WINGFIELD R PTY LTD & ORS v VALUER GENERAL (SA) [2026] SASC 117

On Appeal from SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (SENIOR MEMBER K MCEVOY) 2023/SA000984, 2023/SA000993, 2023/SA000985, 2023/SA000994 AND 2023/SA000996 Appellants: WINGFIELD R PTY LTD, GILLES STREET PTY LTD, AUTO PARK PTY LTD AND KYREN BUILDING PTY LTD Counsel: MR B JENNER - Solicitor: ADCO LEGAL Respondent: VALUER GENERAL (SA) Counsel: MS J CLARE - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Hearing Date/s: 08/05/2026, 02/06/2026 File No/s: CIV-26-002569 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Appeal to a Single Judge) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. WINGFIELD R PTY LTD & ORS v VALUER GENERAL (SA) [2026] SASC 117 Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bochner 18 August 2026 REAL PROPERTY - VALUATION OF LAND - OBJECTIONS AND APPEALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - OTHER MATTERS This is an appeal against the decision of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“the SACAT”) on the determination of five applications concerning the valuation of land at Gilles Street Adelaide, under s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 2013 (SA) and s 25C of the Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA) (“the VLA”). The land subject to this appeal contains an eight-story commercial building comprising retail spaces, offices and car parking, and is co-owned by each of the appellants. On 21 January 2022, the total site value of the land for the financial year 2020-2021 was determined by the Valuer-General of South Australia (“the respondent”) to be $6,250,000.00. The appellants raised an objection to the site value, which was disallowed by the respondent. The appellants then applied to have the land valued by a valuer pursuant to s 25B of the VLA (“the review valuer”), which returned with a site value of $5,375,000.00. The respondent applied to the SACAT for a review of the review valuer’s determination, where the Tribunal heard the evidence of two further professional valuers. The Senior Member set aside the review valuer’s valuation and increased the site value of the land to $6,900,000. This is the decision subject to this appeal. -- 1 of 14 -- The appellants argued that, as a result of s 25C of the VLA, the hearing before the Tribunal was to be determined in accordance with the principles set out in House v The King and that the Court must first make a finding on whether the Senior Member was correct to find that error was established. Section 25C(3)(b) of the LVA requires that the SACAT conduct the review hearing as a hearing de novo. The Court is not required to determine whether the Senior Member was correct in deciding that an error was made by the review; it is required to determine only whether the valuation reached by the Senior Member was “entirely erroneous”. The appellants contended that the Senior Member was in error to find that the review valuer did not make the suitable disclosures when conducting his valuation, and that the review valuer complied with all his obligations. The respondents submitted that the Senior Member was correct to find that the review valuer’s valuation lacked transparency, that the failure to mention comparable sales constituted error, and that the Senior Member was not required to seek further written reasons from the review valuer. Held, dismissing the appeal: 1. Leave to appeal be granted. 2. The Senior Member had no obligation to go behind the written determination provided by the review valuer in order to decide whether it was the correct or preferable valuation. The analysis of evidence undertaken is clear and the reasons provided for preferring the valuation are comprehensive and detailed. The appeal is dismissed. Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA) ss 24, 25 25B and 25C; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 34, referred to. Ardoch Pty Ltd v Valuer General (No 2) (2006) 148 LGERA 408; Young Auto Park Pty Ltd v Valuer-General (2026) 265 LGERA 265, applied. Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development v Scali [2024] SASC 4, distinguished. Warren v Coombs (1979) 142 CLR 531; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172, discussed. -- 2 of 14 -- WINGFIELD R PTY LTD & ORS v VALUER GENERAL (SA) [2026] SASC 117 Appeal to a single Judge 1 BOCHNER J: The appellants are the co-owners of land at Gilles Street, Adelaide (“the land”). Situated on the land is an eight-storey commercial building, comprising retail spaces, offices and car parking. On 21 January 2022, the total site value of the land as at 1 January 2021 for the financial year 2020-2021 was determined by the Valuer-General of South Australia to be $6,250,000.00; the value was apportioned between the appellants in accordance with the lots held by each. For the purpose of this appeal, it is not necessary to outline the specific proportions held by each appellant. 2 On 21 January 2022, the appellants objected to the site value determined by the Valuer-General. The Valuer-General disallowed the objections on 8 June 2022, and on 29 June 2022, the appellants applied to have the land valued by a review valuer, pursuant to s 25B of the Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA) (“the VLA”). The review valuer, Mr Carter, provided his valuation on 17 March 2023, by which he assessed the value of the land as at 1 January 2021 to be $5,375,000.00. The Valuer-General then applied to the South Australian Civil and Tribunal for a review of Mr Carter’s decision, pursuant to s 25C of the VLA and s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (“the SACAT Act”). 3 At the Tribunal hearing, the appellants led evidence from Mr Tom Rowe and the Valuer-General called evidence from Ms Joanne Gaetjens, both professional valuers, as to the value of the land. The Valuer-General argued that Mr Carter’s valuation was not the correct or preferable valuation, and that the methodology adopted and applied by him was flawed, wrong in principle and led to errors. Ms Gaetjens expressed the opinion that the site value of the land was either $6,250,000.00 or $6,900,000.00. The Valuer-General argued that Mr Carter’s valuation should be set aside and the value increased in accordance with Ms Gaetjens’ views. 4 The Senior Member who heard the matter set aside Mr Carter’s valuation and increased the site value of the land to $6,900,000, as at 1 January 2021. The appellants have now appealed the decision of the Senior Member to this Court. Leave to appeal 5 The appellants require leave to appeal the decision of the Senior Member. Leave to appeal was not opposed by the Valuer-General. As a result, I will grant leave to appeal, without considering this question further. -- 3 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 2 The legislative framework and the nature of an appeal from the SACAT to this Court 6 Sections 24 and 25 of the VLA set out the process to be followed when a person wishes to object to the valuation attributed to land by the Valuer-General. This process was duly followed by the parties. The process for review by a review valuer is prescribed in s 25B of the VLA. Section 25B provides: 25B—Review by valuer (1) A person who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Valuer-General upon an objection under this Part may, within 21 days of the day on which he or she receives notice of the decision, apply for a review of the valuation in accordance with this section. (2) An application under this section— (a) must be made in the prescribed manner and form; and (b) must be lodged at the office of the Valuer-General or served, by post, on the Valuer-General; and (c) must be accompanied by the prescribed fee. (3) No application for review of a valuation may be made under this section if the objection to the valuation involves a question of law. (4) Where due application for review of a valuation is made under this section, a land valuer (in this section referred to as the valuer) must be selected in accordance with the regulations from the appropriate panel of land valuers to conduct the review. (5) Subject to this section, the valuer must, in conducting a review under this section, take into account— (a) the matters set out in the application for review; and (b) any representations of the applicant and the Valuer-General made under subsection (7); and (c) any other matter that the valuer considers relevant to the review of the valuation. (6) The matters to be considered upon a review under this section must be confined to questions of fact and must not involve questions of law. (7) The valuer must afford the applicant and the Valuer-General a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the valuer on the subject matter of the review. (8) Representations may be made under subsection (7) personally, by a land valuer acting on behalf of the applicant or the Valuer-General, or by any other representative. (9) Subject to subsection (10), the valuer must, upon the determination of the review, confirm, increase or decrease the valuation. -- 4 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 3 (10) A valuer must not make any alteration to a valuation under subsection (9) which has the effect of increasing or decreasing the valuation by a proportion of one-tenth or less. (11) The Valuer-General must make such alterations (if any) to the valuation and valuation roll as are necessary to give effect to the decision of the valuer upon the review. (12) Where a valuation is reduced upon a review under this section, the fee paid by the applicant for the review must be refunded. 7 There is no suggestion that the process set out in s 25B was not followed. 8 Section 25C provides for a review by the SACAT of any decision of the review valuer, by a person dissatisfied with it. Importantly, s 25C provides: (3) For the purposes of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 — ... (b) a review under this section will be taken to come within SACAT's review jurisdiction but, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, SACAT will consider the matter de novo (adopting such processes and procedures, and considering and receiving such evidence or material, as it thinks fit for the purposes of the proceedings); ... This section modifies the operation of s 34 of the SACAT Act, which relevantly provides: (3) Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (6), the Tribunal will, in exercising its review jurisdiction, examine the decision of the decision-maker by way of rehearing. 9 An appeal from the SACAT to this Court is provided for in s 71 of the SACAT Act. Relevantly, this provides: (3a) An appeal under this section will be by way of rehearing. (3b) The Supreme Court may, in conducting an appeal, draw inferences of fact from evidence or material before the Tribunal and may, as it thinks fit, allow further evidence or material to be presented to it. (4) The Supreme Court may, on an appeal under this section— (a) affirm the decision appealed against; or (b) vary the decision appealed against; or (c) set aside the decision appealed against and, if it thinks fit, return the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with any directions that the Court considers appropriate. Unfortunately, there is a conflict between the parties as to how these sections should be applied. -- 5 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 4 10 The appellants say that, as a result of s 25C of the VLA, the hearing before the Tribunal was to be determined in accordance with the principles set out in House v The King.1 As a result, the Senior Member was required to address two questions consecutively. The first question is whether an error on the part of the review valuer can be demonstrated. If the answer to this question is “yes”, then the second question must be asked. That question addresses which is the correct or preferable valuation. 11 The reasoning of the appellants continue: in this Court, the question is whether the Senior Member was correct to find that error was established; that is, was the Senior Member correct to answer the first question with “yes”. In addressing this question on appeal, the Court must apply the principle set out in Warren v Coombs,2 this is because the answer to this question is not a matter of discretion but is either right or wrong. In reaching this decision, the appellants rely on the decision of Kimber J in Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development v Scali.3 12 The respondent, on the other hand, says that the appropriate principle to be applied, both by the Senior Member at the SACAT and by this Court is that set out in House v The King.4 She says that the Senior Member made only one decision, that being the determination of the correct or preferable site value of the land. Similarly, in this Court, the standard that applies is the deference standard, as set out in House v The King. 13 I consider that the answer to this question is provided by s 25C(3)(b) of the LVA, which requires the SACAT to conduct a hearing de novo. 14 The difference between a rehearing and a hearing de novo is explained by the High Court in Allesch v Maunz,5 where the plurality said: For present purposes, the critical difference between an appeal by way of rehearing and a hearing de novo is that, in the former case, the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error, whereas, in the latter case, those powers may be exercised regardless of error. At least that is so unless, in the case of an appeal by way of rehearing, there is some statutory provision which indicates that the powers may be exercised whether or not there was error at first instance. (footnotes omitted) Thus, in order to reach what she considered to be the correct or preferable value of the land, the Senior Member was not required to find error on the part of the review 1 (1936) 55 CLR 499. 2 (1979) 142 CLR 531. 3 [2024] SASC 4. 4 (1936) 55 CLR 499. 5 (2000) 203 CLR 172, [23]. -- 6 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 5 valuer, and the fact that she did so, does not change the nature of the inquiry that she undertook. 15 It is important that the case of Ardoch Pty Ltd v Valuer General (No 2)6 is understood in its proper context. At the time that it was decided by Debelle J, his Honour was sitting in the Land and Valuation Division of this Court. Once it was created, the SACAT took on the review jurisdiction that had previously been exercised by the Land and Valuation Division. Thus, the decision in Ardoch is applicable to the exercise by the SACAT of its review jurisdiction pursuant to s 25C. His Honour explained the nature of the appeal provided for by the LVA:7 …an appeal under the Valuation of Land Act is not an appeal in the strict sense or an appeal by way of re-hearing on the existing evidence. It is an appeal de novo on the footing that there has not been a prior hearing: Fenton (No 1) at 260; 101 Collins Street v City of Melbourne (1995) 87 LGERA 207 at 213. In my view, the Valuation of Land Act contemplates a full hearing inter partes with each party leading evidence, including valuation evidence, testing the opposing evidence and making submissions. The court will then make its determination whether the valuation should be confirmed, increased or decreased: see s 25C(3) of the Act. ... This has now been made explicit in s 25C(3)(b) of the LVA when providing for an appeal to the SACAT from the decision of a review valuer. 16 In describing the process to be followed by the parties in such an appeal, Debelle J went on to say:8 As it is an appeal against an existing valuation, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the valuation is erroneous. … When considering what must be established to demonstrate that the valuation is erroneous, it must be remembered that valuation is an art, not a science. It is a field where reasonable and experienced valuers, both applying correct legal and valuation principle, may reasonably disagree as to the value of a parcel of land. As Wells J said in Fenton (No 1) (at 263), there is no such thing as an ideally correct value. Expressed another way, an assessment of the value of land is ultimately an opinion based on the available evidence drawn from comparable sales. Two valuers may quite reasonably and without error form a different opinion as to the value of a parcel of land. So an appeal should not be allowed because of a mere difference in the opinion of valuers. In Players Pty Ltd v Corporation of the City of Adelaide I expressed the view that the forming of an opinion by a valuer is a process which might be likened to the exercise of a discretion by a judge. In each instance, a conclusion is formed after considering the relevant evidence and any issues of legal principle. Obviously, the analogy cannot be pressed too far. Nevertheless, I think that the principles applicable to the circumstances in which an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of a discretion provide some guidance as to the circumstances in which this Court will interfere with an assessment made by the Valuer-General. A court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of a discretion 6 (2006) 148 LGERA 408. 7 Ibid, [24]. 8 Ibid, [29]–[33]. -- 7 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 6 unless some error has been made. It will interfere if the judge has acted upon a wrong principle, if he has allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he has mistaken the facts, if he did not take into account some material consideration, or if the decision is plainly unreasonable or plainly unjust: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. Wells J was, I think, seeking to express a like principle in Fenton (No 1). In my view, the court will not interfere with a valuation unless the appellant demonstrates that the valuer whose assessment is subject to appeal has made some error of law; has acted on a wrong principle of valuation; has misapprehended, misused or excluded relevant material, in other words, has failed to have had regard to relevant factors or has had regard to irrelevant factors; has misapplied principle or has in some other way erred in discharging the task of a valuer. The court will also interfere where the valuation is manifestly excessive or manifestly low. To adapt the observations of Jacobs J in Fenton (No 2) at 356, as a matter of practical reality the court will not be likely to interfere unless it is shown that the valuation is either erroneous in principle, or tainted by significant error of fact, or so obviously excessive or so obviously low that some such taint or error must be inferred. The court will have little difficulty where the valuer has made an error of principle or misapplied principles. An incorrect analysis of comparable sales or a failure to mention relevant comparable sales are instances of a misuse or exclusion or relevant material. To put the matter shortly, the court will not interfere if the difference between the Valuer-General’s valuation and that of the appellant is essentially a difference of opinion. It will interfere only if the appellant demonstrates error of the kind just mentioned. 17 I consider that, in submitting that the Senior Member was required to follow a two-stage process, with the identification of error, followed by the determination of the correct or preferable valuation, the appellants fell into the trap against which Debelle J expressly warned; they have has sought to take too far the analogy with an appeal from the exercise of a discretion. They have submitted that the process outlined in House v The King must be followed, rather than a process analogous to that. A true reading of Ardoch leads to the conclusion that the Senior Member could have reached a value that was different to that reached by the review valuer, as long as she was satisfied that it was the correct or preferable value, even without identifying a specific error in the original valuation process. The fact that she did so does not turn her inquiry into a two-stage process. It remains the case that she is required to answer only one question: what is the correct or preferable valuation of the land? 18 As a result, I conclude that, while Ardoch clearly applies to the decision- making by the Senior Member, House v The King in its strict sense does not. 19 The logical step from this conclusion is that the principle set out in Warren v Coombs is not relevant to the hearing of the appeal in this Court. There is no threshold question to which there is a unique answer that must be addressed first. In other words, I am not required to determine whether the Senior Member was correct in deciding that an error was made by Mr Carter. I am required to determine only whether the valuation reached by the Senior Member was “entirely erroneous”.9 As B Doyle J said in Young Auto Park Pty Ltd v Valuer-General:10 9 Young Auto Park Pty Ltd v Valuer-General (2026) 265 LGERA 265, [28]. 10 Ibid, [28]–[30]. -- 8 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 7 The appeal to this Court against the Tribunal’s decision is by way of rehearing. An appeal by way of rehearing in a valuation matter will generally only succeed where the decision- maker acted on some wrong principle of law or where the valuation is ‘entirely erroneous’. The Court may interfere where the valuer whose assessment is subject to appeal has made some error of law; has acted on a wrong principle of valuation; has misapprehended, misused or excluded relevant material, in other words, has failed to have regard to relevant factors or has had regard to irrelevant factors; has misapplied a principle or has in some other way erred in discharging the task of a valuer. This may extend to an incorrect analysis of comparable sales or a failure to mention relevant comparable sales. The Court will not interfere if there is a mere difference of opinion with the valuer whose valuation is under challenge. In short, the deference standard, rather than the correctness standard, applies, because there is no uniquely correct valuation and because valuation depends upon a measure of judgment involving opinion, estimation and impression. (footnotes omitted) 20 For completeness, I consider that the appellants’ reliance on the case of Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development v Scali11 is misconceived. In that case, Kimber J was addressing legislation in quite different terms to the VLA; it is the terms of s 25C of the VLA that have led me to the conclusion that I have reached. The decision of the Senior Member 21 In setting aside Mr Carter’s valuation, the Senior Member: • Heard evidence from two licensed land valuers, Ms Gaetjens and Mr Rowe and considered other evidence adduced by the parties; • Provided a detailed summary of the evidence given by each of Ms Gaetjens and Mr Rowe, as well as an analysis of their reports, including their joint report; • Set out a detailed summary of the submissions made by each party; • Found that she needed to be satisfied that the appellant (the respondent before me) had demonstrated an error on Mr Carter’s part in order for the decision to be varied, set aside or remitted to the decision-maker for reconsideration; • Noted that, although Mr Carter’s notes and the documents that he took into account were provided to the SACAT, they contained minimal reasoning; • Considered that Mr Carter provided no valuation analysis, discussion of the relevance of the sales to which the land was compared or discussion of the current market circumstances; 11 [2024] SASC 4. -- 9 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 8 • Considered that Mr Carter’s report did not disclose how he employed the direct comparison method to reach his assessment; • Concluded that the lack of transparency as a result of these omissions constituted an error, such that she could not affirm the decision without further consideration; • Considered that Mr Rowe, who gave evidence on behalf of the appellants, appeared as an advocate for them, which raised the question of his independence and therefore the weight of his evidence was diminished; • Was satisfied that Ms Gaetjens was an independent expert; • As to sales data that post-dated the valuation date, concluded that the later the data is from the sales date, the less a useful it is likely to be as a comparator. 22 The Senior Member concluded:12 I am satisfied there is error in the decision of the review valuer, in his lack of clarity concerning the methodology and analysis of the market in reaching his conclusions; and in the exclusion of Gilles Lane from his assessment of value, which led him to valuing only a portion of the site, not the whole of the site. The decision therefore cannot be affirmed as correct or preferable without further consideration. 23 In determining the correct or preferable valuation of the land, the Senior Member considered four valuations: the original value assessed by the respondent, the valuation by Ms Gaetjens (which was supported by two other valuers), the valuation of Mr Carter and that of Mr Rowe. She undertook a further analysis of the joint report prepared by Ms Gaetjens and Mr Rowe, including their disagreement in relation to their assessment of the market as at the valuation date. She noted that they made quite different assessments of the strength of the market as at 1 January 2021. Ultimately, she preferred the analysis of Ms Gaetjens to that of Mr Rowe, in that she considered her evidence to be more detailed and considered and on the basis that “she presented a superior professional appreciation and account of market considerations”.13 She concluded that the valuation supported by Ms Gaetjens’ evidence reflected the preferable valuation of the land, and having set aside Mr Carter’s decision, valued the land accordingly. She increased the site value of the land as at 1 January 2021 from $5,375,000.00 to $6,900,000.00. This is the decision that appellants now seek to review in this Court. 24 The only question that is the subject of this appeal is whether the Senior Member should have found error in Mr Carter’s valuation, as a result of which his valuation was set aside. The appellants do not take issue with the weight that the Senior Member placed on the evidence and report of Mr Rowe. In 12 SACAT, Order of the Tribunal made on 28 January 2026, [173]. 13 Ibid, [192]. -- 10 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 9 particular, I note that the parties are in agreement that the Senior Member was in error to find that the review valuer excluded part of the land from his valuation. The appellants’ submissions 25 The appellants contend that the Senior Member was in error to find that Mr Carter’s papers should have disclosed how he made the comparisons necessary for the purpose of a valuation by the direct comparison method, and that his report otherwise lacked transparency. They say that Mr Carter complied with the requirements of s 25B of the VLA in conducting his valuation as well as that set out in regulation 7 of the Valuation of Land Regulations 2020 (SA). Neither the VLA nor the regulations require the review valuer to do more than provide his determination in the form in which it was provided. Thus, any criticism of lack of transparency is misconceived. 26 The appellants noted that, while the respondent submitted to the SACAT that Mr Carter had used a process of averaging to reach a valuation, the Senior Member found that she could not conclude that he did not use the direct comparison method, nor that he had used the averaging method. There is, in fact, no requirement on the review valuer to disclose in his determination or other papers how he made use of comparable sales, or to otherwise make clear his reasoning. In this regard, the appellants say that the Senior Member places an unnecessarily high burden on Mr Carter, whose obligations are limited to those set out in s 25B(5) of the VLA. 27 As to Mr Carter’s determination, the appellants say that this was provided on the template document produced by the office of the respondent. His determination provided all of the details required by the template document; if the level of detail that the respondent now contends is required should have been provided by him, then this should have been made clear in the template document. Further, the appellants submitted that the Review Valuer Checklist, also a template document prepared by the respondent’s office, does not require the level of detail that the Senior Member found was lacking. The detail required by the Senior Member, and the lack of which led her to form the view that the valuation lacked transparency, is simply not required by the Act, the template determination document or the Review Valuer Checklist. Given that, the Senior Member fell into error in demanding that level of detail. Nor was there any requirement that the review valuer’s working papers should have been produced to the SACAT. 28 For the purpose of the appeal, the appellants sought to rely on two documents that were not before the SACAT. This was not opposed by the respondent. The first document is a fact sheet prepared by the respondent’s office and titled “Property Valuations Review of Valuation”. The second is also a fact sheet, and is headed “Review by Valuer What Happens Next”. In particular, the appellants note that each fact sheet advises that the review valuer is not required to inspect the subject property or the sales evidence presented, but they must take into account any representations made by the applicant (the appellants in this matter) and the Valuer-General (the respondent before me). The appellants say that these -- 11 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 10 statements are inconsistent with the submissions now made by the respondent in her criticism of the review valuer. 29 The appellants concede that s 35(2)(a) requires a decision-maker (in this case, the review valuer) to provide a written statement of reasons for their decision. However, they say that neither the respondent nor the Senior Member advised them or Mr Carter that they did not consider that the written determination provided amounted to a written statement of reasons. If they had reached this view, they could have asked Mr Carter to provide a written statement within the meaning of the Act. In the alternative, the Senior Member should have invoked the power given to her by s 35(5) to request Mr Carter to provide an additional statement of reasons, or could have required him pursuant to s 35(4), to provide additional documents in his possession or control that may be relevant to the review of his valuation. 30 The appellants further say that, if the respondent wished to criticise the valuation method used by Mr Carter, particularly on the basis of lack of transparency, she should have called him to give evidence at the SACAT. The appellants say that, in the absence of oral evidence from the review valuer, it was not open to the Senior Member to find that his valuation lacked transparency. If the respondent wished to call into question his statement that he used the direct comparison method to value the land, then he should have been called to give evidence, rather than basing a case on inference alone. The appellants go so far as to submit that, as a matter of fairness, the respondent was obliged to call Mr Carter to give evidence once she sought to question his statement that he carried out his valuation using the direct comparison method. The respondent’s submissions 31 The respondent submits that the Senior Member was correct to find that Mr Carter’s valuation lacked transparency. The lack of material demonstrating the valuation principles applied and the analysis undertaken by him allowed her to infer, rightly, that no proper valuation had been performed. The failure to mention comparable sales and the omission of any analysis constituted error, or allowed error to be inferred. 32 As to the appellants’ submission that either the respondent or the SACAT should have sought further written reasons from Mr Carter, the respondent says that, while the Senior Member could have done this, she was not required to do so, nor did her failure to do so prevent her from drawing inferences from the material that was before her. In making this submission, the respondent relied on Ardoch. In failing to provide any information as to his analysis and application of valuation principles, Mr Carter allowed the inference to be drawn that he “has acted on a wrong principle, has misapprehended, misused or excluded relevant factors or has -- 12 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 11 had regard to irrelevant factors; has misapplied principle or has in some other way erred in discharging the task of a valuer”.14 Consideration 33 I do not consider that any error was made by the Senior Member in reaching the conclusion that the correct or preferable valuation was that assessed by Ms Gaetjens. In doing so, I consider that she did no more than apply the principles set out in Ardoch in an orthodox way. It was for the respondent to demonstrate that Mr Carter had made an error in his valuation; the lack of any satisfactory analysis or review of the comparable sales, and the lack of clarity as to the methodology that he used, has allowed an inference to drawn, properly, that such an error was made. While it was open to the Senior Member to request a further written statement from him, or require him to attend to give oral evidence or for the respondent to do the same, there is no requirement that they do so. 34 At the time that he provided his written determination, there can be no doubt that Mr Carter would have been well aware that his valuation would be open to challenge in the SACAT, if one or other of the parties was dissatisfied with it. Thus, he should have known that, if his valuation lacked sufficient clarity, he ran the risk that it would be set aside. In effect, he should have been aware that the materials that he provided needed to be sufficient to demonstrate the principled basis on which his valuation was reached. The fact that neither the fact sheets nor the template determination expressly states this is neither here nor there. As a professional valuer, appointed to the relevant panel of land valuers pursuant to s 25A of the VLA, it should have been obvious that his valuation needed to contain sufficient information to allow its justification. 35 I do not consider that any unfairness was visited on either the appellants or Mr Carter by the inferences drawn in the absence of his being called to give evidence. The criticism of his valuation extends only so far as to its lacking transparent reasoning and intelligible analysis of the comparable sales; it does not extend to an allegation of dishonesty or impropriety. The criticism goes no further than a criticism of the written determination, and what it did or did not demonstrate. 36 I find that, by considering the matter on the basis of the materials placed before her, including the four valuations relied on by the parties, the Senior Member undertook her task in an orthodox manner. There was no obligation on her to go behind the written determination provided by the review valuer in order to decide whether it was the correct or preferable valuation. Her task was to assess his determination as it stood. If, in determining the correct or preferable value of the land, she preferred the evidence of Ms Gaetjens to that of Mr Rowe, she was entitled to do so. Her analysis of their evidence is clear and her reasons for preferring Ms Gaetjens’ opinion are comprehensive and detailed. 14 Ardoch Pty Ltd v Valuer General (No 2) (2006) 148 LGERA 408, [33]. -- 13 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 117 Bochner J 12 37 Given the conclusion that I have reached, the appeal must be dismissed. In the circumstances, I do not consider the respondent’s notice of alternative contention. -- 14 of 14 --