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Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius [2026] VSC 420 (26 June 2026)

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Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius [2026] VSC 420 (26 June 2026) AustLII Search Supreme Court of Victoria Search AustLII ▼ Search Options All databases This database only Full text Titles only Advanced Search… Search term: × Close About Contact Copyright & Usage Privacy Disclaimers Feedback Help Type Cases Jurisdiction Victoria Database Supreme Court of Victoria Year 2026 Citation [2026] VSC 420 All Databases Cases & Legislation Journals & Scholarship Law Reform Treaties Libraries Communities LawCite Australia CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA New Zealand Specific Year Any 2015 Year Range 1970 2015 2015 2015 Apply --> Any Any 2026 --> Any 2015 2014 2013 --> Any 2015 2014 2013 --> Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius [2026] VSC 420 (26 June 2026) Last Updated: 26 June 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted COMMON LAW DIVISION TRUSTS, EQUITY AND PROBATE LIST S ECI 2023 05295 S ECI 2024 02107 S ECI 2025 04523 BETWEEN: MARCEL HADDO Plaintiff v HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST, SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB TOMA DAMASCUS SYRIA (according to the attached Schedule of Parties) Defendants AND BETWEEN: HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST, SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB TOMA DAMASCUS SYRIA Plaintiff by Counterclaim v MARCEL HADDO (according to the attached Schedule of Parties) Defendants by Counterclaim --- JUDGE : Finanzio J WHERE HELD : Melbourne DATE OF HEARING : 23 June 2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT : 26 June 2026 CASE MAY BE CITED AS : Haddo v His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius, Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, Supreme Head of the Universal Syrian Orthodox Church of Bab Toma Damascus Syria MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION : [2026] VSC 420 --- CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS – Charitable trusts – Administrative Scheme – Trust Property - the statement of claim and cross claim were substantially resolved at mediation but the Court was required to consider whether to approve an administrative scheme which would allow the trust property to be administered by the church under the control of the new trustee – Where it was agreed before the Court that the trust was a charitable trust – Where a declaration is sought by consent on the original purpose of the charitable trust – Where the need for an administrative scheme was agreed between the parties, including the Attorney-General, and where the text of the administrative scheme had been agreed. --- APPEARANCES : Counsel Solicitors For the Plaintiff Mr T Egan of counsel JHK Legal For the First and Third Defendants Mr S Glacken KC with Mr N Elias of counsel Madison Marcus Law Firm For the Second and Fourth Defendants Dr P Bender of counsel Victorian Government Solicitor HIS HONOUR: The community of Saint Yacoub is a church community of the Syrian Orthodox faith, established in 1979 by the families of the Saint Aphrem Syrian Orthodox Church Community then based in Thornbury. In the same year, the Mar-Yacoub Syrian Orthodox Benevolent Society (‘Benevolent Society’) was formed by a trust deed executed on 11 September 1979 (‘the 1979 trust deed’). An undated constitution of the Benevolent Society describes aspirations common to fledgling migrant communities laying down roots in their newly adopted country. The aspirations for their community build upon their common faith and cultural connection, setting a course for the establishment of community facilities as a framework within which those connections could grow. In 1980, the trustees purchased land located in Westmeadows (‘Westmeadows land’) where a church building was established. Mr Haddo has been a member of the community since its inception and was one of the original trustees under the 1979 trust deed. In the 1990s, the Westmeadows land was sold and the proceeds were used, along with donations and loans, to purchase 17 hectares of land located at 75 Whites Lane, Mickleham (‘the Mickleham land’). A church was constructed on the Mickleham land, which serves the local church community to the present day. In 1995, Mr Haddo, with two other trustees, transferred the title of the Mickleham land to the supreme head of the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch, His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius, Patriarch and all the East, Supreme Head of the Universal Syrian Orthodox Church of Bab Toma Damascus Syria (‘the Patriarch’). The Mickleham land, being located in a part of Melbourne earmarked for urban expansion and residential subdivision, was later subdivided. In July 2023, part of the land was sold to a development company for a sum exceeding $30 million. A dispute arose between Mr Haddo and the Patriarch, as the registered proprietor of the Mickleham land. It was common ground that the land was held by the Patriarch on trust for a charitable purpose. The principal area of dispute between the parties was as to the description of the trust purposes. On the one hand, it was contended by Mr Haddo that the property was transferred to the Patriarch to be held on trust for the benefit of the local community of Saint Yacoub, who had together raised the funds to purchase the land and establish the community. The Patriarch claimed to hold the property on trust for the benefit of the global Church community by right of his succession to the Holy See of the Syrian Orthodox Church (‘the trust proceeding’). Upon the sale of the land, Mr Haddo, no doubt motivated by deeply held views and strong convictions, lodged a caveat over the Mickleham land and gave an undertaking as to damages in the caveat proceeding to preserve his position, resulting in restrictions on the use of the net sale proceeds derived from the Mickleham land pending the outcome of the trust proceeding (‘caveat proceeding’). On 5 December 2025, this Court gave direction in a judicial advice application that there was a sufficient factual basis to justify the Patriarch defending the trust proceeding and prosecuting a counterclaim (‘judicial advice proceeding’). [1] It is unnecessary to recite the detailed claims made in each proceeding. Following mediation, the parties executed a deed of settlement settling the trust proceeding and the caveat proceeding subject to the Court making orders that give effect to those terms. The parties seek orders disposing of the trust proceeding which may be summarised as follows: (a) a declaration that the land is held by the Patriarch upon a charitable trust having as its purpose the maintenance and propagation of the Syriac Orthodox Christian faith through the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch; (b) the removal of the Patriarch as trustee, and in their place, the appointment of a company limited by guarantee to operate as a corporate trustee with objects to promote the Syrian Orthodox religion, in whom the title to the Mickleham land is to be vested; (c) an order pursuant to the Court’s general law jurisdiction empowering the newly appointed trustee to apply the trust property and to carry out the purpose of the trust in accordance with an administrative scheme to be approved by the Court the terms of which have been negotiated by and agreed by the parties; and (d) that costs be paid on an agreed basis from the trust proceeds. In the caveat proceeding orders are sought releasing Mr Haddo from his undertaking as to damages, and vacating the earlier orders of the Court preserving and restricting the use of the proceeds from the sale of part of the Mickleham land, with no orders as to costs. At a hearing on 23 June 2026 the parties relied upon a short statement of facts, material contained in affidavits tendered without objection, and the deed of settlement executed between the parties. The principal submissions were made on behalf of the Patriarch, which were adopted by Mr Haddo, with one small exception of no apparent consequence to the outcome. Counsel for the Attorney-General appeared to confirm that the Attorney-General also consented to the orders disposing of the trust proceedings. [2] The detailed written and oral submissions of the parties were of great assistance. I have read those submissions and the material tendered by agreement in support of the applications. The submissions advance the reasons why I should be satisfied that the orders proposed should be made. These proceedings arise out of complex disputes between the parties concerning valuable property and how it should be applied. If the proceedings were to continue as a contested trial, the Court would be required to determine a substantial number of factual issues. The settlement which has been reached avoids significant expenditure on legal costs by all parties. Taken as a package the settlement provides for the application of the trust funds or trust property for the advancement of the purposes of the Syrian Orthodox Church by facilitating the future development of the Mickleham land for the local community of Saint Yacoub. The terms of settlement and proposed orders would have the effect of establishing a clearly stated purpose for the trust and a carefully articulated administrative scheme for dealing with its property. It is self-evident from the detail of this settlement that it has been negotiated carefully by the parties with the assistance of experienced counsel and the solicitors instructing them to produce a compromise to which the Attorney-General has consented. That consensus by itself is an important factor militating in favour of approval. I am persuaded by the submissions and briefly summarise my reasons as follows. Declaration Where parties seek final dispositive orders by consent the Court needs to be satisfied that there is a proper basis for the orders. The same caution applies to the grant of declaratory relief by consent. Caution is especially necessary in declaratory proceedings because of the potential for the relief to affect those who are not parties to the proceeding. In this case, that concern is alleviated, if not eliminated, by the fact that the relief sought is supported by an agreed statements of fact or admissions arrived at between parties who were initially in dispute, and have since reached agreement on the terms of declaratory relief to quell that dispute. While the traditional view might have been that declaratory orders could only be made on evidence in the presence of contradicter, modern authority supports the view that declaratory relief is available where – as here – a claim is first met with opposition, but the initial dispute is resolved by the terms of a declaration agreed by the parties. The utility of declaratory relief in quelling a dispute in this way is well recognised. [3] The parties in this case seek relief by agreement on the strength of the combined effect of: (a) the settlement deed itself – which contains the admissions that support the making of the declaration sought; (b) the short statement of agreed facts which is tendered (without any controversy relevant to the outcome) and which has been agreed between parties which until now have been locked in a complex dispute; and (c) the presence and consent of the Attorney-General to the proposed compromise – indeed, counsel for the Attorney-General appeared at the hearing and made oral submissions to the effect that she found the material to be a satisfactory basis upon which the declaration could be made. There is authority and academic discussion which supports the contention that it is necessary to obtain the consent of the Attorney-General to settle proceedings involving charitable trusts. [4] It was submitted for the Patriarch that this may overstate the position. Even if that is so, and the correct position is no higher than that the consent of the Attorney-General might be required before proceedings of this kind can be settled by agreement, in this case the consent has been expressly given. The parties submit that I should be satisfied that this is a case where declaratory orders should be made for the reasons set out in para [60] of the Patriarch’s submissions, which I set out for completeness: (a) the consent is as between the active parties in the trust proceeding and the caveat proceeding and that the Attorney-General appears in the trust proceeding in her role as protector of charities; (b) the settlement deed between the active parties sets out the basis for the final relief, including the declaratory relief, and the Attorney-General agrees with the orders and administrative scheme (VGSO letter 15 June 2026); (c) the final disposition comes after the directions given in the judicial advice proceeding that the Patriarch is justified in defending the claim and prosecuting the counterclaim after hearing from the Attorney-General; and (d) the final relief being sought substantially accords with the relief on the counterclaim which was the subject of the judicial advice. The parties say that if there were doubt about the appropriateness of granting relief without recourse to evidence, they tendered the evidence which they say independently substantiates the orders they seek. On the material before me, I am satisfied that the declaratory relief is appropriate for the reasons advanced by the parties. It is clear that the Mickleham land is held on trust for a charitable purpose. The underlying dispute in the trust proceeding arose from uncertainty as to the precise purposes of the trust, and whether those purposes were confined to the local church community or the broader purpose of the maintenance and propagation of the Syriac Orthodox Christian faith through the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch. To make the declaration sought I must be satisfied that there is sufficient material to support the conclusion that the original purpose of the charitable trust was for the benefit of the maintenance and propagation of the broader faith - not confined to its local manifestation. There is no trust deed dealing specifically with the Mickleham land. Consideration of the donor’s or founder’s intent is required, but in the absence of express statements, intent can be inferred from the use of the land for a church and other circumstances. [5] In this case: (a) The Mickleham land was purchased with donations, loans and the proceeds from the sale of land on which the community established its first church at Westmeadows. (b) The proceeds of the sale of the Westmeadows land were likely the trust property of a charitable trust for religious purposes. The trust likely subsisted over the proceeds of sale of the Westmeadows land when they were deployed to acquire the Mickleham land. [6] (c) The Westmeadows land was purchased by Mr Haddo and two others, as trustees of the Benevolent Society, an auxiliary organisation to the Saint Yacoub Church Community which has since dissolved. (d) Both the Westmeadows land and then the Mickleham land have been used for a local church under the auspices of a hierarchical church. (e) The constitution of the Benevolent Society had objects including to raise funds, to build a church for the Syrian Orthodox Community, and to be loyal to the Patriarch as the Supreme Head of the Syrian Orthodox Church. (f) The Syrian Orthodox Church is a hierarchical religious organisation, the essence of which is established by its Constitution , and the operation of bylaws authorised under it by which local parish communities are managed. (g) The Mickleham land was voluntarily transferred by the then trustees to the office of the Patriarch, the effect of which is that the land was likely held for the purposes of the maintenance and propagation of the Syriac Orthodox Christian faith through the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch. [7] There is enough on the material to satisfy me that the original purpose of the trust is as described in the proposed declaration. Even if additional or other purposes could be discerned from the material before me emphasising more local church community objects, it is likely that such purposes would significantly overlap (to the point of being subsumed within) the purpose of the trust as described by the proposed declaration. Administrative scheme The absence of a trust deed or other instrument specifically guiding the decisions of the trustee can be a recipe for future dispute in a situation like the present. It is eminently wise that an administrative scheme to guide the use to which the trust property is to be put has been proposed, and sensible that it has been agreed. It is clear to me that the terms of the administrative scheme have been carefully crafted to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of the local community and the broader church. I am fortified in that view by the position adopted by the Attorney General. Change of trustee The proposed change to the trustee, and the consequential vesting orders required to give effect to the transfer of the property to the new trustee are uncontroversial. The replacement trustee is a company limited by a guarantee with religious objects that are entirely consistent with the declared purpose of the trust. It is preferable that the trustee be a body with a local presence. Costs orders Costs orders are agreed by the parties. In the caveat proceeding, the parties seek that there be no orders as to the costs of that proceeding. I will make those orders. In judicial advice proceeding, the Patriarch sought its costs be assessed on an indemnity basis and paid out of the trust property, and otherwise no order on the Attorney-General’s costs. I will make those orders. In the trust proceeding, the parties also seek orders for the Patriarch’s costs as trustee as assessed, and for the costs of Mr Haddo and the Attorney-General as fixed, also to be paid out of the trust property. I will also make those orders. That the Patriarch and the Attorney-General should have their costs is uncontroversial. On behalf of Mr Haddo it was submitted that the proposed cost orders reflect the fact that in bringing the primary trust proceeding, and by lodging the caveat, Mr Haddo effected a secure administration for the net sale proceeds of the Mickleham land to be used for the benefit of the local church community. The point was also made that in doing so, Mr Haddo had the courage of his convictions by giving the undertaking as to damages, and by incurring legal costs significantly in excess of those proposed to be paid by the trust. I accept all of those submissions and I will make the orders as to costs in favour of Mr Haddo in the terms agreed by the parties. --- SCHEDULE OF PARTIES S ECI 2023 05295 BETWEEN: MARCEL HADDO Plaintiff - v - HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST, SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB TOMA DAMASCAUS SYRIA First Defendant ESTATE OF JOHN ELIA Second Defendant FATHER APHREM AFRAM Third Defendant ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF VICTORIA Fourth Defendant AND BETWEEN: HIS HOLINESS MORAN MOR IGNATIUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST, SUPREME HEAD OF THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BAB TOMA DAMASCAUS SYRIA Plaintiff by Counterclaim - v - MARCEL HADDO First Defendant by Counterclaim ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF VICTORIA Second Defendant by Counterclaim REGISTRAR OF TITLES Third Defendant by Counterclaim [1] His Holiness Moran Mor Ignatius, Patriarch of Antioch And all the East, Supreme Head of the Universal Syrian Orthodox Church of Bab Toma Damascus Syria v Attorney-General of Victoria [2025] VSC 756 , [54] (Moore J). [2] The Attorney-General was joined by the Patriarch as the second defendant to the counterclaim as a necessary party. The Attorney-General raised that Mr Haddo’s failure to obtain the fiat from the Attorney-General in commencing his proceeding raised a question of whether the proceeding was competent. This issue is immaterial as orders can be made on the Patriarch’s counterclaim to which there is no issue about the competency. [3] Foris GFS Australia Pty Ltd v Manivel [2022] VSC 482 , [39] (Elliott J), citing Patten v Burke Publishing Co Ltd [1991] 2 All ER 821 , 823 (Millett J) and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 , 680–681 [58]–[59]. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EDirect Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 976 , [39] (Reeves J). [4] F. Maxwell Bradshaw, The Law of Charitable Trusts in Australia (Butterworths, 1983) 167; Jean Warburton et al, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 9 th ed, 2003) [10.043]. See also Re Buckhurst [1911] VicLawRp 1 ; [1911] VLR 61 , 66-9 (Cussen J); Permanent Trustee Co v New South Wales (Supreme Court of New South Wales), Santow J, 23 November 1995, 3-4; Ubiparipovic v Vucicevic [2018] NSWSC 1583 , [8] (Slattery J); Smolonogov v Our Lady of Kazan Russian Community of Lidcombe Inc [2020] NSWSC 1484 , [28] (Rein J). [5] Attorney-General (Vic) v St John Prodromos Greek Orthodox Community Inc [2000] VSC 12 , [97], [119]-[120] (Mandie J); Radmanovich v Nedeljkovic [2001] NSWSC 492 ; (2001) 52 NSWLR 641 , 667 [149]-[151] (Young CJ); Bishop Irinej v Free Serbian Orthodox Church, Diocese for Australia and New Zealand Property Trust [2015] NSWSC 637 , [81] (White J). [6] See Estate of Chaddock [2025] NSWSC 463 , [47] (Richmond J). [7] See for example Re Delany [1902] 2 Ch 642 , 646 (Farwell J). 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