Crime and Corruption Commission v Donaldson & Anor [2026] QCAT 382

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Crime and Corruption Commission v Donaldson & Anor [2026] QCAT 382 PARTIES: CRIME AND CORRUPTION COMMISSION (applicant) v DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT GLEN DONALDSON (first respondent) SERGEANT DAVID JOSEPH HARPER (second respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: OCR219-25 MATTER TYPE: Occupational regulation matters DELIVERED ON: 17 August 2026 HEARING DATE: On the papers HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member King-Scott ORDERS: The first respondent’s application to strike out the applicant’s review application, filed 16 February 2026, is dismissed. Direct that the matter be listed for directions for the further conduct of the review application. CATCHWORDS: POLICE – INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION – DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL FOR MISCONDUCT – QUEENSLAND – where the first respondent, as delegate of the Commissioner of Police, decided under s 7.10 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) not to refer a complaint against the second respondent to a prescribed officer – where the Crime and Corruption Commission applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision – where the first respondent applied under s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) to strike out the review application as misconceived for want of jurisdiction – whether a decision under s 7.10 not to refer a complaint to a prescribed officer is ‘a decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding’ within schedule 1 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) – whether the review application is misconceived ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND -- 1 of 11 -- 2 ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – jurisdiction – statutory construction – text, context and purpose – use of extrinsic material Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A, s 14B Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 4, s 35, s 47, s 219N, s 219O, s 219P, s 219T, sch 1 Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s 6A.1, s 7.1, s 7.2, s 7.3, s 7.9, s 7.10, s 7.11, s 7.12 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 32, s 47, s 157 Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 Beck v Kerry M Ryan Pty Ltd [2019] QCAT 38 Crime and Corruption Commission v Dawes & Anor [2017] QCAT 66 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232 Lee v Crime and Corruption Commission [2015] QSC 226 Norvill v Commissioner of Queensland Police Service & Anor [2022] QCA 104 Perry v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2022] QCAT 234 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 Rita Commisso Enterprises Pty Ltd v The Body Corporate for Acacia Lodge Hostel [2013] QCAT 342 Simons v Dowd Lawyers Pty Ltd [2020] QCAT 348 Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 Wilson v Ashford [2022] QCAT 304 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) Applicant: P Wilson KC, instructed by the Crime and Corruption Commission First Respondent: M Nicolson of Counsel, instructed by QPS Legal Services, Queensland Police Service REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction [1] On 13 June 2025 the first respondent, Detective Superintendent Glen Donaldson, as delegate of the Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service, decided under s 7.10 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) (‘PSAA’) not to refer a complaint concerning the second respondent, Sergeant David Joseph Harper, to a prescribed -- 2 of 11 -- 3 officer, instead directing that the matter be resolved by Local Management Resolution. [2] On 30 September 2025 the applicant (‘the Commission’) filed an application pursuant to s 219P of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) (‘CC Act’) seeking review of that decision. [3] By application filed 16 February 2026, the first respondent seeks orders under s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’) striking out the review application as misconceived. The basis of the application is jurisdictional: the first respondent contends that a decision made under s 7.10 of the PSAA is not a ‘reviewable decision’ within the meaning of s 219O of, and schedule 1 to, the CC Act, and that the Tribunal accordingly has no jurisdiction to entertain the review. [4] The application was determined on the papers. The Tribunal had before it the first respondent’s outline of submissions dated 13 February 2026, the Commission’s outline of submissions in response dated 20 March 2026, and the first respondent’s reply submissions dated 10 April 2026, together with the additional material enclosed with the reply. [5] For the reasons which follow, the first respondent’s application is dismissed. A decision by the Commissioner, or the Commissioner’s delegate, under s 7.10 of the PSAA not to refer a complaint to a prescribed officer is a ‘decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding against an officer in relation to whom a complaint mentioned in section 7.2 of the [PSAA] has been made’ within item 7 of schedule 1 to the CC Act. It is therefore a reviewable decision, and the Tribunal has jurisdiction. Background [6] The complaint arises from an arrest at Roma on 13 October 2024. A Queensland Police Service investigation dealt with nine allegations against four officers. Three of those allegations — Allegations 2, 7 and 8 — concerned Sergeant Harper.1 [7] Allegation 2 alleged that Sergeant Harper failed to report misconduct, namely excessive use of force. Allegation 7 alleged that he used excessive force in effecting the arrest. Allegation 8 alleged that he engaged in degrading treatment of the arrested person by failing to allow him to get dressed before being transported, unclothed, to the Roma Watchhouse. [8] The investigating officers found there was insufficient evidence to support each of the three allegations and recommended in each case that the matter be referred to the first respondent for consideration. [9] In reasons dated 13 June 2025, the first respondent reached conclusions differing in material respects from those of the investigators. In relation to Allegation 2, he found Sergeant Harper had not discharged his reporting obligation under s 6A.1 of the PSAA, the conduct of the subject member being serious enough that the briefing of the officer-in-charge ought not to have been delayed. In relation to Allegation 7, he found there was sufficient evidence to support the allegation, observing that the 1 The first respondent’s reasons of 13 June 2025 refer in one place to ‘Allegations 8 and 9’. Nothing turns on this for present purposes; the parties’ submissions proceed on the footing that Allegations 2, 7 and 8 are the allegations concerning the second respondent. -- 3 of 11 -- 4 pulling of the arrested person’s hair, the grabbing of his throat, and the decision to pull him from the truck by the leg were not approved tactics and escalated the situation. In relation to Allegation 8, he likewise found there was sufficient evidence to support the allegation, observing that the arrested person, once seated and calm and handcuffed to the front, could have been provided with pants to protect his dignity and human rights. [10] Notwithstanding those findings, the first respondent determined in each case that the matter could be adequately resolved through Local Management Resolution. The effect of his decision was that the complaint was not referred to a prescribed officer under s 7.10 of the PSAA, and no disciplinary proceeding under Part 7 of the PSAA would ensue. The statutory framework [11] Part 7 of the PSAA provides the discipline process for officers. Its purposes, relevantly, include providing for a system that is fair to officers, protects the community, and maintains appropriate standards of discipline: s 7.1. [12] Section 7.2 identifies the complaints to which Part 7 applies, being complaints about officers received by the Commissioner or the Commission. Section 7.3 defines a ‘disciplinary proceeding’ as ‘a proceeding against the subject officer under Division 3 or 4’. Division 3 (ss 7.15–7.24) provides for abbreviated disciplinary proceedings; Division 4 (ss 7.25–7.42) provides the process for hearings by a prescribed officer. [13] Division 2 of Part 7 is headed Preliminary provisions for starting disciplinary proceedings. Within that Division, s 7.9 requires the Commissioner to consider whether to impose a professional development strategy. Section 7.10 then provides: 7.10 Referral of complaint to prescribed officer (1) This section applies if— (a) the complaint mentioned in section 7.2 has been received by the commissioner; and (b) the commissioner has considered under section 7.9 whether to impose a professional development strategy. (2) The commissioner must decide whether to refer the complaint to a prescribed officer, having regard to the following matters— (a) any professional development strategy, or other management action, that has been implemented in relation to the subject officer; (b) whether implementation of any other professional development strategy would be sufficient to achieve the purposes mentioned in section 7.1(b); (c) the subject officer’s disciplinary history and service history; (d) the seriousness of the conduct to which the complaint relates; (e) whether it is necessary to take disciplinary action against the subject officer to achieve the purposes mentioned in section 7.1(b). [14] Section 7.11 provides the requirements for starting a disciplinary proceeding. It applies if the Commissioner has, under s 7.10, referred the complaint to a prescribed officer. Under s 7.11(2), the prescribed officer may start a disciplinary proceeding -- 4 of 11 -- 5 against the subject officer if the prescribed officer reasonably believes there is a ground for disciplinary action against the subject officer. [15] Chapter 5, Part 3 of the CC Act confers the Commission’s review rights. Section 219O provides that certain decisions made under the PSAA, mentioned in schedule 1, column 1, are reviewable decisions. Item 7 — the final item — in schedule 1, column 1, describes: a decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding against an officer in relation to whom a complaint mentioned in section 7.2 of the PSAA has been made. [16] Unlike items 1 to 4 of schedule 1, which in terms reference decisions ‘under part 7, division 4’ of the PSAA, item 7 contains no divisional reference. [17] Section 219P governs applications for review. Section 219P (2)(a)(i) provides that, where the reviewable decision is a decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding, the time limit for applying is 28 days after the aggrieved person becomes aware of the decision — in contrast to the other categories of reviewable decision, for which time runs from service of a QCAT Information Notice. [18] Section 219T provides the remedy. Where the reviewable decision is a decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding under the PSAA, Part 7, against an officer in relation to whom a complaint mentioned in s 7.2 of that Act has been made, and QCAT sets the decision aside, s 219T (2) provides that QCAT must return the matter to the Commissioner of Police with a direction to start a disciplinary proceeding. Section 219T (4) provides that the six-month time limit in subsection (3) for starting the proceeding applies despite s 7.12 of the PSAA. The strike out principles [19] Section 47 of the QCAT Act empowers the Tribunal to strike out or dismiss a proceeding, or part of a proceeding, if the Tribunal considers it, amongst other things, misconceived. A proceeding is relevantly ‘misconceived’ where it lacks substance because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine it. [20] The power has been described as, in effect, a summary judgment power,2 and the principles applicable to summary disposition in civil proceedings apply with equal force. The power involves the exercise of a broad discretion and should not be exercised lightly.3 It should only be exercised where it is clear that a party has no real prospect of success and there is no need for a hearing.4 The various verbal formulae describing the test are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go forward in the ordinary way.5 A case must be clearly made out to support a dismissal, the Tribunal being required to find that there is no arguable case or that it is doomed to fail.6 2 Beck v Kerry M Ryan Pty Ltd [2019] QCAT 38, [22]. 3 Wilson v Ashford [2022] QCAT 304, [7]–[8]. 4 Beck v Kerry M Ryan Pty Ltd [2019] QCAT 38, [24]; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232. 5 Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552, [57] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), applied in Simons v Dowd Lawyers Pty Ltd [2020] QCAT 348, [34]–[36]; endorsed in Perry v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2022] QCAT 234, [9]. 6 Rita Commisso Enterprises Pty Ltd v The Body Corporate for Acacia Lodge Hostel [2013] QCAT 342, [3], [15]. -- 5 of 11 -- 6 [21] The onus rests on the first respondent as the party seeking strike out.7 [22] That said, where the asserted defect is jurisdictional, and the jurisdictional question is a pure question of statutory construction which the parties have fully argued, it is appropriate for the Tribunal to determine the question. An application raising a jurisdictional point may properly be dealt with under s 47 of the QCAT Act.8 The parties here have joined issue squarely on the construction point, and neither suggests that any evidence bears upon it. I therefore propose to decide it. The first respondent’s submissions [23] The first respondent’s argument may be summarised as follows: (a) ‘disciplinary proceeding’ is exhaustively defined by s 7.3 of the PSAA as a proceeding under Division 3 or 4; (b) only a prescribed officer can ‘start’ a disciplinary proceeding, and only under s 7.11; (c) the words of item 7 of schedule 1 — ‘start a disciplinary proceeding against’ — mirror the text of s 7.11(2), and do not appear in s 7.10; (d) the first respondent was exercising a power under s 7.10, within Division 2; he was not a prescribed officer, made no decision about whether to start a disciplinary proceeding, and could not have made such a decision; (e) accordingly, his decision is not a ‘decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding’ within item 7, is not a reviewable decision, and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction. [24] The first respondent relies on the well-known statements in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority9 and Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue10 as to the primacy of the statutory text, submitting that the meaning of ss 7.10 and 7.11 is clear and unambiguous, and that the extrinsic material relied upon by the Commission cannot be used to displace it.11 He submits that, if regard is had to the Explanatory Notes at all, passages at pages 8 and 28 are consistent with his reading, in that they describe s 7.10 as concerning referral for the commencement of disciplinary proceedings and s 7.11 as the provision under which a proceeding is started. [25] The first respondent also relies on Norvill v Commissioner of Queensland Police Service & Anor,12 in which the Court of Appeal described Part 7 as providing a multi- staged process: first, a determination whether to impose a professional development strategy; secondly, a determination whether to refer the complaint to a prescribed officer; and thirdly, in the event of referral, the prescribed officer’s decision whether to start a disciplinary proceeding. Each stage, it is submitted, is separate, with distinct decision-makers and distinct considerations; the second stage does not permit a 7 See generally Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232; see also Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118. 8 Crime and Corruption Commission v Dawes & Anor [2017] QCAT 66. 9 [1998] HCA 28. 10 [2009] HCA 41. 11 Explanatory Notes, Police Service Administration (Discipline Reform) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 (Qld). 12 [2022] QCA 104, [27]–[31] (Sofronoff P, Fraser JA and Boddice J). -- 6 of 11 -- 7 determination whether to start a disciplinary proceeding, simply whether to refer the complaint to a prescribed officer. [26] Finally, the first respondent points to the absence of any requirement to issue a QCAT Information Notice in respect of a s 7.10 decision. Other provisions in Part 7 — s 7.27(4) and s 7.31 — specifically provide for QCAT Information Notices in respect of certain decisions, and s 157(1) of the QCAT Act requires such a notice only for a reviewable decision. The absence of a notice requirement at s 7.10, it is submitted, supports the conclusion that a s 7.10 decision is not reviewable. The Commission’s submissions [27] The Commission submits that the text, structure and purpose of the legislation all support the opposite construction. [28] As to text: item 7 of schedule 1 is notably broad. Unlike items 1 to 4, which specifically reference decisions ‘under part 7, division 4 of the PSAA’, item 7 contains no divisional reference. It does not say ‘a decision under Division 3 or 4 not to start a disciplinary proceeding’, and it does not confine the category to decisions by prescribed officers. The legislature knew how to confine a reviewable decision to a specific division of Part 7 and chose not to do so for item 7; that drafting choice must be given effect.13 The word ‘start’ should be read in its ordinary and natural sense as referring to the initiation of the disciplinary process as a whole; a decision not to refer under s 7.10 is a decision not to start that process. Item 7 also cross-references s 7.2, which defines the scope of Part 7’s application to complaints — territory occupied by Division 2, not Divisions 3 and 4. [29] As to structure: s 7.11(1) conditions the prescribed officer’s power on a prior referral under s 7.10, creating a mandatory sequential process. If the Commissioner declines to refer, no prescribed officer ever receives the complaint and the s 7.11(2) power can never be exercised. The non-referral decision is thus the effective decision that no disciplinary proceeding will be started, because it forecloses the only pathway to a Division 3 or 4 proceeding. [30] The Commission places particular reliance on s 219T. Where QCAT sets aside a decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding, s 219T (2) requires QCAT to return the matter to the Commissioner of Police with a direction to start a disciplinary proceeding. If item 7 captured only a prescribed officer’s decision under s 7.11(2), the remedy would logically be directed to the prescribed officer or would direct the Commissioner to refer so that the prescribed officer could then decide. Section 219T contemplates no such intermediate step. The direction to the Commissioner is a strong structural indicator that the legislature treated the Commissioner’s s 7.10 decision as the operative decision about starting the proceeding. Section 219T (4) override of the s 7.12 time limits likewise anticipates cases where the Commissioner initially declined to pursue disciplinary proceedings and time has passed. [31] Section 219P(2)(a)(i), the Commission submits, directly answers the QCAT Information Notice argument. Parliament designed a different time-limit mechanism specifically for decisions not to start a disciplinary proceeding — one running from the applicant’s awareness of the decision, not from any notice — precisely because 13 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, [71]; Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A. -- 7 of 11 -- 8 the decision-maker at the s 7.10 stage is the Commissioner or delegate, not a prescribed officer who would ordinarily issue a QCAT Information Notice in the course of Division 3 or 4 proceedings. The absence of a notice requirement at s 7.10 is not a gap in the scheme but a sign the legislation was designed to accommodate this scenario. [32] As to purpose: the 2019 amendments effected by the Police Service Administration (Discipline Reform) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (Qld) were designed to enhance Commission oversight of police discipline decisions. The Explanatory Notes state that the Bill will allow the Commission to apply for review of QPS decisions not to institute disciplinary proceedings against an officer, implementing Recommendation 15 of the PCCC Report,14 and that new schedule 1, column 1 provides that the Commission can apply for review of a QPS decision not to commence disciplinary proceedings against an officer.15 The amendments followed Crime and Corruption Commission v Dawes & Anor,16 in which a Commission review application was struck out because the decision under review did not fall within the then-applicable review provisions. The first respondent’s construction would re-open the gap the 2019 amendments were enacted to close and would permit the Commissioner or a delegate effectively to immunise officers from disciplinary proceedings by declining to make a referral under s 7.10, with no external review available. [33] The Commission also relies upon Lee v Crime and Corruption Commission,17 where Daubney J held that a decision to deal with a complaint against a police officer by way of managerial guidance rather than disciplinary proceedings did not exhaust the Commission’s power to assume responsibility for the investigation, observing that a contrary conclusion would subvert the Commission’s primary responsibility for dealing with complaints about corrupt conduct and the patent importance of its monitoring role. [34] Finally, the Commission submits that even if the Tribunal considered the question finely balanced, that would itself demonstrate that the matter is not suitable for summary determination under s 47 and should be determined after a full hearing on the merits. Consideration [35] The task of statutory construction begins with the text, but the text must be considered in its context, which includes the general purpose and policy of the provision and, in particular, the mischief it is seeking to remedy.18 The primary object is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute.19 [36] The first respondent’s reliance on Alcan assumes what it must demonstrate: that the text of item 7, read with ss 7.10 and 7.11 of the PSAA, clearly bears the meaning for which he contends. In my view it does not. The passage in Alcan concerning extrinsic 14 Explanatory Notes, Police Service Administration (Discipline Reform) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 (Qld), 5. 15 Ibid 14. 16 [2017] QCAT 66. 17 [2015] QSC 226, [83]. 18 Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, [47]. 19 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, [69]. -- 8 of 11 -- 9 material addresses the situation where such material is deployed to displace the clear meaning of the text. Here, the contest is as to what the text, read in its statutory context, means. Context is considered at the first stage of the construction exercise, not merely as a tiebreaker after ambiguity is found. [37] Three textual and structural features, in my view, tell decisively in favour of the Commission’s construction. [38] First, the drafting of schedule 1 itself. Items 1 to 4 are expressly confined to decisions ‘under part 7, division 4 of the PSAA’. Item 7 contains no such confinement. Had the legislature intended item 7 to capture only a prescribed officer’s decision under s 7.11(2) — a provision within Division 4 of Part 7 — the obvious course was to employ the same formula. The difference in drafting between items 1 to 4 and item 7 is deliberate, and effect must be given to it. On the first respondent’s construction, the omission of the divisional reference in item 7 does no work at all. [39] Secondly, the character of the s 7.10 decision within the scheme of Part 7. As the Court of Appeal explained in Norvill, the disciplinary process is multi-staged and sequential. But that sequence is precisely why the first respondent’s construction cannot be accepted. Section 7.11(1) conditions the prescribed officer’s power on a referral having been made under s 7.10. Where the Commissioner or delegate declines to refer, the third stage can never be reached: no prescribed officer receives the complaint, and no decision under s 7.11(2) — whether to start or not to start — is ever made. On the first respondent’s construction, item 7 would be confined to the case where a complaint is referred to a prescribed officer who then declines to start a proceeding, and would leave wholly unreviewable the anterior decision which, in substance and effect, determines that no disciplinary proceeding will occur at all. Norvill describes the stages; it says nothing about which decisions within those stages are reviewable, and its analysis of the sequential structure in truth supports the Commission’s submission. [40] Thirdly, and most tellingly, s 219T. The remedy provision assumes that, when a ‘decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding’ is set aside, the matter is returned to the Commissioner of Police with a direction to start a disciplinary proceeding. If item 7 were confined to decisions of prescribed officers under s 7.11(2), the remedy is directed to the wrong person, the Commissioner, having already referred the complaint, would have no further function, and the direction would need to be given to the prescribed officer. Alternatively, the direction to the Commissioner would have to be read as a direction to refer, so as to enable the prescribed officer then to consider whether to start — an intermediate step for which s 219T does not provide, and one which would leave open the possibility that the prescribed officer, notwithstanding QCAT’s order, declined to start the proceeding. The more natural reading, and the one consistent with the statutory language, is that Parliament treated the Commissioner’s s 7.10 decision as the operative decision about starting the proceeding. Section 219T (4), overriding the s 7.12 time limits, confirms that Parliament anticipated the very scenario before the Tribunal, an initial decision not to pursue discipline, the passage of time, and a review process requiring proceedings to be started that would otherwise be out of time. [41] The first respondent’s submission that s 219T relies on there being a reviewable decision present, and therefore does not assist, with respect, misses the point of the Commission’s argument. The Commission does not deploy s 219T to assume the answer; it deploys s 219T as context bearing upon what item 7 means. A construction -- 9 of 11 -- 10 of item 7 under which the remedy in s 219T operates coherently is to be preferred to one under which it does not. [42] The QCAT Information Notice argument is answered by s 219P(2)(a)(i). Parliament provided a bespoke time limit for this category of reviewable decision, running from the aggrieved person’s awareness of the decision rather than from service of a QCAT Information Notice. That mechanism would be unnecessary if the only decisions within item 7 were those of prescribed officers made in the course of Division 3 or 4 processes, in respect of which the notice machinery in ss 7.27 and 7.31 of the PSAA and s 157(1) of the QCAT Act operates. The absence of a notice requirement at the s 7.10 stage is not an indicator of non-reviewability; it is the reason the awareness- based time limit exists. [43] Nor does the definition of ‘disciplinary proceeding’ in s 7.3 carry the weight the first respondent places upon it. The definition identifies what a disciplinary proceeding is — a Division 3 or 4 proceeding. It does not purport to identify who may make a decision about whether such a proceeding will be started, nor to restrict the phrase ‘a decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding’ in schedule 1 to decisions of prescribed officers. The definition tells us the nature of the proceeding; item 7 is concerned with the decision that prevents such a proceeding from occurring. A decision under s 7.10 not to refer is, in its legal and practical operation, a decision that no proceeding under Division 3 or 4 — no ‘disciplinary proceeding’ as defined — will be started. [44] This construction is confirmed, to the extent confirmation is required,20 by the extrinsic material. The Explanatory Notes to the 2019 Bill state in terms that the amendments will allow the Commission to apply for review of QPS decisions not to institute disciplinary proceedings against an officer. The legislative history reinforces the point: the review provisions were amended following Dawes, in which the Commission’s review application was struck out because the decision under review fell outside the then-applicable provisions. The first respondent’s construction would restore, in relation to the most consequential decision in the Part 7 framework, the very gap the amendments were enacted to close. The passages of the Explanatory Notes at pages 8 and 28 relied upon by the first respondent describe the operation of ss 7.10 and 7.11 accurately but say nothing about the scope of schedule 1, item 7; they do not assist him. [45] The construction also coheres with the purpose of the scheme. The Commission’s monitoring role in respect of police misconduct, and its overriding responsibility to promote public confidence in the way corruption within units of public administration is dealt with, have been emphasised by the Supreme Court.21 A decision under s 7.10 not to refer a complaint to a prescribed officer brings the disciplinary pathway to an end by means other than discipline. To exclude that decision from review would leave the Commission without any effective mechanism to challenge the gateway decision in the Part 7 framework, and would permit outcomes of the present kind — where the decision-maker’s own reasons record findings of sufficient evidence of excessive force and degrading treatment, yet no disciplinary proceeding ensues — to pass without independent scrutiny. I do not suggest the first respondent’s decision was 20 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14B. 21 Lee v Crime and Corruption Commission [2015] QSC 226, [83] (Daubney J). -- 10 of 11 -- 11 wrong; that is a matter for the substantive review. The point is that the legislature plainly intended decisions of this character to be susceptible of review. [46] It follows that the first respondent’s decision of 13 June 2025 under s 7.10 of the PSAA not to refer the complaint concerning the second respondent to a prescribed officer is a reviewable decision within s 219O of, and item 7 of schedule 1 to, the CC Act. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Commission’s review application. The application is not misconceived. [47] Had I reached a different view on the construction question — or had I considered the question finely balanced — the outcome would be the same. A strike out under s 47 requires a high degree of certainty that the proceeding is doomed to fail. The construction question raised by the first respondent is, at its lowest, genuinely contestable, involving questions of statutory construction of the kind properly the subject of full argument and determination. On either footing, the first respondent has not discharged the onus of demonstrating that the Commission’s review application has no real prospect of success. [48] The Commission invited the Tribunal to consider listing the application for an oral hearing given the complexity of the arguments. Both parties have filed comprehensive written submissions, including submissions in reply, and the question is one of pure statutory construction upon which no evidence bears. I was satisfied it was appropriate to determine the application on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the QCAT Act. Conclusion [49] The first respondent’s application filed 16 February 2026 to strike out the Commission’s review application is dismissed. Directions will be made for the further conduct of the review application. -- 11 of 11 --