Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius [2026] VSC 420 (26 June 2026)
Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius [2026] VSC 420 (26 June 2026)
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Citation [2026] VSC 420
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Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius [2026] VSC 420 (26 June 2026)
Last Updated: 26 June 2026
IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF VICTORIA
Not Restricted
COMMON LAW
DIVISION
TRUSTS, EQUITY AND PROBATE
LIST
S ECI 2023
05295 S ECI 2024 02107
S ECI 2025 04523
BETWEEN:
MARCEL HADDO
Plaintiff
v
HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST,
SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB
TOMA DAMASCUS
SYRIA (according to the attached Schedule of Parties)
Defendants
AND BETWEEN:
HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST,
SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB
TOMA DAMASCUS
SYRIA
Plaintiff by Counterclaim
v
MARCEL HADDO (according to the attached Schedule of Parties)
Defendants by Counterclaim
---
JUDGE :
Finanzio J
WHERE HELD :
Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING :
23 June 2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT :
26 June 2026
CASE MAY BE CITED AS :
Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius,
Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, Supreme Head of the Universal Syrian
Orthodox Church
of Bab Toma Damascus Syria
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION :
[2026] VSC 420
---
CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS – Charitable trusts –
Administrative Scheme – Trust Property - the statement of claim
and cross
claim were substantially resolved at mediation but the Court was required to
consider whether to approve an administrative
scheme which would allow the trust
property to be administered by the church under the control of the new trustee
– Where it
was agreed before the Court that the trust was a charitable
trust – Where a declaration is sought by consent on the original
purpose
of the charitable trust – Where the need for an administrative scheme was
agreed between the parties, including the
Attorney-General, and where the text
of the administrative scheme had been agreed.
---
APPEARANCES :
Counsel
Solicitors
For the Plaintiff
Mr T Egan of counsel
JHK Legal
For the First and Third Defendants
Mr S Glacken KC with Mr N Elias of counsel
Madison Marcus Law Firm
For the Second and Fourth Defendants
Dr P Bender of counsel
Victorian Government Solicitor
HIS HONOUR:
The
community of Saint Yacoub is a church community of the Syrian Orthodox faith,
established in 1979 by the families of the Saint
Aphrem Syrian Orthodox Church
Community then based in Thornbury. In the same year, the Mar-Yacoub Syrian
Orthodox Benevolent Society
(‘Benevolent Society’) was formed by a
trust deed executed on 11 September 1979 (‘the 1979 trust deed’).
An undated constitution of the Benevolent Society describes aspirations common
to fledgling migrant communities laying down roots
in their newly adopted
country. The aspirations for their community build upon their common faith and
cultural connection, setting
a course for the establishment of community
facilities as a framework within which those connections could grow. In 1980,
the trustees
purchased land located in Westmeadows (‘Westmeadows
land’) where a church building was established.
Mr
Haddo has been a member of the community since its inception and was one of the
original trustees under the 1979 trust deed.
In
the 1990s, the Westmeadows land was sold and the proceeds were used, along with
donations and loans, to purchase 17 hectares of
land located at 75 Whites Lane,
Mickleham (‘the Mickleham land’). A church was constructed on the
Mickleham land, which
serves the local church community to the present day.
In
1995, Mr Haddo, with two other trustees, transferred the title of the Mickleham
land to the supreme head of the Syrian Orthodox
Church of Antioch, His Holiness
Moran Mor Ignatius, Patriarch and all the East, Supreme Head of the Universal
Syrian Orthodox Church
of Bab Toma Damascus Syria (‘the Patriarch’).
The
Mickleham land, being located in a part of Melbourne earmarked for urban
expansion and residential subdivision, was later subdivided.
In July 2023, part
of the land was sold to a development company for a sum exceeding $30
million.
A
dispute arose between Mr Haddo and the Patriarch, as the registered proprietor
of the Mickleham land.
It was common ground that
the land was held by the
Patriarch on trust for a charitable purpose. The principal area of dispute
between the parties was as to
the description of the trust purposes. On the one
hand, it was contended by Mr Haddo that the property was transferred to the
Patriarch
to be held on trust for the benefit of the local community of Saint
Yacoub, who had together raised the funds to purchase the land
and establish the
community. The Patriarch claimed to hold the property on trust for the benefit
of the global Church community
by right of his succession to the Holy See of the
Syrian Orthodox Church (‘the trust proceeding’).
Upon
the sale of the land, Mr Haddo, no doubt motivated by deeply held views and
strong convictions, lodged a caveat over the Mickleham
land and gave an
undertaking as to damages in the caveat proceeding to preserve his position,
resulting in restrictions on the use
of the net sale proceeds derived from the
Mickleham land pending the outcome of the trust proceeding (‘caveat
proceeding’).
On
5 December 2025, this Court gave direction in a judicial advice application that
there was a sufficient factual basis to justify
the Patriarch defending the
trust proceeding and prosecuting a counterclaim (‘judicial advice
proceeding’). [1]
It is
unnecessary to recite the detailed claims made in each proceeding.
Following
mediation, the parties executed a deed of settlement settling the trust
proceeding and the caveat proceeding subject to
the Court making orders that
give effect to those terms.
The
parties seek orders disposing of the trust proceeding which may be summarised as
follows:
(a) a declaration that the land is held by the Patriarch upon a charitable trust
having as its purpose the maintenance and propagation
of the Syriac Orthodox
Christian faith through the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch;
(b) the removal of the Patriarch as trustee, and in their place, the appointment
of a company limited by guarantee to operate as
a corporate trustee with objects
to promote the Syrian Orthodox religion, in whom the title to the Mickleham land
is to be vested;
(c) an order pursuant to the Court’s general law jurisdiction empowering
the newly appointed trustee to apply the trust property
and to carry out the
purpose of the trust in accordance with an administrative scheme to be approved
by the Court the terms of which
have been negotiated by and agreed by the
parties; and
(d) that costs be paid on an agreed basis from the trust proceeds.
In
the caveat proceeding orders are sought releasing Mr Haddo from his undertaking
as to damages, and vacating the earlier orders
of the Court preserving and
restricting the use of the proceeds from the sale of part of the Mickleham land,
with no orders as to
costs.
At
a hearing on 23 June 2026 the parties relied upon a short statement of facts,
material contained in affidavits tendered without
objection, and the deed of
settlement executed between the parties. The principal submissions were made on
behalf of the Patriarch,
which were adopted by Mr Haddo, with one small
exception of no apparent consequence to the outcome. Counsel for the
Attorney-General
appeared to confirm that the Attorney-General also consented to
the orders disposing of the trust
proceedings. [2]
The
detailed written and oral submissions of the parties were of great assistance.
I have read those submissions and the material
tendered by agreement in support
of the applications. The submissions advance the reasons why I should be
satisfied that the orders
proposed should be made.
These
proceedings arise out of complex disputes between the parties concerning
valuable property and how it should be applied. If
the proceedings were to
continue as a contested trial, the Court would be required to determine a
substantial number of factual issues.
The settlement which has been reached
avoids significant expenditure on legal costs by all parties. Taken as a package
the settlement
provides for the application of the trust funds or trust property
for the advancement of the purposes of the Syrian Orthodox Church
by
facilitating the future development of the Mickleham land for the local
community of Saint Yacoub. The terms of settlement and
proposed orders would
have the effect of establishing a clearly stated purpose for the trust and a
carefully articulated administrative
scheme for dealing with its property. It
is self-evident from the detail of this settlement that it has been negotiated
carefully
by the parties with the assistance of experienced counsel and the
solicitors instructing them to produce a compromise to which the
Attorney-General has consented. That consensus by itself is an important factor
militating in favour of approval.
I
am persuaded by the submissions and briefly summarise my reasons as
follows.
Declaration
Where
parties seek final dispositive orders by consent the Court needs to be satisfied
that there is a proper basis for the orders.
The same caution applies to the
grant of declaratory relief by consent. Caution is especially necessary in
declaratory proceedings
because of the potential for the relief to affect those
who are not parties to the proceeding. In this case, that concern is
alleviated,
if not eliminated, by the fact that the relief sought is supported
by an agreed statements of fact or admissions arrived at between
parties who
were initially in dispute, and have since reached agreement on the terms of
declaratory relief to quell that dispute.
While the traditional view might have
been that declaratory orders could only be made on evidence in the presence of
contradicter,
modern authority supports the view that declaratory relief is
available where – as here – a claim is first met with opposition,
but the initial dispute is resolved by the terms of a declaration agreed by the
parties. The utility of declaratory relief in quelling
a dispute in this way is
well recognised. [3]
The
parties in this case seek relief by agreement on the strength of the combined
effect of:
(a) the settlement deed itself – which contains the admissions that
support the making of the declaration sought;
(b) the short statement of agreed facts which is tendered (without any
controversy relevant to the outcome) and which has been agreed
between parties
which until now have been locked in a complex dispute; and
(c) the presence and consent of the Attorney-General to the proposed compromise
– indeed, counsel for the Attorney-General
appeared at the hearing and
made oral submissions to the effect that she found the material to be a
satisfactory basis upon which
the declaration could be made.
There
is authority and academic discussion which supports the contention that it is
necessary to obtain the consent of the Attorney-General
to settle proceedings
involving charitable trusts. [4]
It was
submitted for the Patriarch that this may overstate the position. Even if that
is so, and the correct position is no higher
than that the consent of the
Attorney-General might be required before proceedings of this kind can be
settled by agreement, in this
case the consent has been expressly given.
The
parties submit that I should be satisfied that this is a case where declaratory
orders should be made for the reasons set out
in para [60] of the
Patriarch’s submissions, which I set out for completeness:
(a) the consent is as between the active parties in the trust proceeding and the
caveat proceeding and that the Attorney-General
appears in the trust proceeding
in her role as protector of charities;
(b) the settlement deed between the active parties sets out the basis for the
final relief, including the declaratory relief, and
the Attorney-General agrees
with the orders and administrative scheme (VGSO letter 15 June 2026);
(c) the final disposition comes after the directions given in the judicial
advice proceeding that the Patriarch is justified in defending
the claim and
prosecuting the counterclaim after hearing from the Attorney-General; and
(d) the final relief being sought substantially accords with the relief on the
counterclaim which was the subject of the judicial
advice.
The
parties say that if there were doubt about the appropriateness of granting
relief without recourse to evidence, they tendered
the evidence which they say
independently substantiates the orders they seek.
On
the material before me, I am satisfied that the declaratory relief is
appropriate for the reasons advanced by the parties.
It
is clear that the Mickleham land is held on trust for a charitable purpose. The
underlying dispute in the trust proceeding arose
from uncertainty as to the
precise purposes of the trust, and whether those purposes were confined to the
local church community
or the broader purpose of the maintenance and propagation
of the Syriac Orthodox Christian faith through the Syrian Orthodox Church
of
Antioch.
To
make the declaration sought I must be satisfied that there is sufficient
material to support the conclusion that the original purpose
of the charitable
trust was for the benefit of the maintenance and propagation of the broader
faith - not confined to its local manifestation.
There
is no trust deed dealing specifically with the Mickleham land. Consideration of
the donor’s or founder’s intent
is required, but in the absence of
express statements, intent can be inferred from the use of the land for a church
and other circumstances. [5]
In this
case:
(a) The Mickleham land was purchased with donations, loans and the proceeds from
the sale of land on which the community established
its first church at
Westmeadows.
(b) The proceeds of the sale of the Westmeadows land were likely the trust
property of a charitable trust for religious purposes.
The trust likely
subsisted over the proceeds of sale of the Westmeadows land when they were
deployed to acquire the Mickleham
land. [6]
(c) The Westmeadows land was purchased by Mr Haddo and two others, as trustees
of the Benevolent Society, an auxiliary organisation
to the Saint Yacoub Church
Community which has since dissolved.
(d) Both the Westmeadows land and then the Mickleham land have been used for a
local church under the auspices of a hierarchical
church.
(e) The constitution of the Benevolent Society had objects including to raise
funds, to build a church for the Syrian Orthodox Community,
and to be loyal to
the Patriarch as the Supreme Head of the Syrian Orthodox Church.
(f) The Syrian Orthodox Church is a hierarchical religious organisation, the
essence of which is established by its Constitution , and the operation of bylaws
authorised under it by which local parish communities are managed.
(g) The Mickleham land was voluntarily transferred by the then trustees to the
office of the Patriarch, the effect of which is that
the land was likely held
for the purposes of the maintenance and propagation of the Syriac Orthodox
Christian faith through the Syrian
Orthodox Church of
Antioch. [7]
There
is enough on the material to satisfy me that the original purpose of the trust
is as described in the proposed declaration.
Even if additional or other
purposes could be discerned from the material before me emphasising more local
church community objects,
it is likely that such purposes would significantly
overlap (to the point of being subsumed within) the purpose of the trust as
described
by the proposed declaration.
Administrative
scheme
The
absence of a trust deed or other instrument specifically guiding the decisions
of the trustee can be a recipe for future dispute
in a situation like the
present. It is eminently wise that an administrative scheme to guide the use to
which the trust property
is to be put has been proposed, and sensible that it
has been agreed. It is clear to me that the terms of the administrative scheme
have been carefully crafted to strike an appropriate balance between the
interests of the local community and the broader church.
I am fortified in that
view by the position adopted by the Attorney General.
Change of
trustee
The
proposed change to the trustee, and the consequential vesting orders required to
give effect to the transfer of the property to
the new trustee are
uncontroversial. The replacement trustee is a company limited by a guarantee
with religious objects that are
entirely consistent with the declared purpose of
the trust. It is preferable that the trustee be a body with a local
presence.
Costs orders
Costs
orders are agreed by the parties.
In
the caveat proceeding, the parties seek that there be no orders as to the costs
of that proceeding. I will make those orders.
In
judicial advice proceeding, the Patriarch sought its costs be assessed on an
indemnity basis and paid out of the trust property,
and otherwise no order on
the Attorney-General’s costs. I will make those orders.
In
the trust proceeding, the parties also seek orders for the Patriarch’s
costs as trustee as assessed, and for the costs of
Mr Haddo and the
Attorney-General as fixed, also to be paid out of the trust property. I will
also make those orders. That the
Patriarch and the Attorney-General should have
their costs is uncontroversial.
On
behalf of Mr Haddo it was submitted that the proposed cost orders reflect the
fact that in bringing the primary trust proceeding,
and by lodging the caveat,
Mr Haddo effected a secure administration for the net sale proceeds of the
Mickleham land to be used for
the benefit of the local church community. The
point was also made that in doing so, Mr Haddo had the courage of his
convictions
by giving the undertaking as to damages, and by incurring legal
costs significantly in excess of those proposed to be paid by the
trust. I
accept all of those submissions and I will make the orders as to costs in favour
of Mr Haddo in the terms agreed by the
parties.
---
SCHEDULE
OF PARTIES
S ECI 2023 05295
BETWEEN:
MARCEL HADDO
Plaintiff
- v -
HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST,
SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB
TOMA DAMASCAUS
SYRIA
First Defendant
ESTATE OF JOHN ELIA
Second Defendant
FATHER APHREM AFRAM
Third Defendant
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF VICTORIA
Fourth Defendant
AND BETWEEN:
HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST,
SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB
TOMA DAMASCAUS
SYRIA
Plaintiff by Counterclaim
- v -
MARCEL HADDO
First Defendant by Counterclaim
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF VICTORIA
Second Defendant by Counterclaim
REGISTRAR OF TITLES
Third Defendant by Counterclaim
[1]
His Holiness Moran Mor
Ignatius, Patriarch of Antioch And all the East, Supreme Head of the Universal
Syrian Orthodox Church of Bab
Toma Damascus Syria v Attorney-General of Victoria
[2025] VSC 756 , [54] (Moore J).
[2]
The Attorney-General was
joined by the Patriarch as the second defendant to the counterclaim as a
necessary party. The Attorney-General
raised that Mr Haddo’s failure to
obtain the fiat from the Attorney-General in commencing his proceeding raised a
question
of whether the proceeding was competent. This issue is immaterial as
orders can be made on the Patriarch’s counterclaim to
which there is no
issue about the competency.
[3]
Foris GFS Australia Pty Ltd
v Manivel
[2022] VSC 482 , [39] (Elliott J), citing Patten v Burke
Publishing Co Ltd
[1991] 2 All ER 821 , 823 (Millett J) and Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd
(2006) 236 ALR
665 , 680–681 [58]–[59]. See also Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v EDirect Pty Ltd (in liq)
[2012] FCA 976 , [39] (Reeves
J).
[4]
F. Maxwell Bradshaw, The
Law of Charitable Trusts in Australia (Butterworths, 1983) 167; Jean
Warburton et al, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 9 th
ed, 2003) [10.043]. See also Re Buckhurst
[1911] VicLawRp 1 ;
[1911] VLR 61 , 66-9 (Cussen J);
Permanent Trustee Co v New South Wales (Supreme Court of New South
Wales), Santow J, 23 November 1995, 3-4; Ubiparipovic v Vucicevic
[2018]
NSWSC 1583 , [8] (Slattery J); Smolonogov v Our Lady of Kazan Russian
Community of Lidcombe Inc
[2020] NSWSC 1484 , [28] (Rein J).
[5]
Attorney-General (Vic) v St
John Prodromos Greek Orthodox Community Inc
[2000] VSC 12 , [97], [119]-[120]
(Mandie J); Radmanovich v Nedeljkovic
[2001] NSWSC 492 ;
(2001) 52 NSWLR 641 , 667
[149]-[151] (Young CJ); Bishop Irinej v Free Serbian Orthodox Church, Diocese
for Australia and New Zealand Property Trust
[2015] NSWSC 637 , [81] (White
J).
[6]
See Estate of Chaddock
[2025] NSWSC 463 , [47] (Richmond J).
[7]
See for example Re Delany
[1902] 2 Ch 642 , 646 (Farwell J).
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