ROMARO -v- SILVERFIELD NOMINEES PTY LTD [2026] WASC 344

[2026] WASC 344 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CIVIL CITATION : ROMARO -v- SILVERFIELD NOMINEES PTY LTD [2026] WASC 344 CORAM : PALMER J HEARD : 20 AUGUST 2026 DELIVERED : 20 AUGUST 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 2259 of 2024 BETWEEN : TERRY STEPHEN ROMARO First Plaintiff PIKACHU PTY LTD Second Plaintiff AND SILVERFIELD NOMINEES PTY LTD Defendant Catchwords: Practice and procedure - Application for a 'case management' stay of the proceedings pending determination of related proceedings Legislation: Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) -- 1 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 Page 2 Result: Application dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: First Plaintiff : Mr T M Clavey Second Plaintiff : Mr T M Clavey Defendant : Ms J Taylor SC Solicitors: First Plaintiff : Blackwall Legal LLP Second Plaintiff : Blackwall Legal LLP Defendant : Jackson McDonald Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Henry v Henry [1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571 Low v Romaro [2023] WASCA 155 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Emmott [2021] NSWCA 315; (2021) 396 ALR 497 Romaro v Low [2023] WASC 209 Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 242 Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Boots Company (Australia) Pty Ltd [1992] FCA 71; (1992) 34 FCR 287 -- 2 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 PALMER J Page 3 PALMER J: (These reasons were delivered extemporaneously and have been edited to correct matters of grammar and infelicity of expression and to add footnotes) Introduction 1 This is an application for a temporary stay of these proceedings, pending the outcome of related proceedings in this court between the plaintiffs and their former insurance broker (the Broker Proceedings). 2 The defendant is an incorporated legal practice that traded under the name of Park Legal Solutions and acted for the plaintiffs in the Broker Proceedings between early 2015 and January 2019. 3 The first plaintiff (Mr Romaro) was born on 4 October 1948. He is a director of the second plaintiff, who is the corporate trustee of Mr Romaro's self-managed superannuation fund. 4 The Broker Proceedings were commenced in 2014. In 2023, after the defendant had ceased acting for the plaintiffs in those proceedings, the plaintiffs' current solicitors amended the statement of claim in the Broker Proceedings to introduce new allegations in respect of the broker's conduct in 2007. 5 The defendants in those proceedings (the Broker Defendants) applied to strike out the amendments on the basis that they exceeded the scope of the indorsement and that the claims were statute barred. 6 The strike out application was dismissed by Master Sanderson who considered that the cause of action fell within the scope of the indorsement.1 The Broker Defendants appealed that decision, but the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.2 7 The Broker Defendants have pleaded a limitation defence. It will be necessary for the trial judge in the Broker Proceedings to decide whether the claims concerning the broker's conduct in 2007 are statute barred.3 8 On 23 October 2024, the plaintiffs commenced the current proceedings, alleging that the defendant failed to exercise the care and 1 Romaro v Low [2023] WASC 209 [8] - [10]. 2 Low v Romaro [2023] WASCA 155 (the Broker Proceedings Appeal). 3 Broker Proceedings Appeal, [33] - [34]. -- 3 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 PALMER J Page 4 skill expected of a legal practitioner by not pleading the new allegations within the limitation period. 9 These proceedings are not far advanced and are yet to proceed past the filing of an amended statement of claim. 10 On 2 June 2026, the defendant made the present application to stay the proceedings. When a court will stay proceedings 11 The power of a court to grant a temporary stay is an aspect of the court's general power to control its own proceedings.4 12 Many of the cases concerning temporary stays involve situations in which proceedings are pending in two different courts. Where proceedings are pending in two different courts, the power to grant a stay may be exercisable where proceedings are pending in another court and it is desirable that those proceedings should proceed to their conclusion first. The exercise of the power to grant a stay is informed by the general principle that it is undesirable that two courts should determine the same dispute, and practical considerations based on common-sense and fairness guide which action should proceed first.5 13 In the context of a situation where proceedings are pending in two different courts, the considerations relevant to the grant of a stay have been said to include:6 (a) which proceeding was commenced first; (b) whether the termination of one proceeding is likely to have a material effect on the other; (c) the public interest; (d) the undesirability of two courts competing to see which of them determines common facts first; (e) consideration of circumstances relating to witnesses; 4 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Emmott [2021] NSWCA 315; (2021) 396 ALR 497 (Michael Wilson) [105] (Brereton JA, Leeming JA & Emmett AJA agreeing) 5 Michael Wilson [105]. 6 Henry v Henry [1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571, 590 approving Lockhart J in Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Boots Company (Australia) Pty Ltd [1992] FCA 71; (1992) 34 FCR 287, 291; Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 242 [101]. -- 4 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 PALMER J Page 5 (f) whether work done on pleadings, particulars, discovery, interrogatories and preparation might be wasted; (g) the undesirability of a substantial waste of time and effort if it becomes a common practice to bring actions in two courts involving substantially the same issues; (h) how far advanced the proceedings are in each court; (i) the law should strive against permitting multiplicity of proceedings in relation to similar issues; and (j) generally balancing the advantages and disadvantages to each party. 14 I have some reservations about the relevance of much of this analysis where an application for a stay relates to two sets of proceedings in the general division of the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, no issue arises about the undesirability of two courts determining the same dispute. Both disputes will be determined by the same court. 15 If an issue arises about the undesirability of multiple proceedings in the same court case management options other than a stay are available. For example orders may be made for the hearing of proceedings together, or the consolidation of proceedings. 16 All of that said, I do not doubt that the court's general power to control its own proceedings gives me the power to grant a temporary stay in appropriate circumstances. 17 In considering whether to grant a temporary stay, I must also take into account O 1 r 4A and 4B of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (the Rules of the Supreme Court). 18 Order 1 r 4A of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that the practice, procedure and interlocutory processes of the court shall have as their goal the elimination of any lapse of time from the date of initiation of proceedings to their final determination beyond that reasonably required for interlocutory activities essential to the fair and just determination of the issues bona fide in contention between the parties and the preparation of the case for trial. 19 Order 1 r 4B of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that actions, causes and matters in the court will, to the extent that the -- 5 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 PALMER J Page 6 resources of the court permit, be managed and supervised in accordance with a system of positive case flow management with the objects of: (a) promoting the just determination of litigation; and (b) disposing efficiently of the business of the Court; and (c) maximising the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources; and (d) facilitating the timely disposal of business; and (e) ensuring the procedure applicable, and the costs of the procedure to the parties and the State, are proportionate to the value, importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute; and (f) that the procedure applicable, and the costs of the procedure to the parties, are proportionate to the financial position of each party. Why the defendant says that the proceedings should be stayed 20 The defendant contended that a stay of the proceedings would ensure the most efficient use of the resources of the parties and the court and fulfil the objects of O 1 r 4A and r 4B of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 21 The defendant argued that if the proceedings were not stayed, there was the potential for the costs it incurred defending the proceedings to be wasted. 22 It relied upon the fact the plaintiffs seemed to accept that the defendant's liability would only arise if the Broker Defendants' limitation defence succeeded. It argued that the substance of that defence had already been assessed by Master Sanderson. It also pointed to the possibility that the plaintiffs' claim against the Broker Defendants might fail entirely, or the plaintiffs might decide not to progress these proceedings if they recovered damages from the Broker Defendants. It contended that in any of these eventualities, the costs it incurred defending the proceedings will be wasted. 23 Further, the defendant argued that if findings of fact and law were made in the Broker Proceedings, those findings might reduce the scope -- 6 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 PALMER J Page 7 for dispute in these proceedings and facilitate their resolution without a trial. 24 The defendant also contended that there would be no case management benefit in holding consecutive trials. It argued that if the trial of these proceedings occurred before judgment in the Broker Proceedings, the trial would be held at a time when crucial factual and legal questions relevant to the determination of its liability remained undetermined. Why I refused to stay the proceedings 25 In my view the application for stay should be refused. This is for five reasons. 26 First, I am obliged by O 1 r 4A and r 4B of the Rules of the Supreme Court to manage these proceedings to ensure their timely disposal, with the goal of eliminating any delay between the initiation of the proceedings and their final determination. The need for the timely disposal of these proceedings is reinforced by the fact that Mr Romaro is 77 years old and will soon turn 78. 27 A stay would result in the further progress of these proceedings being deferred until after judgment in the Broker Proceedings. In October 2023, the Court of Appeal described the conduct of those proceedings as 'dilatory' and their progress 'glacial'.7 I note that despite the passage of almost another three years, the Broker Proceedings are yet to come to trial. 28 It is possible that the Broker Proceedings would be subject to an appeal. Any stay might last until any appeal were determined. 29 Further, the present proceedings are not well advanced and are a long way off trial. If they are stayed now and it is necessary to resume them at a later date, it may be anticipated that a significant amount of time would be required before they are ready for trial. In this regard, I note that although the proceedings were commenced over 20 months ago, they are yet to proceed past an amended statement of claim being filed. 30 While it seems likely that the plaintiffs must bear some responsibility for these delays, I consider that further delaying the 7 Broker Proceedings Appeal, [36]. -- 7 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 PALMER J Page 8 progress of these proceedings is contrary to the interests of the proper administration of justice. 31 Secondly, if the defendant succeeds in defending the present proceedings, or the plaintiffs seek to discontinue them,8 it might be anticipated that the plaintiffs would be ordered to pay the defendant's costs. The prejudice to the defendant in having to defend the proceedings in the meantime may therefore be ameliorated by an appropriate award of costs at a later date. 32 Thirdly, while defending the proceedings might deplete the insurance fund available to satisfy any judgment, it is the plaintiffs who would be likely to suffer any detriment. The plaintiffs are represented by lawyers, are no doubt aware of the consequences of their decision and wish to prosecute the litigation anyway. 33 Fourthly, no application has been made for the trial of these proceedings to be held consecutively with the Broker Proceedings. I do not consider that the determination of the defendant's application for a stay requires determination of whether the trials should be heard consecutively. Any such determination would best be made when such an application has been made and the Broker Defendants have been afforded a hearing. 34 Fifthly, while it may be that the making of findings of fact and law in the Broker Proceedings might reduce the scope for dispute in these proceedings, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not consider this sufficient reason to grant a temporary stay. Conclusion 35 For all of these reasons, I will dismiss the defendant's application for a stay. 36 I will hear the parties on costs but my preliminary view is that costs should follow the event and that the defendant should pay the plaintiffs' costs of the application. 8 See O 23 r 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. -- 8 of 9 -- [2026] WASC 344 PALMER J Page 9 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. SK Associate to the Hon. Justice Palmer 20 AUGUST 2026 -- 9 of 9 --