Amendment (Protection of Vulnerable Workers) Bill 2017 (Cth);38 and ii. outstanding wages for overtime hours worked (including penalty rates and allowances), superannuation and accumulated annual leave (including leave loading) pursuant to the National Employment Standards and modern awards, namely the Queensland Health Framework Award – State 2012 (30/03/12).39 [48] Dr Algahmdi also alleges that the contents of a document attached to her further reply submissions form 'contractual entitlements'.40 The document she refers to as her 'employment contract' is entitled 'Fact Sheet – Relocation Entitlements for Junior and Senior Doctors' and was emailed to her by an employee of the respondent on 17 September 2014.41 The document provides for costs associated with, inter alia, direct economy class flights for employees and their families travelling more than 700 km, one way. 34 See Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 172(1)(d). 35 State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) v Algahamdi [2016] QIRC 057. 36 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023 at [13]. 37 State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) v Algahamdi [2016] QIRC 057 at [12] and [32]. 38 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023 at [14]. 39 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023 at [15] – [17]. 40 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023 at [1]. 41 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023, pages 17 to 22. -- 13 of 15 -- 14 [49] Finally, Dr Algahamdi alleges that the respondent is guilty of wage theft and has made deliberate attempts to conceal their actions to avoid criminal liability. She threatens to pursue her rights under s 391 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) by reporting the respondent to the police.42 In the same submissions, Dr Algahamdi reveals that she recorded her dismissal and will use the recording as evidence in the elusive wage theft proceedings.43 [50] Dr Algahamdi concludes her further reply submissions by requesting: (a) the matter be listed for hearing rather than be decided on the papers;44 (b) the Commission issue summons to four named employees of the respondent so that they can be named as 'suspects' or 'witnesses' in wage theft proceedings; (c) the Commission issue an order for disclosure; and (d) the Commission dismiss the dismissal application. Consideration [51] A useful starting point in considering the respondent’s application is to return to the application filed by Dr Algahamdi on 19 April 2021. In the section of the form headed ‘Decision sought’ Dr Algahamdi states: My employment was unfairly terminated, and the case is currently under review in the QLD IRC. I am still within legal timeframe to claim unpaid wages for the rest of the contract that was unfairly ended by Unfair dismissal. I request full payment of entire length of my contract and Request up to date payment because my contract is linked to my licence to practice under AHPRA as IMG so I was not able to work. [52] In her own words, Dr Algahamdi reveals that the true intent of her application is to reagitate her assertion that her employment was unfairly terminated. Dr Algahamdi’s rights to pursue remedies for unfair dismissal have now twice been dismissed by the Commission. That cause of action is absolutely closed. [53] Further, the claim made by Dr Algahamdi is for compensation for the loss of the opportunity to earn income under the contract. In essence, Dr Algahamdi’s application is for breach of contract albeit under the guise of an unpaid wages claim. Consistent with the finding of the Court in Tweddell, that is the antithesis of an unpaid wages claim. 42 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023 at [8] – [9] and [18]. 43 Submissions filed by the Applicant on 13 March 2023 at [16]. 44 Refer to transcript from mention on 29 March 2023, page 7, lines 6-16. -- 14 of 15 -- 15 Further, Dr Algahamdi has failed to demonstrate a lawful foundation for the non-wage components of her claim that she has later added. [54] To whatever extent Dr Algahamdi might consider she has suffered damage in the form of lost wages, that loss arises as a consequence of the lawful termination of her employment. While I accept that Dr Algahamdi might retain a sense of having been wrongfully terminated, she has had her opportunity to prove that, and she failed to diligently prosecute those proceedings. There can be no basis upon which she can now alter the objective characterisation of the termination of her employment as anything other than lawful. [55] In those circumstances, save for the notice requirement of four weeks (which was paid), Dr Algahamdi can have no further entitlement to wages or damages for the loss of opportunity to have earned them. The characterisation of this claim as one for unpaid wages is therefore fundamentally misconceived. [56] It only remains to be said that the further matters raised by Dr Algahamdi in her reply submissions, that were not the subject of a response from the respondent, demonstrate even more so the significant lack of insight of Dr Algahamdi into the technicalities and limitations attending the type of proceedings she is purporting to bring. [57] Further again, even if Dr Algahamdi were able to pursue this grievance in an application to recover unpaid wages, the time limitation prescribed to commence such proceedings is (and has been across all relevant previous iterations of the IR Act) limited to a period of 6 years from the date the wages are said to have been owing. Dr Algahamdi was terminated on 19 April 2015. She filed these proceedings on 19 May 2021. Dr Algahamdi cannot pursue recovery of any wages said to be owing for work performed for any period prior to 19 May 2015. The period of Dr Algahamdi’s employment that could have been subject to an application to recover unpaid wages is wholly excluded by the limitation contained in the IR Act. [58] For all of these reasons, and for those contended for by the respondent, Dr Algahamdi’s claim is so patently unmeritorious that this matter does not warrant any further utilisation of the resources of this Commission. It is not in the public interest for the Commission to deal with the matter further and the application of Dr Algahamdi ought to be dismissed. Order [59] For all of the foregoing reasons I make the following Order: 1. The application to strike out B/2021/37 is allowed. 2. Matter number B/2021/37 is dismissed. -- 15 of 15 --