Dryden v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2026] QIRC 265

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Dryden v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2026] QIRC 265 PARTIES: Dryden, Rachael (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Respondent) CASE NO.: PSA/2024/140 PROCEEDING: DELIVERED ON: Public Sector Appeal – Disciplinary Decision 25 August 2026 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Power IC On the papers ORDER: Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed. CATCHWORDS: PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – Public Sector Appeal – appeal against a decision pursuant to s 131(1)(c) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) – whether disciplinary declaration made pursuant to s 95(8) of the Public Sector Act was fair and reasonable – decision fair and reasonable – appeal dismissed. LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 562B, s 562C, s 564 Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld), s 71, s 91, s 95 CASES: Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10 -- 1 of 15 -- 2 Goodall v State of Queensland & Anor [2018] QSC 319 Reasons for Decision [1] Ms Rachael Dryden ('the Appellant') was employed by the State of Queensland (Queensland Health) ('the Respondent') as a Registered Nurse ('RN') with the Brisbane Women's Correctional Centre within Prison Health Services at West Moreton Health ('WMH'). [2] Ms Therese Hayes, Executive Director Preventative and Prison Health Services, WMH, wrote to the Appellant asking her to show cause in relation to the following allegations: … Allegation 1 It is alleged that on 20 November 2023, you inappropriately recorded in [the patient's] medical record that you saw the patient when in fact, you did not see the patient at all. … Allegation 2 If allegation one is substantiated, it is alleged that you were dishonest during a meeting with Ms Kiona Louw, Nurse Unit Manager on 27 November 2023. … Allegation 3 It is alleged that on 12 December 2023, you inappropriately recorded in [the patient's] medical record that you saw the patient and took observations in the Health Centre, when you actually saw the patient in the kitchen earlier that day during your medication round and did not take any observations at all. … Allegation 4 If allegation three is substantiated, it is alleged that you acted inappropriately when retrospectively amending a patient's record. … Allegation 5 It is alleged that on 13 December 2023, you failed to appropriately triage and assess [the patient], on receipt of a request for Health Services form. … [3] Following the Appellant's response to the show cause notice, Ms Hayes provided supplementary evidence to the Appellant. The Appellant then provided a further response. [4] On 5 April 2024, Ms Hayes notified the Appellant of her decision in relation to disciplinary findings and proposed disciplinary action. [5] The decision maker found that Allegations 1, 2, 3 and 5 were substantiated and determined pursuant to s 91(1)(b) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act') that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct, that is inappropriate or improper conduct in an official capacity within the meaning of s 91(5)(a) of the PS Act. -- 2 of 15 -- 3 [6] The decision maker also found that Allegation 4 was substantiated and determined pursuant to s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act that the Appellant had contravened, without reasonable excuse, a relevant standard of conduct in a way that was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action, with the relevant standard applying to the Appellant being an approved code of conduct under the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994, the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service ('the Code of Conduct'). [7] This decision included an outline of the Appellant’s appeal rights regarding the decision on disciplinary findings and an opportunity for the Appellant to respond to the proposed disciplinary action of termination of her employment. [8] The Appellant wrote to the decision maker regarding the findings and proposed penalty and advised that she resigned from her employment effective 17 May 2024. [9] On 1 August 2024, Ms Hannah Bloch, Chief Executive of WHM, wrote to the Appellant and informed her that in view of the findings and grounds for discipline outlined in the decision, that the disciplinary action that would have been taken against the Appellant under s 93 of the PS Act, had her employment not ended, would have been termination. [10] On 21 August 2024, the Appellant filed an appeal notice appealing against a disciplinary decision dated 5 April 2024 pursuant to s 131(1)(c) of the PS Act. [11] The issue for determination is whether the decision by Ms Bloch was fair and reasonable. Legislative Framework [12] Section 91 of the PS Act provides the following grounds for discipline: 91 Grounds for discipline (1) A public sector employee's chief executive may discipline the employee if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee has— (a) engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of the employee's duties, including, for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or (b) been guilty of misconduct; or (c) been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse; or (d) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to the employee as a public sector employee by a responsible person; or (e) used, without reasonable excuse, a substance to an extent that has adversely affected the competent performance of the employee's duties; or -- 3 of 15 -- 4 (f) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a requirement of the chief executive under section 71 in relation to the employee's employment or secondment by, in response to the requirement— (i) failing to disclose a serious disciplinary action; or (ii) giving false or misleading information; or (g) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a provision of— (i) this Act, other than section 39 or 40; or (ii) another Act that applies to the employee in relation to the employee's employment; or (h) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a relevant standard of conduct in a way that is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action. (2) A disciplinary ground arises when the act or omission constituting the ground is done or made. (3) Also, a chief executive may discipline, on the same grounds mentioned in subsection (1), a public sector employee under section 94 or a person under section 95. (4) To remove any doubt, it is declared that a disciplinary ground does not arise in relation to a public sector employee only because the employee's work performance or personal conduct fails to satisfy the work performance and personal conduct principles or the public sector principles. (5) In this section— misconduct means— (a) inappropriate or improper conduct in an official capacity; or (b) inappropriate or improper conduct in a private capacity that reflects seriously and adversely on the public sector entity in which the employee is employed. Example of misconduct— victimising another public sector employee in the course of the other employee's employment in the public sector relevant standard of conduct — (a) for a public sector employee, means— (i) standard of conduct applying to the employee under an approved code of conduct under the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994; or (ii) a standard of conduct, if any, applying to the employee under an approved standard of practice under the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994; and (b) for a public sector employee who is an ambulance officer under the Ambulance Service Act 1991, section 13(1)—includes a code of practice under section 41 of that Act; and (c) for a public sector employee who is a fire service officer under the Fire Services Act 1990—includes a code of practice under section 7B of that Act. responsible person, for a direction, means a person with authority to give the direction, whether the authority derives from this Act or another law. -- 4 of 15 -- 5 [13] Section 95 of the PS Act provides the following: 95 Disciplinary declaration if employment as public sector employee ends (1) This section applies if— (a) a person is employed in a public sector entity (the former entity); and (b) a disciplinary ground arises in relation to the person; and (c) after the disciplinary ground arises the person's employment as a public sector employee ends for any reason. (2) However, this section does not apply in relation to a person who is a former public sector employee if the person's previous chief executive is aware— (a) the person is a CCC employee; and (b) the previous chief executive or the chief executive officer of the Crime and Corruption Commission has taken, is taking, or intends to take disciplinary action against the person, under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, chapter 6, part 1, division 9, in relation to the disciplinary ground. (3) The former public sector employee's previous chief executive may make a disciplinary finding or take or continue to take disciplinary action against the former public sector employee in relation to the disciplinary ground. (4) The disciplinary finding or disciplinary action must be made or taken within a period of 2 years after the end of the employee's employment. (5) However, subsection (4) does not stop disciplinary action being taken following an appeal or review. (6) Subsection (4) does not affect— (a) an investigation of a suspected criminal offence; or (b) an investigation of a matter for the purpose of notifying the Crime and Corruption Commission of suspected corrupt conduct under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001. (7) In disciplining the former public sector employee, the former public sector employee's previous chief executive may make a disciplinary declaration and may not take any other disciplinary action. (8) The former public sector employee's previous chief executive may only make a disciplinary declaration if the disciplinary action that would have been taken against the employee if the employee's employment had not ended would have been— (a) termination of employment; or (b) reduction of classification level. (9) The making of the disciplinary declaration does not affect the way in which the employee's employment ended, or any benefits, rights or liabilities arising because the employment ended. -- 5 of 15 -- 6 (10) In this section— disciplinary declaration means a declaration of— (a) the disciplinary finding against the former public sector employee; and (b) the disciplinary action that would have been taken against the former public sector employee if the employee's employment had not ended. previous chief executive, of a person, means the person's chief executive before the employment of the person as a public sector employee ends for any reason. Appeal principles [14] The appeal must be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against.1 As the word 'review' has no settled meaning, it must take its meaning from the context in which it appears.2 An appeal under ch 11 pt 6 div 4 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') is not by way of rehearing,3 but involves a review of the decision arrived at and the decision making process associated therewith. [15] The stated purpose of such an appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.4 Findings which are reasonably open to the decision maker are not expected to be disturbed on appeal. What decisions can the Industrial Commissioner make? [16] In deciding this appeal, s 562C of the IR Act provides that the Industrial Commissioner may: (a) confirm the decision appealed against; or (b) set the decision aside and substitute another decision; or (c) set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate. Grounds of appeal [17] The Appellant attached submissions to her appeal notice, submitting that: • The allegations are the only complaints the Appellant has received in her three years at Queensland Health, and they occurred shortly after she made a verbal complaint of bullying to a senior nursing staff member; 1 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(2) ('IR Act'). 2 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10. 3 Goodall v State of Queensland & Anor [2018] QSC 319, 5. 4 IR Act, s 562B(3). -- 6 of 15 -- 7 • In each case the Appellant documented her initial assessment and the action to be taken. The Appellant accepts that in one case her record keeping was not as detailed as it could have been but argues that she acknowledged the matter and was taking action to improve; • The Appellant saw and reported on a patient who matched the description provided, being a patient with facial injuries and erratic behaviour, but did not enter the cell based on the officers' advice. The Appellant submits that she did not have the opportunity to clarify her misunderstanding as the misidentification was only made apparent to her when discussing with a colleague later; • The patient with possible stroke symptoms was delayed in arriving due to the officer's delay, not due to any failure by the Appellant to request that the patient be brought up. Further, the Appellant was unable to make a detailed assessment as she was rostered to COVID testing and was assisting in the assessment of a student nurse; • The Appellant's responses to the questions asked at the times of the incidents were honest and based on her understanding of the patients referred to; and • Although the Appellant holds herself innocent of the allegations, she chose to resign, and this resignation was accepted by the Executive Director Preventative and Prisoner Health in April 2024. The Appellant was then advised that the Respondent was going to change their decision from accepting the decision to termination of employment without providing reasons. Submissions [18] The Commission issued a Directions Order calling for submissions from both parties following receipt of the Appeal Notice. The submissions are summarised below. Appellant's submissions [19] In support of the Appeal, the Appellant submits the following: • The Appellant states that her complaint of bullying involves staff members who were involved in these allegations, and the complaint was not acted on to her knowledge. • The Respondent advised that there were several possible options that could be taken against the Appellant, and that she chose to resign due to the distress she was experiencing with the process. -- 7 of 15 -- 8 • In response to Allegation 1, the Appellant submits she assessed a patient in her work area who matched the description of the referred patient. The Appellant argues that she was not told that the referred patient had not been shifted to her area, and she could not verbally confirm the patient's identity with her as the Appellant had not been told her name, and the patient was exhibiting escalating behaviour. The patient had the symptoms that had been described to the Appellant, so she assumed that the patient was the referred patient. • In response to Allegation 2, the Appellant argues that she answered her questions truthfully on the assumption that she had seen the patient under discussion. The Appellant further argues that she wasn't given an opportunity to clarify her misunderstanding with the clinical nurse in a timely manner as she was only made aware of the misidentification by a colleague who had seen the referred patient later. • In response to Allegation 3, the Appellant submits that she checked the patient in the kitchen, taking their temperature, checking their hands and feet for any swelling, checking vital signs, with the patient not disclosing any cardiac issues. The Appellant then submitted a medical request form regarding swelling in the patient's hands and feet from the kitchen. The Appellant further submits that the kitchen assessment was an initial check, but she wanted the patient to attend the Health Centre for a more complete assessment. • In response to Allegation 4, the Appellant submits that she clarified her actions to include 'in the kitchen' after receiving feedback about her failure to follow the correct recording procedures. The Appellant argues that her intention was not to hide anything. • In response to Allegation 5, the Appellant submits that after seeing the patient in her cell, she requested to a prison officer that the patient be taken directly to the Health Centre. The Appellant argues that as previous requests of this nature had always been acted on promptly, she proceeded to attend another urgent patient. The Appellant further submits that upon returning to the Health Centre and learning the patient had not been brought up, she made repeated requests to officers to have her brought to the Centre. The Appellant argues the delay in the patient's arrival was not because of any failure on her part to request this. • In response to the show cause notice, the Appellant emphatically rejects that she showed "blatant disregard for the health and welfare of vulnerable patients" or that she has been dishonest in fulfilling her duties. The Appellant argues that she has described extenuating and mitigating circumstances which explain her actions. -- 8 of 15 -- 9 • The Appellant argues that Allegations 1, 3 and 5 could have been addressed through management action such as training and development, and that the decision maker determined the conduct could not be managed through local management action before the Appellant had an opportunity to respond. The Appellant also argues that Allegations 2 and 4 rest on assumptions of guilt regarding the other allegations, and as she is innocent of those, Allegations 2 and 4 have no basis. • The Appellant argues that she has not been offered any other disciplinary options or given any reason why these were not considered or why positive performance management principles weren't implemented. • The Appellant also argues that she offered her resignation after responding to the allegations, making it reasonable to assume the resignation was accepted with full consideration of her responses. The Appellant further argues the Respondent has provided no grounds for changing their original decision to accept her resignation. • The Appellant included multiple attachments to her submissions, the first of which contained more detailed chronologies about the allegations. Respondent's submissions [20] The Respondent's submissions are summarised as follows: • The Respondent submits that as the Appellant received the Second Show Cause Notice on 5 April 2024, the deadline for the filing of the appeal was on 26 April 2024. Therefore, any appeal of findings is outside of the 21-day time limit. • The Respondent notes that the Second Show Cause Notice was sent to the Appellant and her union representative and expressly informed the Appellant of the 21-day limit for filing. The Respondent states that the importance of statutory time limits has been consistently recognised, referring to Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor,5 and Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited ('Erhardt')6. • The Respondent argues that the delay by the Appellant to file her Notice of Appeal is significant and refers to Erhardt which states that extensions to legislative timeframes should only be allowed in exceptional circumstances. The Appellant further refers to Clarke v State of Queensland (Queensland Health),7 and submits that the Commission should decline to hear the appeal against disciplinary findings due to it being out of time and having limited prospects of success. 5 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541. 6 Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG 20. 7 Clarke v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 089, [64]. -- 9 of 15 -- 10 • The Respondent submits that the disciplinary findings against the Appellant were procedurally fair as she had the opportunity to respond to the First Show Cause Notice and the Supplementary Evidence Letter before any decisions on disciplinary findings were made. • The Respondent refers to s 93(1) and s 95(3) of the PS Act which provide that an employee's chief executive may continue to take disciplinary action against a former employee if a disciplinary ground arises in relation to an employee prior to the end of their employment. • The Respondent submits that the Second Show Cause Notice was issued to the Appellant on 5 April 2024, however her employment only ended on 17 May 2024. The Respondent argues it was therefore open to Ms Bloch to make the disciplinary declaration against the Appellant. • The Respondent argues that the disciplinary action of termination was reasonable and proportionate to the seriousness of the Appellant's conduct. The Respondent further argues that the substantiated conduct of the Appellant jeopardised the health and safety of consumers of WMH Health Care Services. • The Respondent submits that the Appellant's conduct caused a loss of trust and confidence in her as an employee, and her disregard for the health and well-being of patients, along with her dishonesty in fulfilling her duties, was considered incompatible with employment as an RN. The Respondent further submits that none of the Appellant's responses provided any extenuating or mitigating circumstances which would justify or excuse her actions. • The Respondent rejects the Appellant's submission that her length of service was not taken into consideration and argues that the seriousness of her conduct outweighs her prior fifteen months of service at WMH. • The Respondent also rejects the Appellant's submission that her conduct could have been dealt with as performance issues and submits that the substantiated findings related to the Appellant's honesty and integrity in making records of her interactions with consumers. The Respondent submits that honesty and integrity are serious conduct issues. • The Respondent submits that the Appellant would have been terminated if she had remained an employee at WMH. -- 10 of 15 -- 11 Appellant's submissions in reply [21] The Appellant submits in reply that: • The Appellant was not advised of her suspension until she reported for duty and discovered that her workplace was barred; • The decision maker's consideration of the logbook and CCTV evidence fails to consider the Appellant's explanation that she was not clearly told where the patient she needed to treat was being held, and that the patient she attempted to treat was the one she believed she had been asked to attend; • The Appellant's explanations for her conduct were ignored by the decision maker, and she was not advised of the nature of the penalty until it had been determined; • The Appellant's resignation letter included the phrase, "In order to bring this matter to a conclusion, I advise that I will tender my resignation…". The Appellant argues that her resignation's acceptance involved the Respondent recognising that such an acceptance would draw the matter to a close; • The Appellant contests the Respondent's out of time argument, referring to the letter dated 1 August 2024 which stated that "A right of review of a disciplinary decision is contained in Chapter 10 of the PSA. You may appeal my disciplinary decision to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission within 21 days of your receipt of this letter." The Appellant then lodged her appeal on 20 August 2024; • The Appellant contests the Respondent's submission that she has not provided any extenuating or mitigating circumstances, referring to her responses dated 14 March 2024, 18 March 2024, and her Form 89 Appeal Notice; • The Respondent has not provided sufficient reasons for their rejection of her submissions and have either ignored them or preferred the interpretation of events given by the patient; • The evidence the Appellant provided in relation to Allegation 1 shows that she had good reasons for assuming that the patient she saw in the unit was the patient she had been asked to attend. The Appellant further argues that she was not dishonest in her interview as the intended patient was not made clear to her for several days until after her interview with Ms Louw; • The Appellant accepts that her record-keeping in relation to Allegations 3 and 4 was incomplete but submits that her act of amending the record was intended only to make the record more accurate; and -- 11 of 15 -- 12 • The Appellant reiterates her position that termination is an excessive outcome for the allegations. Consideration [22] The Appeal Notice indicates that the Appellant appeals the decision of Ms Bloch dated 1 August 2024. This decision made a disciplinary declaration against the Appellant in the following terms: After further considering all information available to me in relation to this matter, I have determined to make a disciplinary declaration pursuant to section 95 of the PSA that: • prior to your employment with WMH ending on 19 April 2024, grounds for discipline arose under section 91 of the PSA, in that in relation to Allegations 1, 2, 3 and 5, you were guilty of misconduct, that is inappropriate or improper conduct in an official capacity within the meaning of s 91(5)(a) of the PSA and in relation to Allegation 4, you had contravened, without reasonable excuse, a standard of conduct applying to her under an approved code of conduct under the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994, namely the Code, specifically standard 4.1 of the Code, in a way that is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action in accordance with section 91(1)(h) of the PSA. • the disciplinary action that would have been taken against you under section 93 of the PSA, had your employment not ended, would have been termination of your employment. [23] The content of the Appeal Notice however indicates that the Appellant also seeks to appeal the decision of Ms Hayes dated 5 April 2024 substantiating a number of allegations and making disciplinary findings ('the disciplinary finding decision'). [24] The statutory time period within which an appeal may be filed against a decision is 21 days in accordance with s 564 of the IR Act: 564 Time limit for appeal (1) An appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal must be started, as required under the rules, within the appeal period. (2) However, on an application made during or after the appeal period, the industrial tribunal may allow an appeal to be started within a longer period. (3) In this section— appeal period, for an appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal, means the period within 21 days after— (a) if the decision is given at a hearing—the announcement of the decision at the hearing; or (b) if the decision is given through the registrar—the release of the decision; or (c) if the decision is a promotion decision—the decision is publicly notified under the Public Sector Act 2022; or -- 12 of 15 -- 13 (d) if, under another Act, the decision is given in another way—the decision is given in the other way. [25] If the Appellant intended to appeal the disciplinary findings decision by Ms Hayes, such an appeal was required to be filed within the 21-day timeframe, that is by 26 April 2024. This appeal was filed on 21 August 2024, approximately 117 days outside of the statutory time limit. [26] The Appellant has not provided an explanation as to why an appeal against the disciplinary finding decision was not filed within the 21-day period. This is despite being on notice of the Respondent’s contention that the appeal of the disciplinary findings should not be heard on the basis that it was not filed within time. [27] It is possible to grant an extension of time to allow an appeal filed outside of the statutory timeframe to be considered, however in circumstances where the delay is significant and no explanation is provided as to the reason the appeal was not filed within time I will not infer that an extension of time has been sought. Accordingly, the disciplinary findings decision by Ms Hayes is not subject to this appeal on the basis that it is statute barred. [28] The only decision subject to this appeal is that filed within the statutory timeframe, that is, the decision of Ms Bloch that the Appellant would have been terminated from her position had she remained an employee in accordance with s 71 of the PS Act. [29] The Appellant submits that the Respondent 'changed their decision' to accept her resignation and instead terminated her employment. That is a mischaracterisation of the decision. The Appellant is considered to have resigned from her position following her letter of 19 April 2024. The Appellant's letter stated the following: Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your decision of 5 April 2024. I would like to state I disagree with your findings and do not agree with the disciplinary penalty you have proposed. In order to bring this matter to a conclusion, I advise that I will tender my resignation from my position of Registered Nurse with Prison Health with two weeks' notice being given (3 rd May 2024). … [30] Section 95(9) of the PS Act is outlined as follows: The making of the disciplinary declaration does not affect the way in which the employee's employment ended, or any benefits, rights or liabilities arising because the employment ended. [31] The decision of Ms Bloch was not to rescind acceptance of the Appellant's resignation, rather it was a post-separation disciplinary declaration that the Appellant would have been terminated had she remained an employee. -- 13 of 15 -- 14 [32] In circumstances where Ms Bloch had determined that the disciplinary action of termination would have been taken had the Appellant not resigned, s 95(8) of the PS Act permits a post-separation disciplinary declaration to be made. [33] The substantiated allegations as outlined at paragraph [2] resulted in a disciplinary finding for Allegations 1, 2, 3 and 5 that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct within the meaning of s 91(5)(a) of the PS Act. Regarding Allegation 4, the Respondent determined that the Appellant had contravened, without reasonable excuse, a standard of conduct under the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994, namely cl 4.1 of the Code of Conduct, in a way that was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action in accordance with s91(1)(h) of the PS Act. [34] Ms Hayes informed the Appellant of the disciplinary findings and invited her to respond to the proposed disciplinary action of termination of employment. [35] In the Appellant's response to Ms Hayes, she advised that she disagreed with the findings and resigned from her employment. No submissions were made as to the proposed disciplinary action of termination of her employment. [36] The substantiated allegations were of a serious nature relating to the health and welfare of vulnerable patients. The behaviour included dishonest conduct which the Respondent submits caused a loss of trust and confidence in the Appellant as an employee. [37] The Appellant submits that her conduct should have been dealt with as a performance issue and support and guidance should have been provided to allow her to improve. I accept the Respondent's submission that the Appellant's disregard for the health and welfare of patients and her dishonesty in fulfilling her duties is incompatible with employment as an RN. This conduct is significantly more serious than the type of performance issues that are generally dealt with through management guidance. [38] In circumstances where the Appellant was afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations and proposed disciplinary findings and a further opportunity to respond to the proposed disciplinary action, I consider that the disciplinary process was procedurally fair. [39] The Appellant's human rights were considered, with Ms Bloch acknowledging that the decision may impact the Appellant's human rights under ss 23 and 25 of the Human Rights Act. Ms Bloch determined that the decision is consistent with her responsibilities under the PS Act to ensure employees perform their duties with integrity and act honestly, fairly and in the public interest, thereby outweighing any limited potential impact on the Appellant's human rights. This determination was open to Ms Bloch. -- 14 of 15 -- 15 [40] After considering the seriousness of the substantiated allegations and the findings of misconduct and contravention of the Code of Conduct, I am satisfied that the decision to make a declaration pursuant to s 95 of the PS Act that the Appellant's employment would have been terminated had it not ended was fair and reasonable. Order [41] I make the following order: 1. Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed. -- 15 of 15 --