ARMET -v- CFC CONSOLIDATED PTY LTD [2026] WADC 81

[2026] WADC 81 [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 1 JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CIVIL LOCATION : PERTH CITATION : ARMET -v- CFC CONSOLIDATED PTY LTD [2026] WADC 81 CORAM : CORMANN DCJ HEARD : 22 & 24 JULY 2025 DELIVERED : 24 AUGUST 2026 FILE NO/S : APP 68 of 2024 BETWEEN : STEPHANE ARMET Appellant AND CFC CONSOLIDATED PTY LTD Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : WORKERS COMPENSATION ARBITRATION SERVICE Coram : ARBITRATOR FLETCHER File Number : A123961 Catchwords: Workers compensation - Appeal from decision of arbitration service - Claim for medical expenses likely to be incurred for treatment of compensable injuries - -- 1 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 2 Procedural fairness - Worker's application determined on papers - Adequacy of reasons - Impartiality, integrity and independence of decision-maker - Turns on own facts Legislation: Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (WA) Result: Leave to appeal granted Appeal dismissed Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In person Respondent : Mr T Offer Solicitors: Appellant : Not applicable Respondent : McCabes Lawyers Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Armet v CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd [2020] WADC 142 Armet v CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd [2021] WASCA 42 Armet v Stephen Browne [2024] WASCA 44 Atanasoska v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 17 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250 BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Treby [2017] WADC 6 Cameron v Cole [1944] HCA 5; (1944) 68 CLR 571 Cape Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Burridge [2019] WADC 105 Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266 Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576; (1994) 127 ALR 699 Cullen v Woodside Energy Ltd [2021] WADC 56 -- 2 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 3 Greenslade v Hiew [2022] WASCA 47 Napier v BHP Billiton (Worsley Alumina) Pty Ltd [2015] WASCA 230 National Companies & Securities Commission v The News Corporation Ltd [1984] HCA 29; (1984) 156 CLR 296 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56; (2003) 216 CLR 212 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152 Velez Pty Ltd v Tudor [2011] WASCA 218 Waite v Alcoa of Australia Ltd [2020] WASCA 1 Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd [2024] WADC 77 -- 3 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 4 Table of Contents A Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 5 B The application to WorkCover ........................................................................................... 5 C The arbitrator's reasons ....................................................................................................... 8 Claimed expenses for tinnitus, hair loss, plantar fasciitis, cervical spine and neck pain ....... 8 Claimed expenses for backache and referred foot pain .......................................................... 9 Claimed expenses for psychological injury .......................................................................... 10 D The appeal to this court .................................................................................................... 10 A question of law.................................................................................................................. 12 E The written submissions ................................................................................................... 13 F The appeal hearing ........................................................................................................... 13 G The evidence in the appeal ............................................................................................... 15 H The grounds of appeal ...................................................................................................... 16 I Disposition of the appeal .................................................................................................. 17 Ground 1: Determination of application on the papers - procedural fairness ...................... 17 Ground 2: Adequacy of reasons for decision ....................................................................... 22 Ground 3: Integrity, independence and impartiality............................................................. 30 Ground 4: Wrong application of the law .............................................................................. 31 Ground 5: Failure to resolve conflicts of facts and expert opinions: Wrongful conclusion that Mr Armet's application gave rise to issue estoppel ....................................................... 33 J Conclusion and orders ...................................................................................................... 36 -- 4 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 5 CORMANN DCJ: A Introduction 1 This is an appeal from a decision of an arbitrator of WorkCover WA (WorkCover) delivered on 27 September 2024. The arbitrator dismissed an application by Mr Armet for the payment of medical expenses he asserted were likely to be incurred for the treatment of injuries alleged to have been sustained by him in 2015. 2 The appeal was heard by me over two days, on 22 and 24 July 2025. 3 For the reasons set out below, while leave to appeal is granted, the appeal will be dismissed. B The application to WorkCover 4 In 2015, Mr Armet sustained injuries during his employment with CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd (CFC): (a) firstly, on 18 March 2015 when he sustained injury to his lumbar spine; and (b) secondly, following a return to work, when on 4 September 2015 he suffered an aggravation of his lumbar spinal injury. 5 Liability for Mr Armet's injury was accepted by CFC under the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (1981 Act).1 6 In an application filed at WorkCover on 7 August 2023, Mr Armet applied for orders pursuant to s 18 and sch 1 cl 17(1) of the 1981 Act for the payment of medical expenses he said were likely to be incurred for treatment of the injuries (application). 7 In the application, Mr Armet: (a) particularised the compensable injuries as 'Backache with Sciatica, right foot, plantar fasciitis, cervical spine, hair loss, tinnitus symptoms and psychiatric and psychological disorder'; and 1 Respondent's Outline of Submissions filed 9 July 2025, par 3 (Respondent's Submissions). -- 5 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 6 (b) claimed that expenses likely to be incurred for those injuries included 24 physiotherapy sessions, 24 chiropractic sessions, one year of hydrotherapy, and 24 psychiatric and psychological treatment/therapy sessions. 8 Mr Armet's application was opposed by CFC on two bases: (a) first, that existing arbitration and appeal decisions had dealt with, and represented final determinations on, the same matters arising in the application; and (b) alternatively, the expenses were not reasonable because they were not connected or related to a compensable injury, or otherwise not capable of alleviating, remedying, curing or preventing the deterioration of a compensable injury. 9 An initial directions hearing was convened on 1 September 2023. Both Mr Armet and a lawyer for CFC attended by telephone. The arbitrator ordered that, by no later than 19 September 2023, Mr Armet serve a copy of his application on CFC's solicitors and otherwise adjourned for further directions on 12 October 2023.2 10 Mr Armet and a lawyer for CFC both attended the next directions hearing on 12 October 2023, again by telephone. Orders were made for Mr Armet to file and serve, by no later than 10 November 2023, any evidence on which he intended to rely in his application, as well as a document foreshadowing any further evidence upon which he may seek to rely. Corresponding orders were made for the filing and service of evidence on behalf of the CFC. The arbitrator adjourned for further directions on 12 December 2023.3 11 Both Mr Armet and a lawyer for CFC attended the further directions hearing on 12 December 2023, again by telephone. The arbitrator made an order that Mr Armet file an indexed book of documents by no later than 19 January 2024 and adjourned for further directions on 9 February 2024. 2 VIQ transcript dated 1 September 2023, tab 4, documents supplied by Workers Compensation Arbitration Service (WCAS). 3 VIQ transcript dated 12 October 2023, tab 4, WCAS. -- 6 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 7 12 As regards the directions on 9 February 2024, a 'directions orders' memorandum4 issued by the arbitrator for that hearing indicates that: (a) this was the fourth directions hearing, the purpose of which was to monitor the progress of the parties in finalising the evidence required to list the matter for arbitration hearing; (b) there was no appearance at the hearing by Mr Armet; (c) three attempts were made to contact Mr Armet by his mobile telephone with each call diverting to message bank; (d) the arbitrator was satisfied that a notice of listing of the hearing by telephone had been provided to the parties; (e) the arbitrator then noted Mr Armet had sent an email to WorkCover at 7.54 am that morning in which he stated that there would be 'NO attendance by telephone'; and (f) the hearing proceeded in Mr Armet's absence pursuant to s 200(2) of the 1981 Act. 13 Also, during the 9 February 2024 directions hearing, CFC stated that it did not apply to cross-examine Mr Armet. The arbitrator noted there were no witnesses proposed to be called by Mr Armet, and no witnesses to be called by CFC. He then made orders including that: (a) the arbitration hearing be conducted on the papers pursuant to s 198(3) in service of s 3(d) of the 1981 Act;5 and (b) CFC file and serve, by no later than 19 February 2024, an outline of submissions and list of authorities and indexed book of documents; and (c) Mr Armet file and serve, by no later than 5 March 2024, an outline of any responsive submissions. 14 In compliance with these orders: (a) on 19 February 2024, CFC filed written submissions for arbitration together with a book of documents; and (b) on 5 March 2024, Mr Armet filed a document in the form of submissions titled 'To Whom It May Concern'. 4 Tab 3, WCAS, reflects that, due to 'recording difficulties', there is no transcript of the 9 February 2024 hearing. The directions orders were issued on 12 February 2024. 5 Being to conduct the hearing and determine the dispute in a manner that is fair, just, economical, informal, and quick. -- 7 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 8 15 Accordingly, the application proceeded on the papers, being ultimately: (a) written submissions6 and book of documents7 filed by Mr Armet; (b) written submissions8 and book of documents filed by CFC;9 and (c) responsive submissions of Mr Armet.10 C The arbitrator's reasons 16 In written reasons dated 27 September 2024 (reasons), the arbitrator concluded, in essence, that: (a) existing arbitration decisions had already considered and dismissed applications for payment of medical expenses for treatment of the plantar fasciitis, hair loss and tinnitus, and that those decisions represented final determinations of Mr Armet's application for expenses for those injuries; and (b) there had not been final determination in respect of medical expenses for back injury and referred foot pain, nor psychological injury, but, while these were valid claims, the arbitrator was otherwise not satisfied that the treatment sought was reasonable, because, he found, it was not causally related to the compensable injuries. Claimed expenses for tinnitus, hair loss, plantar fasciitis, cervical spine and neck pain 17 The arbitrator recorded his conclusion that previous arbitration service decisions (A34042 and A36114)11 had determined already Mr Armet's claims of medical expenses for treatment of tinnitus, hair loss, plantar fasciitis, cervical spine and neck pain.12 6 Applicant's Submissions Regarding Access to Medical Treatment filed 29 January 2024, tab 5, WCAS. 7 Applicant's Book of Documents filed 29 January 2024, vols 2 - 5 (Exhibit A1). 8 Respondent's Submissions Annexure 'A' filed 28 September 2023; Respondent's Submissions for Arbitration dated 26 February 2024, tab 5, WCAS. 9 Respondent's Book of Documents filed 26 February 2024, vol 5 (Exhibit A2). 10 Applicant's Submissions addressed 'To whom it may concern' filed 5 March 2024, tab 5, WCAS. 11 Published on 13 December 2017. 12 Reasons [9(a)]. And with such decisions subsequently upheld in the District Court and Court of Appeal: Armet v CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd [2020] WADC 142 and Armet v CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd [2021] WASCA 42. -- 8 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 9 18 The arbitrator noted that: (a) A36114 contained findings dismissing claims brought for payment of medical expenses expressly for those same injuries. The claims were dismissed in A36114 on the basis that they were not found to be compensable consequences of the injuries sustained in March and September 2015;13 and (b) he concluded that, because previous proceedings had dismissed applications by Mr Armet against CFC for the same matters, it was not open for Mr Armet to relitigate those claims in the application before him in 2024.14 Claimed expenses for backache and referred foot pain 19 The arbitrator recorded his conclusion that previous arbitration services decisions (A36114 and A49168)15 had upheld claims for expenses for backache and referred foot pain. As there had not been a final determination of Mr Armet's entitlement to payment of medical expenses for those injuries, his claim was valid.16 20 As regards the back pain and referred foot pain, the arbitrator then referred to what he said was the evidence relied on by Mr Armet17 as to whether these injuries gave rise to an entitlement to expenses for the further treatment, being physiotherapy, chiropractic and hydrotherapy sessions. However, based on the evidence adduced, the arbitrator was not satisfied that the expenses sought were reasonable because, he found, they were not connected to the compensable injuries.18 21 Rather, the arbitrator found that a progression of pre-existing degenerative changes in Mr Armet's lumbar spine was the cause of any ongoing back and foot pain, and that was not a compensable injury.19 The expenses sought bore no connection or relationship to compensable injuries within the meaning of 'reasonable expenses' in sch 1 cl 17. 13 Reasons [30(b)]. 14 Reasons [32]. 15 Reasons [9(b)]. 16 Again, with resulting appeal decisions: Armet v CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd [2020] WADC 142 and Armet v CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd [2021] WASCA 42. 17 Particularly, reports from neurosurgeons, Dr Watson and Dr Narula, as well as from occupational physicians, Professor Thompson and Dr Dayoub. 18 Reasons [35] - [37]. 19 Reasons [38] - [39]. -- 9 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 10 Claimed expenses for psychological injury 22 Finally, the arbitrator noted that A49618 published in June 2020 had upheld Mr Armet's claim for payment of medical expenses for treatment of a diagnosed psychological disorder.20 He then turned his mind to whether Mr Armet had established that: (a) he continued to suffer from the diagnosed condition; and (b) if so, whether the compensable injuries remained a material contributing cause of that condition; and (c) if so, whether the treatment claimed was a reasonable expense. 23 He referred to the evidence relevant to these questions,21 and ultimately concluded that: (a) he was not satisfied that Mr Armet continued to suffer from the diagnosed condition; and (b) in any event, if that was wrong, he was not satisfied that the compensable injury continued to be a material contributing cause of the condition, but rather, it was caused predominantly, if not wholly, by stress, anxiety and pain arising from non-compensable injuries.22 D The appeal to this court 24 This appeal was commenced by Mr Armet by notice filed on 24 October 2024 (Notice). Pursuant to s 391(1) of the Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (WA) (Act) the appeal can only be brought with leave. 25 The prerequisite for the grant of leave is that a question of law must be involved.23 Further, and relevant to this appeal, the court must not grant leave unless the amount of compensation at issue is at least $5,000.24 Then, even if those prerequisites are satisfied, the grant still lies in the discretion of the court. 20 Reasons [40]. 21 Namely, reports of psychiatrists, Dr Terace and Dr McCarthy, as well as psychologists, Dr Rae and Dr Heckenberg. 22 Reasons [47]. 23 The Act s 391(2). 24 The Act s 391(3)(i). -- 10 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 11 26 The appeal is to be by way of review of the decision under appeal.25 Evidence that is fresh evidence or in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to the decision appealed against cannot be given on appeal to this court except with leave.26 27 On hearing the appeal, the court may: (a) affirm, amend or quash the decision, or substitute, or make, in addition, any decision that should have been made in the first instance; and (b) subject to s 400 of the Act, make any further order or decision, as to costs or otherwise, as the court thinks fit.27 28 In the Notice, Mr Armet stated that the question of law arising was that the arbitration service: … failed to afford [him] with natural justice, procedural fairness, failed to apply the correct law, failed to provide relevant and adequate reasons for decision, etc. 29 Mr Armet then set out 12 'grounds' of appeal, posed, in essence, as 'whether' the arbitrator: (a) failed to afford him natural justice and a hearing 'in person' in accordance with international law; (b) failed to afford him procedural fairness and to conduct a hearing fairly and in accordance with the Act; (c) violated obligations of integrity, impartiality and independence when performing a function under a Commonwealth programme; (d) violated principles of judicial conduct, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (Bangalore Principles) when exercising a power under a Commonwealth law; (e) misconstrued the evidence; (f) failed to apply the correct law to the facts found or to be found; 25 The Act s 391(5). 26 The Act s 391(6). 27 The Act s 391(7). -- 11 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 12 (g) failed to account for and resolve conflicts of facts and opinions on material matters; (h) made a finding of fact(s) on an important issue not supported by evidence; (i) failed to provide relevant and adequate reasons for decision; (j) misapprehended the facts and evidence found or to be found; (k) erred with respect to the legal effect of the facts; and (l) erred in law when acting in a procedurally unfair way (rule against bias and right of hearing). A question of law 30 Leave may only be granted if 'a question of law is involved'. For his appeal to succeed, Mr Armet must establish that the arbitrator made an error of law28 that is material to the decision, in the sense that it contributes to the decision and but for the error the decision would or might have been different.29 31 An appeal will 'involve a question of law' if the arbitrator has made an error of law or an error of mixed law and fact.30 32 An arbitrator does not make an error of law merely because he or she finds a fact wrongly or upon a doubtful basis.31 The question of whether leave should be granted should, in most cases, be considered together with the substantive merits of the appeal. It is only when the merits are properly examined will the court then be in a position to say whether an error of fact is so fundamental that it is properly characterised as an error of law. The court can then either grant leave or either uphold or dismiss the appeal or simply refuse leave.32 28 Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266 [53] - [54] (Granitto); BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250 [3] (Brady); Cape Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Burridge [2019] WADC 105. 29 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; Brady [15] (Pullin JA, Buss & Wheeler JJA agreeing). 30 Brady [3]; Atanasoska v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 17 [20] (Atanasoska). 31 Atanasoska [21]; Granitto [53] - [55]. 32 Brady [14]; BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Treby [2017] WADC 6 [52] - [54]. -- 12 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 13 33 If there is a question of law involved, leave should be granted if, in all the circumstances of the particular case, it is in the interests of justice that there be a grant of leave.33 E The written submissions 34 In this appeal, Mr Armet relied on the following written submissions: (a) Grounds of Appeal attached to the Notice filed 24 October 2024 (pages 3 - 43); and (b) Submissions for Appeal filed 5 May 2025 (pages 1 - 6). 35 CFC relied on an Outline of Written Submissions filed on 9 July 2025. F The appeal hearing 36 The appeal was heard by me over two days on 22 and 24 July 2025. 37 The transcript reflects that the appeal hearing commenced on the first day at 11.03 am and was adjourned at the end of the first day at 3.41 pm, with regular breaks including for lunch. Mr Armet completed his submissions at or around 3.40 pm on the first day. I indicated to the parties that I would adjourn until Thursday morning when I would then hear from CFC's counsel with oral submissions, after which Mr Armet would then have a short time to address anything else arising.34 38 In the meantime, overnight on Wednesday, 23 July 2025, my chambers received email communication from Mr Armet indicating, among other things, that he did not intend to attend for the second day of his appeal. When convening the hearing for the second scheduled day, I referred to, and set out, the terms of that communication for the transcript, as follows:35 I'm just going to update for the benefit of the respondent's representatives and for the purposes of transcript. This is the second day of Mr Armet's listed appeal hearing days in the matter. Overnight my chambers has received email communication from Mr Armet advising that he would not be attending the court for the second day of his hearing. Mr Armet indicated that the decision had not 33 Waite v Alcoa of Australia Ltd [2020] WASCA 1 [78] (judgment of the court); Brady [20]. 34 ts 101. 35 ts 103 - ts 104. -- 13 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 14 been made lightly and otherwise suggested that financial hardship had caused him to reassess his daily commitments and priorities. And that his medical conditions make it difficult and painful for him to undertake the journey and to remain seated or standing for long periods. Mr Armet in his email has also taken issue with Tuesday's hearing suggesting that given my presiding over the matter he was not surprised at how proceedings unfolded on Tuesday and that what he witnessed and experienced unfortunately confirmed what he had come to expect after many years of engagement with the justice system. Mr Armet did not particularise what that experience was nor the significance of my presiding over the case other than to say in general terms that he does not believe the court has upheld its duty to respect, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of his rights as a person with disabilities and as a non-national. From the court's perspective, however, I see no matter of concern in terms of Mr Armet's appeal hearing on Tuesday nor, in fact, any aspect of the conduct of this appeal. On Tuesday Mr Armet was given adequate and ample opportunity to argue each aspect of his case. He was offered and he took the opportunity to be able to address this court for the entire duration of the hearing while seated to ensure he was comfortable and that he could concentrate. Mr Armet was offered regular breaks and regular breaks were taken in any event as is usual. And he was offered to take his time to slow down and to ensure the court had an opportunity to understand the submissions he was making. Importantly for the conduct of today also in his email to my chambers Mr Armet did indicate that in terms of his decision not to attend this morning he does not feel it meaningful, necessary, or emotionally sustainable to listen by any means to the respondent's arguments, which he says have remained largely unchanged. He has also stated that he does not intend to submit any further argument on his part in relation to his case. No adjournment has been sought nor requested by him and I see no basis to give one. 39 I then stated as follows:36 … So in all of those circumstances I see it as entirely appropriate to continue with the hearing in Mr Armet's absence given his stated decision. I will hear any submissions the respondent wishes to make in reply to his case. And in the circumstances given his absence I won't make a decision today and deliver a decision with oral reasons, I will simply reserve at the close of the hearing today … 36 ts 104. -- 14 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 15 G The evidence in the appeal 40 Mr Armet filed three substantive affidavits in the appeal, comprising materials totalling approximately 3,276 pages. 41 The first affidavit, filed 24 October 2024, was in effect, in the nature of written submissions and set out background or procedural history. It does not contain any new or fresh evidence for the purposes of his appeal. 42 The second affidavit, filed 31 March 2025, was titled: 'Correction of Procedural Negligence and Provision of Additional Documentation'. This contained a mixture of: (a) communication exchanges between Mr Armet and WorkCover, in relation to various proceedings and applications brought by him in that jurisdiction in relation to his dispute with CFC; (b) documents filed in those applications and proceedings, or other applications also brought by Mr Armet against CFC; (c) medical reports and evidence relied on by Mr Armet in that jurisdiction in support of his application the subject of this appeal; (d) communication between Mr Armet and the workers compensation insurer (GIO), and WorkCover documentation (eg progress certificates of capacity) related to his claim in the application the subject of this appeal; and (e) a bundle of United Nations articles and commentary. 43 In relation to any evidentiary materials in the second affidavit, Mr Armet did not identify anything in the hearing before me as being evidence that was not before the arbitrator. That is, they were materials before the arbitrator and to that extent, leave is not needed for him to rely on any evidence in that affidavit. 44 The third affidavit, filed 21 July 2025, referred to the provision of relevant and corroborative materials 'supporting his cause of action'. In it, Mr Armet: (a) asserted the material highlighted the 'negligence' of WorkCover in handling the matter and bad faith conduct of GIO and its legal representatives; and -- 15 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 16 (b) annexed communications and filings again, from other applications and proceedings filed by Mr Armet against CFC, including complaints and submissions made by Mr Armet in those matters. 45 None of the material appears to have any relevance to Mr Armet's appeal to this court about whether he was afforded procedural fairness, or whether the arbitrator otherwise made some other error of law in his determination of the application. With the exception of the evidence referred to below, in [46], leave is not granted to adduce any evidence out of the third affidavit. 46 Relevantly however, in the third affidavit, Mr Armet did seek to adduce evidence as to 'out-of-pocket expenses' directly relevant to this appeal.37 He deposed to routinely being billed $240 per session with a psychiatrist, which the respondent accepted constituted evidence to support a finding that the amount in issue on appeal is greater than $5,000.38 Leave to rely on that evidence was not opposed by the respondent and, given its relevance to this appeal, leave is granted to adduce that evidence. 47 Therefore, in determining the appeal, I have had regard to all evidence that was before the arbitrator39 together with the evidence in Mr Armet's third affidavit as to the cost or predicted cost of psychological treatment expenses the subject of his application and this appeal. H The grounds of appeal 48 It seems to me that, having considered Mr Armet's Notice, together with his written and oral submissions, that the appeal requires determination of the following: (a) whether the arbitrator denied Mr Armet procedural fairness by deciding his application on the papers without a hearing in person (Ground 1); (b) whether the arbitrator failed to provide adequate written reasons for his decision (Ground 2); 37 ts 13 - ts 14. 38 ts 14 - ts 15 and ts 115. 39 Exhibit A1 and Exhibit A2. -- 16 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 17 (c) whether the arbitrator breached principles of natural justice and procedural fairness by failing to conduct the proceeding and make a decision with requisite integrity, independence and impartiality (Ground 3); (d) whether the arbitrator failed to apply the correct law (Ground 4); and (e) whether the arbitrator failed to resolve conflicts of facts and expert opinions after wrongfully concluding that existing judicial decisions represented final determinations on some matters in the application (Ground 5). I Disposition of the appeal Ground 1: Determination of application on the papers - procedural fairness 49 Section 198 of the 1981 Act provided for various ways of 'conducting arbitration proceedings'. Section 198(3) provided that: If an arbitrator thinks it appropriate, the arbitrator may conduct all or part of a proceeding entirely on the basis of documents without the parties or their representatives or any witnesses attending or participating in a hearing. 50 At the fourth and final directions hearing, the arbitrator decided under s 198(3) to conduct the arbitration hearing on the papers. He recorded his decision in the 9 February 2024 'directions orders' as follows:40 Pursuant to the provisions of s 198(3) I am of the view it is appropriate that the arbitration hearing in this matter be conducted on the papers without the parties or their legal representatives … as this serves the purposes of s 3(d) of the Act, by conducting the arbitration hearing and determining the dispute 'in a manner that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick'. There are no witnesses to be cross-examined. In that regard, [CFC] is not calling any witnesses … [and] at today's hearing [CFC] stated that it does not propose cross-examining [Mr Armet] and there are no other witnesses for [Mr Armet]. The totality of the evidence is contained in documents filed and served by the parties and they have been afforded the opportunity to file formal submissions on the issues to be determined. 40 Directions Orders dated 12 February 2024, tab 1, WCAS. -- 17 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 18 The issues of fact and law are not complex. They are limited to whether [Mr Armet] has discharged the onus on him to establish to the requisite standard an entitlement to the relief he is seeking, namely whether the … expenses sought … are connected or related to the compensable injury sustained … and are apt for 'alleviating, remedying, or curing, or preventing the deterioration' … of the injury and any disability or symptoms attributable to it within the meaning of 'reasonable expense' in clause 17 … Accordingly, I am satisfied that an arbitration hearing on the papers can be conducted in a manner that is 'fair and just' and, moreover, 'economical, informal and quick' in that the parties and their legal representatives will not be required to attend and incur the expense of participating in the hearing. 51 In this appeal, the question is whether, in so deciding and by not having a hearing in person, the arbitrator failed to afford Mr Armet procedural fairness. 52 The content of the duty of procedural fairness needs ordinarily to be understood having regard to the nature of the proceedings. Arbitration disputes should generally be amenable to being determined efficiently and expeditiously. Provided that a reasonable opportunity to present their case is given to the parties, issues dealt with by an arbitrator under the arbitration process need to be flexible and account for the informality of the procedure in that process.41 53 The arbitrator was obliged by the common law to afford natural justice to Mr Armet. This required that he be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case.42 What amounts to a reasonable opportunity to present a case, depends upon the circumstances of the case, the nature of the jurisdiction, the subject matter that is being dealt with and the statutory provisions governing the power or jurisdiction being exercised.43 As a general rule a person is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case if he is not 41 Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd [2024] WADC 77 [51.4] (Zamora). 42 Cameron v Cole [1944] HCA 5; (1944) 68 CLR 571, 589; Cullen v Woodside Energy Ltd [2021] WADC 56 [46] (Stavrianou DCJ) (Cullen). 43 National Companies & Securities Commission v The News Corporation Ltd [1984] HCA 29; (1984) 156 CLR 296, 311 - 312 (Gibbs CJ); SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152 [26]; Cullen [47]. -- 18 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 19 entitled to put information and submissions to the decision-maker in support of an outcome in support of his interests.44 54 During the appeal, Mr Armet contended that the arbitrator violated 'a lot of human rights listed in the UN Charter'; by way of example, 'the right to recognition as a person before the law'. He contended that this right:45 … is particular to the administration of justice. It's related to the juristic personality of a person and also to the juristic capacity of the person. And by not allowing me to have a hearing is a breach of that right, okay. 55 In asking that he expand upon his concerns that there had not been a hearing in person, Mr Armet stated that he had been 'barred to enter WorkCover WA since … September 2020'.46 Mr Armet then alleged, in essence, that to deny someone entry into a building of the State, they needed to have committed some serious crime. He stated, in his case, it was a:47 pure policy of segregation and racism. That's all. 56 I understand that it is common ground that in or around September 2020, Mr Armet was barred from entering WorkCover premises. As part of his Notice in this appeal, Mr Armet produced a letter from WorkCover dated 25 September 2020 advising he was not permitted to attend the WorkCover offices effective immediately and until further notice, and giving reasons why.48 57 However, it does not appear to me that Mr Armet's contentions about any ban from the premises, or the reasons for it, are material to a fair and proper disposition of whether he was denied procedural fairness in his application. The question on appeal for me was whether the arbitrator made some appellable error in deciding to determine the matter on the papers and not convene a hearing in person. For the following reasons, I can find no error in that respect, and no denial of procedural fairness to Mr Armet. 44 Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576; (1994) 127 ALR 699, 591 - 592; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56; (2003) 216 CLR 212 [22]; Cullen [48]. 45 ts 19. 46 ts 19. 47 ts 20. 48 Notice of Appeal and Grounds of Appeal filed 24 October 2024, page 5. -- 19 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 20 58 First, it was incumbent on the arbitrator to afford Mr Armet a reasonable opportunity to present his case. I am satisfied that the material before me demonstrates that this occurred, including because: (a) Four directions hearings were convened, three of which were attended by both parties. Both parties attended by telephone, not just Mr Armet. The fourth was conducted in the absence of Mr Armet in the circumstances described above, in [12] of these reasons. At each of the four hearings, various, fairly standard and usual programming orders were made, and sufficient time allowed, for both parties to file and serve the evidence on which they each relied, and any written submissions, including responsive. (b) The transcript of the third directions hearing reflects an exchange between the arbitrator and Mr Armet, during which the arbitrator sought clarification from Mr Armet as to whether he had now filed all documents on which he intended to rely, which Mr Armet confirmed was the case.49 The arbitrator noted this was composed of approximately 1,550 pages of un-indexed material and ultimately ordered that Mr Armet file, by no later than 19 January 2024, an indexed and paginated book of documents, which he ultimately did. 59 Secondly, the decision to hold an arbitration hearing on the papers is an entirely discretionary power of the arbitrator, under s 189(3) of the 1981 Act. There is nothing unusual or sinister about this form of hearing, and it is commonplace in that, and often other, jurisdictions for appropriate reasons. In my view, it is evident that the power was properly considered and utilised by the arbitrator including in circumstances where: (a) there was no call or application for cross-examination of Mr Armet or any other witness; (b) both parties had been given due opportunity to file evidence and submissions, and both had done so; (c) both parties were, by the orders of 12 December 2023, on notice that consideration would be given to whether the arbitrator could determine the application on the papers; 49 VIQ transcript dated 12 December 2023, tab 4, WCAS. -- 20 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 21 (d) both parties were, by the orders of 9 February 2024, on notice of the arbitrator's confirmed decision to decide the application on the papers; and (e) Mr Armet did then file and serve submissions following the 9 February 2024 hearing - in compliance with those orders - for the purposes of the arbitration determination. 60 Thirdly, the arbitrator's orders of 9 February 2024 set out on page 4, appeal rights including that a party had 28 days to lodge any application for leave to appeal. As submitted on behalf of CFC in the appeal,50 at the time the orders were made Mr Armet did not challenge the orders or the decision of the arbitrator in that respect. Rather instead, he went so far as to positively comply with the programming orders made, when he filed further submissions. 61 Fourthly, by the orders of 9 February 2024, the parties were on notice that the arbitrator sought input from them as to whether determinations of previous claims made in that jurisdiction by Mr Armet might enliven the principal of issue estoppel, thereby restricting the re-agitation and redetermination of any of the same issues arising. In that respect, Mr Armet was entitled to have brought to his attention, and did, critical issues or factors on which the arbitrator's decision might turn in a significant way. Mr Armet then addressed those matters at pages 9 and 10 of his closing submissions filed on 5 March 2024. 62 Fifthly, I accept, as contended on behalf of CFC,51 that in this appeal Mr Armet did not point to any additional evidence, nor any submission, that formed part of his case that he had been deprived of putting before the arbitrator. His arguments on appeal were all concerns about the arbitrator's use of the evidence before him and what findings he made based on that evidence. 63 Ultimately, it is apparent that Mr Armet had ample opportunity to present his evidence and his submissions, to respond to CFC's submissions and to respond to issues of significance raised by the arbitrator. He was on notice from 12 December 2023 that the application might be determined on the papers. Then, he was on notice from the orders of 9 February 2024, that it would be. There was no denial of procedural fairness nor failure to afford natural justice to Mr Armet by reason of the arbitrator's decision to determine the 50 ts 108. 51 ts 107 - ts 109. -- 21 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 22 application on the papers under s 189(3) of the 1981 Act. It was open for the arbitrator to conclude that a determination on the papers was fair and just and that it was an economical, informal and efficient way to decide the matter. Ground 2: Adequacy of reasons for decision 64 Section 213(4) of the 1981 Act outlines what the reasons for the decision of an arbitrator ought to cover: (4) The reasons for an arbitrator's decision - (a) need only identify the facts that the arbitrator has accepted in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and (b) need only identify the law that the arbitrator has applied in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and (c) need not canvass all the evidence given in the case; and (d) need not canvass all the factual and legal arguments or issues arising in the case. 65 In relation to the context in which s 213(4) was enacted, the following has also been established: (a) because arbitrators are frequently called on to give reasons in disputes where there will be a significant number of conflicting medical reports, by implication, the legislature intended that an arbitrator should not be required to engage in an exhaustive process of specifying which opinions are rejected and the reasons for their rejection; (b) the realities of work pressure and time limitations in these jurisdictions must be acknowledged, and in recognition of the summary nature of the proceedings, the statutory provisions obviate the need for the decision-maker to canvass all evidence, all factual or legal arguments, or all issues, arising in the case; and (c) the arbitrator is still ultimately obliged to expose the reasoning process linking the facts accepted and the law applied, and justifying the ultimate result.52 52 Velez Pty Ltd v Tudor [2011] WASCA 218 [70]. -- 22 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 23 66 Mr Armet's complaints as to the adequacy of the reasons was not articulated in his Notice nor his written submissions. At the hearing as to the adequacy of the reasons, he was asked about this, and submitted:53 It's completely inadequate because it's empty. His decision is - is empty of anything. Is empty. 67 One of the more specific matters of concern to Mr Armet appeared to be about the fulsomeness of the arbitrator's references to medical reports and evidence, and that, in Mr Armet's submission, he had excluded evidence of significance:54 … And not only this, we will see during his decision that when he start to paraphrase, you know, paraphrase - - - paraphrase Professor Narula with the most accurate report of all, he actually erase all the main important things of that report, so it went all in the bin for all purpose was not legit, it's not legitimate. The intention is completely wrong, all right. … … First of all, did you ever notice in that decision any mention of permanent impairment report from anywhere? There was none, nothing. What does it tell you? And as well we are coming back to the beginning of the reason to deny the medical, to get medical expense, your Honour, to refuse medical treatment to someone, ground 1, there is no compensable injury, ground 2, there is no injury, so the arbitrator consciously and voluntarily omit to state that there is actually a long-term evaluation of the body leading to permanent impairments of each injury, okay, so that's the point. By erasing the whole permanent impairment (indistinct) of the whole report, you actually support your decision to refuse medical treatment. Is that a sign of partiality? Is this a sign of integrity? Obviously not. 68 In that context, Mr Armet's concerns about the reasons goes both to the legal adequacy of the reasons, and to the assertion that the arbitrator's approach to the evidence was reflective of some partiality or compromised independence or integrity. The assertions as to partiality or compromise are dealt with below, under Ground 3. 69 In the reasons, the arbitrator identified the issue raised by Mr Armet's application, being a claim for the payment of medical 53 ts 60. 54 ts 51 - ts 52. -- 23 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 24 expenses likely to be incurred for the injuries alleged by Mr Armet to be compensable injuries.55 70 The arbitrator then referred to the legal principles applicable to a determination of the issue arising, including as to what the applicant must establish to demonstrate an entitlement to 'reasonable expenses incurred or likely to be incurred' for the treatment of 'an injury'.56 71 As to the claim for expenses for neck injury, plantar fasciitis, hair loss and tinnitus, the arbitrator identified the relevant law and principles in respect of res judicata and estoppel.57 He went on to reason that, having noted the matters decided in A36114 and A34042,58 those injuries had already been found not to be compensable injuries arising from the incidents in 2015, and, as such it was not open to Mr Armet to relitigate those matters by seeking medical expenses for such alleged injuries.59 72 The balance of the reasons dealt with a determination on the claim for expenses for compensable injuries: the lumbar spinal injury and right foot pain, and psychological disorder. 73 As to spinal injury and foot pain, the arbitrator referred to and generally reproduced the medical evidence he says was relied on by Mr Armet to establish that his compensable injuries persisted as a material contributing cause of symptoms giving rise to an entitlement to reasonable expenses for treatment.60 This included: (a) Dr Watson, neurosurgeon, dated 1 November 2016 (2016 Watson Report); (b) Professor Narula, neurosurgeon, dated 12 February 2018 (Narula 2018 Report); (c) Professor Thompson, physician, dated 1 February 2019 (Thompson Report); and (d) Dr Dayoub, physician, dated 28 September 2022 (Dayoub Report). 55 Reasons [29]. 56 Reasons [21] - [28]. 57 Reasons [11] - [20]. 58 Reasons [32] - [33]. 59 Reasons [30] and [31]. 60 Reasons [36]. -- 24 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 25 74 The arbitrator then set out his findings that:61 (a) Mr Armet suffered a compensable injury in 2015, being a lumbosacral strain which aggravated a pre-existing degenerative change including a disc protrusion; (b) the compensable injury was treated contemporaneously; and (c) the pre-existing degenerative change was now the sole cause of any ongoing back pain or right foot pain. 75 A finding that the acute injury lumbosacral strain had resolved and that any current symptomology was attributable to degenerative changes appears to be reasonable and open to the arbitrator based on the evidence. For example: (a) Dr Narula's view that it was not likely that Mr Armet was currently suffering the effects of an acute injury, but was likely to be experiencing progressing symptomatic degeneration; (b) Professor Thompson's views that there appeared to be no radiological evidence of any acute injury but that degenerative appearances seem to have worsened: and (c) Dr Dayoub's view that a strain of the type suffered by Mr Armet to his lumbar spine should be recovered, particularly in the absence of any significant structural abnormality evident on the radiology. 76 Mr Armet, however, contends that this overlooks significant medical evidence including of Dr Narula who he describes as being the main assessor of the whole permanent impairment report.62 His concern in this respect is understood to be that the reasons are silent on, or exclude significant portions of, what he contends is relevant medical evidence supporting his application, being a report of Dr Narula dated 6 November 2015 as well as progress medical certificates completed by Dr Narula in 2017 and 2018. 77 In his written submissions, Mr Armet contended that he had been suffering, since March 2015, from chronic pain related to the lumbar spine, to the right hip, radiating to the right leg as well as from right 61 Reasons [38] - [39]. 62 ts 44. -- 25 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 26 foot pain.63 In support of this submission Mr Armet cited Annexure C:64 Period of incidents with injuries, threat and wilful neglect or degrading treatment or punishment: incident Notification & Reporting Investigation, CFC Group Form incident statement - GPs' Medical Certificates, CT Scan - Team Member Interview Form (disciplinary action) - WCWA First certificate of capacity - Tax Invoice for WCWA payment - Hazard/Near-Miss Report - WCWA Progress certificates of capacity - GIO Form 3A Acceptance of Liability. 78 However, I can see nothing in those materials that supports the contention that as at 2024, he had been suffering persistent back and foot pain since March 2015. His application was filed in 2023 and determined in 2024 and among other things, the documentation on which he relies all predates 2019. 79 The arbitrator is not obliged to refer to all expert evidence or reports or materials. It is apparent he was aware of and referred to the significant medical reports in terms of assessing whether Mr Armet was suffering with symptoms, at the time of his application being determined, that were causally related to compensable injuries or not. There was nothing unusual, untoward or inadequate about referring to Dr Narula's updated assessment report of 2018 in the detail of his reasons, and not the earlier 2015 report nor the progress certificates. In that regard, Mr Armet contended:65 The arbitrator blatantly and inaccurately dismissed findings that supported the facts and evidence indicating that all injuries occurred or were exacerbated during the period of employment and not afterwards. a) … the Evaluation of the Whole Permanent of the Body is the main and relevant medical expertise to appreciate the injured's capacity for work and ability to hold a job. A WPI report is the most relevant piece of medical assessment and evaluation for return to work, retraining program, origin of injuries and link to workplace negligence purposes. 80 However, such matters (evaluation for purpose of return to work or a retraining programme), were not matters for determination arising on Mr Armet's application (nor in this appeal). The questions here involved whether, if Mr Armet did adduce evidence demonstrative of persisting symptomology (as at 2024) arising from compensable 63 Applicant's Submissions filed 29 January 2024, page 16, par 2(a)(i), tab 5, WCAS. 64 Exhibit A1, vol 2, Annexure C, pages 200 - 234. 65 Notice, page 25, par 5.1. -- 26 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 27 injuries, the treatment expenses claimed were necessary and reasonable. Neither Dr Narula's 2015 report, nor the 2017 and 2018 certificates have any particular probative value in that regard. 81 What is however, revealed in an analysis of whether the reasons are legally adequate, is that they do not appear to reveal any rationale for the arbitrator's conclusion or finding that Mr Armet suffered pre-existing degenerative changes and was now experiencing symptomatic progression of that pre-existing condition, unrelated to compensable injury. It seems to me that the reasons are inadequate to the extent that the arbitrator did not explain a reasoning path or demonstrate how the evidence was used to arrive at that finding. No facts or matters are referred to by the arbitrator in reaching the conclusion that the degenerative changes were pre-existing and that Mr Armet's symptomology is unrelated to the 2015 incidents. In the absence of the reasoning process in that respect being articulated in the reasons, I cannot conclude whether the finding of pre-existing degenerative change is correct. 82 The question then, is whether the correctness of that finding would be material to the outcome of Mr Armet's application. If it is, then the absence of adequate reasons to explain that conclusion might constitute error sufficient to require intervention on appeal. An appeal court will only intervene when the inadequacy or insufficiency in the reasons is such as to give rise to a miscarriage of justice.66 83 Here, I am not satisfied that any inadequacy of this particular reasoning gives rise to a miscarriage of justice, because: (a) even if Mr Armet had established that persisting symptomatic degenerative changes were aggravated or contributed to by compensable injury, he failed to adduce any evidence to demonstrate that the alleged expenses were 'necessary' or 'reasonable' for the purposes of cl 17 of the 1981 Act; (b) his application for payment of expenses for treatment was set out in written submissions only, being 24 x physiotherapy services at $1,800; 24 x chiropractic services at $1,800 and one-year hydrotherapy facility at $1,000.67 There was no evidence before the arbitrator about these treatments, nor as to likely cost-effectiveness, nor likely success of treatment. 66 Greenslade v Hiew [2022] WASCA 47 [48] - [49]. 67 Submissions filed 29 January 2024, page 27. -- 27 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 28 None of the outdated reports, certificates or any other material on which Mr Armet relies deals with these matters; and (c) the only up to date assessment and recommendation in that regard came from Dr Dayoub in 2022; it being his opinion that no future active medical or allied health treatment was indicated. 84 It seems to me then, that Mr Armet's application fell well short of establishing that any of the treatment expenses claimed for back pain were indicated, appropriate or likely to be successful, regardless of its persistence or its cause. As a result, they do not have any sufficient foundation to be characterised as a claim for reasonable expenses in the manner contemplated in Napier v BHP Billiton (Worsley Alumina) Pty Ltd.68 The correctness therefore of the arbitrator's finding as to current lumbar spinal symptomology and its cause/s is immaterial to Mr Armet's application in the circumstances. 85 Finally, then, as to the adequacy of the reasons relevant to the claimed expenses for psychological injury, the arbitrator first crystallised the issue on which he was to decide, being whether Mr Armet had demonstrated that:69 (a) he continued to suffer an adjustment disorder and that compensable injuries remained a material cause of that condition; and (b) further, that the cost of treatment consisting of 24 sessions was a reasonable expense. 86 The arbitrator referred to and generally reproduced the medical evidence he says was relied on by Mr Armet:70 (a) Dr Terace, psychiatrist, dated 12 February 2019; (b) Dr McCarthy, psychiatrist, dated 17 November 2017; (c) Dr Rae, clinical psychologist, three reports;71 and (d) Dr Heckenberg, psychologist, dated 16 June 2022. 68 Napier v BHP Billiton (Worsley Alumina) Pty Ltd [2015] WASCA 230. 69 Reasons [41]. 70 Reasons [42] - [45]. 71 Reports of Dr Rae dated 3 March, 6 July and 5 November 2020. -- 28 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 29 87 He noted that CFC relied on a further report from Dr Terace, following an assessment of Mr Armet on 19 January 2023, with the corresponding report dated 3 February 2023. 88 The arbitrator then set out his findings that:72 (a) based on the opinion expressed by Dr Terace in 2023, he was not satisfied that Mr Armet continued to suffer with an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood; and (b) if he was wrong about that, he was not satisfied that any disorder was materially caused by compensable injury, but rather, any cause was predominantly or wholly stress, anxiety and pain associated with non-compensable injury. 89 The arbitrator explained that his decision to accept the 2023 assessment of Dr Terace included that as a psychiatrist, Dr Terace was more highly qualified than psychologist Dr Heckenberg. Further, because Dr Terace's assessment had been conducted more recently in time.73 There is nothing improper, illogical or ill-reasoned about the arbitrator's process or conclusion in that respect. I accept CFC's submission in particular that the manner in which the arbitrator dealt with the evidence appears entirely unremarkable.74 90 The arbitrator's reasons in respect of alleged psychological injury, properly reflect his findings of fact, and the reasoning process engaged in in terms of making findings. Ultimately, these findings were linked to an application of the relevant law.75 In any event, and more generally, as to the arbitrator's decision to accept one expressed expert medical opinion over another, this does not involve any questions of law on appeal. Complaints of this nature by Mr Armet go to factual findings only. 91 Ultimately therefore, while there is an absence of reasoning in one aspect of the decision relating to Mr Armet's back injury which might involve an error of fact, the error is not material and there is no miscarriage of justice. 72 Reasons [46] - [49]. 73 Reasons [46]. 74 Respondent's Submissions, par 4.31. 75 Reasons [48] and [49]. -- 29 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 30 Ground 3: Integrity, independence and impartiality 92 In his application76 and this appeal, Mr Armet made many general assertions of bias, discrimination and corruption of WorkCover and Western Australian governmental authorities and decision-makers generally. In his written submissions77 Mr Armet stated: The Government Body WorkCover WA's officials and arbitration services erred in law by implementing a policy of discriminatory corruption and practice of racism, racial discrimination, segregation … … there is a significant set of facts which gives rise to the existence of institutionalized and discriminatory corruption during the appreciation, consideration, interpretation and determination of claims … there is a significant set of facts which gives rise to the existence of a white western australian policy or ideology to deny rights, access medical care and provision of health-related goods … 93 Specifically in support of his contentions that the arbitrator in this application had violated the obligation to integrity, impartiality and independence, it is apparent that Mr Armet's particular concern was that the arbitrator's decision to rely on one expert opinion over another in the application reflected partiality or compromised independence or integrity.78 94 In written submissions, Mr Armet contended that the arbitrator had erred in law in failing to conduct an impartial and independent selection of medical evidence, and that he had expressly and wrongly ruled out findings from 2017 MRI results, instead focusing solely, like Dr Dayoub, on the CT scan report of March 2015. Then, in the hearing, Mr Armet submitted:79 … There is a probability more likely than not … something like this, so when you choose to support your decision, a GP like (indistinct), okay, a guy who was … who has no particular qualification or experience in the job and who perform that job within 24 hours and committing a lot of lies in the report that I will supply to you, when you choose that guy and you erase all the other guys who are like professor over 25 years of practice as a neurosurgeon, you know, … and this is not the first time that it happen[ed] at WorkCover because other arbitrator did the same thing, when you choose, there is definitely a sign or a smell or an essence that there is a lack or an absence of independence and partiality. This is for sure. 76 For example, Applicant's Submissions, tab 5, page 3, WCAS. 77 Notice, page 14. 78 ts 34 - ts 35. 79 ts 49. -- 30 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 31 95 Mr Armet's concerns about the fulsomeness of the arbitrator's references to reports and that he had overlooked evidence of significance, was that this was reflective of some partiality or other compromise as set out in [67] herein. However, there is nothing before me to suggest or demonstrate that the manner in which the arbitrator addressed or dealt with any of the evidence in this case is reflective of any partiality or some compromise of independence or integrity. The arbitrator conducted a review of the medical evidence and set out conclusions on the issues arising in Mr Armet's application. And, prior to his determination of the application, he had properly conducted four directions hearings with the parties in which he took steps to ensure all material that either party wanted to rely on had been produced. 96 Mr Armet's contentions included that the evidence that the arbitrator relied on to reach the view that he did not suffer the psychological injury, was the wrong evidence and that he should have relied on other evidence that he contends did establish the suffering of the injury. He took issue with the expertise of, for example, a psychologist versus a psychiatrist expressing medical opinion and his preference of one over the other.80 In that respect, as already outlined, the arbitrator referred in his reasons to the relevant psychological evidence relied on. He explained the basis for his decision to accept the 2023 assessment of Dr Terace.81 There was nothing improper, illogical or ill-reasoned about that. 97 Ultimately, there is no evidence before me in the appeal that calls into question the integrity, the impartiality nor the independence of the arbitrator. Ground 4: Wrong application of the law 98 In the written submissions for this appeal filed on 5 May 2025, Mr Armet set out eight areas of submission in which he ultimately alleged that during 10 years of claims and applications by him, WorkCover's exercise of power and performance of function had been in violation of many human rights and freedoms enunciated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other International Conventions. He primarily laid out each of his areas of concern as being violations of the Bangalore Principles by, in effect, all 80 ts 35 - ts 37. 81 Reasons [46]. -- 31 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 32 of the arbitrators involved in various determinations the subject of his dispute with CFC. 99 Then, during the appeal, Mr Armet submitted in relation to the application of the Bangalore Principles to the legislation that governs workers compensation in Western Australia, as follows:82 Again, your Honour, who are you to need that special authorisation to accept something? The Bangalore of judicial conduct, it's something with worldwide accepted by everyone, okay, so I expect anyone who is administrating justice, including an arbitrator of worker's compensation to behave like a judge and to follow the old section and rules of that Bangalore. 100 The Bangalore Principles are not part of the domestic law of Western Australia, however, it is accepted that the principles are 'largely consistent with and reflective of the principles of procedural fairness and judicial independence and impartiality'.83 To that extent, I have already dealt with, earlier in these reasons, Mr Armet's complaints as to procedural fairness, and integrity, independence and impartiality. 101 Insofar as any other reliance was placed by Mr Armet in his application or this appeal on any other international laws, conventions or instruments, I am satisfied that the matters arising out of his application and this appeal properly concern the application of domestic law and principles. And that each of Mr Armet's alleged errors, or grounds, in this appeal concern such law, for example: (a) procedural fairness; (b) duties in respect of independence or impartiality; (c) adequacy of written reasons; and (d) failure to resolve conflicts of facts and expert opinions because of a wrongful conclusion that existing judicial decisions already represented final determinations on matters arising in the application for determination. 102 Therefore, any ground of appeal that the arbitrator should have applied, but failed to apply, laws other than the relevant domestic law and principles, is unsubstantiated and ultimately, is without merit. 82 ts 48. 83 Armet v Stephen Browne [2024] WASCA 44 [65]. -- 32 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 33 Ground 5: Failure to resolve conflicts of facts and expert opinions: Wrongful conclusion that Mr Armet's application gave rise to issue estoppel 103 This ground, in essence, appears to be a challenge to the arbitrator's conclusions that a significant part of Mr Armet's application gave rise to an issue estoppel. Mr Armet disputes that existing arbitration decisions dismissed applications for payment of medical expenses for the injuries and he disputes that these decisions represented final determinations of his application for expenses for those injuries.84 Mr Armet's complaint it seems is that because (he contends) the arbitrator wrongly reached that decision, he thereby failed to consider the evidence and resolve questions of fact or conflicts on the relevant expert evidence. 104 At the hearing before me, Mr Armet contended that his application was not one which gave rise to an issue estoppel. He stated that he had never filed an action before the court for medical expenses and costs for the compensable injuries.85 He suggested that: The previous application - they were not applications - they were appeals about the injury - were denied to be compensable. … This is the first time, after 10 years, that I am fighting to get some medical cost and expenses for something that has been denied to me for 10 years for three compensable injuries, your Honour. We are talking about three compensable injuries here. … Okay? So what is the estoppel? So that bloke - that bloke tried to create the - - - … … 105 I note that Arbitrator Rutherford's decision A34042 published 13 December 2017 reflects, in [4] that, by his application in that matter, Mr Armet sought on order that CFC pay expenses incurred by him in relation to an alleged tinnitus condition. At [7] the arbitrator recorded his finding that while Mr Armet had developed 'tinnitus', Mr Armet had failed to establish that it was either a compensable injury or consequential condition of a compensable injury. 84 ts 39 - ts 40. 85 ts 39 - ts 40. -- 33 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 34 106 I further note that Arbitrator Rutherford's decision A36114 also published on 13 December 2017 reflects, in [1] and [3] that, by his application in that matter, Mr Armet sought an order that CFC pay expenses for treatment of backache with sciatica, neck injury, foot injury being expressed as foot pain and/or plantar fasciitis, and hair loss. Relevantly: (a) at [7], Arbitrator Rutherford recorded his finding that he was satisfied that Mr Armet suffered with foot pain arising from the 2015 back injury for which he had incurred treatment expenses and for which CFC was liable; (b) at [8] recorded his finding that Mr Armet had not established that any of the other conditions (being neck injury and hair loss) were compensable injuries, and therefore no associated treatment expenses were payable by CFC; and (c) recorded a finding, in effect, in [11] that while the 'backache' injury was a compensable injury, there were no new or relevant treatment expenses for which CFC was liable. 107 Finally, I further note that Arbitrator Soh's decision A49618 delivered 24 October 2019 reflects in [3], that that application concerned claims by Mr Armet that his back injury had caused him to suffer a psychological or psychiatric injury (adjustment disorder). In [4], Arbitrator Soh notes that the application concerned Mr Armet's claim for medical expenses associated with that condition. Relevantly: (a) in [9] Arbitrator Soh recorded his finding that Mr Armet was suffering an adjustment disorder materially caused by his back injury sustained at work; and (b) recorded his finding, in [10] that the application for medical expenses was therefore granted, but otherwise noted he was not in a position to make orders in respect of all recommended treatment items. -- 34 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 35 108 Evidently therefore, Mr Armet has brought and had determined applications for payment of medical expenses by CFC for: (a) referred foot pain; (b) tinnitus; (c) hair loss; (d) neck pain; (e) back pain (the lumbar spinal injury); and (f) adjustment disorder. 109 Further, medical conditions of tinnitus, hair loss and neck pain have been determined not to be compensable injuries. In this appeal, I am therefore not satisfied the arbitrator made any appellable error in his findings in that respect, being that the principle of res judicata precludes redetermination of those matters. It follows therefore, that I am not satisfied that there is any appellable error in the arbitrator's decision not to substantively consider the same medical evidence as to those injuries, including not to make any findings of fact nor any findings as to the causes of those injuries. 110 The arbitrator otherwise properly substantively considered the available evidence as to the compensable injuries (back pain and foot pain and adjustment disorder) and then made the findings to which I have already referred, where relevant, in these reasons. 111 At page 40 of his written submissions attached to his Notice, Mr Armet contended that: [the arbitrator] at 37, 38, 38 … expressly and wrongly ruled out and disregarded the arbitrator's findings and undisputed evaluation of … foot injury and impairment … cervical spine impairment, tinnitus … hair loss … lumbar spine with sciatica impairment and … psychological or psychiatric impairment … 112 By reason of matters reflected above in [105] - [110] there is no merit in any of the contentions by Mr Armet that the arbitrator's decision not to substantively determine his application for medical expenses insofar as it concerned non-compensable injuries, involved any error of law. -- 35 of 36 -- [2026] WADC 81 CORMANN DCJ [2026] WADC 81 [JM] Page 36 J Conclusion and orders 113 While leave to appeal is granted, for the reasons explained Mr Armet's appeal will be dismissed. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia. IC Associate 24 AUGUST 2026 -- 36 of 36 --