ABC by her tutor DEF v Irmak and Dagdanasar; ABC by her tutor DEF v Irmak (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1025

Catchwords: TORTS – intentional torts – where 18-year-old plaintiff became intoxicated after her Year 12 school formal and found herself isolated and alone in the street late at night – where she was picked up by a stranger and taken to a house where she was detained, drugged and repeatedly and violently sexually assaulted by three men – where plaintiff did not consent and was incapable of consenting due to heavy intoxication – where objective evidence corroborates plaintiff’s account including expert pharmacological evidence, medical examination evidence and a video recording taken during part of the sexual assaults – plaintiff established that the first and second defendants were two of the three men who detained, drugged and sexually assaulted her in the manner alleged – physical, psychological and psychiatric injuries and economic loss TORTS – intentional torts – where the first defendant, whilst held on remand following his arrest for the sexual assaults, conspired with his brother, the third defendant, to locate the plaintiff and coerce her to change her evidence to falsely assert she had consented to the sexual activity – where conspiracy with others, including a person who unbeknownst to them was an undercover police officer – where the first and third defendants were convicted of attempting to pervert the course of justice – where objective evidence corroborates the plaintiff’s account including intercepted telephone calls between the conspirators and agreed facts on which the third defendant was sentenced – irrelevant that the conspiracy involved an undercover police officer – conspiracy to injure by unlawful means – where plaintiff changed her identity, moved her residence and severed contact with family and friends due to threats – where plaintiff continues to live under an assumed identity – plaintiff established the first and third defendants conspired to injure her by causing her psychological harm and that she suffered psychological injuries and economic loss TORTS – joint and successive tortfeasors – plaintiff’s submission that “you can’t unscramble the egg” categorising all three defendants as joint tortfeasors whose joint acts contributed to the same damage not accepted – first and second defendants liable as joint tortfeasors for the sexual assaults – first and third defendants liable as joint tortfeasors for the conspiracy TORTS – c ommon l aw damages – apportionment between multiple joint tortfeasors across multiple torts – Court to do the best it can to determine the extent of the damage referable to different torts – third defendant not liable for damages solely attributable to the sexual assaults – aggravated damages – economic loss attributed equally Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: ABC by her tutor DEF v Irmak and Dagdanasar; ABC by her tutor DEF v Irmak (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1025 Hearing dates: 17 – 18 November 2025 Date of orders: 28 August 2026 Decision date: 28 August 2026 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: McGuire J Decision: (1) Enter judgment for the plaintiff against the third defendant, with damages to be assessed; (2) Direct the parties within 7 days to provide my Associate with a schedule calculating interest and/or loss of future earning capacity if different from that which the Court proposes, together with written submissions (not exceeding two pages) in support of such calculations; (3) Stand the proceedings over for 14 days for the determination of any issues in relation to the calculations and for the assessment of damages; and (4) Order the defendants to pay the plaintiff ’ s costs. Catchwords: TORTS – intentional torts – where 18-year-old plaintiff became intoxicated after her Year 12 school formal and found herself isolated and alone in the street late at night – where she was picked up by a stranger and taken to a house where she was detained, drugged and repeatedly and violently sexually assaulted by three men – where plaintiff did not consent and was incapable of consenting due to heavy intoxication – where objective evidence corroborates plaintiff’s account including expert pharmacological evidence, medical examination evidence and a video recording taken during part of the sexual assaults – plaintiff established that the first and second defendants were two of the three men who detained, drugged and sexually assaulted her in the manner alleged – physical, psychological and psychiatric injuries and economic loss TORTS – intentional torts – where the first defendant, whilst held on remand following his arrest for the sexual assaults, conspired with his brother, the third defendant, to locate the plaintiff and coerce her to change her evidence to falsely assert she had consented to the sexual activity – where conspiracy with others, including a person who unbeknownst to them was an undercover police officer – where the first and third defendants were convicted of attempting to pervert the course of justice – where objective evidence corroborates the plaintiff’s account including intercepted telephone calls between the conspirators and agreed facts on which the third defendant was sentenced – irrelevant that the conspiracy involved an undercover police officer – conspiracy to injure by unlawful means – where plaintiff changed her identity, moved her residence and severed contact with family and friends due to threats – where plaintiff continues to live under an assumed identity – plaintiff established the first and third defendants conspired to injure her by causing her psychological harm and that she suffered psychological injuries and economic loss TORTS – joint and successive tortfeasors – plaintiff’s submission that “you can’t unscramble the egg” categorising all three defendants as joint tortfeasors whose joint acts contributed to the same damage not accepted – first and second defendants liable as joint tortfeasors for the sexual assaults – first and third defendants liable as joint tortfeasors for the conspiracy TORTS – c ommon l aw damages – apportionment between multiple joint tortfeasors across multiple torts – Court to do the best it can to determine the extent of the damage referable to different torts – third defendant not liable for damages solely attributable to the sexual assaults – aggravated damages – economic loss attributed equally Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 3B(1) , 15B, 18(1), Pts 2A, 7 Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 100 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) , ss 61J(1), 61JA(1) , 319 , 315A, 319, 323, 327, 333 Criminal Code (Cth) , s 11.5 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 140 Cases Cited: AA v PD [2022] NSWSC 1039 Agius v The Queen (2013) 248 CLR 601; [2013] HCA 27 Arthur Harris v 718932 [2003] NSWCA 38 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34 Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1 at 19; [1980] HCA 10 Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807 Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678; [2004] NSWCA 140 Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70 Haiye Developments Pty Ltd v The Commercial Business Centre Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 937 Hamod v New South Wales (No 12) [2009] NSWSC 242 Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76; [2002] 2 All ER 1 Jongen v CSR Ltd (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-192 Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 47 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448; [1991] 3 WLR 188 Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34; [1999] FCA 899 MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; [1991] HCA 3 McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101; (1999) 165 ALR 409 McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343; [1931] HCA 54 McWilliam v Penthouse Publications Ltd [2001] NSWCA 237 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 67 ALJR 170 New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445 New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57 New South Wales v Loh Min Choo [2012] NSWCA 275 Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; [2001] HCA 69 R v Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256 Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1; [1995] HCA 29 Seltsam Pty Limited v Ghaleb [2005] NSWCA 208 State of New South Wales v Abed [2014] NSWCA 419; (2014) 246 A Crim R 549 State of New South Wales v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12; Aust Torts Reports 81-826 State of New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133 Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Entain Group Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 220 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82 Thompson v Smiths Ship Repairers Ltd [1984] QB 405 Westlawn Finance Limited v Tagg [2018] NSWSC 1491 Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30; [1959] HCA 51 Yammine v Kalwy [1979] 2 NSWLR 151 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Proceedings 2020/248409 ABC (Plaintiff) Ali Irmak (First Defendant) Ruhi Dagdanasar (Second Defendant) Proceedings 2022/220365 ABC (Plaintiff) Recep Irmak (Third Defendant) Representation: Counsel: Proceedings 2020/248409 J Turnbull SC with M Keaney (Plaintiff) Proceedings 2022/220365 J Turnbull SC with M Keaney (Plaintiff) PG Bolster with A Bartolo (Third Defendant) Solicitors: Proceedings 2020/248409 GJ Gooden (Plaintiff) Jones + Associates (Plaintiff) (On 28 August 2026) Proceedings 2022/220365 GJ Gooden (Plaintiff) Jones + Associates (Plaintiff) (On 28 August 2026) Michael Vassili Lawyers (Third defendant) File Number(s): 2020/248409; 2022/220365 Publication restriction: Pursuant to s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), the disclosure by publication or otherwise of any information as to the name and identity of the plaintiff, except as may be necessary, is prohibited. JUDGMENT Introduction On the evening of 8 November 2016, the plaintiff, ABC, attended her school formal. S he was at that time an 18-year-old student in Year 12. Not unlike many young people attending school formals, she was anxious about the event. That anxiety resulted in her eating too little food and drinking too much alcohol. Late in the evening , she found herself intoxicated, isolated and sitting alone in a gutter near a suburban Sydney railway station trying to organise a way to get home. She was then picked up by a stranger, Mustafa Yasser- Basoglu (also known as Yucebasoglu ), who sexually assaulted her in his car. He then drove her to a house in Glenwood. At that house , Ali Irmak (the first defendant), Ruhi Dagdanasar (the second defendant) and Mr Yasser- Basoglu supplied the plaintiff with drugs, including 4-Hydroxybutanoic acid (commonly known as gamma- h ydroxybutyrate , GHB or liquid ecstasy) and crystalline methamphetamine (commonly known as i ce) and alcoholic drinks and they repeatedly and violently sexually assaulted her. The sexual assaults occurred over the course of several hours during the evening of 8 November 2016 and into 9 November 2016. Throughout that period , t he plaintiff was so heavily intoxicated, she was incapable of consent. The police investigation which followed led to the arrest s of the first and second defendants on 16 November 2016. They were held on remand, bail - refused, from that date pending trial in the District Court. Whilst on remand, the first defendant conspired with his brother, Recep Irmak (who I will refer to as the third defendant), to approach the plaintiff to force her to falsely tell the police that she had not been sexually assaulted on 8 and 9 November 2016 and instead to falsely assert that she had consented to sexual activity with all three men. Following further police investigation, the third defendant was arrested on 20 June 2017 and he and the first defendant were then charged with conspiring with the intention of perverting the course of justice. The events of 8 and 9 November 2016 and the subsequent events give rise to the plaintiff ’ s two claims for damages. The interaction between the separate proceedings and the various defendants The plaintiff commenced proceedings 2020/248409 by way of Statement of Claim filed on 2 6 August 2020 seeking damages against the first and second defendants, being two of the three men who sexually assaulted her , gave her intoxicating substances and deprived her of her liberty on 8 and 9 November 2016 ( “ the sexual assault claims ” ) . A F urther A mended S tatement of C laim was filed on 23 September 2022 in proceedings 2020/248409 . By that amended pleading , the plaintiff seeks damages against the first defendant for his role in the conspiracy. Proceedings 202 2 /220365 were commenced by way of Statement of Claim filed on 27 July 2022 seeking damages against the third defendant for his role in the conspiracy. (Collectively, “ the conspiracy claims ” . ) Mr Yasser- Basoglu is not a defendant in either proceeding. There is evidence which refers to him fleeing to Turkey sometime after 9 November 2016 to avoid arrest and prosecution. The first and second defendants did not participate in the hearing of the plaintiff ’ s claims. Although defences to the original S tatement of C laim had been filed by their previous solicitor, neither filed any defence to the Further Amended Statement of Claim and neither filed any evidence. They are each serving significant terms of imprisonment having been convicted of offences relating to their sexual assault s on the plaintiff. The first and second defendants appeared via audio - visual links from prison at a mention of this matter on 11 November 2025. At that mention, during which they represented themselves, they each informed the C ourt that they did not intend to defend the proceedings, did not intend to rely on any evidence and did not wish to participate in the hearing of the plaintiff ’ s claims. In those circumstances , the hearing proceeded without their participation. The third defendant , who defended the proceedings, submitted that the plaintiff ’ s claim for damages against him should be dismissed with costs. Certificates of conviction and other evidence, admitted to prove the fact of the convictions, establish that: on 19 July 2019 , the first and second defendants were each convicted of: one count of sexual intercourse without consent, while in the company of each other and another, and recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm (contrary to s 61JA(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)); and five counts of sexual intercourse without consent, while in the company of each other and another (contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act , which is a statutory alternative to s 61JA(1) without the element of reckless infliction of actual bodily harm); on 1 October 2021 , the first defendant was convicted of one count of conspiring with the third defendant to do an act, namely to coerce the plaintiff to change her evidence in court proceedings, with the intention of perverting the course of justice (contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act ); and on 18 April 2019 , the third defendant was convicted of one count of conspiring with the first defendant to do an act, namely, to coerce the plaintiff to change her evidence in court proceedings, with the intention of perverting the course of justice (contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act ). The plaintiff claims that as a result of the sexual assaults and the conspiracy to coerce her to give false evidence, she has developed psychological injuries and has suffered significant loss. She says that her life would have taken a completely different course were it not for the conduct of the defendants. The sexual assault claims are made against the first and second defendants. There is no allegation that the third defendant was involved in those assaults. The conspiracy claims are made against the first and third defendants. There is no allegation that the second defendant was involved in the conspiracy. Accordingly, the first defendant ’ s liability, if found to exist, is for damages arising from the sexual assault claims and the conspiracy claims . The second defendant ’ s liability, if found to exist, is for damages arising only from the sexual assault claims . The third defendant ’ s liability, if found to exist, is for damages arising only from the conspiracy claims . In proceedings 2020/248409, the plaintiff pleads as against the first and second defendants that as a result of the sexual assaults , she suffered and continues to suffer from severe mental and physical pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, psychiatric injury, psychological injury, serious and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder and generalised anxiety disorder. T he plaintiff also pleads as against the first defendant that as a result of the conspiracy , she suffered and continues to suffer from severe mental suffering. In proceedings 202 2 /220365, the plaintiff pleads as against the third defendant that as a result of the conspiracy , she suffered and continues to suffer from severe mental suffering, serious and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder and generalised anxiety disorder. The proceedings were heard together and, in accordance with pre-trial orders made by Garling J on 13 July 2023 , the evidence in one proceeding is evidence in the other. The evidence Many of the background facts are uncontroversial. I set out such facts in what follows, which reflect my findings. To the extent that certain facts and issues are contested, they largely relate to the alleged conspiracy, whether the third defendant is liable for injury and loss to the plaintiff, and issues of damages. The contested facts are resolved where they arise in those situations. The plaintiff relie s on three evidentiary statements dated 16 September 2022, 11 November 2025 and 17 November 2025. The plaintiff was not required for cross-examination and did not give any oral evidence. The plaintiff relied on expert medical and psychiatric evidence. None of the authors of the medical or psychiatric reports were required by the third defendant for cross-examination. The third defendant did not rely on any evidence. The plaintiff’s version of events The plaintiff was born on 23 October 1998 and lived, during her childhood, in suburban Sydney with her biological parents and subsequently with her mother and stepfather. She attended primary school in suburban Sydney and then secondary school at a coeducational high school in suburban Sydney. In Year 11 , she chose A ncient H istory, B iology, English (Advanced) , M athematics General and S tudies of R eligion II as her elective subjects for senior school years. Her career aspirations included the possibility of pursuing a career in film production. In October 2016 , she applied for acceptance into a Bachelor of Film ( P roduction) p rogram at the SAE Institute. She received a conditional letter of offer into that bachelor course on 20 March 2017. The plaintiff also considered the possibility of pursuing a career in fashion and had considered applying to the FBI Fashion College for enrolment after secondary school. In 2016, while in Year 12 and prior to the sexual assaults in November 2016 , the plaintiff suffered from mental health problems. She did not sit for the Higher School Certificate examinations because her doctor had determined that she was not well enough. She was twice hospitalised in 2016 for mental health problems and was told on the second of those occasions that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety. She was then prescribed fluoxetine , an antidepressant medication, to assist with her anxiety. The plaintiff ’ s secondary school formal , which ha d been organised by the school , was held on Tuesday 8 November 2016. She planned to attend the formal with her school friends. On the morning of the formal, the plaintiff attended a hairdresser with her sister and had her hair curled. She purchased shoes, had her makeup done and collected her dress from a tailor. The plaintiff describes her formal dress as a champagne - coloured, full length, halter dress with a sash of the same colour and material. She wore gold high heel shoes and carried a silver clutch. Because t he dress was sheer and loose, she wore nipple covers and secured the bodice with a double-sided tape known as Hollywood Fashion Tape . Her biological father drove her and a friend to the house of a fellow student who was having pre-formal drinks. She arrived at that house at about 4:00 pm . There , photographs of the students were taken and they drank champagne. At a bout 6:00 pm , the plaintiff ’ s mother picked her up from the pre-formal drinks and dropped her at the function hall where the formal took place. She had no arrangements in place for transport home after the formal and states that that was something she had intended to arrange later in the evening. The plaintiff describes that she felt a lot of anxiety upon arrival at the formal. Although dinner was served , the plaintiff only ate a small amount of dessert. She had not had anything else to eat since eating some sushi for lunch at about 12 noon that day. The plaintiff sat down for much of the formal because her shoes were hurting her. The formal was alcohol - free. As the evening progressed, she sa ys that she believed she had been intoxicated by the earlier consumption of champagne because she started feeling happy and her feet started hurting less. During the course of the evening , a rrangements were made for the plaintiff to attend a post-formal party at the apartment of a school friend. She left the formal with others at about 11:00 pm and travelled to the post-formal party on a minibus arranged by a fellow student. The plaintiff states that she was so intoxicated, she is unable to remember the names of any of the other students on the minibus. The post-formal party was at a penthouse apartment. She recall s that there were about 80 people present . Two of the plaintiff ’ s friends who were at that party had water bottles in which the water had been replaced with vodka. Others at the party were drinking an alcoholic ginger beer mixed with gin . She recalls having about three large gulps of vodka as well as a few sips of the ginger beer and gin. D uring the party , she recalls feeling drunk and states that her memory from that point became limited. The plaintiff ’ s next recollection is of the father of the student hosting the party ushering the students out of the apartment. The next thing she remembers is being on the street outside the apartment , attempt ing to telephone people on her mobile telephone. She recalls walking some short distance from the apartment but believe s she did not walk far because she was cold. At some point , she found herself sitting in a gutter, trying to organise a way to get home. She then recalls that a car pulled alongside her while she was sitting in the gutter. She describes the car as European looking and recalls that apart from the driver there were no other occupants . She states that although the driver was unknown to her, she somehow found herself in the front passenger seat of the car . She recalls feeling scared and uncomfortable. H er next memory was that her formal dress was pulled up to her hips and her legs were pulled up. She recalls the male driver saying words to the effect of “ Y ou ’ re so gorgeous darling ” and then having non-consensual penile vaginal intercourse with her. She describes that he was holding her legs with his hands, thrusting hard and being really rough . She states that she was so drunk , she was unable to speak very well and just lay there. She describes the driver as wearing a black singlet with the brand name “ Everlast ” written across the chest. She describes him as having olive skin, a large nose, stubble and short dark hair. She recalls that he spoke English but with a Middle Eastern accent. She estimates that he was in his late thirties. She also recalls that he had a Puma branded bum bag, which she says was old and dirty. From the plaintiff ’ s description of the driver, and on the basis of other evidence in the proceedings, it is not i n issue that the driver who sexually assaulted her in the car was Mustafa Yasser-Basoglu. The plaintiff ’ s next memory is walking into a two - stor e y house . The car she had just been sexually assaulted in was parked in the driveway. Mr Yasser- Basoglu also came into the house with the plaintiff and remained there during the next several hours. I n side t he house , the plaintiff saw two men sitting on couches consuming drugs . She d escribes that the y were smoking cigarettes and smoking a glass pipe which contained a white substance. The plaintiff g ives descriptions of the two men in the house. She describe s one of the men as having the words “ N o F ear ” tattooed in large letter s across the front of his neck. It is uncontroversial that that person is the first defendant, Ali Irmak. Her description of the other man include s that he was the oldest of the three, who had greying hair in his beard. It is uncontroversial that t h at other person is the second defendant, Ruhi Dagdanasar . Although the plaintiff is a little unclear in relation to the order of events, her memory is that one of the men made her an alcoholic drink containing Coca-Cola and some alcoholic spirit. She describes the alcohol as being “ really strong ” . The man told her to skull the drink, which she did because she was anxious and scared. The plaintiff observed the men on the couch using a home - style blow torch to light the glass pipe and smoking its contents. When she asked what was in the pipe, she was told variously that it was ice, crack or heroin. The plaintiff then sent a text message to someone which reads, “ C an you come and get me. I a m scared. I am at these weird druggo guys house ” . The plaintiff recalls that Mr Yasser- Basoglu sat next to her on the couch and kept touching her, pulling the top of her dress down to expose her breasts and nipple covers and making sexual comments. She recall s that he grabbed her breasts on numerous occasions and lifted her dress up. She also recalls that he slapped her on the thigh and the bottom a number of times. Although the plaintiff recalls not liking what he was doing to her , she recalls that she was too drunk to say anything. She recalls that it hurt when she was slapped. She recalls at some point Mr Yasser- Basoglu saw the double-sided tape on her breasts, which had been used to hold her dress up, and tore the tape of f , causing bruising to her breasts. Mr Yasser- Basoglu blew smoke from the pipe into the plaintiff ’ s face. The men told the plaintiff that the drug inside the pipe was not a hard drug and then describe d it as “ a ngel d ust ” . The second defendant then put the drug pipe to the plaintiff ’ s lips; he lit it and the plaintiff inhaled . She recalls tasting chemicals , which hurt her mouth and throat , and that she then felt “ dizzy ” and “ spaced out ” . The plaintiff ’ s next memory is of the first defendant telling her to come over to him. She believes that she crawled towards him and then sat next to him. The first defendant at that stage had another glass pipe. She recalls that the first defendant then had sex with her twice and remembers being moved into different positions. S he recalls his penis penetrating her vagina and her anus. She cannot recall whether he wore a condom. She recalls that the first defendant was thrusting and was rough with her , and that her head was rolling about because she could not keep it upright. She cannot recall how long the sexual penetration lasted. She remember s that whilst the first defendant was sexually assault ing her , the second defendant commented on the fact that the plaintiff was drooling and was unable to lift her own head. The plaintiff recalls that the first defendant, the second defendant and Mr Yasser- Basoglu passed a glass pipe to her on a few more occasions and lit it and that she inhaled. She recalls at one stage noticing that she had a white powdery substance around her mouth. The plaintiff describes that those drugs made her feel “ really zonked ” and “ basically dead to the world ” . Her next memory is of Mr Yasser- Basoglu inserting his penis in to her mouth. She remembers gagging because she was unable to breathe. She sa ys she was unable to speak and could not move her head. At some stage, Mr Yasser- Basoglu took the plaintiff upstairs, removed her dress and put her in a shower. Mr Yasser- Basoglu watch ed her shower , kiss ed her and comment ed on her appearance. She was then provided with a towel and taken to an upstairs bedroom. In that bedroom , she recalls that Mr Yasser- Basoglu inserted his penis into her mouth again and thrust it in and out with his hands behind her head. She recalls gagging whilst that was occurring. She recall s looking in a wardrobe mirror during that part of the assault and seeing that both she and Mr Yasser- Basoglu were both naked. She also recalls that she could not support her own body weight and kept falling down and that Mr Yasser- Basoglu became angry with her because he had to keep lifting her up . At one point , she was up against a wall. At another point , he was on top of her while she was on the floor. Each time Mr Yasser- Basoglu moved her into a different position , he attempted to put his erect penis inside her. She describes that he was not very successful because she kept falling over. She recalls at one point she was able to push him away and pleaded with him to use a condom. Mr Yasser- Basoglu then engaged in penile anal intercourse with her which she describe s as so rough and painful that she screamed out and said “ N o ” . She recalls she was unable to move , support herself or hold herself up and that she was unable to talk properly. Sometime later, the plaintiff put on underpants, managed to go downstairs and began look ing for her dress. While she was there , the men put a dark blue jacket on her that had a zipper and a hood. She recalls that the second defendant then started rubbing her legs, unzipping the jacket and touching her breasts. Whilst that was occurring , Mr Yasser- Basoglu bit her right nipple. The second defendant then removed the plaintiff ’ s underpants , inserted his penis in to her mouth and thrust his penis in and out of her mouth . She was lying on the couch at that stage. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. Sometime later , the second defendant put his penis in to her mouth again in a manner which he describe s as being really rough . She recalls that he thrust so roughly that it caught the underside of her tongue and tore the skin connecting her tongue to the bottom of her mouth , causing her to make a noise . The second defendant continued to thrust his penis into her mouth ; she gagged and could not breathe. She recalls being able to push him off by pushing her hands against his stomach area. Her next recollection is of being on the lounge room floor with the first defendant and Mr Yasser- Basoglu taking it in turns to have sex with her. She recalls that she was lying on the floor unable to move her head properly and that her head was at a weird angle. She states that the two men took turns having sex with her , one after the other, over and over . She was unable to move and felt trapped. She recalls that whilst this occurr ed , the second defendant used a mobile telephone to video the first defendant and Mr Yasser- Basoglu having sex with her. Although the plaintiff states that she has vivid memories of most of the sexual assaults, she says that each of those memories is short. She cannot recall each incident in its entirety. She recalls feeling scared, helpless and intoxicated throughout the sexual assaults. She is clear in her recollection that she never consented to any of the sexual activity with any of the men, that she did not want to have sex with any of them and that she was too intoxicated to express a lack of consent. She says that her body was limp from alcohol and drugs and that for most of the sexual assaults she was completely unable to speak or resist. At some stage , the men provided the plaintiff with a floral shawl to wear and then later gave her a green sweatshirt and patterned pastel shorts. She recalls that she was wearing the sweatshirt and shorts when she later attended hospital and was seen by a doctor. T he plaintiff recalls that at some stage well into the daylight hours of Wednesday 9 November 2016 , the first defendant and Mr Yasser- Basoglu left the house, leaving her there with the second defendant. She recalls by that time feeling that the effects of alcohol on her were wearing off but that she remained affected by drugs. She also recalls feeling scared and increasingly anxious and realised that she needed to get out of the house. At around 5:00 pm on Wednesday , the plaintiff sent a text message to her older sister which read s, “ I got raped, I am still here, I need to leave ” . Her sister texted her back , ask ing her to telephone. The plaintiff believed t hat she could not telephone because she was scared that the second defendant would overhear her . She instead sent a message to her sister indicating her location. The plaintiff then tried to open the front door of the house but was unsuccessful. Sometime later , the second defendant received a telephone call and t old the plaintiff the man with the tattoo on his neck wanted to speak to her. The second defendant then handed the plaintiff a mobile telephone . She recalls hearing the first defendant ’ s voice saying that he had more “ crack ” and “ a ngel d ust ” and that he would be back at the house at 9:00 pm . T he plaintiff then told the second defendant that she had shared her location with her sister who was going to pick her up and that she wanted him to unlock and open the front door. The second defendant then opened the front door and the plaintiff walked outside. Once outside, the plaintiff reali s ed that she had mistakenly sent her sister the wrong location, that is not the location of the house where the sexual assaults had occurred. She also observed that the second defendant had c o me out of the house a number of times which she believed was h im checking on her. She r ecalls feeling paranoid and panicked. She then walked down the street and away from the house . She was wearing the grey sweatshirt and patterned shorts the men had provided to her . She and her sister remained in telephone contact and arrangements were made for the plaintiff to go to a street corner. T here , she was met by the police who took her to hospital , where she was later medically examined. A t the hospital , the plaintiff recalls that she was incoherent because of the drugs she had been given. She also recalls feeling extremely uncomfortable and that she was shaking and had difficulty walking or talking . She was aware that the clothes she was wearing did not fit properly and she was concerned that the shorts were so small that h er genitals may be exposed. She felt shame talking about what had happened to her and found the physical examination s traumatic and painful. She recalls screaming in pain during the examination s . S he felt a shame d that her mother , who was present with her at the hospital, saw her in that state. Later , s he noticed that her vagina and rectum were painful and tender , her jaw was aching and she was in pain when she moved or s a t down. She noticed bruises on various parts of her body which were sore to the touch. In the days following the sexual assaults , she was unable to walk properly and was shaky. Subsequently , t he plaintiff became aware that some of her friends and acquaintances were questioned by the police. She states that that knowledge caused her to feel shame and discomfort. The plaintiff ’ s biological father was not told immediately about the sexual assaults. She says that she was unable to speak to him for about a week after it had occurred. By the time she felt able to speak to him , he had become concerned and confrontational because she was not responding to his calls and messages to her mobile tele phone . Unbeknownst to him, her telephone was in the possession of the police at the time . Apparently, the plaintiff ’ s father continued to be to be confrontational with her when she first told him about the sexual assaults. The plaintiff was so affected by the physical trauma of the sexual assaults and by the effect of the drugs that she was unable to sleep, with her mind often spinning, and she would shake. She felt overwhelmed by difficult and uncomfortable feelings and emotions, the most prominent of which was shame. She also felt confused and dissociated. Following the sexual assaults , the plaintiff commenced drinking alcohol and developed an alcohol addiction. She required eventual treatment at a rehabilitation clinic. T he plaintiff did not pursue the conditional offer into the bachelor course from the SAE Institute . After the sexual assaults , she felt unable to cope with academic study and felt that she needed to work. She applied for several advertised jobs. In December 2016 , she accepted a position as a law clerk in a Sydney law firm. She was paid about $18 an hour. However, she found it difficult to cope with th at work because she continued to experience anxiety, had difficulty concentrating and felt frightened. Although she avoided thinking about the sexual assaults , she continued to suffer from nightmares and found it difficult to sleep. As a coping mechanism and in an attempt to numb her feelings, s he commenced consuming alcohol at work and at home . On 11 January 2017, whilst she was at work, the plaintiff received a text message from the police officer in charge of the criminal investigation which indicated that the police needed to talk to her after work. Later that same day, the officer in charge visited the plaintiff ’ s home and told her that threats had been made against her and that she had to leave the house immediately. The plaintiff says that she believed her life was in danger , felt an immediate state of panic and was terrified. Within less than an hour of the police visit , the plaintiff, her mother and her younger stepsister left the ir house . They then live d in a succession of Airbnb house s which had been organised and paid for by the police. The plaintiff was also warned by the police not to contact her friends, including by telephone or by social media . She says that she completely cut herself off. Although she continued to make an effort to attend work , her consumption of alcohol increased , and she commenced arriving at work habitually late. In February 2017 , her immediate supervisor and a person from h uman r esources met with her to discuss her work behaviour. During that conversation , her supervisor indicated that she was aware that the plaintiff had been gang raped. The plaintiff became so concerned and upset that her supervisor knew about the sexual assaults , s he packed up her personal belongings , left work and decided not to return. The plaintiff says that f rom that point , she felt completely isolated and began to have suicidal thoughts. She recalls an occasion when she locked herself in the toilets of a shopping centre in the Sydney C entral B usiness D istrict , drank bottles of wine an d passed out . She recalls ambulance officers forc ing the cubicle door open and taking her on a stretcher to St Vincent ’ s Hospital Sydney where she remained for several days. She continued to feel terrified by the revelation that her life might be in danger. She says that t he police would not provide her any details about the threats or about the danger she was in. The plaintiff says that the lack of information increased her fears. In addition, she believes that her mother blamed her for the family having to move accommodation and hide their identities. The plaintiff ’ s tutor, DEF, who i s involved with charities that help victims of sexual abuse, bec a me involved in assisting the plaintiff. On her tutor ’ s recommendation, the plaintiff was admitted to a rehabilitation centre to assist with her alcohol dependency, mental health issues , anxiety, stress and fear. She spent three weeks at a residential rehabilitation centre and recalls participating in programs which involved group therapies. She also recalls engaging with counsellors and a psychiatrist at that centre. After she completed the residential program, she left the centre and went to a halfway house which had been organised by the rehabilitation centre. She remained at th e halfway house for approximately three weeks. Thereafter, her tutor arranged subsidised housing so that she could afford to live on her own. By th at time , the plaintiff ’ s relationship with her mother had become so difficult , the plaintiff could not continue to live with her. For approximately the next year, the plaintiff worked at her tutor ’ s business for about one day each week. In June 2017 , the police took steps to change public documents that identified the plaintiff ’ s place of residence or place of work. She was given a new name and identification documents and was told by the police that she had to continue to sever contact with her friends and family and was required to live under a n assumed identity. She then obtained some parttime casual employment at a department store. At about that time , she then started to consume alcohol again and began seeing a therapist approximately once a week. The criminal trial of the first and second defendants commenced in December 2018. The plaintiff gave evidence during the trial via audio-visual link. She states that she found the experience very traumatic. She also recalls that there was substantial media interest and a lot of traffic on her social media pages, including from some of the people with whom she had attended school. Although she recalls that most of the messages posted on social media were supportive and positive, she nevertheless found it difficult and humiliating for people to know the details of the sexual assaults. Attached to the plaintiff ’ s first evidentiary statement is a media article which the plaintiff became aware of concerning the criminal trial and the sexual assaults. That article describes her as an 18-year-old schoolgirl who had been kidnapped after her Year 12 formal and gang raped for 14 hours. T he article does not name the plaintiff . However, i t names the second defendant and Mr Yasser- Basoglu and states that the plaintiff had received a friend request on Facebook from one of the defendants which had been sent by him as a “ countermeasure ” to threaten her if she went to the police. The article also states that the first and second defendants had discovered where the plaintiff worked in case they ever needed to “ dissuade ” her in person. The article also makes reference to some of her evidence concerning the detail and nature of the sexual assaults and describes the video showing one of the defendants penetrating her from behind whilst another penetrated her from the front. The article also refers to a number of the text messages the plaintiff sent on 9 November 2016 where she states that she was “ raped last night ” . The plaintiff also states that in 2019 , while she was living in an apartment block in suburban Sydney , she heard someone repeatedly banging on her apartment door at about 12:45 am . Because the apartment block has a security console at the main door , she believe d that whoever was banging on her door must have circumvented the front security system. She felt terrified and, believ ing that her life was in danger , she called her tutor and told her what was occurring. At a bout 1:00 am , her tutor rang her back and told her the police were on the way. When the police arrived, they told her that they had found the security gate had been forced open, a chain on the gate had been cut and the door to the laundry had been found propped open. Following that event, the plaintiff left th at accommodation and stayed elsewhere for the next three months. In May 2021, the plaintiff began working at an institution that provides support for disadvantaged children and their families. She states that she enjoy ed this work and work ed six days each fortnight for which she wa s paid $873 per fortnight. Since the criminal trial of the first and second defendants , the plaintiff has moved accommodation twice. She continues to live in rental accommodation and pays approximately $191 in rent per fortnight. Her rent is subsidised by a charity. She is unaware how long that rent subsidy arrangement might continue. T he police have advised her that for her own safety she should not discuss what occurred or disclose her true identity to anyone . As a consequence , she has found it difficult to fully participate in group rehabilitation programs because she feels unable to disclose her real identity or discuss her background. She believes that her inability to engage ha s resulted in her not fully benefit ting from those programs . The relationship with the plaintiff ’ s mother continued to deteriorate. She says that she no longer has an option of living with her. The plaintiff lived at a refuge for one month and then lived in supported independent living accommodation. She says that she felt , and continues to feel, completely dysfunctional , unable to work, unable to be punctual, unable to complete ordinary household tasks and continual ly “ in freeze ” . During the criminal trial , the plaintiff quit her job because she felt unable to cope. After the trial , she was unable to work for approximately two years because she felt “ in freeze ” and traumatised. She had no money and was unable to purchase nice clothes or to engage in enjoyable activities. The plaintiff says that she also suffered social anxiety. She describes that there were times when she was unable to leave the house and felt agoraphobic. She says that she was often too anxious to order food deliveries because she felt in capable of answering the door. She re commenced drinking alcohol , describing that she needed to drink alcohol in order to have the confidence to buy more alcohol , food or groceries. Following the security incident at her previous apartment, the plaintiff says that she moved into supported accommodation for three months and that during that period she felt triggered and traumatised and remained completely dysfunctional. As an example, the plaintiff describes that she got a pet cat for company and in the hope of improving her emotional wellbeing. She says that she barely had enough money to purchase cat food and litter and ultimately gave the cat away because she felt incapable of caring for it. In 2021 , the plaintiff went back to work two days a week in a basic unskilled administrative role which involved photocopying and tidying up paper files. In May 2025 , she was advised that she was no longer eligible for the supported accommodation in which she had been residing and had to apply for public housing. She describes that that involved a very long wait list and that her tutor intervene d and arrange d for additional assistance and extensions of time. Despite DEF ’ s intervention, the plaintiff says that she is concerned about the constant looming threat that she might lose her accommodation in the future. She is now working in a fulltime role as an office administrator in a small company which she commenced in about August 2025 . She states that she believes she is working more hours than she i s actually capable of, but that she is doing so because of financial pressures. She has ongoing issues with rent arrears and has a constant concern about becoming homeless. She continues to suffer from ongoing feelings of low self-esteem. She states that she believes she is a loser and pathetic because she ha s been unable to work fulltime due to the effects of the sexual assaults and the conspiracy. She continues to feel traumatised. In relation to loss of enjoyment of life, the plaintiff states that she has effectively lost her entire previous life , including her friends and school contacts. The plaintiff says that there are now only three people who she would describe as friends who she met through employment. Those three people do not know anything of the plaintiff ’ s true identity or the subject matter of these proceedings. She does not speak to anyone about what occurred. Every time the plaintiff sees the assumed name she ha s been given , she feels triggered and reminded of what has occurred. There have been some security issues that could have compromised her identity where mistakes were made about her name in official documentation. She says that she ha s found those times triggering and distressing. She recalls one of those occasions being when she received a fine for not voting that was addressed to her in her birth name , which required a number of administrative steps including a number of personal attendances to correct the record to instead show her assumed name. She found that process triggering, draining and humiliating. Issues arising from her change of identity occur frequently. The plaintiff states that she received unsolicited messages to her social media accounts at about the time of the sexual assaults and that she is aware that she became the topic of conversation and gossip amongst her peer group, add ing to her feelings of embarrassment, humiliation and shame. She states that she was also the subject of some victim blaming. Since the sexual assaults and the threats made to her , she has been unable to trust men. Although she says she ha s had two short relationships , she describes each of them as dysfunctional. She says that she does not believe she will ever have a meaningful intimate or romantic relationship. The plaintiff says that in her mind , the events relating to the sexual assaults and relating to the conspiracy “ flowed into each other and are inseparable ” . She says that she holds no distinction in her mind between the injur ies that she suffered as a result of those events and believes that both have irreparably damaged her life, psychological state and ability to function. The plaintiff ’ s account that some of the sexual activity was videoed is corroborated by confidential Exhibit D tendered by the plaintiff. That exhibit contains video footage on a USB and was tendered on the basis that the footage depicts some of the non-consensual sexual activity that occurred on 8 and 9 November 2016. The exhibit comprise s four video files , which also contain audio, showing the plaintiff being sexually assaulted . It depicts penile vaginal penetration and penile oral penetration whilst the plaintiff is observably barely able to hold up her own head. It also depicts the plaintiff being physically manipulated into position by the first defendant and Mr Yasser- Basoglu . Audio during the sexual assaults record s male voices ta l king to one another, including saying “ T ake a ticket bro ” and “ T urn her over ” . The plaintiff ’ s level of intoxication and inability to consent are readily apparent in the footage. E xpert sexual assault examination evidence The plaintiff relie s on the contents of Exhibit B, which includes various expert certificates, reports and photographs. Those documents establish that the plaintiff was examined by a sexual assault service at a Sydney hospital on 9 November 2016 and was subsequently re-examined during a follow-up consultation on 24 November 2016. The records and photographs from the examination on 9 November 2016 establish that the plaintiff presented with swelling, abrasions and bruising to numerous parts of her body including her arms, shins, knee s , thigh s , inner thigh s and breasts. N ote s record vaginal redness , tenderness and pain and anal pain upon examination . An expert certificate from the doctor who examined the plaintiff on 24 November 2016, approximately 16 days after the sexual assaults, record s that the plaintiff ’ s frenulum, the membrane which attaches the tongue to the floor of the mouth, was reddened and presented with thickened scar tissue which was tender to the touch . That injury is described as indicative of a healing injury to the frenulum consistent with her complaint of forced penile penetration of her mouth . Expert pharmacology evidence The p laintiff relies on reports dated 10 March 2017 and 22 October 2018 by John Farrar, a consultant forensic pharmacologist employed by the New South Wales Police Force with over 35 years ’ experience. His qualifications, which were not in issue, include a Bachelor of Science with Honours in P harmacology , extensive research in relation to the effects of alcohol and other drugs, research in methods of drug analysis, research in metabolic studies , lectur ing on forensic science, authoring peer reviewed papers published in scientific journals and providing expert evidence in courts throughout Australia. Mr Farrar ’ s reports refer to numerous witness statements by other students who had attended the pre-formal drinks, the formal and the post-formal party in relation to their observations of the plaintiff ’ s state of intoxication . Mr Farrar records that at the formal and at the post-formal party, numerous witnesses describe the plaintiff as being drunk and appearing to be intoxicated and that she was observed at one stage during the post-formal party to be lying on the ground . Mr Farrar expresses opinions on the analysis of blood and urine samples taken from the plaintiff. The reports refer to a blood sample provided by the plaintiff during a medical examination at 9:58 pm on 9 November 2016 and the subsequent test results from the analysis of that sample. He also refers to a urine sample provided at about th at same time by the plaintiff and the subsequent results from testing that sample. The substances detected in the plaintiff ’ s blood sample include alcohol, methylamphetamine and fluoxetine. Substances detected in the plaintiff ’ s urine sample include 4-Hydroxybutanoic acid. Mr Farrar expresses relevant opinions on the levels of concentration of those various substances and the likely effect those substances would have had on the plaintiff. In relation to alcohol, Mr Farrar expresses the opinion that the blood alcohol concentration, together with the witness statements concerning their observations of her sobriety, are consistent with the plaintiff having consumed alcohol. However, he states that he is unable to say with any accuracy what her blood alcohol concentration would have been during the sexual assaults because the precise qua nt ity of alcohol consumed by her and the pattern of drinking at the time she was in the company of the first and second defendants and Mr Yasser- Basoglu is unknown. Mr Farrar describes t he concentration of methylamphetamine in the plaintiff ’ s blood sample as “ a substantial quantity ” , consistent with her description of a white powder that she was forced to smoke and it causing her to feel “ dizzy ” and “ spaced out ” . He expresses the opinion that the effects of the methylamphetamine consumed by her would have been profound , particularly when taking into account her likely methylamphetamine-na ïve status. Mr Farrar notes that there is no evidence in the blood or urine sample of the plaintiff consuming heroin, “ crack ” (cocaine base) or “ a ngel dust ” (phencyclidine) . In relation to the presence of 4-Hydroxybutanoic acid in her urine sample, Mr Farrar states that the quantity consumed by the plaintiff could not be back-calculated from a urine concentration. He notes that the plaintiff had urinated several times prior to providing the sample which was tested. However, Mr Farrar is of the opinion that the presence of 4-Hydroxybutanoic acid in the urine sample at the concentration detected was suggestive of consuming a significant quantity of that drug. The ultimate opinion expressed by Mr Farrar is that the symptoms described by the plaintiff in relation to her cognitive and psychomotor impairment and her heavily fragmented recollection of events are consistent with the combined effects of alcohol and 4-Hydroxybutanoic acid. He is also of the opinion that methylamphetamine - induced sedation would ha ve added to the sedation caused by the alcohol and 4-Hydroxybutanoic acid. He is of the opinion, based on his analysis of the drugs present in the blood and urine samples and their concentrations, that the plaintiff ’ s ability to perceive threats to her safety and to defend herself against sexual assault were severely diminished by the effects of the drugs administered to her. He is also of the opinion that it would not have been possible for the plaintiff at the time of the sexual assaults to make judgments, to form rational decisions or to give considered consent to the sexual acts perpetrated on her. In relation to the presence of fluoxetine in the plaintiff ’ s blood sample , Mr Farrar notes in his report that the plaintiff had previously been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety and had been taking fluoxetine as prescribed. He is of the opinion that fluoxetine would not have contributed to the cognitive or psychomotor impairment that the plaintiff suffered to any significant extent. In his report dated 22 October 2018 , Mr Farrar states that he had been asked to express supplementary opinions in relation to the drug isobutyl nitr i te. He states that isobutyl nitr i te increases intracranial blood pressure, produces a euphoric effect, is reported to enhance sexual performance and causes relaxation of the anal sphincter. He refers to products commonly known as “ jungle juice ” which have been found to contain isopropyl nitr i te, amyl nitr i te and 2-methyl butyl nitr i te. H e also states that isobutyl nitr i te would not have been detectable in the plaintiff ’ s blood or urine samples she provided more than 14 hours after consumption. However, h is report does not refer to any connection between the events of 8 and 9 November 2016 and isobutyl nitr i te or “ jungle juice ” . No other evidence establishes the relevance of isobutyl nitrite or “ jungle juice ” . Accordingly, that part of Mr Farrar ’ s report must be ignored. Expert psychological evidence The plaintiff relie s on three reports by Dr Thomas Dor n an, registered psychologist, dated 16 September 2021, 14 Ma y 2022 and 13 November 2025. Dr Dor n an ’ s expertise, which was not in issue, includes a Doctor of P hilosophy ( P sychology ) , B achelor of S ocial S cience ( P sychology ) , P ostgraduate D iploma in P sychology ( F orensic P sychology ) and in excess of 18 years ’ experience working as a registered psychologist as at the date of his reports. Dr Dor n an notes that the plaintiff described to him her relationship with her mother as having broken down following the sexual assaults . H e records that she had to leave the family home because of threats made to her safety by a ssociates of the offenders and that she had been told by the police that she had to sever all ties with her family and friends. He records that she reported fe eling isolated, alone and that she struggle d to function on a daily basis . The plaintiff is described as previously being quite social and outgoing and that she suffered from typical teen angst as an adolescent . D r Dornan reports that following the sexual assaults , her life changed dramatically and that because she was required to assume a new identity, s he has become isolated and lonely. He records th at th e plaintiff has been unable to maintain significant adult relationships because of the impact of the sexual assault s and the related overwhelming feelings of shame and disgust. The plaintiff reported to Dr Do rnan that she did not initiate friendships and did not date because she did not feel safe and had difficulty trusting men. She suffers from feeling fearful and unsafe. Dr Dornan also record s that prior to the sexual assaults , the plaintiff only consumed alcohol casually and occasionally when she felt emotionally overwhelmed. He describes that her consumption of alcohol became problematic after the sexual assaults and that she relied on alcohol to manage her feelings of emotional dysregulation. Alcohol use s ince the sexual assaults has interfered with her ability to maintain employment. He is of the opinion that the plaintiff would meet the criteria for a diagnosis of a lcohol u se d isorder, moderate. When describing the implications that the sexual assaults had on the plaintiff , Dr Dor n an also ma kes reference to the impact on her which followed the requirement for her to change accommodation, change her identity and lose her friends. He describes the combined effects of the sexual assaults and the change of identity a s resulting in her experiencing additional periods of re- traumati s ation, a downward spiral of depression, guilt, self-doubt, fear and anxiety. Although he records th at th e plaintiff reported suffering from symptoms of depression when she was 15 years of age, he note s that she reported that her symptoms persisted for only 12 months before reducing. T hose symptoms significantly increased in scale f ollowing the sexual assaults . H e records that since the assaults , the plaintiff has experienced persistent suicidal ideation and refers to an incident where the plaintiff became heavily intoxicated, intended to commit suicide and was admitted to St Vincent ’ s Hospital Sydney . He notes that s he continues, on a persistent occasional basis , t o suffer from suicidal ideation and suffer from sleep disruption, lack of energy, involuntary and distressing memories, nightmares, and dissociative symptoms when she loses track of time and location. The plaintiff reported that those periods of dissociation correspond with flashbacks to the sexual assaults triggered by sounds, smells or clothing brand names of items associated with her assailants . Dr Do rnan describes t hat t he plaintiff lives in a persistent state of fear and guilt, arising from the combined result of the sexual assaults and the threats to her safety and that of her family. He records that the plaintiff presented with physical and psychological damage suffered as a result of the sexual assaults but notes that the threats to her safety escalated her diagnosis and ensured that her treatment would largely be ineffective. He is of the opinion that the sexual assaults followed by the threats to her safety and the impact on interpersonal relationships and the removal of supports have all contributed to her develop ing complex and chronic trauma symptoms. He is also of the opinion that the plaintiff will be unable to have male relationships until her sense of safety is resolved through appropriate therapeutic interventions. He considers, given their chronic nature, her psychological symptoms will continue to have a long-term impact on her physical wellbeing. Dr Dornan is of the opinion that the plaintiff meets the criteria for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, severe, with mixed features and post-traumatic stress disorder with dissociative symptoms. He notes that the plaintiff has a history of difficulties obtaining and maintaining employment and states that people suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, such as the plaintiff, have an increased likelihood of unemployment and increased difficulty in meeting work-related obligations. He notes that post-traumatic stress disorder is associated with an increased risk of suicidal ideation, such as those expressed by the plaintiff , and that without effective intervention she will continue to experience such challenges throughout her adult life. In his second report dated 14 May 2022, Dr Dor n an states that when he saw the plaintiff on 2 May 2022 , she presented with very few changes since his last review, apart from a return to employment. He records that the plaintiff had been working for a children ’ s charit y s ince the middle of 2021. Although employed, the plaintiff reported that she continued to struggle with the challenges of employment. Dr Dornan reports that the plaintiff continued to meet the diagnosis for m ajor d epressive d isorder and p ost - t raumatic s tress d isorder. He records that the symptoms of those disorders arose from both the sexual assaults and the ongoing threats by the family of the assailants which caused her to move out of her family home and sever ties with her family and friends. He notes that the plaintiff had “ a long way to go ” before she would be able to resolve her psychological issues. In his report dated 1 3 November 2025, Dr Dor n an records that the plaintiff continued to meet the criteria for diagnos e s of p ost - t raumatic s tress d isorder, p ersistent d epressive d isorder and a lcohol u se d isorder and th at her symptoms appeared to be chronic. Dr Dor n an also note s that the plaintiff continued to live under a pseudonym to protect her safety and continued to struggle with a loss of identity and experienced distress as a result. He note s that she continued to have challenging and unstable living arrangements, that she ha d been forced to live in specific police approved locations for her safety and protection because of the threats made to her safety and that she took those threats seriously. Dr D ornan describes that those environmental stressors, which are know n to exacerbate psychological distress, had a profound impact on her mental health and functioning. The inability of the plaintiff to establish stable accommodation and a proper sense of self have undermined her mental health functioning and recovery. Expert psychiatric evidence Two reports by A ssociate Prof essor Michael Robertson, consultant psychiatrist , are relied upon by the plaintiff. His expertise , which was not in issue, includes more than 25 years of clinical, academic and leadership experience and qualifications as a medical practitioner and specialist in clinical and forensic psychiatry. In his report dated 10 November 2023, A ssociate Professor Robertson records that as a result of the sexual assaults , the plaintiff experience d profound disturbance, including psychiatric symptoms, nightmares, flashbacks, psychological hyperarousal, exaggerated startle reflex and extreme hypervigilanc e . He also records that her psychological distress escalated as a result of being advised that she was at risk from her assailants or their associates who sought to intimidate her into changing her evidence, requiring her to change her identity and lose contact with her family and friends. He is of the opinion that the sexual assaults and the subsequent threats have left the plaintiff profoundly traumati s ed, resulting in her feeling psychological dissociation , s ocial anxiety, frequent nightmares, relationship difficulties, emotional numbness and compromised work capacity. Associate P rofessor Robertson is of the opinion that the plaintiff has c omplex p ost - t raumatic s tress d isorder and features of a p ersistent d epressive d isorder a s a comorbid condition and a previous a lcohol u se d isorder. H e states: “The severely traumatic experiences of 08 and 09 November 2016, exacerbated by further threats to her safety and the profound disruption to her life necessitated by changing identities and disruption to her ext ant social support network were the substantial and main contributing factors to her current clinical presentation. ” Although noting that the plaintiff reported anxiety and depression in her adolescent years , A ssociate P rofessor Robertson is of the opinion that the profound and extensive experience of traumatic stress associated with the sexual assaults and the subsequent threats w ere the main causal factor to her current presentation. He considers that there are likely to be long-term difficulties with her interpersonal and occupational functioning with diminished earning capacity. The recommendations for future mental health care treatment include monthly psychiatric treatment for the first six months, reduced frequency of psychiatric treatment over the next two years and ongoing psychiatric supervision for the next five years. In addition, he recommends psychotropic therapy medication, psychological therapy and d ialecti c b ehaviour t herapy . T he costs and frequency of the recommended therapy are set out in his report. In a supplementary report dated 31 October 2024 , A ssociate Professor Robertson states that the traumatic events of the sexual assaults on 8 and 9 November 20 1 6 and the subsequent threats to the plaintiff ’ s safety were necessary and sufficient conditions for her to have developed a psychiatric disorder, most likely post - traumatic stress disorder. He is of the opinion that in the counterfactual circumstance, one in which none of the offences had been committed, although she may have been at elevated risk of further psychiatric disorder, he does not consider that she was at risk of developing post - traumatic stress disorder, or that she would have suffered from symptomatic disturbance and psychosocial morbidity. He states that on the balance of probability, it was unlikely that her current psychiatric problems would have emerged were it not for the sexual assaults and the subsequent threats to her safety. E vidence of income from employment The plaintiff tender ed t w o notices of assessment issued to her under an assumed name . The n otice s of a ssessment e stablish that her taxable income was $42,662 .00 for the financial year end ing 30 June 20 2 4 and $ 43,843. 00 for the financial year end ing 30 June 2025 . Objective evidence in support of the plaintiff’s conspiracy claims The plaintiff tendered , without objection, a copy of an Agreed Facts document from the third defendant ’ s prosecution . It was the mutual position of the plaintiff and the third defendant that that document set out the facts upon which the third defendant was sentenced for the offen c e of perverting the course of justice, contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act . Because of its significance to the plaintiff ’ s case on the conspiracy claim s and its significance to the third defendant ’ s defen ce , the full text of the A greed F acts document is set out below: “ R v Recep Irmak Agreed facts Pervert the course of justice Section 319 Crimes Act 1. On 9 November 2016, Ali lrmak (DOB 29/10/1978) and other males sexually assaulted [the plaintiff] (aged 18 years). The males were not known to the victim prior to this date. 2. On 16 November 2016, Ali lrmak and another male were arrested in relation to the assault of the victim. They were charged with 10 counts of aggravated sexual assault in company pursuant to s 6IJA Crimes Act. The circumstance of aggravation was actual bodily harm. They were bail refused. Witness 1 3. While in custody, Ali Irmak shared a cell with ‘ Witness 1 ’ . Witness 1 ’ s name is known to NSW Police but it has been redacted from these facts. Ali lrmak told Witness 1 about the allegations made by the victim and expressed a desire to locate her and persuade her to change her evidence. 4. Witness 1 falsely represented to Ali Irmak that he had a friend who knew the victim and could locate her on his behalf. Witness 1 then contacted NSW Police and advised them that Ali was attempting to locate the victim. Witness 1 agreed to co-operate with Police and to provide Ali Irmak with the phone number of an undercover police officer (UCO) who would pretend to be a male capable of locating the victim on Ali ’ s behalf. 9 January 2017 – gaol visit 5. The offender Recep “ Richie ” Irmak (DOB 29/04/1982) is the younger brother of Ali Irmak. On 9 January 2017, Recep Irmak visited Ali Irmak at the MRRC. Towards the end of the visit, Ali introduced Recep to Witness 1. 4 February 2017 at 2:05pm – phone call 6. At approximately 2pm on 4 February 2017, Witness 1 passed the phone number of the UCO to Ali Irmak and told him (Ali) that it was the phone number of the person who would be able to locate the victim. 7. At 2:05pm on the same day, Ali Irmak phoned Recep Irmak using the gaol phone system. Their conversation was conducted in Turkish and spoken in code. During the call, Ali recruited Recep to engage in conversations and negotiations with the UCO with the intention of locating the victim and persuading her to change her evidence. 8. During the conversation, reference is made to Witness 1 ’ s meeting with Recep Irmak and further references are made to the UCO ’ s name and capabilities. Ali instructs Recep to use Witness 1 ’ s name as a reference when speaking with the UCO. 9. The call is transcribed below. The UCO ’ s name and phone number have been redacted: Al: Hey, get a piece of paper and a pen. RI: What happened? Al: Get a piece of paper and pen now! RI: Is everything ok? Al: ... No, no, something else, something really important . You know that friend of ours? RI: Yeah. Al: You know when you came and visited me and I gave you some things? RI: Yeah Al: Yeah yeah , look [gives UCO ’ s phone number]. This kid ’ s name is [gives UCO ’ s name]. RI: Yeah Al: So okay, this friend knows those people. You know how I gave the ...? RI: Yeah Al: You know what I'm going on about? RI: You talking about the conversation? Al: No, no, nothing about that conversation. RI: What did you give? Al: You know how I'm with the solicitor, solicitor, you - the female solicitor? RI: Yeah Al: You know how I told you the name? RI: Natasha? Natasha? Al: Man, this kid said talk, and say this and that, the African kid, say this a n d that, he knows those people RI: Ahhhhhhhh ... I understand. Al: Okay ... this kid lives in Parramatta. Okay. Let him go and take him to the solicitors straight away. He has a matter and he knows these people, take this kid straight away there, the kid wants to be freed … you know what I mean. Get those people to take him to my solicitor straight away and see whatever they can do and they can do whatever to this kid. RI: Oh yeah, I understand. Al: Do you understand, brother? RI: Yeah, I have. Al: This kid is our African friend, he needs our help, we need to help him … he knows those people ... have I explained it? RI: Yeah Al: Have I explained it? RI: Ahhh Al: That's the event. [Redacted ] is his name. RI: Okay Al: You, you, ... tell him to come to my mum's garden and I'll clean/attend to it, bring those people and the people doing the building, ask him if he knows them ... get them to show their licence and see it then you can give them and tell them 'I will give you whatever you want'. RI: Yeah, I understand. Al: You understand? RI: Yeah. Al: Okay brother, my whole life is in your hands. RI: And in God ’ s hands. Al: In God ’ s hands and yours … (irrelevant conversation about God) … Al: My life is in your hands and God willing everything goes well and you know the one thing that needs to be done. RI: The phone just beeped. Al: You know we haven ’ t done anything wrong you know what I mean? … I love you. Get onto this straight away with those people. RI: Yeah, I will go to the solicitor. Al: Yeah, go to the solicitor. I have explained it properly? RI: I ’ m gonna get the brief. Al: Yeah, get the brief and have a look at it and see what it says. RI: Yeah, he ’ s a ?dud [sic] one. Al: Yeah, I know. I didn ’ t do nothing, brother. I don ’ t care about it, you know what I mean? But look, get in contact and look into meeting up with the kid and organise a rendezvous. RI: Ahh yeah Al: One hundred percent, the kid knows us. RI: It could be (a possibility) Al: You understand? If he knows us, turn around and tell him, ‘ you be smart and we will do good by you. ’ Okay I love you … Al: Check out that phone number if it ’ s the right number, belongs to a kid named [redacted]. He lives in Parramatta. Okay. Tell him you ’ re [Witness 1 ’ s]. Tell him you need to meet up with him, you know what I mean? And take a good car with you and get him to ride in the car with you. Tell him not to stress and you will look after him and tell him we may know him etc. He knows what to do anyway. RI: Yeah Al: Okay? Just call him to see if it ’ s his number and, if it rings, the kid ’ s name is [redacted]. The kid ’ s name is [redacted]. (Recep Irmak rings the UCO ’ s phone number) Al: Is it ringing? Ask him, ‘ How are ya ? I ’ m [Witness 1 ’ s] friend. I wanna see you, I wanna talk to my brother ’ and tell him, ‘ you ’ re gonna be happy. ’ Al: Did he answer? RI: Yeah but I shut it. Al: Okay well call him and make a rendezvous and I ’ ll call you in an hour or two. Okay? But make sure you meet up with the kid. Speak to the kid so he knows who we are. RI: Yeah Al: Organise that job straightaway. I ’ ll call you before lock in. 10. During the above call at 2:12pm, Recep Irmak called the UCO and hung up before speaking. “ Natasha ” is a code name for the victim. 4 February 2017 at 2:21pm – phone call 11. At 2:21pm on the same day, Ali Irmak phoned Recep Irmak using the gaol phone system. The conversation was conducted in Turkish and spoken in code. During the call, Ali tells Recep to ensure that the UCO ’ s contact with the victim cannot be linked back to them. The call is excerpted below: Al: Hey, when you talk to that friend, make sure the solicitor doesn ’ t say anything about you and I. You know what I mean? He can sort his own stuff and then we can organise the solicitor ’ s money for him. RI: Mmmmm Al: Do you understand? Make sure he doesn ’ t get you involved. Go speak with him and say, “ Brother we are selling the car for this much, okay? You get the paper work, we can get this much, you bring the paper work, we can get this much and we can see what year model the car is and see if it’s genuine and then we will do whatever you want us to do.” But make sure he doesn’t get your name involved or my name or any of our names. Because I don’t want our names on it. RI: Okay Al: Okay brother. Just keep on calling him and meet up with him and that we are interested and if the paper work and everything is as we want it, no problem, we will do as he wants us to do. RI: Did the thing come? Al: Nah, nah tomorrow. RI: Oh yeah. Al: Yeah, tomorrow. Okay brother. What did you do, you sleep? RI: I was just gonna crash, Al: Yeah yallah . RI: I gotta get up and go. Al: Make sure you meet up with the car owner. He knows everything about the car. This kid will help you out RI: God willing. Al: God willing and you will give him anything he wants but make sure our name doesn ’ t get anywhere. This kid is gonna do everything himself. Make sure our names aren ’ t on anything and you can say he is our brother. Okay I love you. Recep’s first call to UCO 12. At 3:22pm on the same day, Recep Irmak phoned the UCO using the number he had been given by Ali Irmak. During the conversation, Recep Irmak and the UCO make plans to meet. The call is transcribed as follows: RI: Is that [redacted name]? UCO: Yeah. Who ’ s this? RI: I ’ m a friend of [Witness 1]. UCO: Yeah, we have to catch up. RI: Yeah. UCO: Don ’ t talk on … UCO: I ’ m away at the moment . RI: You got my number? UCO: Yeah. I ’ ll call when I ’ m back early next week. RI: You want me to send you a text? UCO: Nah, I ’ m on the ball. 5 February 2017 at 9:06am – phone call 13. At 9:06am the following morning (5 February 2017), Ali Irmak phoned Recep Irmak using the gaol phone system. The conversation was conducted in Turkish and spoken in code. During the call, they discussed Recep ’ s conversation with the UCO including the UCO ’ s nationality and future contact the following Monday. Ali also told Recept [sic] to get confirmation of the UCO ’ s access to the victim ("paper work") before discussing how much they will pay him. The call has been excerpted as follows: Al: What happened? Did they talk to the kid? RI: Yeah, I talked to the kid and I said Monday. Al: The African, the African take someone with him brother. RI: The Arab or the African? Al: The African. RI: But he looks like an Arab, like, his voice sounds Arab. Al: Yeah yeah . Was he speaking Arabic? RI: Nah Turkish (laughs). English. (Background conversation between Al i lrmak and someone in the background) Al: Yeah and what did he say? RI: He said Monday bro Monday, we'll speak then. Al: Yeah and why Monday? RI: I dunno . Al: Why does he want to speak on Monday? RI: I dunno bro, I dunno . He's busy. Al: Oh yeah well talk then and say, you know what I mean, tell him to bring the paperwork for the car and then we'll give the fuckin price. RI: Yeah you're right. Al: I know. RI: (something about a number job) Al: It can't be a number job, take it to the solicitor, you can't have a number job with that paperwork. RI: Yes, it can. Al: Well be careful. Take it to the solicitor and show them carefully, you know what I mean. Al: Call you back anyways 6 February 2017 at 1:13pm 14. At 1:13pm on Monday 6 February 2017, the UCO called Recep Irmak. They arranged to meet the following morning in Homebush. 6 February 2017 at 3:08pm 15. At 3:08pm on 6 February 2017, Ali Irmak phoned Recep Irmak using the gaol phone system. The conversation was conducted in Turkish and spoken in code. The call is excerpted below: Al: Did you meet with that car-driving friend? RI: Yeah, tomorrow. Al: Make sure you talk properly. Be careful. Do you know the make and model of the car? RI: Yeah, I know the surname. Al: Ok. I gotta go. I gotta get locked in now. Love you. Recep’s meeting with the UCO 16. At 11:39am on 7 February 2017, Recep Irmak met the UCO at a carwash in the Strathfield area. The meeting lasted less than five minutes. During the meeting, Recep told the UCO that he (Recep) is Italian and that he doesn ’ t know Witness 1 but his brother does. 17. Recep gave the UCO a post-it note with the name “ [the plaintiff] ” written on it and said, “ Get onto it and ahh get back to me and we will take the next step. ” Recep then asked the UCO to obtain a photo of him (the UCO) and [the plaintiff] together. 18. Recep whispered that the UCO will be paid, “ whatever it costs - 20, 30, 40 ” to find the victim, and to convince her to go to the lawyer and change her story. The following whispered exchange then took place: UCO: And if she doesn ’ t? RI: (laughs) Look what can you do? UCO: You can do a lot of things. RI: (inaudible) UCO: Do you want her gone? RI: I don ’ t know (inaudible) UCO: Do you want her (inaudible)? RI: (laughs) You ’ re a mad cunt. UCO: What do you want? What do you want me to do? You tell me what to do. RI: (inaudible) UCO: Listen, listen. RI: (inaudible) UCO: Oh alright, alright listen, listen how about this. RI: If you ’ ve got any problems … UCO: Nah, nah. RI: Alright, good man. UCO: These... RI: Ahh what is it? Blueberries, berries? UCO: Yeah, yeah, you use them? RI: Nah, my brother does. UCO: Listen, we ’ ll do that. Let you know how it goes. If she ’ s not playing, we ’ ll see and go from there. RI: Alright mate, alright brother. I ’ ll leave it with ya . UCO: Yeah, leave it with me. RI: (inaudible) Good to meet you, brother. UCO: Yeah, yeah. We ’ ll meet. RI: Get back to me, yeah? We ’ ll talk (inaudible). Text me. UCO: Yeah, I ’ ll let you know. Hey, hey, listen, on that. RI: Yeah, yeah, all good brother. Just say, ‘ Let ’ s go for coffee. ’ UCO: Alright, see you brother. 11 February 2017 19. At 3:43pm on 11 February 2017, the UCO called Recep Irmak. During the call, the UCO advised Recep Irmak that he (UCO) had obtained a photo of the victim. Recep acknowledged this and they made an arrangement to meet at a later date . UCO: Yeah, hey listen, you know that property you told me to go to see? RI: Yeah UCO: Yeah, I found it, I got a photo of it but, before I inspect it, I ’ ll sit down with ya . RI: Alright brother, when you ’ re ready UCO: Umm next week sometime, maybe Tuesday or Wednesday. RI: Yeah, just give me a call brother UCO: No worries man. RI: All good UCO: Alright, I ’ ll speak to you later, take it easy. RI: Yeah brother bye 9 March 2017 20. At 4:32pm on 9 March 2017, Recep Irmak called the UCO. During the call, Recep apologised for not getting in contact with the UCO earlier and organised to meet with him in the near future . He further stated that he will give him a call early in the week (i.e. the week commencing 12 March 2017). Events following 21. Over the course of the next two months, a further five phone calls occurred between the Recep Irmak and UCO. They make tentative arrangements to meet again however there were no further face to face meetings between the two. Arrest [22]. On 20 June 2017, Recep lrmak was arrested. He declined to be interviewed. ” The third defendant’s position In his defence filed on 8 August 2024 , t he third defendant pleads that he is aware of the conduct on 8 and 9 November 2016 but was not present at any time when the sexual assaults, deprivation of liberty or degrading treatment of the plaintiff occurred. He admits that the first defendant is his brother, that the first defendant was one of the men who perpetrated the sexual assaults and treatment on 8 and 9 November 2016 , that the first defendant was refused bail from 16 November 2016 and that the first defendant was convicted of multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault in company committed against the plaintiff. In respect of the plaintiff ’ s conspiracy claims , the third defendant : denies that between 9 December 2016 and 21 June 2017 , he conspired with the first defendant to coerce the plaintiff to change her evidence; admits that he met with a n Under Cover Officer (or UCO, as abbreviated in the Agreed Facts ) at Strathfield on 7 February 2017; denies that on 7 February 2017 , in conspiracy with the first defendant , he engaged the services of the UCO to locate and photograph the plaintiff and intimidate her to change her evidence; denies that he intended to intimidate the plaintiff in an attempt to cause her to change her evidence; denies that he acted deliberately and to benefit the first defendant; denies that the police informed the plaintiff that her life was in danger, that she had to change her residence, assume a new identity and reduce contact with her family and friends; does not admit or deny that , in response to that information from the police, the plaintiff changed her residence, assumed a new identity and reduce d contact with her family and friends ; admits that on 18 April 2019 , he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of an offence contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act , by doing an act intending to pervert the course of justice , and was sentenced to 3 years and 5 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months; admits that on 1 October 2021 , the first defendant was convicted of attempting to pervert the course of justice and was sentenced to 4 years and 3 months imprisonment with a 3 year non-parole period; and does not admit or deny that the plaintiff has suffered injuries, loss or damage as a direct result of his conduct and that she is entitled to damages. The third defendant submits that there is no evidence to establish that any conspiracy between the first and third defendants had been formed on 11 January 2017, the date when the plaintiff was informed by the police that she had to move and change her identity. He submits that his involvement prior to 11 January 2017 was limited to him being introduced to Witness 1 by the first defendant on 9 January 2017. The third defendant relies on the absence of evidence from Witness 1 , the absence of any evidence of the content of the conversation on 9 January 2017 and the absence of any pleaded overt act occurring on that date. Further, he submits that there is no evidence that he was party to any conversations with the first defendant or Witness 1 that preceded Witness 1 contacting the police and agreeing to cooperate with them and he submits that there is no evidence that as at 11 January 2017, there had been any threats made against the plaintiff. If any threats were made prior to 11 January 2017, the third defendant submits that he was not party to them. The third defendant also submits that, even if his participation in the 7 February 2017 meeting constituted a relevant overt act, whatever was said at that meeting could not have contributed to the plaintiff ’ s psychological injuries because she was insulated from the details of any conspiracy because of the controlled operation and the police refusing to tell her the details of any danger to her. In the circumstances of the involvement of a UCO and the police controlled operation, the third defendant submits that there was “ virtually no likelihood of the threat being realised ” and that as a result the threat was incapable of causing harm. He submits that the conversation of 7 February 2017 could not have caused any damage because it was never conveyed to the plaintiff. Further , he says that even if she had been informed of the content of the 7 February 2017 conversation , nothing was said in that conversation which caused any exacerbation of the plaintiff ’ s pre-existing post-traumatic stress or generalised anxiety disorders. In written submissions, his counsel accepts that the third defendant pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s 319 of the Crimes Act that “ between 9 December 2016 and 21 June 2017 … [he] conspired with his brother to coerce the victim to change her evidence in court proceedings with the intention of perverting the course of justice ” but submits that he was not charged with making any threat against the plaintiff directly . The third defendant submits that there is no evidence that the events of February 2017 contributed to the injury caused by the sexual assaults and that the expert medical opinions are silent on the extent, if any, to which her conditions and prognos e s are attributable to the separate events – the sexual assaults on the one hand and the conspiracy on the other. Further, the third defendant submits that the plaintiff has failed to plead that the parties to any conspiracy had an intention to injure her, that the conspiracy injured her economic interests or that any conduct by the third defendant caused her damage. He submits that there is no basis to establish that the third defendant agreed to injure the plaintiff by intimidating her or that he was party to a threat to harm her. He says that the chain of causation was broken by the intervention of the police and by what they told her and that any exacerbation of her medical conditions was a result of the police conduct, not the conspiracy. He submits that although it may be accepted that the first and second defendants are joint tortfeasors in respect of the sexual assault claim s , the third defendant could only be liable to the plaintiff for the proportion of her loss and damage arising from the third defendant ’ s actions pursuant to the conspiracy claim s , which is denied. He submits that some or all of the damage suffered would have occurred in any event and that the third defendant ’ s conduct did not cause any additional loss or any exacerbation of a pre-existing injury. Consideration The sexual assault claims The standard of proof necessary to prove causes of action that accrued many years ago and involve conduct giving rise to a breach of the criminal law is the civil standard. In civil proceedings, “ the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities ” : s 140(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). In applying the civil standard of proof, the Court may take into account matters including those listed in s 140(2), one of which is “ the gravity of the matters alleged ” (s 140(2)(c)). These provisions are a statutory restatement of the principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34 at 361-362; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 171. It was said in Neat Holdings at 171 that “ the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove ” . Those principles apply to the present case – specifically, as it does, involving serious allegations of non-consensual sexual abuse and conspiracy that occurred some years ago. I have kept these principles clearly in mind in approaching the fact-finding process. I am not compelled to accept the plaintiff ’ s evidence because of the absence of evidence from the defendants or their failure to cross-examine the plaintiff. Instead, I must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff ’ s evidence should be accepted. After careful consideration of all the evidence, I am satisfied that the first and second defendants behaved towards the plaintiff in the manner in which she alleges. I accept that they supplied her with alcohol which they encouraged her to drink and I accept that they gave her illicit drugs. The blood and urine analysis evidence corroborates the plaintiff ’ s evidence in that regard. I accept that the first and second defendants sexually assaulted her violently and repeatedly over the course of several hours on 8 and 9 November 2016 in the manner which she describes. The fact and nature of some of the acts of sexual assault are recorded in confidential Exhibit D (as described at [ 99 ] above) which depicts the plaintiff being physically manipulated and sexually assaulted. That confidential exhibit also satisfies me that the plaintiff ’ s account, namely that she did not consent, was heavily intoxicated and was unable to keep her head upright , should be accepted. Her evidence of the sexual assaults is supported by the complaint made to her sister, in the text message sent at about 5:00 pm on 9 November 2016, that she had been raped. The medical evidence from the examination and photographs on 9 November 2016 and the examination on 24 November 2016, including of swelling, abrasions and bruising to numerous parts of her body, vaginal and anal pain and injury to her frenulum, further corroborate the plaintiff ’ s evidence of the fact and nature of the sexual assaults and the degree of violence associated with them. Accordingly, the plaintiff has established on the balance of probabilities that the first and second defendants gave her intoxicating substances, took advantage of her intoxication and isolation, sexually assaulted her violently and repeatedly over the course of several hours in circumstances where her incapacity to consent was obvious and deprived her of her liberty in preventing her from leaving the house in which the sexual assaults occurred. In respect of the sexual assault claims, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered injuries, loss and damage as a direct result of the first defendant ’ s conduct and as a direct result of the second defendant ’ s conduct and that she is entitled to damages. T he conspiracy claims The standard of proof necessary to prove the existence and scope of the conspiracy is that referred to in [ 142 ] and [ 143 ] above . There are two forms of the tort of conspiracy : a conspiracy to injure and a conspiracy to injure by unlawful means . Liability for a conspiracy to injure requires proof that harm to the victim was “ the sole, the true, or the dominating, or the main purpose of their conspiracy ” , whereas liability for a conspiracy to injure by unlawful means does not: McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343 ; [1931] HCA 54 at 362 per Dixon J (with whom Rich and McTiernan JJ agreed) ; McWilliam v Penthouse Publications Ltd [2001] NSWCA 237 at [12]-[13] per Mason P (with whom Handley and Hodgson JJA agreed) ; Westlawn Finance Limited v Tagg [2018] NSWSC 1491 at [123]-[124] per Ball J. “ Unlawful means ” in this context includes tort ious acts and criminal acts : Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30; [1959] HCA 51 at 78 - 79; Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34 ; [1999] FCA 899 at 104 per Nicholson J; Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678 ; [2004] NSWCA 140 ( Fatimi v Bryant ) . The tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means requires proof of the following, as summarised in Haiye Developments Pty Ltd v The Commercial Business Centre Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 937 at [510] per Kunc J: that two or more people entered into an agreement to perform an unlawful act, proof of which can be inferred from the circumstances , including the overt acts; by the agreement , the defendants intended to injure the plaintiff, although that need not be the sole or predominant motive; the agreement to injure was executed in whole or in part; and by their execution of the agreement , the defendants have caused damage or loss to the plaintiff. The plaintiff needs to establish actual pecuniary loss. Mere damage to reputation or injury to feelings is insufficient: McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at [141]. After careful consideration of the plaintiff ’ s evidence relating to the conspiracy and of the Agreed Facts, I am satisfied that between 9 December 2016 and 21 June 2017 , the first and third defendants conspired with one another and others to coerce the plaintiff to chang e her evidence to falsely contend that she had consented to the sexual conduct on 8 and 9 November 2016. I am also satisfied that, in so conspiring, the third defendant intended that the coercion would include intimidation of the plaintiff and that such coercion and intimidation was intended t o injure the plaintiff by caus ing her psychological harm . The agreement was executed in part and has caused damage and loss to the plaintiff, including actual pecuniary loss. I reach those findings for the following reasons. First, it can be inferred that the first defendant ’ s introduction of the third defendant to Witness 1 at the M etropolitan Remand and Reception Centre (or MRRC, as abbreviated in the Agreed Facts) on 9 January 2017 occurred after the first defendant had enlisted Witness 1 to assist in locating the plaintiff and coercing her to change her evidence. The introduction of the third defendant to Witness 1 was an overt act by the first defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the conspiracy had commenced by 9 January 2017. Second, it can be inferred from the content of the telephone call between the first defendant and the third defendant at 2:05 pm on 4 February 2017 that the third defendant had entered into the conspiracy during the gaol visit on 9 January 2017. That inference arises from the first defendant stating during that conversation “ Y ou know when you came and visited me and I gave you some things? ” , the third defendant ’ s agreement to that proposition and the references which follow. Those references establish that the third defendant had pre-existing knowledge of the object of the conspiracy and had agreed to participate in carrying it out. It can be inferred that during that telephone conversation , the first defendant instructed the third defendant to negotiate with another person with the intention of locating the plaintiff and coercing her to change her evidence. The references include coded references to the plaintiff, references to the UCO, provision of the UCO ’ s telephone number to the third defendant, references to Witness 1, request s for the third defendant to organise a meeting with the UCO, instruction s to the third defendant to tell the UCO that he knew Witness 1 , instruction s to the third defendant to tell the UCO that he would give him whatever he wanted and the first defendant ’ s statement to the third defendant “ [ M ] y whole life is in your hands ” . Third, t he third defendant ’ s agreement to participate in the agreement is further established by him instigating telephone call s to the UCO at 2:12 pm and 3:22 pm on 4 February 2017 , shortly after the first defendant had asked him to do so. The making of those telephone call s is evidence from which the third defendant ’ s agreement can be inferred . The telephone calls are also evidence of overt act s by the third defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fourth, t he conspiracy had as its object or objects, the plaintiff giving false evidence and the perversion of the course of justice. Giving false evidence, or perjury, is a criminal offence: s 327 of the Crimes Act . Perverting the course of justice is an offence against s 319 of the Crimes Act . The agreed means of achieving those objects, by coercing or intimidating the plaintiff , is , in itself, a criminal offence potentially engaging a number of offence provisions in the Crimes Act . Procuring, persuading, inducing or otherwise causing a person to give false evidence, known as subornation of perjury, is an offence against s 333 of the Crimes Act . Threatening a person not to bring material information about an indictable offence to the attention of the police is an offence against s 315A of the Crimes Act . Doing an act intending to persuade or induce a witness to give false evidence or to withhold true evidence is an offence against s 323 of the Crimes Act . Accordingly, I am satisfied that the conspiracy in the present case was a conspiracy to injur e the plaintiff by unlawful means, namely the unlawful coercion of her to give false evidence. Further, I note that counsel for the third defendant conceded that this was “ obviously an unlawful conspiracy ” in the sense that its object was to pervert the course of justice. Further, t he unlawful intent of the conspirators can be inferred from the use of coded words in the telephone conversations between the first and third defendant s , from the reference s to money to be paid to the UCO for his services (the reference to giv ing “ him ” whatever he wants is clearly a reference to the UCO, not to the plaintiff) and from the first defendant repeatedly telling the third defendant during the conversation at 2:21 pm on 4 February 2017 to ensure that their names were not conveyed and to ensure that th e UCO ’ s contact with the plaintiff could not be linked back to them. Fifth, the object of the conspiracy , established by the content of the conversations set out in the Agreed Facts , include s that the predominant purpose was to cause psychological injury to the plaintiff by intimidation and coercion. Those conversations prove that the scope and nature of the conspiracy was to locate the plaintiff and to coerce her to change her evidence. D uring the telephone conversation at 2:05 pm on 4 February 2017 , the first defendant recruited the third defendant to engage in conversations and negotiations with the UCO “ with the intention of locating the [plaintiff] and persuading her to change her evidence ” . During their telephone conversation at 2:21 pm on 4 February 2017 , the first defendant and the third defendant discuss ed ensuring that the UCO ’ s “ contact with the [ plaintiff] ” could not “ be linked back to them ” . During their telephone conversation at 9:06 am on 5 February 2017 , the first defendant and the third defendant discuss ed ensuring that the third defendant confirms the UCO ’ s “ access to the [ plaintiff] ” . During the meeting on 7 February 2017, the third defendant gave the UCO a note with the plaintiff ’ s name written on it and they discussed finding the plaintiff and convincing her to change her story. During that meeting , when the UCO suggested that he would let the third defendant know how it went and if the plaintiff could not be convinced to change her evidence and they would “ see and go from there ” , the third defendant agreed by stating “ Alright mate, alright brother . I ’ ll leave it with ya ” and “ Get back to me ” . In all of the circumstances set out in the Agreed Facts, including the third defendant ’ s participation in conversations about persuading the plaintiff to change her evidence, the third defendant ’s discussion s of paying the UCO “whatever it costs ” to find and convince the plaintiff to change her evidence , and the first defendant’s comments that his “whole life” was in the third defendant’s hands, it can readily be inferred that the agreement to coerce the plaintiff to change her evidence include d intimidation and coercion intended to cause her such significant psychological harm that she would then be prepared to give false evidence . T he third defendant accept s that he conspired to “ coerce ” the victim to change her evidence in court proceedings with the intention of perverting the course of justice . T he ordinary meaning of the word “coerce” is to force or compel someone into doing something ( Macquarie Dictionary , 9 th ed (202 3 ) ) or to persuade (an unwilling person) to do something by use of force or threats ( Concise Oxford English D ictionary , 11th ed (200 4 ) ) . Accordingly, the third defendant’s acceptance of an intention to coerce carries with it an acceptance of the intention to use force against the plaintiff to cause her to do something against her will. In addition, the third defendant’s intention to cause harm is informed by his admission that he knew of the sexual assaults. That is so because, with that knowledge, it would have been foreseeable to him t hat the plaintiff was vulnerable and that his participation in the conspiracy would cause, or further contribute to, her psychological injuries. In the circumstances, damage to the plaintiff arising from the conspiracy was foreseeable and a natural and probable consequence of the agreement: Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; [2001] HCA 69; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333 ; [2002] NSWCA 82 . An inference to injure the plaintiff is established because the actions were directed at the plaintiff and would necessarily occasion harm: Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Entain Group Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 220 at [31]. As the Court of Appeal stated in Fatimi v Bryant at [13] , “If the conspiracy and the unlawful means were aimed at the plaintiff damage to the plaintiff that was foreseen or foreseeable or was necessarily caused in carrying out the conspiracy will satisfy the requirements for this branch of the tort ” . In the present case, although a purpose of the conspiracy was benefitting the first defendant’s own self-interests in having the plaintiff give false evidence, the fact that that purpose “ necessarily ” involved injury to the plaintiff, in the sense that with out the injury the first defendant’s self - interest could not be achieved, is sufficient to make out this element of the tort: Lon r ho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448 ; [1991] 3 WLR 188 at 476; Fatimi v Bryant at [16]. Sixth , by their conduct in engaging in telephone communications and physical meetings , the first and third defendants each committed physically observable overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy . Acts done in pursuance of an agreement causing temporal damage to the plaintiff must be proved: McKernan v Fraser . The carrying out of such acts is an integral part of the tort: Hamod v New South Wales (No 12) [2009] NSWSC 242 at [114]. It is unnecessary for the conspiracy to have been carried out in whole ; acts performed in partial execution of the agreement is sufficient: Haiye Developments at [510]. In the present case , the conspiratorial agreement was executed, in part, by the commission of the numerous overt acts carried out by the first and third defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy. Seventh, i t is irrelevant that, because of the involvement of the UCO as part of a controlled police operation, the conspiracy was incapable of being carried out. U nder the criminal law , a person may be found guilty of conspiracy to commit an offence even if committing the offence is impossible . See for example s 11.5 of the Criminal Code ( Cth ) . The principle was stated by Gleeson CJ in R v Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256 , at 264 , as follows: “…there would be no problem of law (as distinct, perhaps, from a problem of proof) if the Crown were alleging that the respondents had agreed between themselves to find and buy some stolen cigarettes. If, for example, the respondents had formed themselves into a buying group to purchase stolen cigarettes and had sought out the person who offered to supply them in the present case, it would not have made a presently relevant difference to their culpability if, unknown to them, he had been an undercover policeman who had no real intention of supplying stolen cigarettes. They would, nevertheless, have made an agreement between themselves to purchase stolen cigarettes.” T here wa s nothing impossible in the present case about performing an agreement to coerce the plaintiff to change her evidence. The fact that, unbeknownst to the first and third defendants they conspired , not only with themselves , but also with an undercover police officer who had no intention of fully carrying out the agreement, makes no difference to their liability . That is so because each of the requirements of proof of the tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means ha ve been established. Eighth, t he existence of the UCO and the controlled police operation did not break the chain of causation because the plaintiff was aware of the fact of the conspiracy which existed between the first and third defendants and unaware of the police involvement . Her knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy caused her psychological injury. Even if s he had been aware of the UCO or the controlled operation, which she was not, it does not follow that she would not have suffered damage caused by the first and third defendants ’ conduct. I am satisfied that the phycological injury to the plaintiff would have occurred even if she had been made aware that the police were involved in a controlled operation and were taking steps to protect her from the defendants . That conclusion is supported by the expert medical evidence which establishes that the plaintiff ’ s psychological injuries persist and are ongoing and that she continues to live in fear of the defendants . That continuing impact on the plaintiff has persisted notwithstanding th e fact she has become aware of the involvement of the UCO and the controlled police operation , if not by the time of the defendants ’ prosecution , then certainly by the time she commenced the present civil proceedings. Ninth, I am satisfied that the pla in tiff changed her residence, assumed a new identity and reduced contact with her family and friends as a direct result of the knowledge which she obtained from the police officer in charge of the criminal investigation into the sexual assaults that threats had been made against her. In the circumstances, particularly that she was first informed of the threats less than 2 months after the first and second defendant s were arrested on 16 November 2016 and that the information was conveyed to her by the officer in charge of the sexual assault investigation, it can be readily inferred that she understood that those threats were made by the defendants and their associates who were not in custody. Tenth, c ontrary to the third defendant ’ s contention, there is evidence to establish that the conspiracy between the first and third defendants had been formed by 11 January 2017, when the p olice informed her that she was in danger and needed to move and change her identity. T he third defendant ’ s participati o n in the conspiracy commenced on 9 January 2017 . In any event, the third defendant ’ s approach of analysing participation in the agreement at the point in time when the p laintiff was first informed of the threats, is flawed. That is so for a number of reasons. C onspiracy is a continuing offence . Although t he nub of the offence is entry into an agreement between two or more people to commit an unlawful act , a conspiracy does not end with the making of the agreement. It continues so long as there are two or more parties to it intending to carry out the design: Di rector of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807 at 822-823 ; Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1 ; [1995] HCA 29 at 8 ; Agius v The Queen (2013) 248 CLR 601; [2013] HCA 27 at 56. T he present conspiracy was a continuing agreement which extended well beyond 9 January 2017 . O vert acts in furtherance of the agreement were carried out until May 2017 , when the third defendant continued to contact the UCO with the intention of organising meetings with him. T he plaintiff was made aware that the threats to her safety were ongoing and not confined to 11 January 2017. Her eviden tiary statements refer to her ongoing and continuing concerns and that the police engaged with her over many years to c reat e and maintain her assumed identity and to arrange secure housing. That includes evidence of police engagement with her in mid-March 2017 and June 2017, during the concurrency of the conspiracy. The engagement in mid-March involved the police requesting assistance from the plaintiff ’ s tutor, including with housing support and to obtain medical treatment. The police engagement in June 2017 involved assisting the plaintiff in changing her name, obtaining new identification documents and changing her identification details in public records and informing her that she had to live under the assumed identity and continue to sever contact with family and friends. T he damage , including economic loss, suffered by the plaintiff , which continued well beyond 11 January 2017 , was caused by and continued to be caused by the continuing nature of the conspiracy. Eleventh, t he plaintiff has established that the conspiracy caused her damage in the form of psychological injuries and actual pecuniary loss in the form of loss or diminution of her earning capacity . Accordingly, in respect of the conspiracy claims , the plaintiff has established on the balance of probabilities that she has suffered injuries, loss and damage as a direct result of the conduct of the first defendant and the third defendant and that she is entitled to damages. Joint or successive tortfeasors? Submissions by senior counsel for the plaintiff proceeded on the basis that all three of the defendants caused the plaintiff ongoing psychological damage by what each is alleged to have done. The plaintiff submitted that while “ it may seem difficult ” to hold the third defendant liable for the physical injuries to the plaintiff, the ultimate injuries to her were contributed to by the actions of all three defendants. In written submissions , the plaintiff contended that all three defendants are joint tortfeasors in the one set of events and that the actions of the defendants should be considered as having merged into one event . I n written and oral submissions, senior counsel for the plaintiff put that submission in the following terms “ It is impossible to unscramble the egg ” in that the plaintiff has suffered psychological damage caused by a combination of the acts of all of the defendants . In the alternative , the plaintiff submit ted that the defendants are concurrent tortfeasors, whose independent torts resulted in the same psychological damage to the plaintiff. If damages were to be differently attributed to different defendants, the plaintiff ’ s position was that 50% of the psychological damage should be attributed to the defendants involved in the sexual assaults and 50% to the defendants involved in the conspiracy. The third defendant submitted that 10% would be the appropriate attribution to the latter category. The first and second defendants are pleaded as joint tortfeasors in respect of the sexual assault claim s; the third defendant is not . The first and third defendants are pleaded as joint tortfeasors in respect of the conspiracy claim s; the second defendant is not . D efendants are joint tortfeasors when their joint acts cause the same damage, concurrent tortfeasors when their independent acts cause the same damage and successive tortfeasors when their separate acts cause separate damage: Arthur Harris v 718932 [2003] NSWCA 38 at [22] ( Handley JA , Stein and Santow J J A agreeing ) ; Thompson v Smiths Ship Repairers Ltd [1984] QB 405 at 437- 4 42. In Seltsam Pty Limited v Ghaleb [2005] NSWCA 208 , where a worker was exposed to asbestos by successive employers and sustained asbestosis related pleural disease ( ARPD ) , the injury was treated as a divisible disease, being a disease increasing in severity through an ongoing process of successive events causing harm. There Ipp JA (Mason P agreeing) stated at [34]: "In the case of ARPD, the disease is the consequence of inhaling asbestos fibre in circumstances where each successive inhalation of asbestos inflicts a further and separate form of harm on the victim. As each infliction of harm is an independent event, where ARPD has cumulatively been brought about by different tortfeasors over different periods, each tortfeasor is separately liable for the separate damage each has caused. Such tortfeasors are not jointly, concurrently or severally liable to the victim. The damage for which each is liable has to be separately proved and separately assessed." That reasoning applies here. I am satisfied that the first and second defendants are joint tortfeasors in relation to the sexual assault claims. The third defendant is not. He was not present during the sexual assaults on 8 and 9 November 2016 and did not participate in the assaults. In respect of the conspiracy claim s , I am satisfied that the first and third defendants are joint tortfeasors. The second defendant is not. He did not participate in the conspiracy. The first defendant, as a tortfeasor in respect of both claims, is liable in relation to the sexual assault claim s and the conspiracy claims . I am satisfied that the second and third defendants are successive tortfeasors . Each inflicted harm on the plaintiff in independent events and over different periods. The second defendant inflicted physical and psychological harm on the plaintiff, including ongoing psychological harm, and pecuniary loss as a result of the sexual assaults. The third defendant inflicted psychological harm on the plaintiff, including ongoing psychological harm, and pecuniary loss as a result of the conspiracy. The psychological injuries have been cumulatively brought about by different tortfeasors. Parts of the plaintiff ’ s psychological injuries, including difficulty in forming intimate relationships, are attributable to the sexual assaults. Other parts, including her fear of revealing her true identity and fear of her home being broken into, appear attributable to the conspiracy. The second and third defendants are separately liable for the separate damage each has caused, which should be separately proved and assessed. Notwithstanding th e finding of joint and successive tortfeasors, t he question remains whether the defendants caused separate identifiable damage which could be assessed separately. A finding that a tortfeasor materially contributed to harm suffered does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the tortfeasor is liable for all harm sustained . As stated in State of New South Wales v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12 ; Aust Torts Reports 81-826 at [71] - [7 5 ] ( Basten JA , reasoning on the issue agreed by Spigelman CJ and Hunt AJA ) : “ In evaluating the conflicting positions of the parties, it is helpful to identify a number of basic principles. First, although it is sufficient that tortious conduct of a defendant materially contributes to an injury suffered by the plaintiff, there may be other causes and, in assessing loss, there are circumstances where it is appropriate to visit on the defendant liability for a proportion only of the loss suffered. Secondly, contributing causes may occur in a sequence, or have a continuing concurrent operation at the time the injury is suffered. Where they operate sequentially, the defendant may be liable for the whole of the loss suffered … Thirdly, according to the ‘egg-shell’ skull principle, the defendant will take the victim as she or he is found, and will bear the full extent of the loss suffered, even if the injury is more severe than would have been the case with a person within the normal range of physical or mental attributes. On the other hand, it may be necessary to make allowance, in diminution of the defendant’s liability, for harm which would at some stage have been likely to occur in any event, sometimes expressed as a variation of the egg-shell skull principle, namely the ‘crumbling skull’ principle. … Fourthly, where it is appropriate to apportion loss, that can only be done if the injury is in some sense divisible. In Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] UKHL 1; [1956] AC 613, the medical condition contracted by the worker was caused by exposure to silica dust. The worker was exposed to dust both tortiously and without any breach of duty. There being only one injury, to which the tortious exposure made a not insignificant contribution, causation was established. There was no apportionment, presumably because the injury was treated as indivisible, although as noted by Stuart Smith LJ in Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 111; [2000] 3 All ER 421 at [41], the point was not argued in Bonnington itself. … Fifthly, where a plaintiff proves that tortious conduct materially contributed to his or her injury, an evidentiary onus will lie on the defendant to establish that other causes, including both concurrent causes and pre-existing, but on-going, conditions, also materially contributed. In this case the evidence of a cause for which the Appellant was not responsible was clearly established. Where there is evidence to demonstrate such a contribution, the Court must determine what proportion should be attributed to the wrongful conduct of the defendant and what proportion to other factors for which the defendant is not legally responsible.” It may be appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for a portion only of the loss suffered. Where a constellation of disabilities results from different causes, the C ourt should endeavour to determine the extent of the harm referable to the compensable cause: Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76; [ 2002 ] 2 A ll ER 1. The task of assessing damages in personal injuries cases should be kept as simple as possible: Jongen v CSR Ltd (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-192 at 61,713 per Anderson J . The absence of sufficient detailed evidence to assist in quantifying damages does not result in the C ourt finding that only nominal damages should be awarded . For example, where a plaintiff has suffered a significantly disabling injury which obviously affects the range and nature of the work he or she can perform, in the absence of specific evidence as to what other persons with that kind of disability can earn, the C ourt is to make a judgment and assessment, on a percentage basis or otherwise, of the value of the lost capacity : Yammine v Kalwy [1979] 2 NSWLR 151 at 155 per Reynolds JA ; State of New South Wales v Moss ( 200 0) 54 NSW LR 536 ; [2000] NSWCA 133 . Where the evidence is deficient or lacking , the C ourt is nonetheless to approach the assessment of damages by doing the best it can. The assessment of damages as between the various defendants in this case is particularly challenging. That is particularly so in circumstances where the psychologists and psychiatrists do not delineate in their reports as to how or to what extent the psychological sequelae suffered by the plaintiff relate to each cause of action. Dr Dornan describes the sexual assaults on the plaintiff and the requirement for her to change accommodation, change her identity and lose her friends as having result ed, in combination , in her experiencing additional periods of re-traumatisation, a downward spiral of depression, guilt, self-doubt, fear and anxiety. Dr Dornan also describes the plaintiff ’ s persistent state of fear and guilt as arising from the combined result of the sexual assaults and the threats to her safety. His opinion is that the sexual assaults followed by the threats to her safety and the impact on interpersonal relationships and the removal of supports have all contributed to her develop ing complex and chronic trauma symptoms. Associate Professor Robertson ’ s opinion makes no differentiation between the damages caused by the sexual assaults and those caused by the conspiracy. He considers that the plaintiff ’ s psychological sequelae caused by the sexual assaults were escalated by the conspiracy . His opinion refers to the sexual assaults and the subsequent threats as having had a profound combined effect on her , resulting in her suffering from c omplex p ost- t raumatic s tress d isorder and features of a p ersistent d epressive d isorder as a comorbid condition and a previous a lcohol u se d isorder . He does not separate the events of the sexual assaults and the conspiracy but describes them in combination as being necessary and sufficient conditions for her to have developed a psychiatric disorder. In those circumstances, and because of the absence of evidence allowing for the damages caused by the separate claims to be separately identified or assessed, the C ourt must approach the task of assessing damages by doing the best it can in the circumstances. Assessing damages The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages , including damages for loss of past and future earning capacity , and aggravated damages (another form of compensatory damages) against each of the defendants . Although the plaintiff ’ s pleadings refer to a claim for exemplary damages, that claim was not pursued. I agree that in the circumstances , exemplary damages are not appropriate . That is so because such damages are awarded to punish a defendant for conduct and to deter him or her from committing like conduct again ( Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 47 at 8 ; New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57 at [33]; State of New South Wales v Abed [2014] NSWCA 419 ; (2014) 246 A Crim R 549 at [232]-[233] ). Here the defendants have already each been punished, and one would hope deterred, by virtue of their convict ions and punish ments in the criminal proceedings . As set out in s 3B(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ( CLA ) , the provisions of the CLA do not apply in respect of civil liability for a n intentional act that is done by the person with intent to cause injury or death or that is sexual assault , except for ss 15B and 18(1) as well as Parts 7 and 2A which continue to apply. None of those sections have any relevance to this matter. On the basis of my factual findings referred to above, I find that the sexual assault claims against the first and second defendants are “ sexual assaults ” for the purposes of s 3B(1). In relation to the conspiracy claims, I note that counsel for the third defendant did not submit that the CLA applied. Rather, the third defendant made submissions on the assessment of damages by reference to common law principles. In the absence of any submissions to the contrary, and on the facts as they present themselves in this case, I find that the conspiracy claims are in respect of liability for an “ intentional act that is done … with intent to cause injury ” for the for the purposes of s 3B(1). Accordingly, the provisions of the CLA do not apply to either of the causes of action. As such, damages must be assessed under the common law. The restrictions and limitations on the awarding of damages contained in the CLA do not apply. Damages assessments under the common law may be higher than assessments governed by the CLA as, for example, the 3% tables apply on assessing future loss and the restrictions on interest do not apply. Compensatory damages are intended to put the plaintiff back into the position that he or she would have been in but for the conduct of the defendant. Aggravated damages are a form of compensatory damages which might be awarded to a plaintiff for stress, anxiety and hurt feelings that he or she suffers, over and above any injury sustained , arising from the particularly egregious conduct of a defendant : New South Wales v Ibbett at [31] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Heydon a nd Crennan JJ . The awarding of aggravated damages for sexual assault might be particularly apt in circumstances in which the subject of the sexual assault suffers the long - term burden of shame, embarrassment and indignation in addition to a psychiatric illness arising out of the deliberate conduct towards him or her . Aggravated damages are normally assessed as a lump sum over and above the allowance for general damages. Damages are rarely awarded for hurt feelings, distress or emotional issues without the suffering or development of a recognised psychiatric illness : State of New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445 at [21] per Spigelman CJ . P rovided the Court accepts a causal relationship between the development of a psychological illness and the commission of the tort , the allowance for pain and suffering may have regard to matters such as long - term feelings of guilt, shame and emotional issues such as difficulties in maintaining relationships. Further, the amount of the damages is to be measured against the gravity, severity or frequency of the sexual assaults. Damages must be assessed having regard to the effect on the plaintiff. The a ssessment of pecuniary loss is also difficult in sexual assault case s in circumstances in which the plaintiff has understandably endeavoured to keep the fact of the sexual assaults hidden. A s standard directions in sexual assault trials now recognise, there are often very good reasons why a victim of a sexual assault may hesitate or refrain from making a complaint. In the present case , it is entirely understandable that the plaintiff is reluctant to discuss with others the details of crimes committed against her. She has attempted to obtain and retain employment notwithstanding her inability to be candid about her background and true identity . The plaintiff ’ s ability to earn income from employment has been severely comprised by the defendants ’ conduct. She has sustained pecuniary loss as a result. T he plaintiff here bears the onus and must establish the losses for which s he seeks compensation and the causal connection between those losses and the tortious acts of the defendant s . Sh e must establish causation and loss on the balance of probabilities. I must assess causation in a practical and common sense way. I must consider the question of causation in the framework in which it arises in this matter. Causation is assessed by looking backwards at the events that have occurred and considering whether there is any causal connection between the conduct of the defendant s and the events which have befallen the plaintiff and the development of her psychiatric illness since those events . A ssessing damages is more an impressionistic exercise than a formulaic one . On a practical note, in assess ing damages below where calculations yield amount s in dollars and cents , the cents have been ignored. General and aggravated damages On the findings made above, the plaintiff has clearly made out liability, causation and an entitlement to damages in respect of both causes of action. I find that the first and second defendants are liable for the physical injuries, psychological and psychiatric injures and past and future economic loss caused by the sexual assaults and the deprivation of the plaintiff ’ s liberty. I accept that the plaintiff ’ s physical injuries caused by the sexual assaults were injury to her vagina, injury to her anus, injury to her mouth, bruising to numerous parts of her body and pain and restricted movement to her body. I also accept the expert evidence, to which I have made reference , that as a result of those events, the plaintiff has suffered serious and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder and generalised anxiety disorder. I also accept that the plaintiff ’ s psychological injuries were caused by the conspiracy which operated sequentially to the sexual assaults. Those separate causes of action both contributed to the plaintiff ’ s psychological injuries and pecuniary loss. I am satisfied that the conspiracy has had and will continue to have a significant and long-term effect on the plaintiff ’ s mental health, has substantially contributed to her psychological injuries and delayed her ability to recover from the effect of the sexual assaults. I accept that the plaintiff ’ s ability to recover from the sexual assaults, including her ability to engage in group therapeutic sessions and her ability to get on with her life, have been impacted by the effects of the conspiracy. An award for aggravated damages is given to compensate for injury to a plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and manner of the wrongdoing, that is caused by insult, humiliation and the like. They are awarded when the harm done by the wrongful act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done: AA v PD [2022] NSWSC 1039 at [126]-[128] per Chen J. To secure an award of aggravated damages, typically but not invariably there must be “ conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another person ’ s rights ” : Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70 at [14] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. For the reasons I have already expressed, I find that the first and second defendants ’ conduct in committ ing the sexual assaults , filming parts of that conduct, providing her with drugs and al cohol and depriving her of her liberty was cruel and inhumane and , undoubtedly, was conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of her rights. In addition, the derogatory manner in which the first and second defendants spoke during the recording of the video was additionally cruel, inhumane and in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff ’ s rights. I also accept that the first and third defendants ’ conduct in conspiring to coerce the plaintiff into giving false evidence was cruel, inhume and in contumelious disregard of her rights . That is particularly so because the first and third defendants knew of her vulnerable state caused by the sexual assaults but nonetheless agreed to cause her further emotional distress by agreeing to intimidate her. I am satisfied that the conduct of the defendants has caused injury to the plaintiff ’ s feelings, including by the manner and circumstances in which the acts were perpetuated upon her. In those circumstances , the plaintiff is entitled to aggravated damages for the trauma and humiliation she suffered. I am satisfied, however, that the aggravated damages to be awarded for the sexual assault claims should be higher than that awarded for the conspiracy claims . That is so because the first and second defendants ’ conduct was significantly more cruel , inhumane and in disregard of the plaintiff ’ s rights than the conduct of the third defendant. I accept the consequences of the sexual assaults, and the other events of 8 and 9 November 2016 , have been significant for the plaintiff. In addition to the physical injuries, the sexual assaults and deprivation of liberty have significantly contributed to her psychological injuries, dissension to alcohol abuse and her general inability to function in society. In addition , the plaintiff has been forced to live with shame and guilt, has had difficulty in forming friendships and intimate relationships and has ongoing instability in her life. In addition, I accept that the conspiracy significantly contributed to her post - traumatic stress disorder and generalised anxiety disorder. The conduct of the first and third defendants has continued and exacerbated her psychological injuries in a significant and ongoing respect. The conspiracy has resulted in the plaintiff living in a state of anxiety and fear, fearing strangers, being hypervigilant, suffering from loss of identity, suffering from housing and employment insecurity and being deprived of the support of family and friends. I also accept that, as a direct result of the conspiracy and her need to change her identity, she has been deprived of the therapeutic benefit she might have expected to receive from counselling and group therapy because of her inability to reveal her background and true identity . Counsel for the third defendant submit s that the sentences imposed in the criminal proceedings for the sexual assaults should be compared with the significantly lesser sentences imposed for the conspiracy and that that comparison informs the relative objective seriousness of the separate torts. The third defendant submit s that such an analysis would lead to a general damages award , if any, against the third defendant which would be significantly less than the general damages awarded in respect of the other defendants. I do not accept that submission. The various factors taken into account by criminal courts in sentencing offenders, including maximum penalties, objective seriousness, protection of the community, the need for adequate punishment , aggravating and mitigating factors and an offender ’ s subjective circumstances , have no role to play in assessing damages in tortious claims. The damage caused to the plaintiff cannot be equated to the number of years each defendant was required to serve in prison . The psychological injuries caused by the sexual assaults and the conspiracy cannot, on the evidence, be properly delineated. Doing the best I can , I find that the separate torts have in combination contributed equally to her psychological injuries and pecuniary losses. However, the assessment of general damages for the sexual assault claims must take into account that physical injuries to the plaintiff were occasioned by those assaults for which the third defendant is not liable. Accordingly, the assessment of general damages in respect of the sexual assault claims will be greater than that for the conspiracy claims. I am satisfied, based on the expert evidence, that prior to the sexual assaults , the plaintiff ’ s consumption of alcohol was casual and occasional and that her consumption became problematic after the commission of the torts. I accept that she turned to alcohol abuse in an attempt to regulate her feelings and emotions. I also accept the plaintiff ’ s evidence that her alcohol use has become problematic to the extent that it has interfere d with her ability to maintain employment. In addition , the psychological and psychiatric evidence satisfies me that, although the plaintiff suffered from some anxiety and depressive symptoms in her adolescent years, her current presentation and diagnoses were caused by the sexual assaults and the subsequent threats, not by any pre-existing issues. As Associate Professor Robertson state s , the current psychiatric problems were unlikely to have emerged at all were it not for sexual assaults and the subsequent threats to safety. I accept that the psychological injur ies and pecuniary loss es caused by the defendants are likely to continue for the remainder of the plaintiff ’ s life. Doing the best I can, and on the basis of Associate Professor Robertson ’ s opinion that each of the sexual assaults and the threats was a substantial contributor to her current situation, I assess general damages in respect of the sexual assaults claims and in respect of the conspiracy claims roughly equally . However, I assess general damages for the sexual assault claims at a higher amount than that for the conspiracy claims to allow for the separate physical injuries associated with those assaults . Accordingly, general damages are assessed : for the sexual assault claims in the sum of $ 275 ,000 ; and for the conspiracy claims in the sum of $225,000. The plaintiff claims interest. The power to award interest on damages up to judgment is governed by s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). The plaintiff is not entitled to interest as of right: New South Wales v Loh Min Choo [2012] NSWCA 275 at [54]. The purpose of an award of interest is to compensate the plaintiff for the loss which he or she has suffered by being kept out of his or her money during the relevant period: MB P (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; [1991] HCA 3. For the purposes of assessing interest on past general damages, it is necessary to notionally attribute some portion of the allowance for general damages to the past. Of the amount s assessed for general damages, I allow the following amounts for past and future general damages : for the sexual assault claims I allow $115,000 for past general damages and $160,000 for the future; and for the conspiracy claims I allow $9 5 ,000 for past general damages and $1 3 0,000 for the future . Applying interest at the reduced rate of 2%, reduced to account for the application of interest across the whole period, and the period of 9 years and 8 months (the period of time since the commission of the sexual assaults) and the period of 9 years and 7 months (the period of time since the commencement of the conspiracy) results in the following interest calculation s: for the sexual assault claims : $115,000 x 2 % x 9.67 = $ 22, 241 ; and for the conspiracy claims: $95,000 x 2 % x 9.58 = $ 18,202 I assess aggravated dam ag es : for the sexual assault claims in the amount of $ 7 0,000 ; and for the conspiracy claims in the amount of $ 25 ,000. Past loss of income I accept the plaintiff ’ s evidence that she has had difficulty in finding and maintaining employment since the sexual assaults and the conspiracy. Associated with those difficulties, the plaintiff ’ s abuse of alcohol , which I have found is causally linked to the torts committed against her, has contributed to her employment instability. The plaintiff ’ s evidence has satisfied me that her inability to engage in tertiary education, despite having a t the time a conditional offer in a degree course, has arisen as a direct result of all of the defendants ’ conduct . Were it not for the combined effect of the sexual assaults and the conspiracy , the plaintiff ’ s educational and vocational progress undoubtedly would have each take n a completely different course. I also accept the plaintiff ’ s evidence that she was unable to work during the sexual assault trial and that as a result of the conspiracy she has frequently be en required to change her address. Those changes, together with her inability to reveal her true identity to employers , significantly impacted her ability to earn income from employment. Assessing damages for loss of past earnings is confined in this case by the scant evidence about past employment and income. I accept, based on the plaintiff ’ s notices of assessment for the financial years end ing 30 June 2024 and 30 June 2025, that the plaintiff has been unable to earn an income in excess of $50,000 per year. I also accept that the plaintiff has been unable to pursue her intended career in film production or her alternative intended career in the fashion industry. To a large extent , the employment which the plaintiff has enjoyed to date has been temporary and poorly paid. I accept the plaintiff ’ s submission that, in the absence of more detailed evidence, past economic loss should be calculated at two thirds of the average weekly earnings less the amounts which the plaintiff has earned. I accept and adopt the plaintiff ’ s figure for the a verage weekly earnings for women working full-time of $1,289 after-tax per week. Two-thirds of that figure is $859 per week. Over the period of the past 9 years and 8 months, that equates to $431, 939 . I intend to deduct $100,000 from that amount, to account for her taxable income in 2024 and 2025, together with other smaller amounts earned over the past which she cannot recall. Accordingly, I calculate that the plaintiff is entitled to a total of $331, 939 for past economic loss and I attribute that loss equally to the separate claims. Accordingly, I assess past economic loss: for the sexual assault claims in the amount of $ 165, 969 ; and for the conspiracy claims in the amount of $ 165, 969 . There is some divergence of views concerning the way in which interest for past loss of earnings should be calculated. The conventional approach in New South Wales is to use the average rate of interest in s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) for half the relevant period on the entire amount or for the full period on half the amount : Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1 at 19; [1980] HCA 10. Accordingly, I calculate interest on past economic loss for the full period on half the amount, applying the rate of interest of 8.35%. Accordingly, the calculation is: $165, 969 x 8.35% x 9.6 7 = $ 134,010 . That figure attribute d equally to the separate claims , amounts to $ 67,005 for the sexual assault claims and $ 67,005 for the conspiracy claims . The plaintiff is also entitled to claim her past loss of superannuation, at 10% of her past economic loss. That amounts to a total figure of $33,1 93 . That figure attributed equally to the separate claims, amounts to $16,5 96 for the sexual assault claims and $16,5 96 for the conspiracy claims. Future loss of earning capacity Like past loss, the plaintiff must establish what her earning capacity would have been but for the defendants ’ conduct and to what extent that capacity has been diminished as a result of the sexual assaults and the conspiracy. The assessment of future loss of earning capacity is necessarily imprecise and difficult. No evidence was tendered to establish what the plaintiff ’ s earning capacity may have been if she had successfully completed a degree in film production or if she had successfully embarked on a n alternative career in the fashion industry. In the absence of such evidence , I accept that it is appropriate to assess her capacity on the basis of average weekly earnings. I accept the evidence of Dr Dornan and Associate Professor Robertson that the plaintiff ’ s psychological injuries will continue to affect her employment prospects, her ability to maintain employment and her earning capacity for the remainder of her adult life. As articulated by A ssociate Prof essor Robertson, the profound and extensive impact s of the sexual assaults and the conspiracy will cause her to have difficulties with occupational functioning and diminished earning capacity in the long - term . The expert evidence also establishe s that future therapeutic benefits will be compromised by the plaintiff ’ s inability to reveal her background and true identity during group therapy sessions . In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the plaintiff ’ s depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder will continue to impact on her future loss of earning capacity. The third defendant submitted that the plaintiff had failed to establish that she was unfit for work, but accepted that there may be periods when she will be unable to work due to her psychological injuries. The plaintiff ’ s approach to future economic loss was to claim average weekly earnings until the age of 67, but to reduce that figure by 25% to allow for the vicissitudes of life. I am satisfied that the plaintiff should be awarded damages for future loss of earning capacity on the basis of average weekly earnings. However , the plaintiff has some record of past employment and was in full - time employment at the time of the hearing. D espite that employment, I accept that the plaintiff ’ s ability to maintain full-time employment in the future is significantly compromised. The expert evidence on the topic , which I accept, establishes that her post traumatic stress disorder and problematic use of alcohol will cause her to have difficulties in meeting work-related obligations and an increased likelihood of unemployment throughout her life. I accept that her future employment is likely to be temporary and poorly paid. The plaintiff is presently 27 years of age. Allowing weekly earnings for all females of $1,289 , applying the 3 % multiplier tables for 40 years to the age of 67, then reducing the total by the usual amount of 1 5% for the vicissitudes of life and a further amount of 25% to account for the prospect of some periods of future employment , amounts to $ 946,796 in total . The calculation is : ($1,289 x 1,224.2) – 40 % = $946, 796. I am satisfied that the plaintiff ’ s loss of earning capacity is equally attributable to the sexual assault claims and the conspiracy claims. Accordingly, I assess future loss of earning capacity: for the sexual assault claims in the amount of $ 473,398 ; and for the conspiracy claims in the amount of $ 473,398 . The loss of future superannuation, calculated at 10%, amounts to $ 94,679 in total . A ttributed equally to the separate claims, that figure amounts to $ 47,339 for the sexual assault claims and $ 47,339 for the conspiracy claims. Out of pocket expenses No claim is made in relation to past treatment expenses or other out-of-pocket expenses. The plaintiff explained that that was because past expenses have been paid through a v ictims of c rime compensation s cheme . In his 10 November 2023 report , Associate Professor Robertson set s out a future treatment plan and the costs and frequency of that future therapy. Th e plan include s psychiatric treatment, monthly psychotherapy for the next 10 years, 30 sessions of psychological treatment and dialectic behaviour treatment. The total costs associated with that future treatment is $41,720. Additionally, I note that counsel for the third defendant did not dispute the amount claimed. I am satisfied that treatment is reasonably required following on from the injuries she has suffered. Accordingly , I allow that amount, $41,720 in total , on account of future treatment . I am satisfied that the future out of pocket expenses are equally attributable to the sexual assault claims and the conspiracy claims. That figure attributed equally , amounts to $ 20,860 for the sexual assault claims and $ 20,860 for the conspiracy claims. Contingent assessments T he above calculations of interest (at [22 3 ] and [23 1 ]) and the above calculation of loss of future earning capacity (at [23 9 ]) are made on a contingent basis. Having regard to the manner in which the parties approached the assessment of damages in their submissions, it will be necessary for the parties to file schedules setting out their calculations of interest and loss of future earning capacity if different from that which the Court proposes. Summary of damages The following table summarises the common law damages I award , on a contingent basis, in respect of the sexual assault claims, in relation to which I find the first and second defendants jointly liable : Head of damages: Amount: General damages $275,000 Interest on past general damages $22,241 Aggravated damages $70,000 Past economic loss $165,969 Interest on past economic loss $67,005 Past loss of superannuation $16,596 Future loss of earning capacity $473,398 Future loss of superannuation $47,339 Past out-of-pocket expenses (nil) Future out-of-pocket expenses $20,860 TOTAL: $1,158,408 The following table summarises the common law damages I award , on a contingent basis, in respect of the conspiracy claims, in relation to which I find the first and third defendants jointly liable: Head of damages: Amount: General damages $225,000 Interest on past general damages $18,202 Aggravated damages $25,000 Past economic loss $165,969 Interest on past economic loss $67,005 Past loss of superannuation $16,596 Future loss of earning capacity $473,398 Future loss of superannuation $47,339 Past out-of-pocket expenses (nil) Future out-of-pocket expenses $20,860 TOTAL: $1,059,369 Conclusion and orders For the above reasons, on 17 November 2025, I ordered default judgment for the plaintiff against the first and second defendants, with damages to be assessed. My contingent assessments of damages are as follows: against the first defendant in the sum of $1,108, 888 ; against the second defendant in the sum of $579, 204 ; and against the third defendant in the sum of $529, 684 . I make the following orders: E nter judgment for the plaintiff against the third defendant , with damages to be assessed ; Direct the parties within 7 days to provide my Associate with a schedule calculating interest and/or loss of future earning capacity if different from that which the Court proposes, together with written submissions (not exceeding two pages) in support of such calculations; Stand the proceedings over for 14 days for the determination of any issues in relation to the calculations and for the assessment of damages ; and O rder the defendants to pay the plaintiff ’ s costs. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 28 August 2026