Byrd v Gladstone Regional Council [2026] QIRC 260

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Byrd v Gladstone Regional Council [2026] QIRC 260 PARTIES: Byrd, Zane William (Applicant) v Gladstone Regional Council (Respondent) CASE NO: GP/2026/7 PROCEEDING: Application for injunction DELIVERED ON: HEARING DATES: 21 August 2026 9 June 2026 10 June 2026 11 June 2026 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Dwyer IC Gladstone ORDER: The application filed 20 March 2026 is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – where applicant was the subject of disciplinary proceedings – where applicant alleges he had made a public interest disclosure – where applicant alleges disciplinary proceedings are reprisal for making public interest disclosure – where applicant alternatively alleges disciplinary proceeding is adverse action – whether complaint by applicant was a public interest disclosure – whether purported exercise of statutory obligation to report safety incident is workplace right – whether disciplinary action was taken because the applicant made a public interest disclosure – whether disciplinary action was taken in the belief that applicant had or was going to -- 1 of 16 -- 2 make a public interest disclosure – power of the commission to grant an injunction with respect to reprisal – meaning of workplace right – where applicant did not make a public interest disclosure – where public interest disclosure was not a substantial ground for disciplinary procedure - proceedings dismissed APPEARANCES LEGISLATION: Mr Z. Byrd, the Applicant in person Ms J. Marr of Counsel, instructed by Barry Nillson (led by Mr A. Lewis) for Gladstone Regional Council Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 284, 309, 314. Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) ss 12(3)(a), 12(3)(b) 13, 13(1)(c), 17(3), 40, 48, and 51. CASES: Allan v State of Queensland [2018] QIRC 36 Gilbert v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2021] QIRC 255 Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No.8) [2021] QIRC 114 Reasons for Decision Background [1] Mr Zane Byrd is employed by Gladstone Regional Council (‘GRC’) as an electrician. On 20 March 2026 Mr Byrd (who is self-represented) filed a Form 2 – General Application in the Commission Registry (‘the application’). [2] The application sought inter alia the following order: An interim order restraining the Respondent from dismissing the Applicant or otherwise taking further adverse action against him pending further order or final determination of this application. [3] The grounds for the application are described as follows: Application for injunction about reprisal pursuant to s 48 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) General protections dispute pursuant to s 309 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) alleging adverse action because I exercised a workplace right within the meaning of s 284. -- 2 of 16 -- 3 [4] The application was allocated to me and, noting it included an application for an interim injunction in respect of the possible termination of Mr Byrd’s employment, I listed the matter urgently for mention to schedule a hearing. [5] At the mention held on 30 March 2026 the (then) solicitors for GRC were prepared to give an undertaking preserving Mr Byrd’s employment pending resolution of the application. However, I was somewhat surprised to hear that they were otherwise seeking a rather relaxed timetable for the filing of submissions etc. The proposed directions culminated with a direction for the matter to be dealt with on the papers. None of these proposals were appropriate given the nature of the interim application before the Commission. [6] Given the Commission is the arbiter of fact, it would be highly prejudicial for all parties in this matter for the decision-making process to exclude the opportunity for the Commission to make factual enquiries beyond what might be contained in affidavit material. A hearing was plainly necessary. Additionally, given the prejudice to Mr Byrd arising from his suspension, and the prejudice to the ratepayers of Gladstone arising from Mr Byrd’s suspension on full pay since November 2025, I considered that the interests of justice were best served by an expeditious resolution of this matter. I therefore gave directions for the filing of material and a hearing of the application for an interim injunction on an expedited basis. [7] Immediately following the issue of those directions there was a change in legal representation for the GRC. [8] The application proceeded to hearing in Gladstone on 9 June 2026 for three days. Facts [9] The broader facts in this matter are largely uncontroversial. On or about 14 November 2025, Ms Tina Draper and her colleague (Mr Tatersall) were performing electrical work on a ‘clarifier’ at the Tannum Sands water treatment facility. In the course of performing this work, an error was made which, once discovered, was subsequently and quickly rectified by Ms Draper (‘the incident’). [10] The error was partially observed by Mr Jack Roberts who was the acting leading hand on that day when Mr Byrd was absent. On 17 November 2025, Mr Roberts reported the incident to Mr Byrd. [11] Mr Byrd contends that the incident amounts to a ‘Dangerous Electrical Event’ which he considers was reportable to the Electrical Safety Office and the GRC management. Mr Byrd contends that he discussed the matter with the Acting Team Leader (Mr Damian Wilson) who directed him to attend the Tannum Sands site and inspect the work -- 3 of 16 -- 4 performed on the clarifier. Mr Byrd contends that on doing this he did not find twisted cables (as he expected) but alleges he was sufficiently concerned about some aspect of the wiring that he shut the clarifier down and isolated it. [12] Mr Byrd contends that he met with Mr Rodney Burge, the Team Leader Water Network after the pre-start meeting on 18 November 2025. Mr Byrd contends that he met with Mr Burge in the company of Mr Roberts and that he reported his concerns about the competency of Ms Draper and also her failure to report the incident which he alleges she was lawfully required to do. Mr Byrd does not say how this meeting ended or whether Mr Burge acknowledged his complaint either formally or informally. [13] Mr Byrd also contends that he raised these concerns with Ms Draper and directed her to rectify the faults he alleges he found. Ms Draper denies this. Ms Draper said that the error was fully rectified the day it occurred. [14] Ms Draper provided evidence in the proceedings that on 18 November 2025 she was in Mr Byrd’s office for the pre-start meeting. She contends that most of the electricians were there. She says that Mr Byrd was ‘going off’ in a raised voice at Mr Robert Tattersal (the colleague who had been at Tannum Sands with Ms Draper) about the incident. She contends he described Mr Tattersall as “useless” and did not know what he was doing. Ms Draper says that while Mr Byrd was talking about the incident at this meeting, he turned his back to her and ignored her. [15] Also on 18 November 2025, Ms Draper contends that her colleague Ms Caet Wessling showed her a text message that Mr Byrd had sent her on 23 October 2025. The message read as follows: Yeah…Exactly what we talked about… We understand it…this is why big meets don’t work…Tina is dumb as dog shit and fucking everything up …I wish she would shut up [16] As a consequence of that text message and ongoing concerns she had about Mr Byrd’s behaviour towards her, Ms Draper decided to make a formal complaint about him to GCR management. Ms Wessling also agreed to report the text message. [17] Before making their complaints to management, Ms Draper says she informed another colleague (Mr Craig Fresser) of her intention to make a formal complaint about Mr Byrd and asked for his support. [18] The next day on 19 November 2025, Mr Byrd was absent from work. He was apparently unwell. There is some suggestion that Mr Burge made numerous attempts to call Mr Byrd but they were unsuccessful. Mr Byrd says that Mr Burge eventually left a message indicating he would have to ask the police to conduct a welfare check on him if he did not return the calls. Mr Byrd says he perceived this as a threat though none of this was -- 4 of 16 -- 5 explored in evidence during cross examination with Mr Burge and no other evidence was put before me on the matter by either party at the hearing. [19] Also on 19 November 2025, Ms Draper and her colleague Ms Wessling met with human resources personnel and made a formal complaint about Mr Byrd’s alleged bullying. [20] At some point after they made this complaint, either on or about 19 November 2025, Mr Byrd was informally made aware (through a chain of breaches of confidence beginning with Mr Fresser) that Ms Draper and Ms Wessling had made a complaint to management about him. [21] Upon learning of the complaint to management, at 6:20am on 20 November 2025, Mr Byrd sent a text message (‘the SMS’) to Ms Wessling that read as follows: Hey, I heard you & Tina put a complaint into HR about me for something?? Is that true? [22] Ms Wessling subsequently shared the details of the SMS with Ms Draper. Both women experienced distress arising from the content of SMS and consequently they further complained about this conduct to management on 20 November 2025. [23] Upon receiving this second complaint, the GRC human resources manager Mr Werner Breytenbach then escalated it and, because of the objective seriousness of the conduct, took immediate steps to suspend Mr Byrd pending an investigation into his conduct in sending the SMS. [24] Over the course of the following four months an investigation was conducted by Mr Breytenbach. The investigation concluded that there were possible grounds for disciplinary action and a show cause process followed. The show cause process culminated in a number of allegations being formally put to Mr Byrd. Most of the allegations related to alleged improper conduct and language towards other staff. The last of the allegations related to the SMS alleging it was intimidating. [25] Relevantly, Mr Byrd has not denied sending the SMS but argues it was a simple factual inquiry to Ms Wessling who he regarded as a friend. [26] Following his responses to the show cause process Mr Byrd was informed that some (but not all) of the allegations were substantiated. The substantiated allegations included the allegation relating to the intimidating character of the SMS. The GRC is contemplating terminating Mr Byrd’s employment. [27] Mr Byrd was subsequently informed that GRC was contemplating terminating his employment. It was at that point that he filed this application seeking an injunction to halt the disciplinary process. -- 5 of 16 -- 6 The nature of Mr Byrd's application [28] Mr Byrd contends that the complaint he made to Mr Burge on 18 November 2025 is a Public Interest Disclosure (‘PID’) within the meaning of s 13(1)(c) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) (‘the PID Act’). There was a contention by Mr Byrd that he had made a PID to Ms Draper also, though this was abandoned when I raised s 17(3) of the PID Act with him. [29] During the hearing, Mr Byrd also added an assertion that he made a PID to Mr Wilson on 17 November 2025, though this lacked particulars and was not explored by Mr Byrd with Mr Wilson in cross examination. I do not intend to deal with that assertion in those circumstances. [30] Section 13(1)(c) of the PID Act relevantly provides that: 13 Disclosure by a public officer (1) This section applies if a person who is a public officer has information about— … (c) a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or … (Emphasis added) [31] In essence, Mr Byrd’s application alleges that the disciplinary process that commenced on 20 November 2025 when he was suspended is a reprisal within the meaning of s 40 of the PID Act. Section 40 of the PID Act relevantly provides that: 40 Reprisal and grounds for reprisal (1) A person must not cause, or attempt or conspire to cause, detriment to another person because, or in the belief that— (a) the other person or someone else has made, or intends to make, a public interest disclosure; or (b) the other person or someone else is, has been, or intends to be, involved in a proceeding under the Act against any person. (2) An attempt to cause detriment includes an attempt to induce a person to cause detriment. (3) A contravention of subsection (1) is a reprisal or the taking of a reprisal. (4) A ground mentioned in subsection (1) as the ground for a reprisal is the unlawful ground for the reprisal. -- 6 of 16 -- 7 (5) For the contravention mentioned in subsection (3) to happen, it is sufficient if the unlawful ground is a substantial ground for the act or omission that is the reprisal, even if there is another ground for the act or omission. (Emphasis added) [32] In the circumstances, Mr Byrd contends that he is entitled to an injunction in accordance with the terms of s 48 of the PID Act. Section 48 of the PID Act relevantly provides: 48 Right to apply to industrial commission (1) An application for an injunction about a reprisal may be made to the industrial commission if the reprisal— (a) has caused or may cause detriment to an employee; and (b) involves or may involve a breach of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 or an industrial instrument under that Act. (2) The application may be made by— (a) the employee; or (b) an industrial organisation— (i) whose rules entitle it to represent the industrial interests of the employee; and (ii) acting in the employee’s interests with the employee’s consent; or (c) the Crime and Corruption Commission acting in the employee’s interests with the employee’s consent if— (i) the employee is a public officer; and (ii) the reprisal involves or may involve an act or omission that the Crime and Corruption Commission may investigate. (3) The Industrial Relations Act 2016, section 473 applies to the application, but this part prevails if it is inconsistent with that section. (4) If the industrial commission has jurisdiction to grant an injunction on an application under subsection (1), the jurisdiction is exclusive of the jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal other than the Industrial Court. (5) Without limiting this section, the application is an industrial cause within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 2016. (Emphasis added) -- 7 of 16 -- 8 [33] Further, while it is not entirely clear from the application or his evidence, it would appear that Mr Byrd also contends that the disciplinary process is adverse action within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (the IR Act’). Mr Byrd contends that exercising his statutory obligation under the Electrical Safety Act 2002 (Qld) ('the ES Act’) to report and investigate a concealed dangerous electrical event was a ‘workplace right’ within the meaning of s 284 of the IR Act. [34] It is not clear whether Mr Byrd seeks separate injunctive relief pursuant to s 314 of the IR Act in respect of the alleged adverse action though, as these reasons will subsequently conclude, it is unnecessary to address that question. Respondent's response [35] The respondent’s response (as at the commencement of the hearing) was, in simple terms, that an injunction cannot be granted pursuant to s 48 of the PID Act because Mr Byrd: i. has not made a PID within the meaning of s 13 of the PID Act; or ii. cannot prove reprisal within the meaning of s 40 of the PID Act; and iii. cannot prove the alleged reprisal breaches or may breach the IR Act or an industrial instrument. [36] Additionally, with respect to s 314 of the IR Act, the respondent contends that Mr Byrd cannot prove adverse action because exercising statutory obligations under the ES Act is not an exercise of a workplace right in circumstances where the ES Act is not a workplace law. Evidence [37] Mr Byrd gave evidence at the hearing. Mr Byrd prepared affidavits for a number of other witnesses though none were required for cross examination and their evidence was admitted by consent. [38] The respondents called evidence from Mr Breytenbach1, Mr Burge2, Ms Draper3, Mr Wilson4 and Mr Mark Holmes5 (who was the decision maker with respect to the disciplinary process). Notably, Mr Holmes confirmed his role as the decision maker and that he acted on information from Mr Burge and Mr Breytenbach. 1 Exhibit 12 2 Exhibit 15 3 Exhibit 13 4 Exhibit 16 5 Exhibit 17 -- 8 of 16 -- 9 [39] I do not intend to set out a detailed summary of the evidence in these reasons. The salient portions will be discussed in the reasons that follow. Written submission [40] Following the close of evidence in the proceedings the parties returned on the third day listed for hearing to deliver oral submissions. The matter was programmed in this way to give effect to the urgent nature of the application and to minimise the respective prejudices to each party identified earlier in these reasons. [41] The respondent delivered oral submission as expected. However, at the commencement of proceedings that morning Mr Byrd advised he was not comfortable proceeding with oral submissions and wanted an opportunity to consider the transcript before providing written submission. Despite reservations about the delay that would inevitably arise if I acceded to Mr Byrd’s request, I considered that fairness to Mr Byrd as a self-represented litigant required I grant him that opportunity. Consequently, the parties provided written submissions on 31 July 2026 and 14 August 2026 respectively. [42] Against my express counsel, it appears that Mr Byrd made use of artificial intelligence in the drafting of his submissions. In addition to the now all too familiar convoluted style of submissions crafted in that way, I note that Mr Byrd has regrettably taken advantage of the indulgence granted to him and has now sought to recraft or add to the case he advanced at hearing of the matter. [43] Mr Byrd has been offered every accommodation in his conduct of these proceedings. He had ample time to prepare his case and to both file and receive affidavit evidence. As already noted, Mr Byrd was even given flexibility to manipulate aspects of his case during the hearing. The purpose of the adjournment after the conclusion of the evidence was for Mr Byrd to review the transcript and to have an opportunity to feel comfortable that his closing submissions were complete. It was not an opportunity for him make new arguments or reshape old ones. [44] I have considered the submissions of the parties in full. To the extent that Mr Byrd’s recent written submissions deal with matters or arguments that were not part of his case at hearing, I do not intend to deal with those matters. I will determine this matter on the case presented by each party and the evidence presented at hearing and on the written submissions of the parties that are properly founded on that evidence. [45] I do not intend to restate those submissions in these reasons. I will instead reference the salient portions in my consideration that follows. Consideration Introduction -- 9 of 16 -- 10 [46] It should be noted at this juncture that, as is often the case with interim injunction hearings, the hearing of evidence in these proceedings has ultimately gone to the broader issue of whether there is evidence of reprisal or adverse action sufficient to sustain the substantive complaint. The evidence heard at the hearing has comprehensively addressed matters relevant to the substantive issues such that I consider I am in a position to dispense with the application on both an interim and final basis. [47] The issues that Mr Byrd has been required to overcome were firstly, whether he made a PID and secondly, if he did, whether it was the substantial reason for the alleged reprisal action. In addition to these issues, there is a question as to whether the health and safety concerns asserted by Mr Byrd constitute the exercise of a workplace right, and if so, whether that complaint was the substantive and operative reason for the disciplinary process implemented from 20 November 2025. [48] Mr Byrd seeks relief on an urgent basis. In my view that is an appropriate approach to the application. Notwithstanding that this matter has experienced a longer delay in closure than I initially anticipated, the determination of Mr Byrd’s application remains urgent. For that reason, I do not intend to deal in full with all of the grounds raised by the parties because, as will become clear from the reasons that follow, it is ultimately unnecessary to do so. Did Mr Byrd make a PID? [49] An allegation of reprisal within the meaning of s 40 of the PID Act is not a complex proposition. In simple terms, s 40 provides that a person must not cause detriment to another person because the other person has made a PID or because they believe the other person has made a PID. Importantly, the unlawful ground constituting the reprisal must be a substantial ground for causing the detriment.6 [50] On the plain terms of s 40 of the PID Act, before a complaint of reprisal can be considered, there must be evidence of a PID within the meaning of the PID Act or at least, some factual basis upon which a PID within that meaning might have been anticipated. [51] The first proposition put against Mr Byrd’s application by the respondent is that he has not made a PID, and in particular, he has not made a PID within the meaning of s 13(1)(c) of the PID Act as he contends. On the evidence before me I consider there is significant merit to this assertion. [52] The evidence about when (and to whom) Mr Byrd made his alleged PID was somewhat opaque and inconsistent in his filed material and his oral evidence. The lack of clarity 6 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) ('PID Act') s 40(5). -- 10 of 16 -- 11 was not simply a feature of Mr Byrd’s challenges as a self-represented litigant. As the issues required to prove the elements of a PID began to crystalise at hearing, Mr Byrd’s case shifted and reformed with respect to whom he spoke with on this critical issue and what he said. [53] It ultimately emerged at hearing that it was his conversation with Mr Burge after the pre- start meeting that has the most potential to be characterised as a possible PID. But while it seems uncontroversial that Mr Byrd raised concerns about the competency of Ms Draper with Mr Burge, it is not clear (even from his own evidence) exactly what he disclosed and whether that would rise to the standard of a disclosure of a ‘substantial and specific danger’ as required by s 13(1)(c) of the PID Act. [54] Without evaluating whether there might be a reasonable objective basis for it, I accept that Mr Byrd appears to hold an honest opinion about Ms Draper’s competency generally. But in my view, to reach the ordinary meaning of ‘substantial and specific danger’, the language of s 13(1)(c) of the PID Act requires something more than a simple subjective opinion as to the competency of a co-worker and the subjective safety concerns alleged to arise from it. [55] Moreover, the language of s 13(1)(c) of the PID Act requires disclosure of a ‘specific’ danger. Mr Byrd’s evidence on what he disclosed tended to vacillate from general criticisms based on his opinion of Ms Draper’s competency to broad assertions about her work on the clarifier at Tannum Sands on the day of the incident. In my view, the evidence presented at hearing suggests that the report to Mr Burge (and Mr Wilson) was not sufficiently substantial or specific to meet the standard required for a PID. [56] Further, given the way in which Mr Byrd has framed his alleged PID, he would likely have to demonstrate that he ‘honestly believed on reasonable grounds’ that the conduct of Ms Draper was of the type of conduct prescribed by the PID Act.7 [57] There is unchallenged evidence from Ms Draper that the incident was minor in nature, and it was rectified relatively quickly on the same day, such that the clarifier was able to commence operation again. Ms Draper holds the same standing and qualifications as Mr Byrd and must therefore be considered as equally expert on whether the incident might reasonably be considered ‘substantial’. [58] Mr Byrd’s concerns were founded on what was reported to him by Mr Roberts. Mr Roberts only partially observed the incident. Further, the paucity of detail supplied by Mr Roberts to Ms Faulkner in his subsequent email to her on 20 November 2025 only adds to doubts as to the veracity of the reasonableness of his concerns.8 7 PID Act s 12(3)(a) 8 Attachment DJW-1 to Exhibit 16. See also Exhibit 8. -- 11 of 16 -- 12 [59] In those circumstances the evidence of the reasonableness of Mr Byrd’s honest belief is tenuous at best, especially when one considers that Mr Byrd’s belief was not founded on direct observation of the incident but instead, it was based largely on what Mr Roberts reported to him. I would hold similar doubts as to Mr Byrd’s ability to satisfy the requirements of s 12(3)(b) of the PID Act also in that such vague information could not even tend to show the conduct required to meet the terms of s 13(1)(c). [60] There is significant doubt in my view that the matters reported by Mr Byrd to Mr Burge (and Mr Wilson for that matter) would, even if fully pleaded and particularized, meet the requisite standard prescribed by s 13(1)(c) of the PID Act. On the evidence before me I cannot conclude that the elements of s 13(1)(c) of the PID Act have been met. [61] In circumstances where I find that Mr Byrd did not make a PID within the meaning of the PID Act, it follows that the first ground for a reprisal complaint i.e. ‘because Mr Byrd made a PID’ cannot be met. Additionally, having heard evidence from each of the respective managers to whom Mr Byrd contends he made his PID to, I am equally satisfied that none of them had a belief that Mr Byrd had or would make a PID within the meaning of the PID Act. Substantial ground? [62] Alternatively, and quite apart from the question of whether Mr Byrd made a PID, I can confidently determine other independently decisive issues in this matter that are sufficient to dispense with the application. [63] Throughout these proceedings it has been impressed upon Mr Byrd that he is required to prove the elements of ‘reprisal’ within the meaning of the term as it appears at s 40 of the PID Act. In particular he must prove that the disciplinary process (including his suspension) is a detriment imposed on him because he made a PID. This is consistent with his assertions from the outset. [64] Even if I were to accept that Mr Byrd did make a PID within the meaning of s 13(1)(c) of the PID Act (which I do not) after having heard evidence in these proceedings I am satisfied that the disciplinary process was not because of, or in the belief that, Mr Byrd had made a PID, either as a substantial reason or at all. [65] I have reached this view after having had the benefit of hearing evidence from the key personnel responsible for the disciplinary process. Before discussing that evidence, it must be noted that each of the relevant personnel in the decision-making chain identified the SMS sent on 20 November 2025 as being the trigger for the process. [66] While I note that the disciplinary process (perhaps unnecessarily) expanded to incorporate other, less serious or sustainable allegations, I am of the view that the SMS sent by Mr Byrd to Ms Wessling on 20 November 2025 (which is not disputed) is, in its -- 12 of 16 -- 13 own right, objectively serious. In my view, in the factual context, it is capable of being characterized as likely to cause intimidation and distress. I accept Ms Draper’s evidence that it caused her to fear Mr Byrd and further accept it is likely to have caused distress to Ms Wessling.9 [67] I hasten to add here that I also accept that Mr Byrd may not have intended the SMS to be received in that way nor understood the impact it might have on Ms Wessling or Ms Draper. But that is an issue relevant to mitigation of his conduct and whether it amounts to a valid reason for dismissal. Those are not matters for my consideration in these proceedings. In this matter I am only concerned to determine if the SMS sent on 20 November 2025 is a plausible explanation for the respondent to suspend Mr Byrd and commence disciplinary proceedings and thus, a complete answer to Mr Byrd’s contentions of proscribed intent. [68] On this issue I have heard evidence from the decision maker Mr Holmes. Despite being instructed by me as to his obligation to put his case to witnesses, and despite having an opportunity to put his case to Mr Holmes in cross examination, Mr Byrd failed to do so. [69] To ensure the Commission was fully appraised of all relevant evidence it ultimately fell to me to put to Mr Holmes directly the case made by Mr Byrd. Mr Holmes confirmed that the SMS was central to the decision to suspend Mr Byrd and denied that any complaint about safety, whether in the form of a PID or otherwise, played any role in that decision. I accept his denial. [70] Mr Holmes identified Mr Burge and Mr Breytenbach as personnel upon whom he relied for information to assist with his decision. He was not particularly clear about what role or information was contributed by Mr Burge. [71] Mr Burge gave evidence that he did not receive any specific or clear complaint about safety from Mr Byrd. While he recalled a conversation on 18 November 2025 with Mr Byrd and Mr Roberts complaining generally about Ms Draper, he contended that they were not able to provide details or specifics and that he understood they were going to direct their concerns to another manager. In those circumstances he did not consider he had any role to play and did not consider the matter further. [72] It was never put to Mr Burge that he influenced the decision of Mr Holmes in a proscribed way or at all. I was left with the clear impression that he did not. His evidence demonstrates that he was not sufficiently aware of any safety issue or PID for it to have founded the requisite proscribed intent. [73] Mr Breytenbach did the ‘leg work’ for the respondent with respect to the suspension, investigation, and disciplinary process. I consider that he was likely the most influential 9 Ms Wessling was too unwell to give evidence in the proceedings. -- 13 of 16 -- 14 source of information that Mr Holmes relied on in making his decision. Mr Breytenbach gave clear evidence as to the motivating factors for the suspension and subsequent disciplinary process. He expressly stated that the SMS was the trigger and refuted any suggestion that he had any knowledge of a safety complaint or PID when he commenced the process. I accept his evidence on these matters. [74] For completeness I note that Mr Byrd introduced a further case theory on the second day of the hearing in which he alleged that Ms Draper and Ms Wessling were taking a reprisal when they made their complaint on 19 November 2025. This case was never put to Ms Draper by Mr Byrd and, in circumstances where I accept Ms Draper was genuinely concerned about the display of the conduct she observed on 18 November 2025 (including the offensive words Mr Byrd used to describe her in a text message in October 2025), I consider those factors were the substantial factors motivating her actions in making the complaint on 19 November 2025. [75] Additionally, it was clear from the evidence of Mr Breytenbach and Mr Holmes that the SMS of 20 November 2025 was the substantive trigger for the disciplinary process. There is no evidence or suggestion that the other matters complained about by Ms Draper on 19 November 2025 would have (on their own) lead to Mr Byrd’s suspension and possible dismissal. Having regard to those other allegations I would consider that to be unlikely. [76] The conduct of Mr Byrd on 20 November 2025 was objectively and significantly more serious and posed a risk to the health and safety of Mr Draper and Ms Wessling. I accept that it was this conduct alone that prompted the suspension and subsequent disciplinary process and, as it postdates the complaint made on 19 November 2025, it cannot be said that the complaint by Ms Draper could have triggered the detriment now alleged. [77] For completeness I would add that Mr Byrd attempted to rely (albeit obliquely) on apparent procedural failings and inept investigative processes as evidence of a proscribed intent though, again, he did not clearly put these things directly to Mr Breytenbach. To the extent he did, Mr Breytenbach convincingly rejected the suggestions. [78] While I fully agree that the processes and proficiency of Mr Breytenbach in conducting the disciplinary process left something to be desired, I consider that flaws are common enough in complex disciplinary processes and, in this matter, they are not capable of giving rise to a conclusion Mr Breytenbach was acting for a proscribed reason. [79] I am satisfied that nothing and no one connected with the suspension of Mr Byrd’s employment and the subsequent disciplinary process was motivated substantially (or at all) by any safety complaint or PID. Mr Byrd has therefore failed to prove that the respondent suspended him and undertook a disciplinary process because (or in the belief that) he had made a PID. He has failed to prove the suspension and disciplinary process was a reprisal within the meaning of s 40 of the PID Act. -- 14 of 16 -- 15 [80] In those circumstances, where there is a finding that a reprisal has not occurred, the powers conferred on me by s 48 of the PID Act cannot be invoked.10 Adverse action [81] Further, to the extent I am required to consider injunctive remedies arising under the IR Act, it is trite to note that a compliant arising from a statutory obligation under the ES Act is not a workplace right within the meaning of the IR Act. The ES Act (along with the PID Act and the Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011) are not workplace laws and complaints made by employees arising under those Acts do not have the protections of the IR Act.11 [82] Further, even were it accepted (which it is not) that Mr Byrd had exercised a workplace right either by making a PID, a workplace health and safety complaint, or even making a complaint or enquiry in relation to his employment. I am satisfied that the disciplinary process was commenced in circumstances where Mr Byrd’s complaints (however characterised) were not the operative or immediate reason for the initiation of that process.12 I am satisfied of this for all of the reasons set out earlier with respect to my findings on whether the alleged PID was a substantial ground for the disciplinary action. [83] For completeness, to the extent it is necessary for me to consider any reverse onus as to proscribed conduct, I consider that the GRC has comprehensively discharged this. Conclusion [84] The exercise of the power to grant injunctions under s 48 of the PID Act or the IR Act is contingent on certain preliminary findings. In particular it is necessary to first find that a reprisal has occurred or is occurring, or that contraventions of the IR Act are occurring or have occurred. I have found no evidence of this. [85] In simple summary terms, the evidence comprehensively has established that the singular reason for the commencement of the disciplinary process that Mr Byrd contends is a reprisal or adverse action was the SMS sent by Mr Byrd on 20 November 2025. The sending of that SMS is not disputed. As was reiterated to Mr Byrd many times at hearing, the objective seriousness of that conduct is (in my view) not in doubt, and it presents as a plausible and compelling justification for the actions of which Mr Byrd now complains. Mr Byrd’s subjective characterisation of his conduct is largely irrelevant, and none of his 10 See PID Act s 51. 11 See Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No.8) [2021] QIRC 114 at [35]; Allan v State of Queensland [2018] QIRC 36 at [20]. 12 Gilbert v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2021] QIRC 255. -- 15 of 16 -- 16 efforts to construct a narrative of proscribed conduct by GRC have succeeded in overcoming the glaringly obvious misconduct on his part. [86] In the circumstances, the application filed 20 March 2026 must be dismissed in its entirety. An immediate consequence of this will be that the respondent is now relieved of its undertaking given to the Commission on 30 March 2026 and may recommence the disciplinary process without further delay. [87] I entirely accept Mr Byrd’s evidence that, from his perspective, his SMS of 20 November 2025 was not intended to be intimidating. I consider that his disclosed Autism diagnosis may well explain the direct and unfiltered nature of the message. While I am sympathetic in the circumstances of this explanation, it can only mitigate his conduct. Given the objectively intimidating character of the language in those specific circumstances, and the very real emotional impact on Ms Wessling and Ms Draper, Mr Byrd’s diagnosis cannot excuse his conduct. There must be some consequences for Mr Byrd and what they ought to be is now a matter for the GRC. Order [88] I make the following Order: The application filed 20 March 2026 is dismissed. -- 16 of 16 --