Coop v Ellem & Anor [2026] QDC 117
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Coop v Ellem & Anor [2026] QDC 117
PARTIES: BRIAN COOP
(applicant)
v
TAMMY ELLEM
(first respondent)
BRIAN FREEMAN
(second respondent)
FILE NO/S: No 3277 of 2024
DIVISION: Civil
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATING
COURT: District Court of Queensland at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 21 August 2026
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 1 and 2 April 2026
JUDGE: Heaton KC DCJ
ORDER: 1. The applicant, Brian Coop is the sole owner of 31
Campbell Street, Clinton (Lot70 on RP609563
bearing title reference 30341146).
2. The respondents vacate the property within 21 days
of this Order.
3. The respondents allow the applicant to inspect the
property;
a. In the company of an agent or contractor;
b. On at least 24 hours’ notice, but within five
business days of this Order; and
c. Without interference by the respondents.
4. Damages for unpaid rent in an amount to be
determined, including interest.
5. Cost to be determined.
6. Order that the applicant file written submissions and
supporting material as to quantum of damages by
close of business on 4 September 2026.
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7. Order that the first respondent file material in
response as to quantum of damages by close of
business on 18 September 2026.
CATCHWORDS: REAL PROPERTY – TORRENS TITLE – LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY – PROCEEDINGS FOR
POSSESSION OR RECOVERY OF LAND – where the
applicant seeks a declaration of ownership and possession of
the property, as well as damages for unpaid rent – where the
first respondent contends that she has an ownership interest
arising from an oral agreement for her to purchase the property
– where the second respondent occupies the property with the
first respondent – where the applicant and first respondent are
former de facto partners – where title to the property is
registered solely in the name of the applicant – where the first
respondent contends, during their joint occupancy, she paid
money to the applicant for ‘bills and rent’ and contributed to
the maintenance of the house – where no formal property
settlement was ever entered into – where the applicant paid the
mortgage payments, the rates, insurance and maintenance
expenses of the property – whether the first respondent’s
occupation of the property was a tenancy - whether there was
an agreement between the applicant and the first respondent
for the first respondent to purchase the property – whether the
first respondent has an interest in the property so as to deny the
remedies sought by the applicant
Family Law Act 1975 (Qld) s 44(5)
Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008
(Qld)
Watts & Evans (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 197
COUNSEL: M McDermott for the applicant
The first respondent appeared on her own behalf
The second respondent appeared on his own behalf
SOLICITORS: MacDonald & Michel Lawyers for the applicant
[1] The case concerns a dispute over the ownership of a residential property. The applicant,
Brian Coop, seeks a declaration of ownership and possession of the property, as well as
damages for unpaid rent. The first respondent, Tammy Ellem, contends that she has an
ownership interest arising from an oral agreement for her to purchase the property. The
second respondent, Brian Freeman, occupies the property with the first respondent. He
makes no claim to an interest in the property, but the orders sought will impact upon his
occupation, so he has been joined in the action.
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Factual Background
[2] The applicant and the first respondent are former de facto partners. Their intimate
relationship commenced in 2001 and ended in 2006 during which they resided together
in a rented house at 31 Campbell Street, Clinton (Gladstone). In January 2003, that is,
during the relationship, the owner offered to sell the house to the parties, and it was
purchased for $114 000 by Mr Coop and registered in his name only. The reasons why
that was done are also in dispute, but for the purposes of this matter, I need not resolve
that dispute. There is no dispute that legal title to the property is registered solely in the
name of the applicant.
[3] During their joint occupancy, Ms Ellem says that she paid money to Mr Coop for ‘bills
and rent’1, and she contributed to the maintenance of the house, but beyond that, there is
little evidence of any shared finances.
[4] Following separation, they continued living together in the house, although in separate
bedrooms, until Ms Ellem moved out in August 2007 to reside with her new partner, Mr
Smith.
[5] At the dissolution of the relationship, the parties separated taking their own property and
no formal property settlement was ever done. Relevantly, the first respondent made no
claim through the Family Court to any ownership of the house at Campbell Street, nor
indeed any other property said to be that of the relationship. It is now approximately 20
years since the relationship came to an end and any application for property division is
well out of time2 and beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
[6] At all times, Mr Coop says that he paid the mortgage payments, the rates, insurance and
maintenance expenses of the property. Ms Ellem says that she made some financial
contributions to the property although the evidence about that is vague and seems to be
confined to Ms Ellem’s contention that she paid money to Mr Coop during their
relationship for ‘bills and rent’. I can find no clear evidence of any contributions by Ms
Ellem to the financial commitments of the Campbell Street property following the
separation. Mr Coop decided to refinance the property to conduct some renovations.
There is some uncertainty as to when the renovations were completed, but it seems to
1 See Affidavit of Tammy Lee Ellem sworn on 4 February 2025 at [4]
2 Family Law Act 1975 s.44(5)
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have been sometime in 2010 or 2011. However, Mr Coop’s evidence is that Ms Ellem
made no financial contributions to the property at that time.
[7] Mr Coop and Ms Ellem remained on good terms following their separation. From time
to time, Ms Ellem worked for Mr Coop in his business. They each formed new
relationships. Mr Coop purchased another house with his new partner, and, as already
noted, in 2010 he refinanced the property at Campbell Street so as to undertake some
renovations with the intention to rent out the property as he was then living with his
partner in their new house. He obtained finance appropriate for those plans. He obtained
a rental appraisal suggesting the appropriate value of the rent for the property was $260
to $300 per week at that time.3
[8] By chance, Mr Coop, who remained in contact with Ms Ellem, discovered that she and
Mr Smith needed to find new accommodation. Mr Coop offered for Ms Ellem and Mr
Smith to rent out the property for $280 per week. She agreed. Because of their personal
relationship, no formal agreement was entered into. Consequently, no lease, nor rental
bond formalities were done. Instead, Ms Ellem and her children and partner moved into
31 Campbell Street in December 2010 and thereafter either Ms Ellem or Mr Smith made
payments to Mr Coop’s account by direct deposit.
[9] Ms Ellem has now occupied the property continuously for about 15 years. During that
period, she or Mr Smith made regular payments to Mr Coop through bank deposits into
the arranged account. There is no dispute that money was paid by Ms Ellem and Mr
Smith to the account of Mr Coop. The dispute lies in what the money was for. Mr Coop
says that they were rental payments. Ms Ellem says that they were payments towards
the purchase of the property as a result of a verbal agreement between Mr Coop and Ms
Ellem for her to purchase the property entered into in 2010.
[10] The relationship between Ms Ellem and Mr Smith ended in 2021. At some point after
that, Mr Freeman, the second respondent, moved into the house with Ms Ellem. At the
time of the hearing, he remained in occupation of the house and thus became embroiled
in this litigation, although it is accepted that his interests rely on the success of Ms
Ellem’s claims in relation to the property.4
3 See Affidavit of Brian Coop sworn on 23 March 2026, Exhibit BC1.
4 At the commencement of the trial, Mr Freeman made it plain that he was not interested in participating in the proceedings. He left the
courtroom and did not return, despite apparent attempts by Ms Ellem to get in touch with him, including overnight and before proceeding
recommenced on the second day. Consequently, the issues in the application were determined without any further contribution by Mr Freeman.
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[11] It seems that during 2023, the relationship between Mr Coop and Ms Ellem deteriorated.
It also became apparent to Mr Coop that the property was not being maintained to the
same standard as previously and attempts to enter the property and to organise for trades
people to attend to repairs became problematic and hostilities from the respondents were
encountered.
[12] In 2024, Mr Coop, decided to sell the property. In order to do so, he sought vacant
possession so that the defects could be attended to and the house prepared for sale. He
was by then, in another relationship, living elsewhere, and contemplating a transition to
retirement.
[13] I infer also that the deterioration of his relationship with Ms Ellem, the hostilities that
were being expressed and the deterioration in the maintenance of the house and the need
for significant repairs factored into that decision. On 5 May 2024, Ms Ellem issued Mr
Coop with a Notice to Remedy Breach pursuant to the Residential Tenancies and
Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 listing the defects which Ms Ellem claimed to breach
the terms of her tenancy.5
[14] Mr Coop issued a ‘Notice to Leave’ under the Residential Tenancies and Rooming
Accommodation Act 2008, dated 10 May 2024.6
[15] It is not disputed that the respondents stopped paying rent from July 2024. The
ownership dispute seems to have crystalised at about this time.
[16] The issue for me to resolve in this application turns upon the nature of Ms Ellem’s
occupation of the property at 31 Campbell Street, and in particular whether there was an
agreement for Ms Ellem to purchase the property, and if so, does she have an interest in
the property so as to deny the remedies sought by Mr Coop in this application. The
agreement is said to have been orally made in 2010, at about the time when discussions
took place in relation to Ms Ellem moving back into the property. The applicant denies
that such an agreement was entered into and asserts that Ms Ellem was at all times a
tenant subject to an informal lease agreement.
It was accepted by both the applicant (Coop) and the first respondent (Ellem) that it was appropriate to proceed without the participation of
the second respondent.
5 See Affidavit of Brian Coop sworn on 7 November 2024, Exhibit BC7.
6 See Affidavit of Brian Coop sworn on 7 November 2024, Exhibit BC8.
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[17] The first question to resolve therefore is whether there was such an agreement. As the
respondent asserts the existence of the disputed agreement, it is for the respondent to
establish its existence.
The Alleged Purchase Agreement
[18] The only direct evidence of an agreement to purchase the property comes from Ms
Ellem’s own account. She asserts that in July 2010, there was a verbal agreement that
she would ‘buy out’ Mr Coop’s share of the Campbell Street property.7 She was to pay
weekly amounts to cover the ‘plaintiff’s share’, property rates, water rates and repairs as
required. The agreement was that upon full payment of the purchase price, Mr Coop
would sign over the property deed, “along with everything regarding the Campbell Street
property” to Ms Ellem.8 It is said that the property was then worth $120 000, so that she
was to buy the half share for $60 000. According to the agreement, she says that once
she had paid the agreed amount, Mr Coop was to transfer title to the property to her.
[19] The terms of the oral agreement were, on her evidence, nebulous at best. She accepted
that there was no timeframe, no repayment amount or schedule of payments, and no
interest. Instead, she says that she left that to Mr Coop, as she trusted him. The total
amount to be paid was also not identified as Ms Ellem understood that outgoings were
also to be paid, such as the council rates, water and repairs. Consequently, she was
unable to identify how much she was to pay, and she had kept no records so as to
understand how much she had paid in purported compliance with the agreement.
[20] There is also some uncertainty in her account as to what it was she thought she was
buying. The agreement, she says, was to purchase a half share of the house. Once
complete, the title to the house would be transferred to her. She therefore asserts an
understanding that she was purchasing Mr Coop’s half share, assuming that she already
had a half share in the property.9 That fact is very much disputed by Mr Coop.
[21] It seems that the basis for the belief by Ms Ellem that she had some interest in the
property is her claim that the property was bought by the ‘both’ of them in 2003, as they
were then in a relationship and engaged to be married.10 She says that they both
7 See Affidavit of Tammy Lee Ellem sworn on 6 February 2026 at [11]
8 See Affidavit of Tammy Lee Ellem sworn on 6 February 2026 at [12]
9 Ms Ellem actually disputes that that was her understanding claiming that such a conclusion is ‘illogical’ in her Written Closing Submissions.
This only makes her claims more confusing perhaps suggesting that, on her account, the agreement was for her to buy the whole house for
half the market value.
10 This emerges from her evidence in the Affidavit of Tammy Lee Ellem of 4 February 2025 at [4] to [14]
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approached a bank for finance, but their savings were insufficient. They then approached
Mr Coop’s parents who gave them some money as an engagement present, which was
sufficient to provide a deposit to purchase the house. The house was bought in Mr
Coop’s name only so as to enable them to claim a first homeowner’s grant for this
property, and any future property they may wish to buy could then be in Ms Ellem’s
name only and a second grant obtained.11
[22] Some of these claims are contained within text message communication from Ms Ellem
to Mr Coop which are exhibited to the affidavit of Ms Ellem of 6 February 2026.12 It is
apparent in that communication however, that Ms Ellem’s claims are not accepted by
Mr Coop. His evidence in this trial expressly denies the existence of any such
arrangements at the time of purchasing the property.13
[23] As already noted, the house was purchased by, and registered in, Mr Coop’s name only.
There is no dispute about that. At the dissolution of their intimate relationship, each
party walked away with their own property and no property settlement was done through
the Family Court. I infer that Ms Ellem, perhaps, had a belief that she had a half share
in the house because of the nature of their relationship at the time it was purchased. That
was never, however, formally clarified when their relationship came to an end such that
the formal legal position is that Ms Ellem has no legal interest in the property.
Consequently, there is no basis now to conclude that the respondent owned a half share
in the house so as to acquire title to it by buying the ‘other’ half share, which is what the
agreement she asserts purported to provide to her.
[24] There are however, greater difficulties in accepting the position asserted by Ms Ellem,
given the state of the evidence in this case. Without intending to be exhaustive, the
features of the evidence of particular significance appear to me to be the following;
Payments Made Described as “Rent”
[25] The payments made by Ms Ellem, and Mr Smith (who made them on behalf of Ms
Ellem) were frequently described in the bank transfer records as ‘rent’. Ms Ellem
contends that was done at the request of Mr Coop.
11 See evidence of Tammy Lee Ellem at transcript 1-67 Ln1-5
12 Exhibit B2 Affidavit of Tammy Lee Ellem sworn on 6 February 2026
13 Evidence of Brian Coop at Transcript 1-38 Ln33-38
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[26] Mr Coop’s evidence is that the payments were described in that way because that is
precisely what they were. It is to be noted also that Mr Coop treated the house as an
investment property and accounted for it as such in his personal finances and tax
responsibilities. Although, I accept that how Mr Coop treated the property is perhaps
less important in resolving the question that arises in this application than the evidence
that demonstrates Ms Ellem’s understanding of the true nature of affairs to do with this
house. Although, given that the property was financed and negatively geared for most
of the relevant period of time, it is difficult to comprehend how Mr Coop would have
agreed to a payment plan that failed to meet the costs associated with the house, let alone
purporting to pay it off. Whilst the terms of the claimed agreement are vague, Ms
Ellem’s evidence is that her periodic payments were intended to meet both the expenses
of the property and to buy out the applicant’s ‘share’ for the sum of $60 000. Such an
arrangement is not supported by the evidence relating to the finances.
Notice of ‘Rent’ Increase Sent to Ms Ellem
[27] Whilst the amount paid in rent changed from time to time in accordance with, it seems,
market forces and perhaps generosity, Mr Coop sent a “Rent Increase Notice” to Ms
Ellem on 11 September 202314 advising her of an increase in the rent she was to pay
from, $480 to $600 per fortnight. This was said in the notice to be a consequence of
increases in inflation and loan interest rate rises. Ms Ellem was invited, within the notice,
to contact Mr Coop if she did not wish to continue to rent the premises due to this change.
[28] Ms Ellem accepted that she raised no objection to the payments being described in that
way. She also accepted that Mr Coop had the capacity to determine how much she was
to pay; “It was his choice to say how much I paid him”.15 But, she said, he wanted it all
described as ‘rent’.
Ms Ellem sent a Residential Tenancies Authority ‘Notice to Remedy Breach’ to Mr Coop
[29] On 5 May 2024, Ms Ellem sent a Notice to Remedy Breach to Mr Coop.16 In doing so,
she was exercising her rights under the Residential Tenancies and Rooming
Accommodation Act 2008, that is, her rights as a tenant. In the notice she listed the
details of the alleged breach which was a list of defects in the property. She also listed
a number of defects which had been fixed by her under the heading ‘Tenants Fixed’.
14 See Affidavit of Brian Coop sworn on 7 November 2024: Exhibit BC5 at page 38. See also evidence of Ms Ellem at Transcript 1-77.
15 See oral evidence of Ms Ellem at Transcript 1-77 Ln38.
16 See Affidavit of Brian Coop sworn on 7 November 2024, Exhibit BC7.
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This is conduct which is, in my view, inconsistent with Ms Ellem’s claims of being the
owner of the property subject to the oral agreement. Instead, in this Notice, she describes
herself as a tenant and purports to exercise rights a tenant would have for a landlord to
remedy defects in the property. Contrary to being a purchasing owner of this property,
by this conduct, Ms Ellem has betrayed a subjective belief that she is renting the property
from Mr Coop.
Ms Ellem has Referred to Herself as a ‘Tenant’
[30] Ms Ellem has exhibited a number of text messages which she says were exchanged
between herself and Mr Coop relevant to these proceedings. The point of putting the
messages into evidence in this case seems to be that the messages contain the claims by
Ms Ellem to a verbal agreement for the purchase of the property. In the message
communication, Mr Coop rejects the notion that such an agreement was entered into,
consistent with his position in these proceedings.
[31] Of particular relevance is a message sent by Ms Ellem to Mr Coop on 24 May (it seems,
in 2024) in which she complains that defects in the property have not been attended to
by Mr Coop. She states, “But that is also a landlord issue to fix but you didn’t want to
pay a tradie”. And, “We are tenants, not tradies”.
[32] Whilst I accept that this is one message amongst a number in which she claims an
agreement to purchase was in existance, it remains a contemporaneous record of an
acknowledgement by her that she was in fact renting the property and not buying it, as
she asserts in defence of these legal procedings.
Ms Ellem Considered the Defects and Maintenance Issues to be the Responsibility of Mr
Coop
[33] Ms Ellem has referred in evidence to the many defects in the property and issues with
the maintenance which she promotes as being evidence contradicting Mr Coop’s claims
of being a landlord.17 It seems that her contention is that if he were truly a landlord, then
it was his legal responsibility to attend to these issues.18 As he did not, she submits that
supports her claim that he was in the process of selling it to her. The evidence also
though undermines her claims of an agreement to purchase, in that, if she truly
considered the house to be (almost) hers, then the responsibility to maintain the property
17 See Affidavit of Tammy Lee Ellem sworn on 4 February 2025, Exhibit A1.
18 See Closing Submissions of first respondent at [36] to [40]
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and to pay to fix defects would be hers. The communication which has been put in
evidence, including by her, therefore also supports the conclusion that she considered it
the responsibility of Mr Coop to fix the problems with the house as he was the landlord
and she was the tenant.19
[34] Finally, as already noted, on 5 May 2024, Ms Ellem also sent a Notice to Remedy Breach
(Form 11) pursuant to the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008
alleging a failure on the part of Mr Coop to fix the very many listed defects in the
property.
[35] These features of the evidence in this case support the conclusion, as the only reasonable
conclusion in my view, that Ms Ellem conducted herself consistently with her being a
tenant because that is what she believed herself to be. As that brief outline of the
evidence shows, she paid regular payments which were mostly formally described as
‘rent’, she insisted that Mr Coop attend to repairs and maintenance issues with the house,
she described herself as a tenant in correspondence with him, she exercised the rights of
a tenant pursuant to the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008
and she received a Notice of Rental Increase describing her payments as rent which went
without demur. The lack of formality surrounding the terms of her occupation of the
property and the lack of a formal lease is consistent with the then friendly nature of the
relationship between Mr Coop and Ms Ellem such that it was not considered, at least by
him at that stage, that formality was required. Contrary to the contentions of Ms Ellem,
this does not add weight to the conclusion that a purchasing agreement was in existence.
Conclusion on the Evidence
[36] These features of the evidence lead me to the conclusion that no such verbal agreement
as contended by the first respondent existed. A further impediment to the respondents’
claims is that despite being given the opportunity to do so, she is unable to identify the
factual circumstances surrounding the making of the verbal agreement or the terms of it.
On her case, she was offered the opportunity to pay off the applicant’s half share by
installments decided by Mr Coop, over an indeterminate timeframe, with no record
keeping and no basis upon which she could determine when she had paid the $60 000
she says was half the value of the property. Further, Mr Coop refinanced the property
in order to conduct renovations in late 2010, at around the same time as Ms Ellem
19 See for example, Affidavit of Tammy Lee Ellem sworn on 4 February 2025, Exhibit B2.
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moving back into the property, and the uncontroversial evidence is that the refinancing
loan was in the order of $175 000. Consequently, the amount Ms Ellem claims she was
to pay is well short of half the apparent value of the property at the time she said the
agreement was entered into.
[37] In my assessment of the evidence relating to the nature of Ms Ellem’s occupation of the
property, there is nothing which points to the existence of the alleged oral agreement.
Instead, the circumstances surrounding her occupation are entirely consistent with her
being a tenant and the payments made were rent. The overwhelming impression from
the objective evidence is that Ms Ellem and Mr Coop conducted themselves as landlord
and tenant, albeit with a degree of informality, until the relationship between them seems
to have deteriorated in 2023 and the dispute arose in mid-2024 and then Mr Coop served
a Notice to Leave upon Ms Ellem (10 May 2024).20
The Legal Position
[38] By application filed on 22 November 2024, Mr Coop seeks a declaration that he is the
sole owner of the property at 31 Campbell Street as well as other orders so that he can
take vacant possession of it. His case is that he is the legal owner of the property and
the respondents were merely tenants. They ceased paying rent and have failed to vacate
the property despite being served with a Notice to Leave. The applicant contends that
the respondents have been unlawfully in possession of the property since 14 July 2024.
[39] The respondents acknowledge the legal ownership of the property rests in Mr Coop.
However, they rely on equitable claims to resist the orders sought by the applicant.
Namely, proprietary estoppel, part performance of an oral contract for the sale of land
and a constructive trust.
[40] The success of the respondent’s claims relies upon the existence of an oral agreement
for the purchase of a half share of the property. As noted above, I am unpersuaded on
the evidence that such an agreement existed.
[41] Consequently, the starting position is that the applicant, as registered owner, has
indefeasible title to the property at 31 Campbell Street.
[42] The first impediment to the respondent’s defence of the claim against them is the flawed
assertion that the first respondent has an existing half share in the property as a
20 Affidavit of Brian Coop sworn on 7 November 2024, Exhibit BC8.
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consequence of her relationship with the applicant at the time the property was
purchased, despite it being solely in his name. As was made plain in Watts & Evans (No
3)21, “It is wrong to assume that one spouse enjoys an inchoate interest in the exclusive
property of the other spouse “simply because it was acquired during the marriage”…”.
[43] The respondent’s apparent assumption that she is the half owner of the property is
therefore flawed. The property is the registered property of Mr Coop and there has been
no order of the Family Court to alter that. Any application for property division is
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, and out of time in the Family Court jurisdiction.
The success of the first respondent’s claims in this court must first recognise an existing
half share in the property, as her contentions in these proceedings relate only to the
‘other’ half share. The evidence in this case falls well short of establishing that such an
interest already exists, and this court is in no position to be awarding such an interest.
[44] That, in my view, is sufficient to put an end to the respondent’s resistance to the claim
made by the applicant. However, even if I were wrong about that, given that I am
unpersuaded that an oral agreement existed for the purchase by Ms Ellem of the property,
the other claims by Ms Ellem must also fail.
The Submissions of the First Respondent
[45] It is difficult to understand the precise scope of the various legal contentions advanced
by Ms Ellem in defence of Mr Coop’s claims. Complicating that process is the fact that
her Written Submissions cite authorities which do not exist, at least at the cited location,
or which are not authorities for the propositions she advances, and which appear to be
the product of AI assistance which has ‘hallucinated’. That seriously undermines the
credibility of Ms Ellem generally, and significantly reduces the utility and persuasive
force of her submissions. Regardless, I have attempted to address her contentions, as I
understand them to be.
[46] Ms Ellem contends that Mr Coop should be estopped from denying the 2010 agreement.
The existence or otherwise of the alleged verbal agreement to purchase by installments
is at the heart of the dispute in this case. Ms Ellem says that there was one and she has
acted on it ever since. Mr Coop denies that such an agreement was made and instead
21 [2025] FedCFamC1F 197 at [90]
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Ms Ellem was a tenant, renting the property which he solely owned. As outlined above,
I accept the evidence of Mr Coop in that regard.
[47] A significant impediment to her success in that claim is that Ms Ellem is unable to
identify the terms of the agreement. She states, quite contrary to the evidence (including
her own oral evidence in the hearing), that Mr Coop made “clear and repeated
assurances that she was purchasing the property”.22 I can simply find no support in the
evidence for that claim. I attempted to give her every opportunity when she was giving
evidence, to articulate what she says the agreement was and the circumstances in which
it was made. She was unable to provide any detail. Instead, she says that she left the
details up to him because she trusted him. That makes her decision to stop paying rent
in July 2024 (after she had complained about defects and after she had been served with
a Notice to Leave) difficult to accept. Within the material in this case there is an evident
opinion by her that she has paid out the agreement and the house should now be
transferred to her in accordance with the agreement made in 2010. However, by her own
account, she is in no position to know if that is even true. She has no records of payments
made, and no basis upon which to genuinely conclude that she has paid out the terms of
the agreement.
[48] Ms Ellem also contends that the doctrine of part performance applies. Again, the legal
foundation advanced is unclear. She claims that her payment of rates, water repairs and
improvements is explicable only on the basis of the existence of the verbal agreement. I
do not accept that. Firstly, the evidence of Mr Coop is that he was paying the rates, water
and insurance on the property, as well as the mortgage repayments. Ms Ellem’s
contention is that she understood that her periodic payments were to pay the costs
associated with the property as well as contributing to the $60 000 purchase price.
Again, her claims rely for their foundation on the existence of an agreement that I have
concluded did not exist.
[49] Further, there is nothing in the evidence that cannot be understood as consistent with a
landlord and tenant relationship between two parties who also had a personal relationship
and therefore dispensed with legal formality.
[50] The first respondent claims that her conduct in reliance on what she says was an
agreement to purchase made in 2010 gives rise to an equitable interest in the property.23
22 See Closing Submissions of first respondent at [56]
23 See Closing Submissions of first respondent at [41] to [45]
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Whilst it is again, difficult to understand precisely the legal contention advanced, the
foundation for what is said to be an equitable interest is the alleged 2010 verbal
agreement to purchase. Given that I do not accept that such an agreement existed, there
is no basis for any equitable principles to provide relief to Ms Ellem.
Conclusion
[51] For these reasons, I conclude that the application by Mr Coop must succeed. In my view,
the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the occupation by Ms Ellem
and Mr Freeman (and Mr Smith before that) was subject to an informal rental agreement.
I am satisfied that the agreement alleged by Ms Ellem to have been entered into verbally
between the parties in 2010 did not exist. I accept the evidence of Mr Coop that there
was no agreement for Ms Ellem to purchase the property by installments. Instead, the
relationship between the parties during Ms Ellem’s occupation of the property at 31
Campbell Street was always that of landlord and tenant.
[52] Ms Ellem has failed to establish the existence of any legal basis to resist the orders sought
by Mr Coop. The grounds for equitable intervention raised by the respondents to prevent
the orders sought by the applicant are not established on the evidence.
[53] Mr Coop is the owner of 31 Campbell Street, Clinton. Ms Ellem and Mr Freeman
occupied the property pursuant to a tenancy agreement. Mr Coop validly sought to end
the residential tenancy agreement with the respondents. She, and Mr Freeman, have
failed to vacate the property and to provide possession to Mr Coop since 14 July 2024.
They have also failed to pay rent since 29 June 2024.
Orders:
1. The applicant, Brian Coop is the sole owner of 31 Campbell Street, Clinton (Lot70 on
RP609563 bearing title reference 30341146).
2. The respondents vacate the property within 21 days of this Order.
3. The respondents allow the applicant to inspect the property;
a. In the company of an agent or contractor;
b. On at least 24 hours’ notice, but within five business days of this Order; and
c. Without interference by the respondents.
4. Damages for unpaid rent in an amount to be determined, including interest.
5. Cost to be determined.
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6. Order that the applicant file written submissions and supporting material as to quantum of
damages by close of business on 4 September 2026.
7. Order that the first respondent file material in response as to quantum of damages by close
of business on 18 September 2026.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QDC/2026/117